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



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THE

POLITICIAN's CREED;

OR,

POLITICAL EXTRACTS:

BEING

AN ANSWER TO THESE QUESTIONS,

What is the beſt Form of Government?

AND

What is the beſt Adminiſtration of a Government?

BY A LOVER OF SOCIAL ORDER.

VOL. I.

There are three things which *every one* preſumes to know, whether he has ſtudied them or not, viz. MEDICINE, POLITICS, and THE ART OF MENDING A DULL FIRE.

DR. BEDDOES.

LONDON:
Printed for ROBINSONS, Paternoſter-Row; T. COX, St. Thomas's-ſtreet, Borough; DILLY in the Poultry; MURRAY and HIGHLEY, Fleet-ſtreet; RICHARDSON, Cornhill; WHITE, Fleet-ſtreet; BECKET, and EDWARDS, Pall Mall; HOOKHAM and CARPENTER, Bond-ſtreet; and H. D. SYMONDS, No. 20, Paternoſter-Row.

1799.

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DEDICATION.

TO

WILLIAM WILBERFORCE, Esq. M.P.

SIR,

My deſign in theſe POLITICAL EXTRACTS, is *impartially to inveſtigate the advantages and diſadvantages of the different forms of Government, which have prevailed previous to the eſtabliſhment of our preſent* HAPPY CONSTITUTION; *and to allege arguments, drawn from the beſt authorities, for giving a preference to* OUR MIXED FORM, *as being moſt favourable to the freedom and permanent happineſs of the governed*; and, I truſt, that my concluſions will appear to you, Sir, and to other minds, equally pure and

unprejudiced, as the fair and honeſt reſult of
comprehenſive and liberal inquiry. I have for
born entering, as I had firſt intended, into th
conſideration of the American and French Re
publics; as the former is an infant ſtate, whei
population and luxury have not yet reached the
limits; and the latter, ſtill continuing a ſtrugg
of contending factions (reſembling much the ur
happy records of ancient republics), has not, anc
perhaps, never will be ſettled, and therefore ca
form no data for reaſoning on modern republican
iſm. In the other volumes I have ventured upo
a truly ſublime ſubject, more ſuited to talen
and virtues, ſuch as you are known to poſſeſ
which is, *the management of a ſtate, ſo as to produ*
the greateſt general ſecurity and happineſs; and i
in this arduous attempt, I may have appeared de
ficient, or much to have erred, I truſt that th
generous heart will excuſe my failure, in con

ſideration of the motives that have actuated my conduct in this inquiry; for I can have no other wiſh but that of approving myſelf both a ſincere patriot and a good ſubject. Wiſhing you, Sir, every ſucceſs in your uniform exertions for the welfare of your country, I have the honour to be,

SIR,

With the utmoſt Eſteem, Veneration, and Reſpect,

Your obedient humble Servant, &c. &c.

December 1, 1798.

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PREFACE.

IT is a *queſtion* with ſeveral, whether there be *any eſſential difference* between *one* FORM OF GOVERNMENT and *another?* or, whether *every* FORM may not become *good* or *bad*, according as it is *well* or *ill adminiſtered?*—Were it once admitted, that ALL *governments* are *alike*, and that the *only* difference conſiſts in the *character* and *conduct of the governors*, moſt *political diſputes* would be at an *end*, and all *zeal* for *one conſtitution* above *another* muſt be eſteemed *mere bigotry* and *folly*.—But, though a friend to *moderation*, I cannot, ſays HUME, forbear condemning this ſentiment, and ſhould be ſorry to think, that *human affairs* admit of *no greater ſtability*, than what they receive from the *caſual humours* and *characters of particular men*.

It is *true*, thoſe who maintain, that the *goodneſs* of *all governments* conſiſts in the *goodneſs* of the *adminiſtration*, may cite many particular inſtances in hiſtory, where the *very ſame government*, in *different hands*, has varied ſuddenly into the two *oppoſite extremes* of *good* and *bad*.—Compare the French government under HENRY IV.—Oppreſſion, levity, artifice, on the part of the *rulers*; faction, ſedition, treachery, rebellion, diſloyalty, on the part of the *ſubjects*: theſe compoſe the character of the former miſerable æra.—But when the patriotic and heroic prince, who ſucceeded, was once firmly ſeated on the throne, the *government*, the *people*, every thing, ſeemed to be *totally changed*; and all from the *difference* of the *temper* and *ſentiments of theſe two ſovereigns*.—Inſtances of *this kind* may be *multiplied*, almoſt *without number*, from *ancient* as well as *modern hiſtory*, *foreign* as well as *domeſtic*.

But here it may be proper to make a *diſtinction*.—All ABSOLUTE GOVERNMENTS muſt very much

much *depend* on the *adminiſtration*; and this is *one* of the *greateſt inconveniences* attending that *form* of *government*.—But a REPUBLICAN or MIXED GOVERNMENT would be an *obvious abſurdity*, if the particular *checks* and *controuls*, provided by *the conſtitution*, had really *no influence*, and made it not the *intereſt*, even of *bad men*, to *act* for the *public good*.—Such is the *intention* of theſe *forms* of government, and ſuch is their REAL EFFECT, where they are WISELY CONSTITUTED: as, on the *other hand*, they are the *ſource of all diſorder*, and of the *blackeſt crimes*, where either *ſkill* or *honeſty* has been *wanting* in their original *frame* and *inſtitution* *.

So *great* is the *force* of *laws*, and of particular *forms* of *government*, and ſo *little dependence* have they on the *humours* and *tempers* of men, that *conſequences* almoſt as *general* and *certain* may ſome-

* The preſent conſtitution in France can hardly be called a *mixed form* of government, it has no balance of intereſts and powers.—It is a *pure republic*, although *repreſentative*, and a ſad example of the truth of the above remark.

times

In the POLISH government *every nobleman*, by means of his fiefs, has a *diſtinct* hereditary authority over his vaſſals, and the *whole body* has no authority but what it receives from the concurrence of its parts.

The different operations and tendencies of theſe two ſpecies of government might be made apparent even a priori.—A VENETIAN nobility is *preferable* to a POLISH, let the *humours* and *education* of men be ever ſo much *varied.*—A *nobility*, who poſſeſs their power in *common*, will preſerve peace and order, both among themſelves, and their ſubjects; and no member can have authority enough to controul the laws for a moment.—The *nobles* will preſerve their authority over the people, but without any grievous tyranny, or any breach of private property; becauſe ſuch a tyrannical government promotes not the intereſt of the whole body, however it may that of *ſome individuals.*—There will be a diſtinction of rank between the nobility and people, but this will be

the

the only diſtinction in the ſtate.—The *whole nobility* will form *one body*, and the whole *people another*, without any of thoſe *private feuds* and *animoſities*, which ſpread *ruin* and *deſolation every* where.—It is eaſy to ſee the *diſadvantages* of a POLISH nobility in *every one* of *theſe particulars*.

It is poſſible ſo to conſtitute a FREE GOVERNMENT, as that *a ſingle perſon*, call him *doge*, *prince*, or *king*, who ſhall poſſeſs a *large ſhare of power*, ſhall form a proper *balance* or *counterpoiſe* to the other parts of the legiſlature.—*This chief magiſtrate* may be either *elective* or *hereditary*; and though the *former* inſtitution may, to a *ſuperficial view*, appear the *moſt advantageous*, yet a *more accurate inſpection* will diſcover in it *greater inconveniences* than in the *latter*, and ſuch as are founded on cauſes and principles eternal and immutable.—THE FILLING OF THE THRONE, IN SUCH A GOVERNMENT, IS A POINT OF TOO GREAT AND TOO GENERAL INTEREST, NOT TO

DIVIDE THE WHOLE PEOPLE INTO FACTIONS: WHENCE A CIVIL WAR, THE GREATEST OF ILLS, MAY BE APPREHENDED, ALMOST WITH CERTAINTY, UPON EVERY VACANCY.—The *prince elected* muſt be either a *foreigner* or a *native: the* former *will be ignorant of the people whom he is to govern; ſuſpicious of his new ſubjects, and ſuſpected by them; giving his confidence entirely to ſtrangers, who will have no other care but that of enriching themſelves in the quickeſt manner, while their maſter's favour and authority are able to ſupport them.*—*A* native *will carry into the throne all his private animoſities and friendſhips, and will never be viewed in his elevation, without exciting the ſentiment of envy in thoſe, who formerly conſidered him as their equal.* —Not to mention, that a *crown is too high a reward ever to be given to merit alone,* and will always induce the candidates to employ *force,* or *money,* or *intrigue,* to procure the votes of the electors: ſo that *ſuch an election* will give no *better chance* for *ſuperior* merit in the prince, than

if

if the ſtate had truſted to *birth alone* for determining *their ſovereign.*

It may therefore be pronounced as an *univerſal* axiom in politics, THAT AN HEREDITARY PRINCE, A NOBILITY WITHOUT VASSALS, AND A PEOPLE VOTING BY THEIR REPRESENTATIVES, FORM THE BEST MONARCHY, ARISTOCRACY, AND DEMOCRACY.—But in order to *prove* more fully that POLITICS ADMIT OF GENERAL TRUTHS, which are *unchangeable* by the *humour* or *education* either of *ſubject* or *ſovereign*, it may not be amiſs to obſerve ſome other *principles* of this ſcience, which may ſeem to deſerve *that character.*

There are two great tyrannies, the tyranny of a *deſpot*, and that of a *multitude.*—Of theſe the moſt dreadful is *republican tyranny.*—The *deſpot* may receive the juſt blow, and fall from his high elevation, nothing is required but the arm of a Brutus: but the deſtruction of the *many-headed monſter* is an Herculean labour.

In *deſpotic ſtates*, as well as in *republics*, the downfall of the miniſters of government is uſually effected by the death of the parties.—In the *former*, they quietly yield up their breath; in the *latter*, the ſtruggle is attended with a dreadful convulſion, and the ſuperiour faction gains the aſcendancy after a mighty carnage.

Situated *between* the *two* ſtands, *our* MIXED FORM of GOVERNMENT, a GOVERNMENT *nicely poiſed between*, THE EXTREMES of TOO MUCH LIBERTY and TOO MUCH POWER, where an unſucceſsful and improvident miniſter is diſplaced without the loſs of life, and the murder of friends, and where the ſeveral parts of the CONSTITUTIONS are ſo framed, that they ſerve as a check to each other; a CONSTITUTION, where the king is clothed with a power, that enables him to do all the good he has a mind to; and wants no degree of authority, but what a good prince would not, and an ill one ought not to have: where he governs, though not abſolute-

ly, yet gloriouſly, becauſe he governs men, and not ſlaves; and is obeyed by them cheerfully, becauſe they know that, in obeying him, they obey thoſe laws only which they themſelves have had a ſhare in contriving.

It is undoubtedly very natural for men to think *that form* of *government* the beſt, under which they draw their firſt breath, and to propoſe it as a model and ſtandard for all others.—But, if any people upon earth have a juſt title thus to boaſt, it is *we* of *this iſland*; who enjoy a CONSTITUTION, *wiſely moulded, out of all the different forms and kinds of civil government, into ſuch an excellent and happy frame, as contains in it all the advantages of their ſeveral forms, without ſharing in any of their great inconveniencies.*

Our MIXED FORM of GOVERNMENT is authorized by lawyers, admired by ſtrangers, recommended by divines, acknowledged by politicians, acquieſced in, nay paſſionately cheriſhed, by

by the people in general; and all this during a period of at leaſt a *hundred* and *eighty years*.—This general conſent ſurely, during ſo long a time, muſt be ſufficient to render any conſtitution legal and valid: if the origin of all power be derived, as is alledged, from the people; here is *their conſent* in the fulleſt and moſt ample terms that can be derived or imagined.—We muſt be all ſenſible that the plan of liberty is ſettled; its happy effects are proved by experience; a long tract of time has given it ſtability.—We muſt be ſenſible, that public liberty, with internal peace and order, has flouriſhed almoſt without interruption: trade and manufactures, and agriculture, have increaſed: the arts and ſciences, and philoſophy, have been cultivated.—Even religious parties have been neceſſitated to lay aſide their mutual rancour: and the glory of the nation has ſpread itſelf over Europe; derived equally from our progreſs in the arts of peace, and from our valour in war.—*So long and ſo glorious a period no nation almoſt can boaſt of: nor is there another inſtance in the whole hiſ-*

tory

tory of mankind, that ſo many millions of people have, during ſuch a ſpace of time, been held together, in a manner ſo free, ſo rational, and ſo ſuitable to the dignity of human nature.

Legiſlators, therefore, ought not to *truſt* the *government* of a ſtate entirely to *chance*, but ought to *provide* a *ſyſtem of laws* to *regulate who are to adminiſter public affairs* to the *lateſt poſterity*.—*Effects* will always correſpond *to cauſes*; *and wiſe regulations in any commonwealth are the moſt valuable legacy that can be left to future ages*.—In the *ſmalleſt court* or *office*, the *ſtated forms* and *methods*, by which *buſineſs muſt be conducted*, are *found* to be a *conſiderable check* on the *natural depravity of mankind*.—Why ſhould not the caſe be the ſame in *public affairs*?—Can we aſcribe the *ſtability* and *wiſdom* of our MIXED CONSTITUTION, through ſo many ages, to *any thing* but the *form* of *government*?—And is it not eaſy to point out *thoſe defects* in the ORIGINAL CONSTITUTION, which produced the *tumultuous governments* of ATHENS and of ROME,

Rome, and *ended* at laſt in the *ruin* of theſe two famous *republics?*

HERE, THEN, IS A SUFFICIENT INDUCEMENT TO MAINTAIN, WITH THE UTMOST ZEAL, THOSE FORMS AND INSTITUTIONS, BY WHICH LIBERTY IS SECURED, THE PUBLIC GOOD CONSULTED, AND THE AVARICE OR AMBITION OF PARTICULAR MEN RESTRAINED.

PART I.

POLITICAL DISQUISITIONS

ON THE

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES

OF

DIFFERENT GOVERNMENTS.

ORIGIN OF GOVERNMENTS.

SECT. I.

PATERNAL AUTHORITY;

OR,

FIRST STAGE OF SOCIETY.

AMONG ſavages, who are ſtrangers to the art of writing, and who have ſcarcely any method of recording facts, the experience and obſervation of each individual are almoſt the only means of procuring knowledge; and the only perſons who can attain a ſuperior degree of wiſdom and ſagacity, are thoſe who have lived to a conſiderable age.—In all barbarous countries *old men* are therefore univerſally reſpected, and attain ſuperior influence and authority.

Among the *Grecians*, at the ſiege of Troy, the man who had lived three ages was treated with uncommon deference, and was their principal adviſer and director in all important deliberations.

" Doſt thou not ſee, O Gaul," ſays MORNI, in one of the poems of Oſſian, " how the ſteps of my age are " honoured? MORNI moves forth, and the young meet " him with reverence, and turn their eyes, with ſilent " joy, on his courſe *."

The *Jewiſh lawgiver*, whoſe ſyſtem of laws was, in many reſpects, accommodated to the circumſtances of an early people, has thought proper to enforce the reſpect due to old age, by making it even the ſubject of a particular precept.—" See that thou riſe up before the hoary " head, and honour the face of the old man †."

So inſeparably connected are age and authority in early periods, that in the language of rude nations the ſame word which ſignifies an *old man* is generally employed to denote a *ruler* or *magiſtrate* ‡.

Among the *Chineſe*, who, from their little intercourſe with ſtrangers, are remarkably attached to their ancient uſages, the art of writing, notwithſtanding their improvement in manufactures, is ſtill beyond the reach of the vulgar.—This people have accordingly preſerved that

* Vide the Poem of Oſſian by Macpherſon.

† Leviticus, chap. xix. ver. 32.

‡ In the language of the Arabs, ſee D'Arvieux trav. Arab.—This alſo is the caſe in the German and moſt of the modern languages of Europe.

high

high admiration of the advantages ariſing from *long experience* and *obſervation*, which we commonly meet with in times of ignorance and ſimplicity.—Among them, neither birth, nor riches, nor honours, nor dignities, can make a man forget that reverence which is due to *grey hairs*; and we are told, that the ſovereign himſelf never fails to reſpect *old age*, even in perſons of the loweſt condition *.

We may eaſily imagine that this admiration and reverence, which is excited by wiſdom and knowledge, muſt, in a particular manner, affect the *conduct* of *children* with reſpect to their father.—The experience of the father muſt always appear greatly ſuperior to that of his children, and becomes the more remarkable, according as he advances in years, and decays in bodily ſtrength.—He is placed in a ſituation where that experience is conſtantly diſplayed to them, and where, being exerted for their preſervation and welfare, it is regarded in the moſt favourable light.—From him they learn thoſe contrivances which they make uſe of in procuring their food, and the various ſtratagems which they put in practice againſt their enemies.—By him they are inſtructed in the

* The art of printing and writing has greatly tended to aboliſh this reſpect in more enlightened countries.

different branches of their domeſtic œconomy, and are directed what meaſures to purſue in all thoſe difficulties and diſtreſſes in which they may be involved.—They hear, with wonder, the exploits he hath performed, and the precautions which he hath uſed in former times to avoid the evils with which he was ſurrounded, or the addreſs and dexterity which he hath employed to extricate himſelf from thoſe misfortunes which had befallen him; and, from his obſervation of the paſt, they are enabled to learn uſeful leſſons of prudence, for the regulation of their future conduct and behaviour.—If ever they depart from his counſel, and follow their own headſtrong inclination, they are commonly taught by the event to repent of their folly and raſhneſs, and are ſtruck with new admiration of that uncommon penetration and foreſight which he appears to poſſeſs.—They look upon him as a ſuperior being, and imagine that the gifts of fortune are at his diſpoſal.—They dread his curſe, as the cauſe of every misfortune; and they eſteem his bleſſing of more value than the richeſt inheritance.

In the Iliad, when PHENIX is ſent on a meſſage to Achilles, he bewails his misfortune in having no children

dren of his own, and imputes it to the curſe of his father, which he had incurred in his youth.

> My ſire with curſes loads my hated head,
> And cries, "Ye furies! barren be his bed!"
> Infernal JOVE, the vengeful fiends below,
> And ruthleſs PROSERPINE confirmed his vow.
>
> HOMER.

"And ESAU ſaid unto his father, Haſt thou but one "bleſſing, my father? Bleſs me, even me alſo, O! my "father.—And ESAU lift up his voice and wept *."

To theſe obſervations we may add, that the authority of the father is confirmed and rendered more univerſal, by the force and influence of *cuſtom*.

We naturally retain, after we are old, thoſe habits of reſpect and ſubmiſſion which we received in our youth; and we find it difficult to put ourſelves upon a level with thoſe perſons whom we have long regarded as greatly our ſuperiors.—The ſlave, who has been bred up in a low ſituation, does not immediately, upon obtaining his freedom, lay aſide thoſe ſentiments which he has been accuſtomed to feel.—He retains for ſome time the idea of his former dependence; and, notwithſtanding the change of his circumſtances, is diſpoſed to con-

* Geneſis, xxvii. 38.

tinue

tinue that reſpect and reverence which he owed to his maſter.—We find, that the legiſlature, in ſome countries, has even regarded and enforced theſe natural ſentiments.—Among the *Romans* a freed man was, through the whole of his life, obliged to pay to his patron what was called "*obſequium et reverentia*;" and which conſiſted in attendance upon him on public occaſions, and in ſhewing him certain marks of honour and diſtinction. —If ever he failed in the obſervance of theſe duties, he was thought unworthy of his liberty, and was again reduced to be the ſlave of that perſon to whom he had behaved in ſo unbecoming a manner *.

A ſon, who has been accuſtomed from his infancy to ſerve and to obey his father, is in the ſame manner diſpoſed *for the future* to continue that ſervice and obedience.—Even after he is grown up, and has arrived at his full ſtrength of body, and maturity of judgment, he retains the early impreſſions of his youth, and remains, in a great meaſure, under the yoke of that authority to which he hath hitherto ſubmitted.—He ſhrinks at the angry countenance of his father, and trembles at the power of that arm whoſe ſevere diſcipline he has ſo often

* Vide Heineccii antiq. Roman. lib. 9. ſect. 1. Dig. de op. lib. ſect. 1. Inſt. de cap. deminut. l. un. Cod. de ingrat. liber.

expe-

experienced, and of whoſe valour and dexterity he has ſo often been a witneſs.—He thinks it the higheſt preſumption to diſpute the wiſdom and propriety of thoſe commands to which he has always liſtened, as to an oracle, and which he has been taught to regard as the infallible rule of his conduct.—He is naturally led to acquieſce in that juriſdiction which he has ſeen exerted on ſo many different occaſions, and which he finds to be uniformly acknowledged by all the members of the family.—In proportion to the ſeverity and rigour with which he is treated, his habits of ſubmiſſion become the ſtronger, and his implicit obedience is eſteemed the more indiſpenſably neceſſary.—He looks upon his father as inveſted by heaven with an unlimited power and authority over all his children; and imagines that, whatever they may ſuffer from his arbitrary conduct, their rebellion againſt him, or reſiſtance to his will, would be the ſame ſpecies of impiety, as to call in queſtion the authority of the Deity, or to quarrel with thoſe ſevere diſpenſations of Providence with which, in the government of the world, he is ſometimes pleaſed to viſit his creatures.

From theſe diſpoſitions, which commonly prevail among the members of his family, the father can have

no

no difficulty to enforce his orders, wherever compulſion may be neceſſary.—In order to correct the depravity, or to ſubdue the unruly temper of any ſingle child, he can make uſe of that influence which he poſſeſſes over the reſt, who will regard the unnatural behaviour of their brother with horror and deteſtation, and be ready to contribute their aſſiſtance in reducing him to obedience, or in puniſhing his tranſgreſſion.

In the hiſtory of early nations, and even of thoſe which have made ſome advances in refinement, we meet with a great variety of *facts* to illuſtrate the *nature* and *extent* of *that juriſdiction and authority which originally belonged to the father, as the head and governor of his family.*

We are told, by CÆSAR, that among the *Gauls* the father had the power of life and death over his children *; and there is reaſon to believe, that, among the ancient *German nations*, he was inveſted with the ſame unlimited juriſdiction †.

According to the cuſtoms which took place among the early inhabitants of *Arabia*, it would ſeem, that, in like manner, the father was under no reſtraint in the

* Cæſ. de bell. Gall. lib. 6.

† See Heineccius elem. jur. German.

niſtration and government of his family.—When the ſons of JACOB propoſed to carry their brother BENJAMIN along with them into Egypt, and their father diſcovered an unwillingneſs to part with him, "REUBEN ſpake unto his father, ſaying, Slay my two ſons, "if I bring him not to thee: deliver him into my "hand, and I will bring him to thee again *."

Among the *Tartars*, nothing can exceed the reſpect and reverence which the children uſually pay to their father.—They look upon him as the ſovereign lord and maſter of his family, and conſider it as their duty to ſerve him upon all occaſions.—In thoſe parts of Tartary which have any intercourſe with the great nations of Aſia, it is alſo common for the father to ſell his children of both ſexes; and from thence the women and eunuchs, in the harams and ſeraglios belonging to men of wealth and diſtinction in thoſe countries, are ſaid to be frequently procured †.

Upon the coaſt of *Africa*, the power of the father is carried to the moſt exceſſive pitch, and exerciſed with the utmoſt ſeverity.—It is too well known to be denied,

* Geneſis, xlii. 37.

† Hiſtoire generale des voyages, tom. 9.——Chardin. tom. 1.

that, in order to ſupply the European market, he often diſpoſes of his own children for ſlaves; and that the chief part of a man's wealth is ſuppoſed to conſiſt in the number of his deſcendants.—Upon the ſlave coaſt, the children are accuſtomed to throw themſelves upon their knees, as often as they come into the preſence of their father*.

The following account, which is given by Commodore Byron, may ſerve, in ſome meaſure, to ſhew the ſpirit with which the ſavages of *South America* are apt to govern the members of their family.

Here, ſays he, I muſt relate a little anecdote of our chriſtian Cacique.—He and his wife had gone off, at ſome diſtance from the ſhore, in their canoe, when ſhe dived for ſea-eggs; but not meeting with great ſucceſs, they returned a good deal out of humour.—A little boy of theirs, about five years old, whom they appeared to be doatingly fond of, watching for his father and mother's return, ran into the ſurf to meet them: the father handed a baſket of ſea-eggs to the child, which being too heavy for him to carry, he let it fall; upon which the father jumped out of the ca-

* Hiſtoire generale des voyages, tom. 5. liv. 10. chap. 3.

noe,

nce, and catching the boy up in his arms, daſhed him with the utmoſt violence againſt the ſtones.—The poor little creature lay motionleſs and bleeding, and in that condition was taken up by the mother, but died ſoon after.—No one ſeemed to reprobate the conduct of the father.—He appeared, to the byſtanders, only to exerciſe his right.

Such was the *power* which, in early times, appears to have been uniformly poſſeſſed by the *head of a family*.—But the progreſs of a people in civilization and refinement has a natural tendency to limit and reſtrain this primitive juriſdiction.

In thoſe rude and ſimple periods, when men are chiefly employed in hunting and fiſhing, in paſturing cattle, or in cultivating the ground, the children are commonly brought up in the houſe of their father; and continuing in his family as long as he lives, they have no occaſion to acquire any ſeparate property, but depend entirely for ſubſiſtence upon that hereditary eſtate, of which he is the ſole diſpoſer and manager.—Their ſituation, however, in this as well as in many other reſpects, is greatly altered by the introduction of commerce and manufactures.—In a commercial coun-

try, a great part of the inhabitants are employed in ſuch a manner as tends to diſperſe the members of a family, and often requires that they ſhould live at a diſtance from each other.—The children, in their early youth, are obliged to leave their home, in order to be inſtructed in thoſe trades and profeſſions by which it is propoſed they ſhould earn a livelihood, and afterwards to ſettle in thoſe parts of the country which they find convenient for proſecuting their ſeveral employments.—In conſequence of this they are withdrawn, and in a great meaſure emancipated from their father's authority.—They are now in a condition to procure a maintenance without having recourſe to his bounty, and by their own labour and induſtry are ſometimes advanced to great wealth and opulence.—They live in ſeparate families of their own, of which it is requiſite they ſhould have the entire direction; and being placed at ſuch a diſtance from their father, that he has no longer an opportunity of obſerving and controuling their behaviour, it is to be expected that their former habits will gradually be laid aſide and forgotten *.

WHEN WE EXAMINE THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF POLISHED NATIONS, WE ARE CONFIRM-

* Millar.

ED IN THE TRUTH OF THE FOREGOING REMARKS, AND HAVE REASON TO CONCLUDE, THAT, IN MOST COUNTRIES, THE PATERNAL JURISDICTION HAS BEEN REDUCED WITHIN NARROWER BOUNDS, IN PROPORTION TO THE IMPROVEMENTS OF SOCIETY.

SECT.

SECT. II.

OF THE AUTHORITY OF A CHIEF OVER THE MEMBERS OF A TRIBE OR VILLAGE;

OR,

SECOND STAGE OF SOCIETY.

HAVING conſidered the primitive ſtate of a ſingle family of ſavages, we may now examine the changes which happen in their ſituation, after the death of the father, and the different ſpecies of authority to which they are commonly ſubjected.

When the members of a family become too numerous to be maintained and lodged all in the ſame houſe, ſome of them are under the neceſſity of leaving it, and providing themſelves with a new habitation.—The ſons, having arrived at the age of manhood, and being diſpoſed to marry, are led by degrees to have a ſeparate reſidence, where they may live in a more comfortable manner.—They build their huts very near one to another, and each of them forms a diſtinct family; of which

which he aſſumes the direction, and which he endeavours to ſupply with the means of ſubſiſtence.—Thus the original ſociety is gradually enlarged into a village or tribe; and, according as it is placed in circumſtances which favour population, and render its condition proſperous and flouriſhing, it becomes proportionably extenſive, and is ſubdivided into a greater multiplicity of branches.

From the ſituation of this early community it is natural to ſuppoſe, that an uncommon degree of attachment will ſubſiſt between all the different perſons of which it is compoſed.—As the ordinary life of a ſavage renders him hardy and robuſt, ſo he is a ſtranger to all thoſe conſiderations of utility, by which, in a poliſhed nation, men are commonly induced to reſtrain their appetites, and to abſtain from violating the poſſeſſions of each other.—Different clans or tribes of barbarians are therefore diſpoſed to rob and plunder one another, as often as they have an opportunity of doing it with ſucceſs; and their reciprocal inroads and hoſtilities are the ſource of continual animoſities and quarrels, which are proſecuted with a degree of fury and rancour ſuitable to the temper and diſpoſitions of the people.—Thus the members of every ſingle clan are frequently at variance with

with all their neighbours around them; and are obliged to be conſtantly upon their guard, in order to repel the numerous attacks to which they are expoſed, and to preſerve themſelves from that ſevere and barbarous treatment, which they have reaſon to expect, if they ſhould fall under the power of their enemies.—As they are divided from the reſt of the world, ſo they are linked together by a ſenſe of their common danger, and by a regard to their common intereſt.—They are united in all their paſtimes and amuſements, as well as in their ſerious occupations; and when they go out upon a military enterprize, they are no leſs prompted to ſhew their friendſhip for each other, than to gratify their common paſſions of enmity and reſentment.—As they have been brought up together from their infancy, and have no intercourſe with thoſe of a different community, their affections are raiſed to a greater height, in proportion to the narrowneſs of that circle to which they are confined.—As the uniformity of their life ſupplies them with few occurrences, and as they have no opportunity of acquiring any great variety of knowledge, their thoughts are the more fixed upon thoſe particular objects which have once excited their attention, they retain more ſteadily whatever impreſſions they have received

ceived, and become the more devoted to thoſe entertainments and practices with which they have been familiarly acquainted.

Hence it is, that a ſavage is never, without difficulty, prevailed upon to abandon his family and friends, and to relinquiſh the ſight of thoſe objects to which he has been long familiar.—To be baniſhed from them is reckoned the greateſt of all misfortunes.—His cottage, his fields, the faces and converſation of his kindred and companions, inceſſantly recur to his memory, and prevent him from reliſhing any ſituation where theſe are wanting.—He clings to thoſe well-known objects, and dwells upon all thoſe favourite enjoyments which he has loſt.—The poorer the country in which he has lived, the more wretched the manner of life to which he has been accuſtomed, the loſs of it appears to him the more inſupportable. — That very poverty and wretchedneſs, which contracted the ſphere of his amuſements, is the chief circumſtance that increaſes his attachment to thoſe few gratifications which it afforded, and renders him the more a ſlave to thoſe particular habits which he hath acquired.—Not all the allurements of European luxury could bribe a Hottentot to reſign that coarſe manner of life which was become habitual to him; and we may

remark, that the "maladie du pays," which has been ſuppoſed peculiar to the inhabitants of Switzerland, is more or leſs felt by the inhabitants of all countries, according as they approach nearer to the ages of rudeneſs and ſimplicity.

As thoſe clans or villages, which inhabit the more uncultivated parts of the earth, are almoſt continually at war with their neighbours, and are obliged to be always in a poſture of defence, ſo they have conſtant occaſion for *a leader* to conduct them in the various military enterprizes in which they are engaged.

It may be remarked, that wherever a number of people meet together in order to execute any meaſures of common concern, it is convenient that *ſome perſon* ſhould be appointed to direct their proceedings, and prevent them from running into confuſion.—It is accordingly a general regulation, which appears to be uniformly adopted in all countries, that every public aſſembly ſhould have a *preſident*, inveſted with ſuch a degree of authority as is ſuitable to the nature of the buſineſs committed to their care.—But in no caſe is a regulation of this kind ſo neceſſary, as in the conduct of a military expedition.—There is no ſituation in which a body of men are ſo apt to run into diſorder, as in war; where

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it is impoſſible that they ſhould co-operate, and preſerve the leaſt regularity, unleſs they are united under a *ſingle perſon*, who is impowered to direct their movements, and to ſuperintend and controul their ſeveral operations.

As the members of a family have been uſually conducted by the father in all their excurſions of moment, they are naturally diſpoſed, even when their ſociety becomes more enlarged, to continue in that courſe of action to which they have been accuſtomed; and, after they are deprived of this *common parent*, to fall under the guidance of ſome *other perſon*, who appears next to him in rank, and poſſeſſes the greateſt ſhare of their eſteem and confidence.

Superiority in ſtrength, courage, and other perſonal accompliſhments, is the firſt circumſtance by which any *ſingle perſon* is raiſed to be the *leader of a clan*, and by which he is enabled to maintain his authority.

In thoſe rude periods, when men live by hunting and fiſhing, they have no opportunity of acquiring any conſiderable property; and there are no diſtinctions in the rank of individuals, but thoſe which ariſe from perſonal qualities.

The ſtrongeſt man in a village, the man who excels

in running, in wreſtling, or in handling thoſe weapons which they make uſe of in war, is poſſeſſed of an evident advantage in every conteſt that occurs, and is hereby exalted to ſuperior dignity.—In their games and exerciſes he is generally victorious, and becomes more and more diſtinguiſhed above all his companions.—When they go out to battle, he is placed at their head, and occupies that ſtation which is held of the greateſt importance.—His exploits and feats of activity are viewed with pleaſure and admiration; and he becomes their boaſt and champion in every ſtrife or contention in which they are engaged.—The more they have been accuſtomed to follow his banner, they contract a ſtronger attachment to his perſon, and diſcover more readineſs to execute thoſe meaſures which he thinks proper to ſuggeſt.—They imagine that his greatneſs reflects honour upon the ſociety to which he belongs, and are diſpoſed to magnify his proweſs with that fond partiality which they entertain in favour of themſelves.—According as he advances in reputation, he acquires more weight in their debates, and is treated upon every occaſion with greater reſpect and deference.—As they are afraid of incurring his diſpleaſure, ſo are they eager to diſtinguiſh themſelves in his eye, and, by their valour and fidelity,

to

to procure marks of his peculiar approbation and eſteem. "Illum defendere, tueri, ſua quoque fortia facta gloriæ "ejus aſſignare, præcipuum ſacramentum eſt.—Prin-"cipes pro victoria pugnant, comites pro principe *."

Among the natives in ſome parts of the continent of South America, it is cuſtomary, in their military expeditions, to make choice of that perſon for their leader, who is ſuperior to all his companions in *bodily ſtrength*; and this point is uſually determined according to the burden which he is able to carry †.

* Tacitus de mor. German.

† Nouveaux voyages aux Indes Orientales, tom. iii.—Upon the ſame principle, the captain of an expedition is frequently choſen from the number of wounds he has received in battle. Ibid. tom. i.

It has even been remarked, that all animals which live in herds or flocks are apt to fall under the authority of a ſingle leader of ſuperior ſtrength or courage.—Of this a curious inſtance is mentioned by the author of Commodore Anſon's voyage.—"The largeſt ſea-lion," ſays he, "was the maſter "of the flock; and, from the number of females he kept to himſelf, and his "driving off the males, was ſtiled by the ſeamen the baſhaw.—As they are of "a very lethargic diſpoſition, and are not eaſily awakened, it is obſerved, "that each herd places ſome of their males at a diſtance in the manner of cen-"tinels, who always give the alarm whenever any attempt is made either to "moleſt or approach them, by making a loud grunting noiſe like a hog, or "ſnorting like a horſe in full vigour.—The males had often furious battles "with each other, chiefly about the females; and the baſhaw juſt mentioned, "who was commonly ſurrounded by his females, to which no other male "dared to approach, had acquired that diſtinguiſhed pre-eminence by many "bloody conteſts, as was evident from the numerous ſcars viſible in all parts "of his body."

But

uſually tranſmits his fortune to his poſterity, and along with it all the means of creating dependence which he enjoyed.—Thus the ſon, who inherits the eſtate of his father, is enabled to maintain an equal rank, while, at the ſame time, he preſerves all the influence acquired by the former proprietor, augmented and handed down from one generation to another.

Hence that regard to *genealogy* and *deſcent* which we often meet with among thoſe who have remained long in a paſtoral ſtate.—From the ſimplicity of their manners, they are not apt to ſquander or alienate their poſſeſſions; and the repreſentative of an ancient family is naturally diſpoſed to be oſtentatious of a circumſtance which contributes ſo much to increaſe his power and authority *.

For the ſame reaſon the dignity of the chief, which in a former period was frequently *elective*, is now ſuffered more commonly to paſs from father to ſon by *hereditary ſucceſſion*.—As the chief poſſeſſes the largeſt eſtate, ſo he repreſents the moſt powerful family in the tribe; a family from which all the reſt are vain of being deſcend-

* All the Tartars, of whatever country or religion, have an exact knowledge of the tribe from which they are deſcended, and carefully preſerve the remembrance of it from one generation to another.—Although the tribes are often divided into many branches, each branch is conſidered as belonging to the ſame tribe.—Hiſtoire generale des voyages, tom. ix. liv. 3. chap. 3. p. 33.

ed, and the ſuperiority of which they have been uniformly accuſtomed to acknowledge.—He enjoys not only that rank and conſequence which is derived from his own opulence, but ſeems entitled to the continuance of that reſpect and ſubmiſſion which has been paid to his anceſtors; and it rarely happens that any other perſon, though of ſuperior abilities, is capable of ſupplanting him, or of diverting the courſe of that influence which has flowed ſo long in the ſame channel, and has become ſo irreſiſtible by cuſtom.

As the chief man, from his experience, wiſdom, and wealth, is naturally engaged in protecting and ſecuring the members of his tribe from the hoſtile attacks of their neighbours, ſo he endeavours to prevent thoſe diſorders and quarrels which may ſometimes ariſe among themſelves, and which tend to weaken and diſturb the ſociety.—When a diſpute or controverſy happens among thoſe who belong to different families, he readily interpoſes by his good offices, in order to bring about a reconciliation between the parties; who at the ſame time, if they chooſe to avoid an open rupture, may probably be willing to terminate their difference by referring it to his judgment.—In order to render his deciſions effectual, he finds it neceſſary, at firſt, to employ perſuaſion and

THUS IT WAS, THAT, UPON THE RUINS OF THE WESTERN EMPIRE, THERE AROSE IN EVERY PROVINCE PARTICULAR CHIEFS OR BARONS, WHO LIVED IN SEPARATE DISTRICTS, INDEPENDENT OF ONE ANOTHER, AND EACH OF WHOM PROCURED A NUMBER OF VASSALS OR MILITARY TENANTS, AND BECAME GREAT AND POWERFUL IN PROPORTION TO THE ESTATE WHICH HE POSSESSED.—THIS APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN THE FIRST STEP TOWARD THE INTRODUCTION OF THAT SYSTEM OF FEUDAL GOVERNMENT, WHICH WAS AFTERWARDS ESTABLISHED AND SOON BROUGHT TO PERFECTION IN MOST OF THE COUNTRIES OF EUROPE.

SECT. III.

THE ORIGIN OF DIFFERENT KINDS OF GOVERNMENT;

OR,

THE MORE ADVANCED STAGE OF SOCIETY.

THE improvement of agriculture, as it increaſes the quantity of proviſions, and renders particular clans or tribes more numerous and flouriſhing, ſo it obliges them at length to ſend out colonies to a diſtance, who occupy new ſeats wherever they can find a convenient ſituation, and are formed into ſeparate villages, after the model of thoſe with which they were formerly acquainted.—Thus, in proportion as a country is better cultivated, it comes to be inhabited by a greater number of diſtinct ſocieties, whether derived from the ſame or from a different original, agreeing in their manners, and reſembling each other in their government and inſtitutions.

Theſe different communities being frequently at war, and being expoſed to continual invaſions from their

their neighbours, are in many caſes determined, by the conſideration of their mutual intereſt, to unite againſt their common enemies, and to form a variety of combinations, which are more or leſs permanent, according as they are influenced by particular circumſtances.—Thoſe people who have found the advantage of joining their forces in one expedition, are naturally diſpoſed to continue the like aſſociation in another, and by degrees are encouraged to enter into a general defenſive alliance.—The intercourſe which they have maintained in *war*, is not entirely diſſolved even in time of *peace*.—Though originally ſtrangers to each other, yet, having many opportunities of aſſembling in their military enterprizes, they cannot fail to contract an acquaintance, which becomes the ſource of their future correſpondence.—They have frequent opportunities of meeting in their common ſports and diverſions.—The leading men of different villages entertain one another with ruſtic hoſpitality and magnificence; intermarriages begin to take place between their reſpective families; and the various connexions of ſociety are gradually multiplied and extended.

From a ſimple confederacy of this kind, an ARISTOCRATICAL GOVERNMENT is naturally eſtabliſhed.—As

every village, or ſeparate community, is ſubjected to its own leader, it is to be ſuppoſed that, in their joint meaſures, the ſeveral chiefs, when united together, will enjoy an influence correſpondent to that which they have ſeparately acquired over their own particular dependents; and that the frequent meeting and deliberation of thoſe diſtinguiſhed perſonages will at length give riſe to a regular aſſembly, inveſted with power and authority to determine in all the important affairs of the ſociety.

The ſame circumſtances, however, which influence the members of a ſingle clan to be guided by a particular perſon in their ſmaller expeditions, render a ſimilar expedient yet more neceſſary in conducting a numerous army, compoſed of different clans, often diſagreeing in their views, and little connected with each other.—Some ONE LEADER is therefore entruſted with the ſupreme command of their united forces; and the ſame influence, by which he was firſt raiſed to that dignity, enables him frequently to maintain it during *life*, and even in many caſes to render it *hereditary*.—In this manner a GREAT CHIEF or KING is placed at the head of a nation, and claims, by degrees, the inſpection and ſuper-

ſuperintendence of various branches of the public adminiſtration.

But, notwithſtanding the rank and pre-eminence enjoyed by this *primitive ſovereign*, his authority at firſt is far from being conſiderable.—The chiefs, who retain all their original influence over their reſpective tribes, and who are jealous of a ſuperior, are diſpoſed to allow him no higher prerogatives than are requiſite to anſwer the purpoſes for which he was created.—Though, in a day of battle, his power may extend over the whole people, yet on other occaſions it is for the moſt part limited to his own particular clan; and though in the field his orders are not to be diſputed, yet in the council public meaſures are determined by the majority of voices, and the king is little more than the preſident of the meeting.—After the concluſion of an expedition, when the different clans have retired to their ſeparate places of abode, they are almoſt entirely withdrawn from his influence, and live under the protection of their ſeveral leaders, to whoſe juriſdiction and authority they are totally ſubjected.

Such are the uniform accounts which have been given by travellers concerning the government of thoſe kingdoms,

doms, either upon the coaſt of *Africa*, or in the countries belonging to *Aſia*, in which a number of diſtinct tribes or villages are but imperfectly united together *.

But the moſt *noted examples* of that ſpecies of government, which ariſes from the firſt union of different clans, occurs in the early hiſtory of the modern kingdoms of Europe.—It has already been obſerved, that when the *German nations* ſubdued the weſtern empire, the land was divided among a variety of chiefs, or heads of families, who diſtributed a part of their eſtates among their dependents and retainers, over whom they exerciſed an almoſt unlimited authority.—Theſe *barons* were altogether independent of each other, and poſſeſſed a degree of rank and power, in proportion to the number of vaſſals which they were able to maintain.—Their poſſeſſions, which they had obtained by lot, or occupied without oppoſition, were entirely at their diſpoſal, and deſcended to their poſterity by hereditary ſucceſſion. —They acknowledged no ſuperior but the king, to whom they were only liable in military ſervices.

* Hiſtoire generale des voyages, 4to. tom. iv. liv. 8. chap. 3. ſect. 4.—Ibid. tom. v. liv. 9. chap. 7. ſect. 7.—Ibid. liv. 10. chap. 2. 6.—See Callander's collection of voyages, vol. i. p. 67, 68.

The *king*, or *chief*, in all meaſures of importance was obliged to act with the concurrence of an *aſſembly*, compoſed of the *leading men* in the country.—Such were the *ancient parliaments* of France, the *Corts* in Spain, and the *Wittenagemote* in England.—With their advice he determined what enterprizes ſhould be undertaken; and, according to their reſolutions, every *baron* was obliged, under ſevere penalties, to appear in the field at the head of his vaſſals.—In theſe aſſemblies it was uſual to divide the plunder which had been gained by the army, to make ſuch regulations as were intended to be effectual over the whole community, and to decide, in the laſt reſort, the lawſuits which aroſe between the members of different baronies.

The *Roman* and *Greek ſtates* were originally of ſmall extent, and the inhabitants, being collected in one city, were led in a ſhort time to cultivate an acquaintance, and to incorporate in one ſociety.—The *policy*, which was eaſily eſtabliſhed in ſuch a limited territory, put a ſtop to thoſe diviſions ſo prevalent among neighbouring tribes of barbarians.—The animoſity of different families was no longer cheriſhed by reciprocal acts of hoſtility; they were on the contrary united, on all occaſions,

ſions, againſt the common enemies of the ſtate; and as they had every incitement to maintain an intimate correſpondence with each other, the diſtinctions of families were ſoon extinguiſhed and forgotten.—The power of the chiefs, or nobility, which depended upon the attachment of their reſpective clans, was therefore quickly deſtroyed; and the monarch, who remained at the head of the nation without a rival to counterbalance his influence, had no difficulty in extending his authority over the whole of his dominions.

The *more extenſive ſtates* of *Europe*, erected by the Gothic nations, were placed in a different ſituation.—The numerous inhabitants, ſcattered over a wide and often inacceſſible country, were for a long time prevented from having much intercourſe with each other, and from correcting their ancient rude and barbarous cuſtoms.—The ſeveral tribes who had entered into an alliance were not thereby induced to lay aſide their former jealouſies and feuds; and though ſometimes united under a king in common expeditions, they were no leſs frequently divided by their private quarrels, and excited to follow their ſeveral barons in the commiſſion of mutual inroads and depredations.—*Thus*

every kingdom was compoſed of a great variety of parts, looſely combined together, and for ſeveral centuries may be regarded as a collection of ſmall independent ſocieties, rather than as one great political community.—The ſlow advances which were afterwards made by the people towards a more complete union, appear to have been productive of that feudal ſubordination which has been the ſubject of ſo much inveſtigation and controverſy.

In thoſe times of violence and diſorder, when different families were ſo frequently at war, and lying in wait for opportunities to plunder and oppreſs one another, the proprietors of ſmall eſtates were neceſſarily expoſed to many hardſhips and calamities.—Surrounded by wealthier and more powerful neighbours, by whom they were invaded from every quarter, and held in conſtant terror, they could ſeldom indulge the hope of maintaining their poſſeſſions, or of tranſmitting them to their poſterity.—Conſcious, therefore, of their weakneſs, they endeavoured to provide for their future ſafety, by ſoliciting the aid of ſome *opulent chief*, who appeared moſt capable of defending them; and, in order to obtain *that protection* which he afforded to his ancient retainers or vaſſals, they were obliged *to ren-*

der themſelves equally ſubſervient to his intereſt, to relinquiſh their pretenſions to independence, to acknowledge him as their leader, and to yield him that homage and fealty which belonged to a feudal ſuperior.—The nature of theſe important tranſactions, the ſolemnities with which they were accompanied, and the views and motives from which they were uſually concluded, are ſufficiently explained from the copies or forms of thoſe deeds which have been collected and handed down to us.—THE VASSAL *promiſed, in a ſolemn manner, to the juriſdiction of the ſuperior, to reſide within his domain, and to ſerve him in war, whether he ſhould be engaged in proſecuting his own quarrels, or in the common cauſe of the nation.* — THE SUPERIOR, *on the other hand, engaged to exert all his power and influence in protecting the vaſſal, in defending his poſſeſſions, or in avenging his death, in caſe he ſhould be aſſaſſinated.*

Thus, by degrees, the *feudal ſyſtem* was completed in moſt of the countries of Europe.—The whole of a kingdom came to be united in one great fief, of which the king was the ſuperior, or lord paramount, having, in ſome meaſure, the property of all the land within his dominions.—The great barons became his immediate vaſſals, and, according to the tenure by which they

they held their eſtates, were ſubject to his juriſdiction, and liable to him in ſervices of the ſame nature with thoſe which they expected from their own retainers or inferior military tenants *.

THE PROGRESS OF GOVERNMENT IN THE SEVERAL COUNTRIES OF EUROPE WAS SUCH AS MIGHT BE EXPECTED FROM THE INFLUENCE OF THOSE CHANGES WHICH I HAVE MENTIONED.—WHENEVER AN INDEPENDENT PROPRIETOR HAD RESIGNED HIS PROPERTY, AND AGREED TO HOLD HIS LAND BY A FEUDAL TENURE, HE WAS NO LONGER ENTITLED TO A VOICE IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, BUT WAS OBLIGED TO FOLLOW THE DIRECTION OF THE SUPERIOR TO WHOM HE WAS LIABLE IN HOMAGE AND FEALTY. — WE FIND, ACCORDINGLY, THAT IN FRANCE THE PUBLIC ASSEMBLY WAS AT FIRST EXTREMELY NUMEROUS, COMPREHENDING ALL THE DIFFERENT HEADS OF FAMILIES IN THE NATION.—BY DEGREES IT WAS AFTERWARDS REDUCED IN NUMBER, AND CONFINED TO PERSONS OF SUPERIOR OPULENCE AND RANK, WHO WERE CALLED TO A SEPARATE CONFERENCE WITH THE KING.—AS THE NOBLES WERE THUS ADVANCING IN WEALTH AND

* Millar.

SPLEN-

SECT. IV.

THE THREE SPECIES OF MODERN GOVERNMENTS.

As a *ſeries of appeals* muſt be *finite*, there neceſſarily exiſts in every government a *power from which the conſtitution has provided no appeal*; and *which power*, for *that reaſon*, may be termed *abſolute*, *omnipotent*, *uncontrollable*, *arbitrary*, *deſpotic*; *and is alike ſo in all countries*.

The perſon, or aſſembly, in whom *this power* reſides, is called the *ſovereign*, or the ſupreme power of ſtate.

Since to the ſame power univerſally appertains the office of eſtabliſhing public laws, it is called alſo the *legiſlature* of the ſtate.

A government receives its denomination from the *form of the legiſlature*; which *form* is likewiſe what we *commonly mean* by the *conſtitution* of a country.

Political writers enumerate *three principal forms* of government, which, however, are to be regarded rather

are tyranny, expence, exaction, military domination; unneceſſary wars waged to gratify the paſſions of an individual; riſk of the character of the reigning prince; ignorance in the governors of the intereſts and accommodation of the people, and a conſequent deficiency of ſalutary regulations; want of conſtancy and uniformity in the rules of government, and, proceeding from thence, inſecurity of perſon and property.

The *ſeparate advantage* of an ARISTOCRACY conſiſts in the wiſdom which may be expected from experience and education—a permanent council naturally poſſeſſes experience; and the members, who ſucceed to their places in it by inheritance, will, probably, be trained and educated with a view to the ſtations which they are deſtined by their birth to occupy.

The *miſchiefs* of an ARISTOCRACY are, diſſenſions in the ruling orders of the ſtate, which, from the want of a common ſuperior, are liable to proceed to the moſt deſperate extremities; oppreſſion of the lower orders by the privileges of the higher, and by laws partial to the ſeparate intereſts of the law makers.

The *advantages* of a REPUBLIC are, liberty, or exemption from needleſs reſtrictions; equal laws; regulations adapted to the wants and circumſtances of the people; public

vided againſt in each.—Thus, if *ſecrecy* and *diſpatch* be truly enumerated amongſt the ſeparate excellencies of regal government; then a mixed government, which retains monarchy in one part of its conſtitution, ſhould be careful that the other eſtates of the empire do not, by an officious and inquiſitive interference with the executive functions, which are, or ought to be, reſerved to the adminiſtration of the prince, interpoſe delays, or divulge what it is expedient to conceal.—On the other hand, if *profuſion*, *exaction*, *military domination*, and *needleſs wars*, be juſtly accounted natural properties of monarchy, in its ſimple unqualified form; then are theſe the objects to which, in a mixed government, the ariſtocratic and popular parts of the conſtitution ought to direct their vigilance; the dangers againſt which they ſhould raiſe and fortify their barriers: theſe are departments of ſovereignty, over which a power of inſpection and control ought to be depoſited with the people.

The ſame obſervation may be repeated of all the other advantages and inconveniencies which have been aſcribed to the ſeveral ſimple forms of government; and affords a rule whereby to direct the conſtruction, improvement, and adminiſtration of mixed governments, ſubjected however to this remark, that a quality ſometimes

reſults

reſults from the conjunction of two ſimple forms of government, which belongs not to the ſeparate exiſtence of either: thus corruption, which has no place in an abſolute monarchy, and little in a pure republic, is ſure to gain admiſſion into a conſtitution, which divides the ſupreme power between an executive magiſtrate and a popular council.

An *hereditary* MONARCHY is univerſally to be preferred to an *elective* monarchy.—The confeſſion of every writer upon the ſubject of civil government, the experience of ages, the example of Poland, and of the papal dominions, ſeem to place this amongſt the few indubitable maxims which the ſcience of politics admits of.—*A crown is too ſplendid a prize to be conferred upon merit.*—The paſſions or intereſts of the electors exclude all conſideration of the *qualities* of the competitors.—The ſame obſervation holds concerning the appointment to any office which is attended with a great ſhare of power or emolument.—*Nothing is gained by a popular choice worth the diſſenſions, tumults, and interruption of regular induſtry, with which it is inſeparably attended.*—Add to this, that *a king*, who *owes his elevation* to the event of a *conteſt*, or to any other cauſe than a fixed rule of ſucceſſion, *will be apt to regard one part of his ſubjects as the aſſociates*

of

of his fortune, and the other as conquered foes.—Nor ſhould it be forgotten, amongſt the *advantages* of an *hereditary* monarchy, that as plans of national improvement and reform are ſeldom brought to maturity by the exertions of a ſingle reign, a nation cannot attain to the degree of happineſs and proſperity to which it is capable of being carried, unleſs an uniformity of councils, a conſiſtency of public meaſures and deſigns, be continued through a ſucceſſion of ages.—This benefit may be expected with greater probability, where the ſupreme power deſcends in the ſame race, and where each prince ſucceeds, in ſome ſort, to the aim, purſuits, and diſpoſition of his anceſtor, than if the crown, at every change, devolve upon a ſtranger; whoſe firſt care will commonly be to pull down what his predeceſſor had built up; and to ſubſtitute ſyſtems of adminiſtration, which muſt, in their turn, give way to the more favourite novelties of the next ſucceſſor.

ARISTOCRACIES are of *two* kinds, *firſt*, where the power of the nobility belongs to them in their collective capacity alone; that is, where although the government reſide in an aſſembly of the order, yet the members of that aſſembly ſeparately and individually poſſeſs no authority or privilege beyond the reſt of the community:

nity:—this deſcribes the conſtitution of VENICE.—*Secondly*, where the nobles are ſeverally inveſted with great perſonal power and immunities, and where the power of the ſenate is little more than the aggregated power of the individuals who compoſe it:—this is the conſtitution of POLAND.—Of theſe *two forms* of government, the *firſt* is *more tolerable* than the *laſt*; for although the members of a ſenate ſhould many, or even all of them, be profligate enough to abuſe the authority of their ſtations in the proſecution of private deſigns, yet, not being all under a temptation to the ſame injuſtice, not having all the ſame end to gain, it would ſtill be difficult to obtain the conſent of a majority, to any ſpecific act of oppreſſion, which the iniquity of an individual might prompt him to propoſe: or if the will were the ſame, the power is more confined; one tyrant, whether the tyranny reſide in a ſingle perſon, or a ſenate, cannot exerciſe oppreſſion at ſo many places at the ſame time, as it may be carried on by the dominion of a numerous nobility over their reſpective vaſſals and dependents.—Of all ſpecies of domination this is the moſt odious: the freedom and ſatisfaction of private life are more conſtrained and haraſſed by it, than by the moſt vexatious laws, or even by the lawleſs will of an arbitrary

 monarch;

monarch; from whoſe knowledge, and from whoſe injuſtice, the greateſt part of his ſubjects are removed by their diſtance, or concealed by their obſcurity.

Europe exhibits more than one modern example where the people, aggrieved by the exactions, or provoked by the enormities, of their immediate ſuperiors, have joined with the reigning prince in the overthrow of the ariſtocracy, deliberately exchanging their condition for the miſeries of deſpotiſm.—About the middle of the laſt century, the commons of DENMARK, weary of the oppreſſions which they had long ſuffered from the nobles, and exaſperated by ſome recent inſults, preſented themſelves at the foot of the throne, with a formal offer of their conſent to eſtabliſhed unlimited dominion in the king.—The revolution in SWEDEN, ſtill more lately brought about with the acquieſcence, not to ſay the aſſiſtance, of the people, owed its ſucceſs to the ſame cauſe, namely, to the proſpect of deliverance, that it afforded, from the tyranny which their nobles exerciſed under the old conſtitution.—In ENGLAND the people beheld the depreſſion of the barons, under the houſe of Tudor, with ſatisfaction, although they ſaw the crown acquiring thereby a power, which no limitations, that the conſtitution had then provided, were likely to confine.—The leſſon

to

to be drawn from ſuch events is this, that a mixed government, which admits a patrician order into its conſtitution, ought to circumſcribe the perſonal privileges of the nobility, eſpecially claims of hereditary juriſdiction and local authority, with a jealouſy equal to the ſolicitude with which it provides for its own preſervation.—For nothing ſo alienates the minds of the people from the government under which they live, as a perpetual ſenſe of annoyance and inconveniency; or ſo prepares them for the practices of an enterpriſing prince, or a factious demagogue, as the abuſe which almoſt always accompanies the exiſtence of ſeparate immunities.

Amongſt the *inferior*, but by *no means inconſiderable*, *advantages* of a DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION, or of a conſtitution in which the people partake of the power of legiſlation, the following ſhould not be neglected.

I. *The direction which it gives to the education, ſtudies, and purſuits of the ſuperior orders of the community.*—The ſhare which this has in forming the *public manners* and *national character* is very important.—In countries, in which the gentry are excluded from all concern in the government, ſcarce any thing is left which leads to advancement, but the profeſſion of arms.—They who do not addict themſelves to this profeſſion

(and miſerable muſt that country be, which conſtantly employs the military ſervice of a great proportion of any order of its ſubjects) are commonly loſt by the mere want of object and deſtination; that is, they either fall, without reſerve, into the moſt ſottiſh habits of animal gratification, or entirely devote themſelves to the attainment of thoſe futile arts and decorations, which compoſe the buſineſs and recommendation of a court: *on the other hand*, where the whole, or any effective portion of civil power is poſſeſſed by a popular aſſembly, more ſerious purſuits will be encouraged, purer morals, and a more intellectual character, will engage the public eſteem; thoſe faculties, which qualify men for deliberation and debate, and which are the fruit of ſober habits, of early and long continued application, will be rouſed and animated by the reward, which, of all others, moſt readily awakens the ambition of the human mind, political dignity and importance.

II. *Popular elections procure to the common people courteſy from their ſuperiors.*—That contemptuous and overbearing inſolence, with which the lower orders of the community are wont to be treated by the higher, is greatly mitigated where the *people* have *ſomething* to *give*. —The aſſiduity, with which their favour is ſought upon

theſe occaſions, ſerves to generate ſettled habits of condeſcenſion and reſpect; and as human life is more embittered by *affronts* than injuries, whatever contributes to procure mildneſs and civility of manners towards thoſe who are moſt liable to ſuffer from a contrary behaviour, corrects, with the pride, in a great meaſure the evil of inequality, and deſerves to be accounted amongſt the moſt generous inſtitutions of ſocial life.

III. *The ſatisfaction which the people in free governments derive from the knowledge and agitation of political ſubjects*; ſuch as the proceedings and debates of the ſenate; the conduct and character of miniſters; the revolutions, intrigues, and contentions of parties; and, in general, from the diſcuſſion of public meaſures, queſtions, and occurrences.—Subjects of this ſort excite juſt enough of intereſt and emotion, to afford a moderate engagement to the thoughts, without riſing to any painful degree of anxiety, or ever leaving a fixed oppreſſion upon the ſpirits: and what is this, but the end and aim of all thoſe amuſements, which compoſe ſo much of the buſineſs of life and the value of riches?—*For my part, and I believe it to be the caſe with moſt men, who are arrived at the middle age, and occupy the middle claſſes of life; had I all the money, which I pay in taxes to government, at li-*

berty to lay out upon amuſement and diverſion, I know not whether I could make choice of any, in which I ſhould find greater pleaſure, than what I receive from expecting, hearing, and relating public news; reading parliamentary debates, and proceedings; canvaſſing the political arguments, projects, predictions, and intelligence, which are conveyed, by various channels, to every corner of the kingdom.—Theſe topics, exciting univerſal curioſity, and being ſuch as almoſt every man is ready to form, and prepared to deliver their opinion about, *greatly promote*, and, I think, *improve converſation.*—They render it more *rational* and more *innocent.*—They ſupply a *ſubſtitute* for *drinking, gaming, ſcandal*, and *obſcenity.*—Now the ſecrecy, the jealouſy, the ſolitude, and precipitation of deſpotic governments, exclude all this.—But the loſs, you ſay, is trifling.—I know that it is poſſible to render even the mention of it ridiculous, by repreſenting it *as the idle employment of the moſt inſignificant part of the nation, the folly of village-ſtateſmen, and coffee-houſe politicians; but I allow nothing to be a trifle, which miniſters to the harmleſs gratification of multitudes; nor any order of men to be inſignificant, whoſe number bears a reſpectable proportion to the ſum of the whole community*[a].

[a] Paley.

THE

SPOILS, AND ITS STRENGTH IS ONLY THE POWER OF A FEW, AND THE LICENTIOUSNESS OF MANY.

ATHENS was poſſeſſed of the *ſame number of forces*, when ſhe *triumphed* ſo *glorioufly*, and *when* with ſo much *infamy* ſhe was *enſlaved*.—She had *twenty thouſand citizens*[a], when *ſhe defended the Greeks* againſt the PERSIANS, when *ſhe contended for empire* with SPARTA, and invaded SICILY.—She had *twenty thouſand* when DEMETRIUS PHALEREUS *numbered them*[b], as ſlaves are told by the head in a market place.—*When* PHILIP *attempted to lord it over Greece*, and *appeared* at the *gates of Athens*[c], *ſhe had even then loſt nothing but time*.—We may ſee in *Demoſthenes* how difficult it was to *awaken her:* ſhe *dreaded Philip*, not as the *enemy* of her *liberty*, but of her *pleaſures*[d].—This FAMOUS CITY, which had withſtood ſo many defeats, and after having been ſo often deſtroyed, had as often riſen out of her aſhes, was *overthrown* at CHÆRONEA, and at *one blow* deprived of *all hopes of reſource*.—What does it avail her, that Philip ſends back *her priſoners*, if he does not return her *men?*—It was *ever*

a Plutarch, Life of Pericles, Plato in Critia.

b She had at that time twenty-one thouſand citizens, ten thouſand ſtrangers, and four hundred thouſand ſlaves. See Athenæus, Book 6.

c She had then twenty thouſand citizens. See Demoſthenes in Ariſtog.

d They had paſſed a law, which rendered it a capital crime for any one to propoſe applying the money deſigned for the theatres to military ſervice.

after

after as *eaſy* to triumph over the *Athenian forces*, as it had been *difficult* to ſubdue her *virtue*.

How was it poſſible for Carthage to maintain her ground? When HANNIBAL, upon his being made *Prætor*, endeavoured to hinder the *magiſtrates* from plundering the republic, did not *they complain of him to the* ROMANS?—*Wretches*, who would fain be *citizens without a city*, and *beholden for their riches* to their *very deſtroyers!*—ROME *ſoon* inſiſted upon having three hundred of their principal citizens as hoſtages; ſhe obliged them *next* to ſurrender their arms and ſhips, and *then* ſhe declared war[a].—*From the deſperate efforts of this defenceleſs city, one may judge of what ſhe might have performed in her full vigour, and aſſiſted by virtue*[b].

[a] This laſted three years. [b] Monteſquieu.

SECT. VI.

PUBLIC VIRTUE IS IN A LESS DEGREE ESSENTIAL TO AN ARISTOCRACY.

As *virtue* is *neceſſary* in a POPULAR GOVERNMENT, it is requiſite alſo under an ARISTOCRACY.—True it is, that in the *latter* is not ſo *abſolutely requiſite*.

The people, who in reſpect to the *nobility* are the ſame as the ſubjects with regard to a monarch, *are reſtrained by their laws*.—They have, therefore, leſs occaſion for *virtue* than the *people* in a democracy.—*But how are the nobility to be reſtrained?*—They who are to execute the laws againſt their colleagues, will immediately perceive they are acting againſt *themſelves*.—VIRTUE is therefore neceſſary in this body, from the very nature of the conſtitution.

An ARISTOCRATICAL GOVERNMENT has an inherent vigour, unknown to democracy.—The *nobles* form a body, who by their prerogative, and for their own particular intereſt, *reſtrain the people*; it is ſufficient, that there are laws in being to have them executed.

But

But eaſy as it may be for the body of the nobles to reſtrain the people, reſtraints will with difficulty reach the legiſlative body.—*Such is the nature of the conſtitution, that it ſeems to ſubject the very ſame perſons to the power of the laws, and at the ſame time to exempt them.*—*Public crimes*[a] may indeed be *puniſhed*, becauſe it is *here* a *common concern*; but *private crimes* will go *unpuniſhed*, becauſe it is the *common intereſt not to puniſh them.*

Now ſuch a body as this will reſtrain itſelf only two ways; either by a very *eminent virtue*, which puts the nobility in ſome meaſure on a level with the people, or by *an inferior virtue*, which puts them at leaſt upon a level with one another, *and on this their preſervation depends.*

Moderation is therefore the very ſoul of this government; a moderation I mean founded on *virtue*, not that which proceeds from indolence and puſillanimity[b].

[a] Though all crimes be in their own nature *public*, yet there is a *diſtinction* between *crimes really public*, and *thoſe* that are *private*, which are *ſo called, becauſe they are more injurious to individuals than to the community.*

[b] Monteſquieu.

SECT. VII.

HONOUR THE STAY OF MONARCHY.

A MONARCHICAL GOVERNMENT ſuppoſeth, as we have already obſerved, pre-eminences and ranks, as likewiſe a noble deſcent.—Now ſince it is *the nature of honour* to aſpire to preferments and titles, it is properly placed in this government.

Ambition is pernicious in a republic.—But in a monarchy it has ſome good effects; it gives life to the government, and is attended with this advantage, that it is no way dangerous, becauſe it will be continually checked.

It is with this kind of government as with the ſyſtem of the univerſe, in which there is a power that conſtantly repels all bodies from the center, and a power of gravitation that attracts them to it.—HONOUR *ſets all the parts of the body politic in motion, and by its very action connects them; thus each individual advances the public good, while he only thinks of promoting his own intereſt.*

True

True it is, that, *philoſophically ſpeaking*, it is a *falſe honour* which moves all the parts of this government; but even this *falſe honour* is *as uſeful to the public* as *true honour* could poſſibly be to *private people*.

Is it not a very *great point* to oblige men to perform the *moſt difficult actions*, ſuch as require an extraordinary exertion of fortitude and reſolution, *without any other recompence*, than *that* of GLORY and APPLAUSE?

VIRTUE IS NOT ESSENTIAL TO A MONARCHICAL GOVERNMENT.

IN MONARCHIES *policy effects great things with as little virtue as poſſible*.—Thus in the niceſt machines *art* has reduced the number of movements, ſprings, and wheels.

The ſtate ſubſiſts independent of the love of our country, of the thirſt of true glory, of ſelf-denial, of the ſacrifice of our deareſt intereſts, and of all thoſe heroic virtues which we admire in the ancients, and to us are known only by ſtory.

The *laws* ſupply here the *place* of thoſe *virtues*; they are

ſentative: here it is capable of inſpiring the moſt glorious actions, and, joined with the force of laws, may lead us to the end of government as well as virtue itſelf.

Hence, in well regulated monarchies, we find often good ſubjects, and very few good men; for to be a good man[a], a good intention is neceſſary, and we ſhould love our country not ſo much on our own account, as out of regard to the community[b].

[a] This word good man is underſtood here in a political ſenſe only.

[b] Monteſquieu.

SECT. VIII.

FEAR IS THE PRINCIPLE OF A DESPOTIC STATE.

As *virtue* is neceſſary in a REPUBLIC, and in a MONARCHY *honour*, ſo *fear* is neceſſary in a DESPOTIC GOVERNMENT.—With regard to *virtue*, there is *no occaſion for it*, and *honour* would be *extremely dangerous*.

Here the immenſe power of the prince is devolved entirely upon thoſe whom he is pleaſed to intruſt with the adminiſtration.—*Perſons capable of ſetting a value upon themſelves, would be likely to create diſturbances.*—*Fear* muſt therefore *depreſs their ſpirits*, and *extinguiſh* even the *leaſt ſenſe of ambition*.

A MODERATE GOVERNMENT may, whenever it pleaſes, and without the leaſt danger, *relax its ſprings*.—It ſupports itſelf by the *laws*, and by its *own internal ſtrength*.—But *when a deſpotic prince ceaſes one ſingle moment to lift up his arm*, when *he cannot inſtantly demoliſh thoſe whom he has entruſted with the firſt employments* [a], *all*

[a] As it often happens in a military ariſtocracy.

THE CORRUPTION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE THREE GOVERNMENTS.

SECT. IX.

OF THE CORRUPTION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRACY.

THE PRINCIPLE of DEMOCRACY is *corrupted* not only when the *ſpirit* of *equality* is *extinct*, but *likewiſe* when men fall into a *ſpirit of extreme equality*, and when *each citizen* would fain be upon *a level* with *thoſe whom* he has *choſen to command him*.—THEN THE PEOPLE, INCAPABLE OF BEARING THE VERY POWER THEY HAVE DELEGATED, WANT TO MANAGE EVERY THING THEMSELVES, TO DEBATE FOR THE SENATE, TO EXECUTE FOR THE MAGISTRATE, AND TO DECIDE FOR THE JUDGES.

When this is the caſe, VIRTUE *can no longer ſubſiſt in the republic*.—THE POPULACE ARE DESIROUS OF EXERCISING THE FUNCTIONS OF THE MAGISTRATES; WHO CEASE TO BE REVERED.—THE DELIBERATIONS OF THE SENATE ARE SLIGHTED; ALL RESPECT IS THEN LAID

LAID ASIDE FOR THE SENATORS, AND CONSEQUENTLY FOR OLD AGE.—IF THERE IS NO MORE RESPECT FOR OLD AGE, THERE WILL BE NONE PRESENTLY FOR PARENTS; DEFERENCE TO HUSBANDS WILL BE LIKEWISE THROWN OFF, AND SUBMISSION TO MASTERS.—THIS LICENTIOUSNESS WILL SOON BECOME GENERAL; AND THE TROUBLE OF COMMAND BE AS FATIGUING AS THAT OF OBEDIENCE.—WIVES, CHILDREN, SERVANTS, WILL SHAKE OF ALL SUBJECTION.—NO LONGER WILL THERE BE ANY SUCH THINGS AS MANNERS, ORDER, OR VIRTUE.

We find in *Xenophon's Banquet* a very lively deſcription of a REPUBLIC in which the *people* abuſed their *equality*.—Each gueſt gives in his turn the reaſon why he is ſatisfied.—" *Content I am*," ſays Chamides, " *be-*
" *cauſe of my poverty*.—WHEN I WAS RICH, *I was*
" *obliged to pay my court to informers, knowing I was*
" *more liable to be hurt by them, than capable of doing*
" *them harm.—The republic conſtantly demanded ſome*
" *new tax of me; and I could not decline paying*.—SINCE
" I AM GROWN POOR, *I have acquired authority; no-*
" *body threatens me; I rather threaten others.—I can go*
" *or ſtay where I pleaſe.—The rich already riſe from their*
" *ſeats and give me the way.—I am a king, I was before a*
" *ſlave:*



centiouſneſs or oppreſſion, equally labouring under the ſudden and alternate ſucceſſion of liberty and ſervitude, and notwithſtanding her external ſtrength, conſtantly determined to a revolution by the leaſt foreign power: THIS CITY, I SAY, HAD IN HER BOSOM AN IMMENSE MULTITUDE OF PEOPLE, WHOSE FATE IT WAS TO HAVE ALWAYS THIS CRUEL ALTERNATIVE, EITHER OF CHOOSING A TYRANT TO GOVERN THEM, OR OF ACTING THE TYRANT THEMSELVES.

GREAT *ſucceſs*, eſpecially when chiefly owing to the people, intoxicates them to ſuch a degree that it is impoſſible to contain them within bounds.—JEALOUS OF THEIR MAGISTRATES, THEY SOON BECAME JEALOUS LIKEWISE OF THE MAGISTRACY; ENEMIES TO THOSE WHO GOVERN, THEY SOON PROVE ENEMIES ALSO TO THE CONSTITUTION. Thus it was that the victory over the Perſians in the Straits of Salamis corrupted the republic of Athens; and thus the defeat of the Athenians ruined the republic of Syracuſe.

SECT. X.

OF THE CORRUPTION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AN ARISTOCRACY.

AN ARISTOCRACY *is corrupted if the power of the nobles become arbitrary:* when this is the caſe, there can no longer be any public virtue either in the governors or the governed.

If the reigning families *obſerve the laws*, it is a monarchy with ſeveral monarchs, and in *its own nature* one of the *moſt excellent*; for almoſt all theſe monarchs are tied down by the laws.—*But when they do not obſerve them, it is a deſpotic ſtate ſwayed by a great many deſpotic princes.*

The *extremity* of *corruption* is when the *power* of the *nobles* becomes *hereditary*; for *then* they can hardly have any *moderation.*—If they are only a *few*, their *power* is *greater*, but their *ſecurity leſs*; if they are *a larger number*, their *power* is *leſs*, and their *ſecurity greater:* inſomuch that *power* goes on *increaſing*, and *ſecurity diminiſhing*,

niſhing, up to the very *deſpotic prince who is encircled* with *exceſs* of *power* and *danger*.

The *great number* therefore of *nobles* in *an hereditary ariſtocracy* renders the government *leſs violent*: but as there is *leſs virtue*, they fall into a ſpirit of ſupineneſs and negligence, by which the ſtate loſes all its ſtrength and activity.

An ARISTOCRACY may maintain the full vigour of its conſtitution, if the laws be ſuch as are apt to render *the nobles* more ſenſible of the *perils* and *fatigues*, than of the *pleaſure of command*: and if the government be in ſuch a ſituation as to have *ſomething to dread*, while *ſecurity* ſhelters under its protection, and *uncertainty* threatens from abroad.

As a *certain kind of confidence* forms the glory and ſtability of *monarchies*, republics on the contrary muſt have ſomething to apprehend[a].—A fear of the PERSIANS ſupported the laws of GREECE.—CARTHAGE and ROME were alarmed and ſtrengthened by each other.—Strange, that the greater ſecurity thoſe ſtates enjoyed, the more, like ſtagnated waters, they were ſubject to corruption![b]

a Juſtin attributes the extinction of Athenian virtue to the death of Epaminandos. Having no farther emulation, they ſpent their revenues in feaſts, *frequentius cœnam, quam caſtra viſentes*. Then it was that the Macedonians emerged from obſcurity, l. 6.

b Monteſquieu.

SECT. XII.

OF THE CORRUPTION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF A DESPOTIC GOVERNMENT.

The *principle* of A DESPOTIC GOVERNMENT is ſubject to a *continual corruption*, becauſe it is even in its *nature corrupt*.—*Other governments* are *deſtroyed* by *particular accidents*, which *do violence* to the *principles* of *each conſtitution*; *this* is *ruined* by its own *intrinſic imperfections*. —It *maintains itſelf therefore* only when *circumſtances* drawn from the *climate*, *religion*, *ſituation*, or *genius of the people*, oblige it to *conform to order*, and to admit of *ſome rule*.—By theſe things its *nature* is *forced* without being *changed*; its *ferocity remains*; and it is made *tame* and *tractable only for an interval*[a].

[a] Monteſquieu.



owing to her having continued in the *ſame extent* of *territory* after all her wars.—The *ſole aim* of *Sparta* was *liberty*; and the *ſole advantage* of her *liberty*, *glory*.

It was the *ſpirit* of the *Greek republics* to be as *contented* with their *territories*, as with their *laws*.—ATHENS was *firſt fired with ambition* and *gave it* to LACEDÆMON; but it was an *ambition* rather of *commanding* a *free people*, than of *governing ſlaves*; rather of *directing* than of *breaking the union*.—All was loſt upon the ſtarting up of a *monarchy*, a *government whoſe ſpirit is more turned to increaſe of dominion*[a].

[a] Monteſquieu.

SECT. XIV.

THE NATURAL LIMITS OF A MONARCHY.

A MONARCHICAL STATE ought to be of a MODERATE EXTENT.—Were it *ſmall*, it would form itſelf to a *republic*: were it *very large*, *the nobility, poſſeſſed great eſtates, far from the eye of the prince, with a private court of their own, and ſecure moreover from ſudden executions by the laws and manners of the country, ſuch a nobility, I ſay, might throw off their allegiance, having nothing to fear from too ſlow and too diſtant a puniſhment.* After the deceaſe of Alexander his empire was divided. Now was it *poſſible* for thoſe Greek and Macedonian chiefs, who were each of them free and independent, commanders at leaſt of the victorious bands diſperſed throughout *that vaſt extent of conquered land*, how was *poſſible*, I ſay, *for them to be long united*[a]?

[a] Monteſquieu.

count in putting the Tartars, the Moldavians, the Wallachians, and formerly the Tranſilvanians, *between themſelves and their enemies.*

The *real power* of a prince does not conſiſt ſo much in the *facility he meets with in making conqueſts*, as in the *difficulty an enemy finds in attacking him*, and, if I may ſo ſpeak, in the *immutability* of his condition. But the *increaſe of territory* obliges a government to lay itſelf *more open* to an enemy.

As Monarchs therefore ought to be endued with *wiſdom* in order to *increaſe their power*, they ought likewiſe to have an *equal ſhare of prudence to confine it within bounds.*—Upon removing the *inconveniencies of too ſmall a territory*, they ſhould have their eye conſtantly on the *inconveniencies which attend its extent*[a].

[a] Monteſquieu.

THE BIAS WHICH THE DIFFERENT FORMS OF GOVERNMENT GIVE TO THE NATIONAL CHARACTER.

SECT. XVII.

THE EFFECTS OF MONARCHY ON THE NATIONAL CHARACTER.

IN MONARCHIES *our character* is not formed in colleges or academies.—It *commences*, in ſome meaſure, at *our ſetting out in the world*; for *this* is the *ſchool* of what we call *honour*, *that univerſal preceptor which ought every where to be our guide.*

In our days we receive *three different* or *contrary educations*, namely, of our *parents*, of our *maſters*, and of the *world.*—What we learn in the *latter*, effaces all the ideas of the *former.*

Here it is that we conſtantly hear *theſe* rules or maxims, viz. *that we ſhould have a certain nobleneſs in our virtues, a kind of frankneſs in our morals, and a particular politeneſs in our behaviour.*

The

A *court air* conſiſts in quitting a *real* for a *borrowed greatneſs*.—The *latter* pleaſes the courtier more than the *former*.—It inſpires him with *a certain diſdainful modeſty, which ſhews itſelf externally, but whoſe pride inſenſibly diminiſhes in proportion to its diſtance from the ſource of this greatneſs.*

At court we find a delicacy of taſte in every thing, a delicacy ariſing from the conſtant uſe of the ſuperfluities of life, from the variety, and eſpecially the ſatiety of pleaſures, from the multiplicity and even confuſion of fancies, which, if they are but agreeable, are ſure of being well received.

Here it is that HONOUR interferes with every thing, mixing even with people's manner of thinking, and directing their very principles.

To *this whimſical honour* it is owing *that the virtues are only juſt what it pleaſes*; it adds *rules of its own invention* to every thing preſcribed to us; it *extends or limits our duties* according to its own *fancy*, whether they proceed from *religion*, *politics*, or *morality*.

There is nothing ſo ſtrongly inculcated in *monarchies*, by the *laws*, by *religion*, and *honour*, *as ſubmiſſion to the prince's will*; but *this very honour tells us*, that the prince never ought to command a *diſhonourable action*,

tion, becauſe this would render us *incapable* of ſerving him.

CRILLON refuſed to *aſſaſſinate* the Duke of Guiſe, but offered to *fight him*. After the maſſacre of St. Bartholomew, CHARLES IX. having ſent orders to the governors in the ſeveral provinces for the Hugonots to be murdered, VISCOUNT DORTE, who commanded at Bayonne, wrote thus to the king, SIRE, AMONG THE INHABITANTS OF THIS TOWN, AND YOUR MAJESTY'S TROOPS, I COULD NOT FIND SO MUCH AS ONE EXECUTIONER; THEY ARE HONEST CITIZENS AND BRAVE SOLDIERS.—WE JOINTLY THEREFORE BESEECH YOUR MAJESTY TO COMMAND OUR ARMS AND LIVES IN THINGS THAT ARE PRACTICABLE.—*This great and generous ſoul looked upon a baſe action as a thing impoſſible.*

There is nothing that *honour* more ſtrongly recommends to the nobility, *than to ſerve their prince in a military capacity.*—Yet *this very law* of its own making, *honour chooſes to explain*; and in caſe of *any affront*, it *requires* or *permits us to retire.*

Honour therefore has *its ſupreme laws*, to which education is obliged to conform.—The chief of theſe are, *that we are permitted to ſet a value upon our for-*

tune, but are abſolutely forbidden to ſet any upon our lives.

The ſecond is, *that when we are raiſed to a poſt or preferment, we ſhould never do or permit any thing which may ſeem to imply that we look upon ourſelves as inferior to the rank we hold.*

The third is, *that thoſe things which honour forbids are more rigorouſly forbidden, when the laws do not concur in the prohibition; and thoſe it commands are more ſtrongly inſiſted upon, when they happen not to be commanded by law.*

SECT. XVIII.

THE EFFECTS OF DESPOTISM ON THE NATIONAL CHARACTER.

IN DESPOTIC STATES *learning* proves dangerous, *emulation* fatal; and as to *virtue*, Ariſtotle cannot think there is any *one virtue* belonging to *ſlaves*; if ſo, education in *deſpotic countries is confined within a narrow compaſs.*

Exceſſive obedience ſuppoſes *ignorance* in the perſon that *obeys:* for he has *no occaſion to deliberate, to doubt, to reaſon*; he has *only to will.*

Here therefore *education* is in ſome meaſure *needleſs:* to give *ſomething*, one muſt *take away every thing*; and begin with making *a bad ſubject*, in order to make a *good ſlave.*

FOR WHY SHOULD EDUCATION TAKE PAINS IN FORMING A GOOD CITIZEN, ONLY TO MAKE HIM SHARE IN THE PUBLIC MISERY?—IF HE LOVES HIS COUNTRY, HE WILL STRIVE TO RELAX THE SPRINGS OF GOVERNMENT; IF HE MISCARRIES HE WILL BE UNDONE; IF HE SUCCEEDS, HE MUST EXPOSE HIMSELF, THE PRINCE, AND HIS COUNTRY, TO RUIN.

SECT. XIX.

THE EFFECTS OF A REPUBLIC ON THE NATIONAL CHARACTER.

Most of the ancients lived under governments that had *virtue* for their principle; and when this was in full vigour, they performed actions unuſual in our times, and at which our narrow minds are aſtoniſhed.

It is in a *republican government* that the whole power of education is required.—It muſt inſpire us with the ove of *the laws* and of our *country*.—And as *ſuch love* requires a conſtant preference of *public* to *private* intereſt, it demands a ſpecies of ſelf-renunciation, which is ever arduous and painful.

Every thing depends on eſtabliſhing *this love in a republic*; and to inſpire it ought to be the principal buſineſs of education: but the ſureſt way of inſtilling it into children, is for parents to ſet them *an example*.

People have it generally in their power to communicate their ideas to their children; but they are ſtill better able to transfuſe *their paſſions*.

Virtue

Virtue in a republic is a moſt *ſimple thing*; it is *a love of the republic*; it is a *ſenſation*, and not a *conſequence of acquired knowledge: a ſenſation*, that may be *felt by the meaneſt* as well as by the *higheſt perſon* in the ſtate.—When the *common people* adopt *good maxims*, they generally adhere to them *with great ſteadineſs*.

The *love of our country* is conducive to *purity of morals*, and *the latter* is again conducive to the *former*.—The leſs we are able to ſatisfy our *private paſſions*, the more we abandon ourſelves to thoſe of a *general nature*.

SECT. XX.

THE EFFECTS OF CLIMATE ON THE NATIONAL CHARACTER.

A *cold air*[a] conſtringes the extremities of the external fibres of the body; this increaſes their elaſticity, and favours the return of the blood from the extreme parts to the heart.—It contracts[b] thoſe very fibres; conſequently it increaſes alſo their force.—On the contrary a *warm air* relaxes and lengthens the extremes of the fibres; of courſe it diminiſhes their force and elaſticity.

People are therefore *more vigorous in cold climates.*—Here the action of the heart and the reaction of the extremities of the fibres are better performed, the temperature of the humours is greater, the blood moves freer towards the heart, and reciprocally the heart has more power.—*This ſuperiority of ſtrength muſt produce various effects*; for inſtance, *a greater boldneſs*, that is,

[a] This appears even in the countenance: in cold weather people look thinner.

[b] We know it ſhortens iron.

more

more courage; *a greater ſenſe of ſuperiority*, that is, leſs deſire of revenge; *a greater opinion of ſecurity*, that is, more frankneſs, leſs ſuſpicion, policy, and cunning.—*In ſhort*, this muſt be productive of very different tempers.—PUT A MAN INTO A CLOSE WARM PLACE, AND FOR THE REASONS ABOVE GIVEN HE WILL FEEL A GREAT FAINTNESS.—IF UNDER THIS CIRCUMSTANCE YOU PROPOSE A BOLD ENTERPRIZE TO HIM, I BELIEVE YOU WILL FIND HIM VERY LITTLE DISPOSED TOWARDS IT: HIS PRESENT WEAKNESS WILL THROW HIM INTO A DESPONDENCY; HE WILL BE AFRAID OF EVERY THING, BEING IN A STATE OF TOTAL INCAPACITY.—The inhabitants of *warm countries* are, like old men, timorous; the people in *cold countries* are, like young men, brave.—If we reflect on the late wars[a], which are more recent in our memory, and in which we can better diſtinguiſh ſome particular effects that eſcape us at a greater diſtance of time; we ſhall find that the northern people tranſplanted into ſouthern regions[b], did not perform ſuch exploits as their countrymen, who, fighting in their own climate, poſſeſſed their full vigour and courage.

[a] Thoſe for the ſucceſſion to the Spaniſh monarchy.

[b] For inſtance in Spain.

This ſtrength of the fibres in northern nations is the cauſe that the coarſer juices are extracted from their aliments.—From hence *two things* reſult: *one*, that the parts of the chyle or lymph are more proper by reaſon of their large ſurface, to be applied to, and to nouriſh, the fibres: *the other*, that they are leſs proper, from their coarſeneſs, to give a certain ſubtilty to the nervous juice.—*Thoſe people have therefore large bodies and but little vivacity.*

The nerves that terminate from all parts in the cutis form each a nervous bundle; generally ſpeaking, the whole nerve is not moved, but a very minute part.—In *warm climates*, where the cutis is relaxed, the ends of the nerves are expanded and laid open to the weakeſt action of the ſmalleſt objects.—In *cold countries* the cutis is conſtringed and the papillæ compreſſed; the miliary glands are in ſome meaſure paralytic; and the ſenſation does not reach the brain, but when it is very ſtrong and proceeds from the whole nerve at once. *Now imagination, taſte, ſenſibility, and vivacity, depend on an infinite number of ſmall ſenſations.*

In *cold countries*, they have very little ſenſibility for pleaſure; *in temperate countries*, they have more; *in warm countries*, their ſenſibility is exquiſite.—As *cli-*

mates

mates are diſtinguiſhed by degrees of *latitude*, we might diſtinguiſh them alſo in ſome meaſure, by thoſe of *ſenſibility*.—I have been at the opera in ENGLAND and in ITALY; where I have ſeen the *ſame pieces* and the *ſame performers:* and yet the *ſame muſic produces ſuch different effects on the two nations*; one *is ſo cold and phlegmatic, and the* other *ſo lively and enraptured*, that it ſeems almoſt inconceivable.

It is the ſame with regard to *pain*; which is excited by the laceration of ſome fibre of the body.—The author of nature has made it an eſtabliſhed rule that this pain ſhould be more acute in proportion as the laceration is greater: now it is evident, that the large bodies and coarſe fibres of the people of the *north*, are leſs capable of laceration than the delicate fibres of the inhabitants of *warm countries*; conſequently the ſoul is there leſs ſenſible of pain.—*You muſt flay a Muſcovite alive to make him feel.*

From this delicacy of organs peculiar to *warm climates*, it follows that the ſoul is moſt ſenſibly moved by whatever relates to the union of the two ſexes: here every thing leads to this object.

In *northern climates* ſcarce has the animal part of love a power of making itſelf felt.—In *temperate climates*,

love, attended by a thouſand appendages, endeavours to pleaſe by things that have at firſt the appearance, though not the reality of this paſſion.—In *warmer climates* it is liked for its own ſake, it is the only cauſe of happineſs, it is life itſelf

In *ſouthern countries* a machine of a delicate frame, but ſtrong ſenſibility, reſigns itſelf wholly to a paſſion that is inceſſantly flattered in a ſeraglio; or gives way to the love of women who are in perfect independence, and is conſequently expoſed to a thouſand inquietudes.—In *northern regions* the men, robuſt and heavy, find a pleaſure in whatever is apt to throw the ſpirits into motion, ſuch as hunting, travelling, war, and wine.—*If we travel towards the north*, we meet with people who have few vices, many virtues, and a great ſhare of frankneſs and ſincerity.—*If we draw near the ſouth*, we fancy ourſelves intirely removed from the verge of morality: here the ſtrongeſt paſſions are productive of all manner of crimes, each man endeavouring, let the means be what they will, to indulge his inordinate deſires.—In *temperate climates* we find the inhabitants inconſtant in their manners, as well as in their vices and virtues: the climate has not a quality determinate enough to fix them.

THE HEAT OF THE CLIMATE MAY BE SO EXCESSIVE AS TO DEPRIVE THE BODY OF ALL VIGOR AND STRENGTH.—THEN THE FAINTNESS IS COMMUNICATED TO THE MIND; THERE IS NO CURIOSITY, NO ENTERPRIZE, NO GENEROSITY OF SENTIMENT; THE INCLINATIONS ARE ALL PASSIVE; INDOLENCE CONSTITUTES THE UTMOST HAPPINESS; SCARCELY ANY PUNISHMENT IS SO SEVERE AS MENTAL EMPLOYMENT; AND SLAVERY IS MORE SUPPORTABLE THAN THE FORCE AND VIGOR OF MIND NECESSARY FOR HUMAN CONDUCT.

The INDIANS are naturally a puſillanimous people; even *the children of Europeans born in India* loſe the courage peculiar to their own climate.—But how ſhall we reconcile this with their cuſtoms, and penances ſo full of barbarity? *the men voluntarily undergo the greateſt hardſhips; and the women burn themſelves:* here we find a very odd compound of fortitude and weakneſs.

Nature having framed thoſe people of a texture ſo *weak* as to fill them with *timidity*, has formed them at the ſame time of an *imagination ſo lively*, that *every object* makes the *ſtrongeſt impreſſion* upon them.—THAT DELICACY OF ORGANS WHICH RENDERS THEM APPREHENSIVE OF DEATH, CONTRIBUTES LIKEWISE TO

MAKE THEM DREAD A THOUSAND THINGS MORE THAN DEATH: THE VERY SAME SENSIBILITY INDUCES THEM TO FLY, AND DARE, ALL DANGERS.

In ASIA the *ſtrong nations* are oppoſed to the *weak*; the *warlike*, *brave*, and *active people* touch immediately on thoſe who are *indolent*, *effeminate*, *and timorous*; the *one muſt therefore conquer*, and the *other be conquered*.—In EUROPE, on the contrary, *ſtrong nations* are oppoſed to *the ſtrong*; and thoſe who join to each other have nearly the ſame courage.—*This is the grand reaſon of the weakneſs of* ASIA, *and of the ſtrength of* EUROPE: *of the liberty of* EUROPE *and of the ſlavery of* ASIA.—From hence it proceeds, that *liberty in* ASIA *never increaſes*; whilſt *in* EUROPE *it is enlarged, or diminiſhed*, according to particular circumſtances.

THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT.

SECT. XVI.

ORIGIN OF THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION.

O LIBERTY, thou goddeſs heav'nly bright,
Profuſe of bliſs, and pregnant with delight!
Eternal pleaſure in thy preſence reign,
And ſmiling plenty leads thy wanton train;
Eas'd of her load ſubjection grows more light,
And poverty looks cheerful in thy ſight;
Thou mak'ſt the gloomy face of nature gay,
Giv'ſt beauty to the ſun, and pleaſure to the day.
Thee, goddeſs, *thee* BRITANNIA's iſle adores;
How has ſhe oft exhauſted all her ſtores,
How oft, in fields of death, thy preſence ſought,
Nor thinks the mighty prize too dearly bought!

On foreign mountains, let the ſun refine
The grape's ſoft juice, and mellow it to wine;
With citron groves adorn a diſtant ſoil;
And the fat olive ſwell with floods of oil:
We envy not the warmer clime, that lies
In ten degrees of more indulgent ſkies,
Nor at the coarſeneſs of our heav'n repine,
Though o'er our heads the frozen pleiads ſhine;
'Tis *Liberty* that crown's BRITANNIA's iſle,
That makes her barren rocks and bleakeſt mountains ſmile.

ADDISON.

OUR EXCELLENT CONSTITUTION, LIKE THAT OF MOST COUNTRIES IN EUROPE, HATH GROWN OUT OF OCCASION AND EMERGENCY; FROM THE FLUCTUATING POLICY OF DIFFERENT AGES; FROM THE CONTENTIONS, SUCCESSES, INTERESTS, AND OPPORTUNITIES OF DIFFERENT ORDERS AND PARTIES OF MEN IN THE COMMUNITY.—IT RESEMBLES ONE OF THOSE OLD MANSIONS, WHICH, INSTEAD OF BEING BUILT ALL AT ONCE, AFTER A REGULAR PLAN, AND ACCORDING TO THE RULES OF ARCHITECTURE AT PRESENT ESTABLISHED, HAS BEEN REARED IN DIFFERENT AGES OF THE ART, HAS BEEN ALTERED FROM TIME TO TIME, AND HAS BEEN CONTINUALLY RECEIVING

ADDITIONS AND REPAIRS SUITED TO THE TASTE, FORTUNE, OR CONVENIENCY, OF ITS SUCCESSIVE PROPRIETORS.—IN SUCH A BUILDING WE LOOK IN VAIN FOR THE ELEGANCE AND PROPORTION, FOR THE JUST ORDER AND CORRESPONDENCE OF PARTS, WHICH WE EXPECT IN A MODERN EDIFICE; AND WHICH EXTERNAL SYMMETRY, AFTER ALL, CONTRIBUTES MUCH MORE PERHAPS TO THE AMUSEMENT OF THE BEHOLDER, THAN THE ACCOMMODATION OF THE INHABITANT [a].

[a] Paley.

SECT. XVII.

OF A REFORM IN PARLIAMENT.

WHEN we contemplate the THEORY OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT we ſee THE KING inveſted with the moſt *abſolute perſonal impunity*; with a *power of rejecting laws*, which have been reſolved upon *by both houſes of parliament*; of *conferring by his charter*, upon *any ſet or ſucceſſion of men he pleaſes*, the *privilege of ſending repreſentatives into one houſe of parliament*, as *by his immediate appointment he can place whom he will in the other*.—What is this, a *foreigner* might aſk, but a more *circuitous deſpotiſm*?—Yet, when we turn our attention from the *legal extent* to the ACTUAL EXERCISE of *royal authority* in England, we ſee theſe *formidable prerogatives* dwindled into *mere ceremonies*; and IN THEIR STEAD, *a ſure and commanding influence* eſtabliſhed, ariſing from that *enormous patronage, which the increaſed territory and opulence of the empire has placed in the diſpoſal of the executive magiſtrate*.

Upon

Upon queſtions of REFORM the habit of reflection to be encouraged, is a ſober compariſon of the conſtitution under which we live, not with models of *ſpeculative perfection*, but with the *actual chance* of obtaining *a better*.—*This turn of thought will generate a political diſpoſition, equally removed from that* PUERILE ADMIRATION *of preſent eſtabliſhments which ſees no fault, and can endure no change, and that* DISTEMPERED SENSIBILITY, *which is alive only to perceptions of inconveniency, and is too impatient to be delivered from the uneaſineſs which it feels, to compute either the peril, or expence of the remedy.*

Political innovations commonly produce *many effects* beſide *thoſe* that are *intended*.—The *direct conſequence* is often the *leaſt important*.—*Incidental, remote*, and *unthought* of *evils* or *advantages* frequently *exceed the good* that is *deſigned*, or the *miſchief* that is *foreſeen*—It is from the ſilent and unobſerved operation, from the obſcure progreſs of cauſes, ſet at work for different purpoſes, that the greateſt revolutions take their riſe.

When ELIZABETH, and her IMMEDIATE SUCCESSOR, applied themſelves to the encouragement and regulation of TRADE by many wiſe laws, they knew not, that, together with wealth and induſtry, they were



diffuſing a *conſciouſneſs of ſtrength and independency, which would not long endure, under the forms of a mixed government, the dominion of arbitrary princes.*

When it was debated whether the MUTINY ACT (the law by which the army is governed and maintained) ſhould be *temporary* or *perpetual*, little elſe probably occurred to the advocates of *an annual bill*, than the expediency of retaining a *control over the moſt dangerous prerogative of the crown*——THE DIRECTION AND COMMAND OF A STANDING ARMY: whereas, in its effect, *this ſingle reſervation has altered the whole frame and quality of the Britiſh conſtitution.*—For ſince, in conſequence of the military ſyſtem which prevails in neighbouring and rival nations, as well as on account of the internal exigencies of government, *a ſtanding army* has become *eſſential* to the ſafety and adminiſtration of the empire, it enables parliament, by *diſcontinuing this neceſſary proviſion*, ſo to enforce its reſolutions upon any other ſubject, as to render the king's *diſſent* to a law, which has received the *approbation* of both houſes, too *dangerous an experiment* any longer to be adviſed.—A *conteſt* between the *king* and *parliament* cannot now be *perſevered in*, without a diſſolution of the government.—Laſtly, when the conſtitution

tion conferred upon the crown *the nomination to all employments in the public ſervice*, the authors of this arrangement were led to it, by the obvious propriety of leaving to a maſter the choice of his ſervants; and *by the manifeſt inconveniency of engaging the national council, upon every variety, in thoſe perſonal conteſts which attend elections to places of honour and emoluments*.—Our anceſtors did not obſerve that this diſpoſition added an *influence* to the *regal office*, which, as the number and value of public employments increaſed, would ſuperſede in a great meaſure the forms, and change the character of the ancient conſtitution.—They knew not what the experience and reflection of modern ages has diſcovered, that *patronage* univerſally is *power*; that he who poſſeſſes in a ſufficient degree the means of gratifying the deſires of mankind after wealth and diſtinction, by whatever checks and forms his authority may be limited or diſguiſed, will direct the management of public affairs.—Whatever be the mechaniſm of the political engine, he will guide the motion.

Theſe inſtances are adduced to illuſtrate the propoſition we laid down, that, in politics, the moſt important and permanent effects have, for the moſt part, been incidental and unforeſeen: and this propoſition we inculcate, for the ſake of the caution which it teaches,

Every diſtrict of the empire enjoys the privilege of chooſing repreſentatives, *informed of the intereſts and circumſtances and deſires of their conſtituents*, and *entitled* by their ſituation *to communicate that information* to the *national council*.—The meaneſt ſubject has ſome one whom he can call upon to bring forward his complaints and requeſts to public attention.

By annexing the right of voting for members of the Houſe of Commons to different qualifications in different places, each order and profeſſion of men in the community become virtually repreſented; that is, men of all orders and profeſſions, *ſtateſmen*, *courtiers*, *country gentlemen*, *lawyers*, *merchants*, *manufacturers*, *ſoldiers*, *ſailors*, intereſted in the proſperity, and experienced in the occupation of their reſpective profeſſions, *obtain ſeats in parliament*.

The elections, at the ſame time, are ſo connected with the *influence* of *landed property* as to afford a *certainty* that a *conſiderable number of men of great eſtates will be returned to parliament*; and are alſo ſo modified, that men the *moſt eminent* and *ſucceſsful* in their reſpective *profeſſions*, are the *moſt likely*, by their *riches*, or the *weight* of their ſtations, to *prevail* in theſe competitions.

The

The *number*, *fortune*, and *quality* of the members; the *variety* of *intereſts* and *characters* amongſt them; above all, the *temporary duration* of their *power*, and the *change of men* which every *new* election produces, are ſo many *ſecurities* to the public, as well againſt the ſubjection of their judgments to any external dictation, as againſt the formation of a junto in their own body, ſufficiently powerful to govern their deciſions.

The *repreſentatives* are ſo *intermixed* with the *conſtituents*, and the *conſtituents* with the *reſt of the people*, that they *cannot*, without a partiality too flagrant to be endured, *impoſe any burden upon the ſubject*, *in which they do not ſhare themſelves*; nor ſcarcely can they adopt an advantageous regulation, in which their own intereſts will not *participate* of the advantage.

The proceedings and debates of parliament, and the parliamentary conduct of each repreſentative, are known by the people at large.

The repreſentative is ſo far *dependent* upon the *conſtituent*, and *political importance* upon *public favour*, that a *member of parliament* cannot more effectually *recommend* himſelf to *eminence* and *advancement* in the ſtate, *than by contriving and patroniſing laws of public utility.*

When

When *intelligence* of the *condition, wants*, and *occaſions* of the people, is thus *collected* from *every quarter*, when ſuch a *variety* of invention, and *ſo many* underſtandings are ſet at work upon the ſubject, it may be *preſumed*, that the moſt eligible, expedient, remedy, or improvement, *will occur to ſome one or other*; and when a wiſe counſel, or beneficial regulation, is once ſuggeſted, it may be *expected*, from the diſpoſition of an aſſembly ſo conſtituted as the Britiſh Houſe of Commons is, *that it cannot fail of receiving the approbation of a majority.*

To prevent thoſe deſtructive contentions for the ſupreme power, which are ſure to take place, where the members of the ſtate do not live under an acknowledged head, and a known rule of ſucceſſion; to preſerve the people in tranquillity at home, by a ſpeedy and vigorous execution of the laws; to protect their intereſt abroad, by ſtrength and energy in military operations, by thoſe advantages of deciſion, ſecrecy, and diſpatch, which belong to the reſolutions of monarchical councils;—*for theſe purpoſes*, the conſtitution has committed the *executive government* to the adminiſtration and *limited* authority of an *hereditary King.*

In the defence of the empire; in the maintenance of its power, dignity, and privileges, with foreign nations;

tions; in the advancement of its trade by treaties and conventions; and in the providing for the general adminiſtration of municipal juſtice, by a proper choice and appointment of magiſtrates, the inclination of the king and of the people uſually coincide: in this part, therefore, of the regal office, the *conſtitution* entruſts the prerogative with *ample powers*.

The *dangers* principally to be apprehended from regal government, relate to the two articles of TAXATION and PUNISHMENT.—In every form of government, from which the people are excluded, it is the intereſt of the governors to get as much, and of the governed to give as little, as they can: the power alſo of puniſhment, in the hands of an arbitrary prince, oftentimes becomes an engine of extortion, jealouſy, and revenge.—*Wiſely*, therefore, hath the BRITISH CONSTITUTION *guarded the ſafety* of the people, in theſe two points, by the moſt *ſtudious precaution*.

Upon that of *taxation*, every law, which, by the remoteſt conſtruction, may be deemed to levy money upon the property of the ſubject, *muſt originate*, that is, muſt firſt be propoſed and aſſented to, *in the Houſe of Commons*: by which regulation, accompanying the weight which that aſſembly poſſeſſes in all its functions,

the levying of taxes is almoſt excluſively reſerved to the popular part of the conſtitution, who, it is preſumed, *will not tax themſelves*, nor their *fellow ſubjects*, without being firſt convinced of the *neceſſity* of the aids which they grant.

The application alſo of the public ſupplies is watched with the ſame circumſpection as the aſſeſſment.—Many taxes are annual; the produce of others is mortgaged, or appropriated to ſpecific ſervices; *the expenditure of all of them is accounted for in the Houſe of Commons*; as computations of the charge or the purpoſe for which they are wanted are previouſly ſubmitted to the ſame tribunal.

In the infliction of *puniſhment*, the power of the crown, and of the magiſtrate appointed by the crown, is confirmed by the moſt preciſe limitations: *the guilt of the offender muſt be pronounced by twelve men of his own order, indifferently choſen out of the county where the offence was committed: the puniſhment, or the limits to which the puniſhment may be extended, are aſcertained and affixed to the crime, by laws which know not the perſon of the criminal.*

And whereas, arbitrary or clandeſtine *confinement* is the *injury* moſt to be *dreaded* from the ſtrong hand of the

the executive government, becauſe it deprives the priſoner at once of protection and defence, and delivers him into the power, and to the malicious or intereſted deſigns of his enemies; *the conſtitution has provided againſt this danger with extreme ſolicitude.*—The ancient writ of habeas corpus, the habeas corpus act of Charles the Second, and the practice and determinations of our ſovereign courts of juſtice founded upon theſe laws, afford a *complete remedy* for every conceivable caſe of *illegal* impriſonment [a].

[a] Upon complaint in writing by, or on behalf of, any perſon in confinement, to any of the four courts of Weſtminſter Hall, in term time, or to the Lord Chancellor, or one of the Judges, in the vacation; and upon a probable reaſon being ſuggeſted to queſtion the legality of the detention, a writ is iſſued, to the perſon in whoſe cuſtody the complainant is alledged to be, commanding him within a certain limited and ſhort time to produce the body of the priſoner, and the authority under which he is detained.—Upon the return of the writ, ſtrict and inſtantaneous obedience to which is enforced by very ſevere penalties, if no lawful cauſe of impriſonment appear, the court or judge, before whom the priſoner is brought, is authorized and *bound to diſcharge him*; *even though he may have been committed by a ſecretary, or other high officer of ſtate, by the privy council, or by the King in perſon:* ſo that *no ſubject* of this realm can be held in *confinement*, by *any* power, or under *any* pretence whatever, provided he can find means to convey his complaint to one of the four courts of Weſtminſter Hall, or during their receſs to any of the Judges of the ſame, unleſs all theſe ſeveral tribunals agree in determining his impriſonment to be legal.—*He may make application to them, in ſucceſſion; and if one out of the number be found, who thinks the priſoner entitled to his liberty, that one poſſeſſes authority to reſtore it to him.*



Treaſon being that charge, under colour of which the deſtruction of an obnoxious individual is often ſought; and government being at all times more immediately a party in the proſecution; the law, beſide the general care with which it watches over the ſafety of the accuſed, in this caſe, ſenſible of the unequal conteſt in which the ſubject is engaged, has aſſiſted his defence with extraordinary indulgencies.—*By two ſtatutes, enacted ſince the revolution, every perſon indicted for high treaſon ſhall have a copy of his indictment, a liſt of the witneſſes to be produced, and of the jury impannelled, delivered to him ten days before the trial; he is alſo permitted to make his defence by counſel*; privileges which are not allowed to the priſoner in a trial for any other crime: and what is of more importance to the party than all the reſt, *the teſtimony of two witneſſes*, at leaſt, *is required* to *convict* a perſon of *treaſon*; whereas, one poſitive witneſs is ſufficient in almoſt every other ſpecies of accuſation.

We proceed, in the ſecond place, to enquire in what manner the *conſtitution* has provided for its own PRESERVATION; that is, in what manner each part of the *legiſlature is ſecured* in the exerciſe of the powers aſſigned to it, from the *encroachment* of the other parts.—This ſecurity is ſometimes called the *balance of the conſtitution*; and the political

political equilibrium, which this phraſe denotes, conſiſts in two contrivances,—A BALANCE OF POWER, and A BALANCE OF INTEREST.—By *a balance of power* is meant, that there is no power poſſeſſed by *one* part of the legiſlature, the *abuſe* or *exceſs* of which is not *checked* by ſome *antagoniſt power* reſiding in *another* part.—Thus the *power* of the *two houſes* of parliament to frame laws is *checked* by the *King's negative*; that if laws ſubverſive of real government ſhould obtain the conſent of parliament, the reigning prince, by interpoſing his prerogative, may ſave the neceſſary rights and authority of his ſtation.—On the other hand, the *arbitrary application* of this *negative* is *checked* by the privilege which parliament poſſeſſes, of *refuſing ſupplies of money* to the exigencies of the King's adminiſtration.—The conſtitutional maxim, *that the King can do no wrong*, is *balanced* by another maxim, not leſs conſtitutional, *that the illegal commands of the King do not juſtify thoſe who aſſiſt or concur in carrying them into execution*; and by a ſecond rule, ſubſidiary to this, *that the acts of the crown acquire not any legal force, until authenticated by the ſubſcription of ſome of its great officers*.—The wiſdom of this contrivance is worthy of obſervation.—As the King could not be puniſhed, without a civil war, the conſti-

tution

of the republic; that is, it would reduce the nobility from the hereditary ſhare they poſſeſs in the national councils, in which their real greatneſs conſiſts, to the being made a part of the empty pageantry of a deſpotic court.—On the other hand, if the *houſe of commons* ſhould intrench upon the diſtinct province, or uſurp the eſtabliſhed prerogative of the *crown*, the *houſe of lords* would receive an inſtant alarm from every new ſtretch of popular power.—In every conteſt in which the *King* may be engaged with the *repreſentative body*, in defence of his eſtabliſhed ſhare of authority, he will find a ſure ally in the collective power of the *nobility*.—An attachment to the monarchy, from which they derive their own diſtinction; the allurements of a court, in the habits and with the ſentiments of which they have been brought up; their hatred of equality, and of all levelling pretenſions, which may ultimately affect the privileges, or even the exiſtence of their order; in ſhort, every principle and every prejudice which are wont to actuate human conduct, will determine their choice, to the ſide and ſupport of the crown.—Laſtly, if the *nobles* themſelves ſhould attempt to revive the ſuperiorities, which their anceſtors exerciſed under the feudal conſtitution, the *King* and the *people* would alike remember, how

the

the one had been inſulted, and the other enſlaved, by that barbarous tyranny.—They would forget the natural oppoſition of their views and inclinations, when they ſaw themſelves threatened with the return of a *domination*, which was *odious and intolerable to both* [a].

There

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of the republic; that is, it would reduce the nobility from the hereditary ſhare they poſſeſs in the national councils, in which their real greatneſs conſiſts, to the being made a part of the empty pageantry of a deſpotic court.—On the other hand, if the *houſe of commons* ſhould intrench upon the diſtinct province, or uſurp the eſtabliſhed prerogative of the *crown*, the *houſe of lords* would receive an inſtant alarm from every new ſtretch of popular power.—In every conteſt in which the *King* may be engaged with the *repreſentative body*, in defence of his eſtabliſhed ſhare of authority, he will find a ſure ally in the collective power of the *nobility*.—An attachment to the monarchy, from which they derive their own diſtinction; the allurements of a court, in the habits and with the ſentiments of which they have been brought up; their hatred of equality, and of all levelling pretenſions, which may ultimately affect the privileges, or even the exiſtence of their order; in ſhort, every principle and every prejudice which are wont to actuate human conduct, will determine their choice, to the ſide and ſupport of the crown.—Laſtly, if the *nobles* themſelves ſhould attempt to revive the ſuperiorities, which their anceſtors exerciſed under the feudal conſtitution, the *King* and the *people* would alike remember, how

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There is nothing, in the Britiſh conſtitution, ſo remarkable, as the *irregularity of the* POPULAR REPRESENTATION.—The *houſe of commons* conſiſts of *five hundred* and *forty-eight* members, of whom *two hundred* are elected by *ſeven thouſand conſtituents:* ſo that a majority

actual ſtate of theſe advantages deſerves, that, after all, is moſt likely to be right and expedient, which appears to be ſo to the ſeparate judgment and deciſion of a great majority of the nation; at leaſt, that, in general, *is right for them*, which is *agreeable* to their *fixed opinions and deſires.*—But when we obſerve *what is urged as the public opinion*, to be, in truth, the *opinion only*, or perhaps the *feigned profeſſions* of a *few crafty leaders*; that the *members* who *join* in the *cry*, ſerve only to ſwell and multiply the ſound, without any acceſſion of judgment, or exerciſe of underſtanding; and that oftentimes the *wiſeſt counſels* have been thus *overborne* by *tumult* and *uproar*,—we may conceive occaſions to ariſe, in which the *commonwealth may be ſaved* by the *reluctance* of the nobility to adopt the caprices, or to yield to the vehemence of the common people.—In expecting this advantage from an order of nobles, we do not ſuppoſe the nobility to be more unprejudiced than others; we only ſuppoſe that their *prejudices will be different from*, and may occaſionally *counteract*, *thoſe of others.*

The *admiſſion* of *a ſmall number of eccleſiaſtics* into the *houſe of lords* is but an *equitable compenſation* to the clergy for the *excluſion* of their order from the houſe of commons.—They are a ſet of men conſiderable by their number and property, as well as by their influence, and the duties of their ſtation; yet, whilſt every other profeſſion has thoſe amongſt the national repreſentatives, who, being converſant in the ſame occupation, are able to ſtate, and naturally diſpoſed to ſupport, the rights and intereſts of the claſs to which they belong, the clergy alone are deprived of this advantage.—Which hardſhip is made up to them by introducing the prelacy into parliament; *and if biſhops, from gratitude or expectation, be more obſequious to the will of the crown, than thoſe who poſſeſs great temporal inheritances, they are properly inſerted into that part of the conſtitution, from which much or frequent reſiſtance to the meaſures of government is not expected.*

of

of theſe ſeven thouſand, without any reaſonable title to ſuperior weight or influence in the ſtate, may, under certain circumſtances, decide a queſtion againſt the opinion of as many millions.—*Or*, to place the ſame object in another point of view; if my eſtate be ſituated in one county of the kingdom, I poſſeſs the ten thouſandth part of a ſingle repreſentative; if in another, the thouſandth; if in a particular diſtrict, I may be one in twenty who chooſe two repreſentatives; if in a ſtill more favoured ſpot, I may enjoy the right of appointing two myſelf.—If I have been born, or dwell, or have ſerved an apprenticeſhip in one town, I am repreſented in the national aſſembly by two deputies, in the choice of whom I exerciſe an actual and ſenſible ſhare of power; if accident has thrown my birth, or habitation, or ſervice, into another town, I have no repreſentative at all, nor more power or concern in the election of thoſe who make the laws, by which I am governed, than if I was a ſubject of the Grand Signior—and this partiality ſubſiſts without any pretence whatever of merit or of propriety, to juſtify the preference of one place to another.—*Or*, thirdly, to deſcribe the ſtate of national repreſentation as it exiſts in reality, it may be affirmed, I believe, with truth, that about one half of the houſe

of commons obtain their ſeats in that aſſembly by the election of the people, the other half by purchaſe, or by the nomination of ſingle proprietors of great eſtates.

This is a flagrant *incongruity* in the conſtitution; but it is one of thoſe *objections* which *ſtrike moſt forcibly at firſt*.—The *effect* of *all reaſoning* upon the ſubject will *diminiſh* the firſt impreſſion: on which account it deſerves the more attentive examination, that we may be aſſured, before we *adventure* upon a *reformation*, that the MAGNITUDE OF THE EVIL JUSTIFIES THE DANGER OF THE EXPERIMENT.

In the few remarks that follow, we would be underſtood, in the firſt place, to *decline all conference* with thoſe who wiſh to *alter the form of government of theſe kingdoms*.—The reformers with whom we have to do, are they, who, while they *change* this part of the ſyſtem, would *retain the reſt*.—If any Engliſhman expect more happineſs to his country under a *republic*, he may very *conſiſtently* recommend a new modelling of elections to parliament; becauſe, *if the king and houſe of lords were laid aſide*, the preſent diſproportionate repreſentation would produce nothing but a *confuſed and ill-digeſted oligarchy*.—In like manner we wave a controverſy

verſy with thoſe writers who inſiſt upon repreſentation as a *natural* right[a]: we conſider it ſo far only as *a right at all*, as it conduces to PUBLIC UTILITY; that is, *as it contributes to the eſtabliſhment of good laws, or as it ſecures to the people the juſt adminiſtration of theſe laws.*—Theſe *effects* depend upon the *diſpoſition* and *abilities* of the *national counſellors.*—Wherefore, if *men the moſt likely by their qualifications to know and to promote the public intereſt be actually returned to parliament, it ſignifies little who return them.*—If the *propereſt perſons* be *elected*, what matters it *by whom* they are elected?—*At leaſt, no prudent ſtateſman would ſubvert long eſtabliſhed or even ſettled rules of repreſentation, without a proſpect of procuring wiſer or better repreſentatives.*

This then being well obſerved, let us, before we ſeek to obtain any thing more, conſider duly what we *already have.*—We *have* a houſe of commons compoſed of *five hundred and forty-eight members*, in which number are found the moſt CONSIDERABLE LANDHOLDERS

[a] If this right be *natural*, no doubt it muſt be equal, and the right, we may add, of one ſex, as well as of the other.—Whereas every plan of repreſentation we have heard of begins by excluding the votes of women: thus cutting off, at a ſingle ſtroke, *one half* of the public from a right which is aſſerted to be inherent in *all*; a right too, as ſome repreſent it, not only univerſal, but unalienable and indefeaſible.

and

and MERCHANTS of the kingdom; the HEADS of the ARMY, the NAVY, and the LAW; the OCCUPIERS of GREAT OFFICES IN THE STATE; together with MANY PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS, eminent by their knowledge, eloquence, or activity.—Now, if the *country* be not *ſafe* in *ſuch hands*, in *whoſe* may it *confide its intereſts?*—If *ſuch* a number of *ſuch* men be *liable* to the *influence* of *corrupt motives*, what aſſembly of *men* will be *ſecure* from the *ſame danger?*—Does any *new ſcheme of repreſentation promiſe* to *collect* together *more* wiſdom, or to produce *firmer integrity?*

In this view of the ſubject, and attending not to ideas of *order* and *proportion* (of which many minds are much enamoured), but to *effects alone*, we may diſcover *juſt excuſes* for thoſe parts of the preſent repreſentation which appear to a *haſty obſerver moſt exceptionable and abſurd.*

It ſhould be remembered as a maxim extremely applicable to this ſubject, that no order or aſſembly of men whatever can long maintain their place and authority in a *mixed government*, of which the members do not individually poſſeſs a reſpectable ſhare of perſonal importance.—Now, whatever may be the *defects* of the preſent arrangement, it *infallibly ſecures a great weight of property to the houſe of commons*, by rendering *many ſeats*

in

that houſe acceſſible to men of *large fortunes*, and to *ſuch n alone*.—By which means thoſe characters are en-ged in the defence of the ſeparate rights and intereſts this branch of the legiſlature, that are beſt able to pport its claims.—The conſtitution of moſt of the all boroughs, eſpecially the burgage tenure, contri-ites, though undeſignedly, to the ſame effect; for the pointment of the repreſentatives we find commonly nexed to certain great inheritances.—*Elections purely pular* are in this reſpect *uncertain:* in times of *tran-illity*, the *natural aſcendancy of wealth will prevail*; it when the *minds of men* are *inflamed* by political diffen-ons, *this influence* often *yields to more impetuous motives.*

The *variety* of *tenures* and *qualifications*, upon which ie right of voting is founded, appears to me a re-ommendation of the mode which now ſubſiſts, as it nds to introduce into parliament a correſponding *ixture of characters and profeſſions*.—It has been long ſerved that *conſpicuous abilities are moſt frequently found ith the repreſentatives of ſmall boroughs*.—And this is othing more than what the laws of human conduct ight teach us to expect: when ſuch boroughs are ſet ſale, thoſe men are likely to become purchaſers who e able to make the beſt diſplay of their talents: and when

when a ſeat is not ſold, but *given* by the opulent p
prietor of a burgage tenure, the patron finds his own
tereſt conſulted, by the reputation and abilities of
member whom he nominates.

If certain of the nobility hold the *appointment* of
part of the houſe of commons, it ſerves to *maintain*
alliance between the *two branches of the legiſlature*, wh
no good citizen would *wiſh to ſee diſſevered:* it helps
keep the *government* of the country in *the houſe*
commons, in which, it would not perhaps long conti
to reſide, if ſo *powerful* and *wealthy* a part of the
tion as the peerage compoſe, were *excluded from all ſh*
and intereſt in its conſtitution.

If there be a *few* boroughs ſo circumſtanced as
lie at the *diſpoſal* of the *crown*, whilſt the number
ſuch is *known* and *ſmall*, they may be *tolerated with l*
danger.—For where would be the impropriety, or
inconveniency, if the king at once ſhould nomina
limited number of his ſervants to ſeats in parliame
or, what is the ſame thing, if ſeats in parliament w
annexed to the poſſeſſion of certain of the moſt effic
and reſponſible offices in the ſtate?

The preſent repreſentation, after all theſe deducti
and under the confuſion in which it confeſſedly lies

ſtill in ſuch a degree *popular*; or rather the *repreſentatives are ſo connected with the maſs of the community*, by a *ſociety* of *intereſts* and *paſſions*, that the *will of the people*, when it is determined, permanent, and general, almoſt always at length prevails.

UPON THE WHOLE, IN THE SEVERAL PLANS WHICH HAVE BEEN SUGGESTED, OF AN EQUAL OR A REFORMED REPRESENTATION, IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO DISCOVER ANY PROPOSAL THAT HAS A TENDENCY TO THROW MORE OF THE BUSINESS OF THE NATION INTO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, OR TO COLLECT A SET OF MEN MORE FIT TO TRANSACT THAT BUSINESS, OR IN GENERAL MORE INTERESTED IN THE NATIONAL HAPPINESS AND PROSPERITY.

One conſequence, however, may be *expected* from *theſe projects*, namely, "*leſs flexibility to the* INFLUENCE OF THE CROWN."—And ſince the *diminution of this influence*, is the *ſecret*, and perhaps the *ſole deſign* of the various ſchemes that have been produced, whether for *regulating the elections*, *contracting the duration*, or for *purifying* the *conſtitution of parliament* by the *excluſion of placemen and penſioners*; it is obvious to remark, that the more *apt* and *natural*, as well as the more *ſafe*

and *quiet way* of attaining the *ſame end*, would be by a *direct reduction* of the *patronage of the crown*, which might be effected to a *certain extent* without *hazarding farther conſequences*.—Superfluous and exorbitant emoluments of office may not only be *ſuppreſſed* for the preſent; but proviſions of law be deviſed, which ſhould for the future reſtrain within certain limits, the *number* and *value* of the offices in the *donation of the king*.

But whilſt we diſpute concerning *different* ſchemes of *reformation*, all directed to the *ſame end*, a previous *doubt* occurs in the debate, whether the *end itſelf be good, or ſafe—whether the influence ſo loudly complained of can be deſtroyed, or even much diminiſhed, without danger to the ſtate*.

Whilſt the *zeal* of ſome men beholds *this influence* with a *jealouſy*, which nothing but its *entire abolition* can appeaſe, many *wiſe* and *virtuous politicians* deem a *conſiderable portion of it* to be as *neceſſary a part of the Britiſh conſtitution*, as any *other ingredient* in the *compoſition*—to be that, indeed, which gives coheſion and ſolidity to the whole.—Were the *meaſures of government*, ſay they, *oppoſed* from *nothing but principle*, government ought to have *nothing* but the *rectitude of its meaſures* to *ſupport them*; but ſince *oppoſition* ſprings

from *other motives*, government muſt poſſeſs an *influence* to *counteract theſe motives*; to produce, not a *bias* of the paſſions, but a *neutrality:* it muſt have *ſome weight* to caſt into the ſcale to ſet the balance even.

It is the nature of ambition always to preſs upon the boundaries which confine it.—LICENTIOUSNESS, FACTION, ENVY, IMPATIENCE OF CONTROL OR INFERIORITY; THE SECRET PLEASURE OF MORTIFYING THE GREAT, OR THE HOPE OF DISPOSSESSING THEM; A CONSTANT WILLINGNESS TO QUESTION AND THWART WHATEVER IS DICTATED OR EVEN PROPOSED BY ANOTHER; A DISPOSITION COMMON TO ALL BODIES OF MEN TO EXTEND THE CLAIMS AND AUTHORITY OF THEIR ORDER; ABOVE ALL, THAT LOVE OF POWER AND OF SHOWING IT, WHICH RESIDES MORE OR LESS IN EVERY HUMAN BREAST, AND WHICH, IN POPULAR ASSEMBLIES, IS INFLAMED, LIKE EVERY OTHER PASSION, BY COMMUNICATION AND ENCOURAGEMENT: theſe motives, added to *private* deſigns and reſentments, *cheriſhed* alſo by popular acclamation, and operating upon the great mare of power already poſſeſſed by the houſe of commons, might *induce a majority*, or at leaſt a *large party* of men in that aſſembly, to *unite* in endeavouring to



draw to themſelves the *whole government of the ſtate*; or at leaſt ſo to *obſtruct* the *conduct of public affairs*, by a *wanton* and *perverſe oppoſition*, as to render it *impoſſible* for the *wiſeſt* ſtateſman to *carry forwards the buſineſs of the nation with ſucceſs or ſatisfaction*.

Some paſſages of *our national hiſtory* afford *grounds* for *theſe apprehenſions*.—Before the acceſſion of James the Firſt, or, at leaſt, during the reigns of his three immediate predeceſſors, the government of England was a government by force; that is, the king carried his meaſures in parliament by INTIMIDATION.—A ſenſe of perſonal danger kept the members of the houſe of commons in ſubjection.—A conjunction of fortunate cauſes delivered at laſt the parliament and nation from ſlavery.—That overbearing ſyſtem, which had declined in the hands of James, expired early in the reign of his ſon.—After the reſtoration there ſucceeded in its place, and ſince the revolution has been methodically purſued, the more ſucceſsful expedient of INFLUENCE.—Now we remember what paſſed *between* the *loſs* of *terror*, and the *eſtabliſhment* of *influence*.—THE TRANSACTIONS OF THAT INTERVAL, WHATEVER WE MAY THINK OF THEIR OCCASION OR EFFECT, NO FRIEND OF REGAL GOVERNMENT WOULD WISH TO SEE REVIVED.

But

But the affairs of this kingdom afford a more recent tteſtation to the ſame doctrine.—In the Britiſh colonies f NORTH AMERICA, the late aſſemblies poſſeſſed uch of the power and conſtitution of *our houſe of ommons*.—The king and government of Great Britain eld *no patronage* in the country, which could create *ttachment* and *influence* ſufficient to *counteract* that *ſtleſs, arrogating ſpirit*, which in *popular aſſemblies*, hen *left to itſelf*, will never *brook an authority*, that *ecks* and *interferes with its own*.—To this cauſe, ıcited perhaps by ſome *unſeaſonable provocations*, we ay attribute, as to their *true* and *proper original*, e will not ſay the *misfortunes*, but the *changes* that ve taken place in the Britiſh empire.—The *admo-ıon*, which ſuch examples ſuggeſt, will have its ight with *thoſe*, who are *content* with the *general ıme of the Engliſh conſtitution*; and who conſider *ſtabi-y* amongſt the *firſt perfections* of any government.

We *proteſt* however againſt any conſtruction, by ıich what is here ſaid ſhall be attempted to be applied the *juſtification of* BRIBERY, or of any *clandeſtine re-ard* or *ſolicitation* whatever.—*The very ſecrecy of ſuch ociations conſtitutes or begets a conſciouſneſs of guilt*; *which en the mind is once taught to endure without uneaſineſs*,

the



the character is prepared for every compliance.—And there is the greater danger in theſe corrupt practices, as the *extent* of their operation is *unlimited* and *unknown.*—Our apology relates ſolely to *that influence*, which reſults from the *acceptance* or *expectation of public preferments.*

In political, above all other ſubjects, the arguments, or rather the conjectures on each ſide of a queſtion, are often ſo equally poized, that the *wiſeſt judgments* may be held in ſuſpenſe.—*Theſe I call ſubjects of* INDIFFERENCE.—But again, when the ſubject is not *indifferent in itſelf*, it will appear ſuch to a great part of thoſe to whom it is propoſed, for want of information, or reflection, or experience, or of capacity to collect and weigh the reaſons by which either ſide is ſupported.—*Theſe are ſubjects of* APPARENT INDIFFERENCE.—This indifference occurs ſtill more frequently in *perſonal conteſts*; in which we do not often diſcover any reaſon of public utility, for the *preference* of one competitor to another.—*Theſe caſes compoſe the province of influence*; that is, *the deciſion in theſe caſes will inevitably be determined by influence of ſome ſort or other.*—The *only doubt is*, what *influence* ſhall be *admitted.*—If you remove the influence of the *crown*, it is only to make way for *in-*

fluence

fluence from a different quarter.—If motives of *expectation* and *gratitude* be withdrawn, other *motives* will ſucceed in their place, acting probably in an *oppoſite direction*, but equally irrelative and external to the proper merits of the queſtion.—There exiſt, as we have ſeen, *paſſions* in the *human heart*, which will always make a *ſtrong party* againſt the *executive power* of a mixed government.—According as the diſpoſition of parliament is *friendly* or *adverſe* to the recommendation of the crown in matters which are *really* or *apparently indifferent*, as indifference hath been now explained, the buſineſs of empire will be tranſacted with *eaſe* and convenience, or *embarraſſed* with *endleſs contention and difficulty*.—Nor is it a *concluſion founded* in *juſtice* or *warranted* by *experience*, that, becauſe men are induced by views of intereſt to *yield their conſent to meaſures*, concerning which their *judgment decides nothing*, they may be brought by the *ſame influence*, to act in *deliberate oppoſition to knowledge and duty*.

Whoever reviews the operations of government in this country ſince the revolution, will find *few* even of the moſt queſtionable meaſures of adminiſtration, about which the *beſt inſtructed judgment* might not have doubted at the time; but of which he may affirm with certainty,

certainty, *that they were indifferent to the greateſt part of thoſe who concurred in them.*—From the ſucceſs or the facility, with which they who dealt out the patronage of the crown carried meaſures like theſe, *we ought not to conclude*, that a *ſimilar application of honours and emoluments would procure the conſent of parliament to councils evidently detrimental to the common welfare.*

Is there not, on the contrary, more reaſon to fear, that the prerogative, if deprived of influence, would not be long able to ſupport itſelf?—For when we reflect upon the power of the houſe of commons to extort a compliance with its reſolutions from the other parts of the legiſlature; or to put to death the conſtitution by a refuſal of the annual grants of money, to the ſupport of the neceſſary functions of government—when we reflect alſo, what *motives* there are, which in the viciſſitudes of political intereſts and paſſions, may one day arm and point this power againſt the executive magiſtrate—when we attend to theſe conſiderations, we ſhall be led perhaps to acknowledge, that there is not more of paradox than of truth, in that important but much decried apophthegm,—"*that an independent parliament is incompatible with the exiſtence of the monarchy.*"

SECT.

SECT. XVIII.

THE DECLARATION OF OUR RIGHTS.

BERTY denotes a ſtate of *freedom*, in contradiſ-
on to *ſlavery* or *reſtraint*; and may be conſidered
ıer *natural* or *civil*.

ıe *abſolute rights* of man, conſidered as a free agent,
ved with diſcernment to know good from evil, and
power of chooſing thoſe meaſures which appear to
o be moſt deſirable, are uſually ſummed up in
ıeneral appellation, and denominated the *natural li-
of mankind*.—This *natural liberty* conſiſts properly
ower of acting as one thinks fit, without any re-
: or controul, unleſs by the law of nature; being
t inherent in us by birth, and one of the gifts of
o man at his creation, when he endued him with
:ulty of free-will.—But every man, when he en-
to ſociety, gives up *a part of his natural liberty*, as
ice of ſo *valuable a purchaſe*; and, in conſideration
eiving the advantages of mutual commerce, ob-

liges himſelf to conform to thoſe laws which the community has thought proper to eſtabliſh. — And this ſpecies of *legal obedience* and conformity is infinitely more *deſirable* than that *wild* and *ſavage liberty* which *is ſacrificed* to obtain it.—*For no man, that conſiders a moment, would wiſh to retain the abſolute and uncontrouled power of doing whatever he pleaſes; the conſequence of which is that every other man would alſo have the ſame power; and then there would be no ſecurity to individuals in any of the enjoyments of life* [a].

Political,

[a] The poets in deſcribing the ſtate of nature have painted the golden age or the reign of SATURN. The ſeaſons, in that firſt period were ſo temperate, if we credit theſe agreeable fictions, that there was no neceſſity for men to provide themſelves with cloaths and houſes, as a ſecurity againſt the violence of heat and cold: the rivers flowed with wine and milk: the oaks yielded honey; and nature ſpontaneouſly produced her greateſt delicacies. Nor were theſe the chief advantages of that happy age. Tempeſts were not alone removed from nature; but thoſe more furious tempeſts were unknown to human breaſts, which now cauſe ſuch uproar, and engender ſuch confuſion. Avarice, ambition, cruelty, ſelfiſhneſs, were never heard of: cordial affection, compaſſion, ſympathy, were the only movements with which the mind was yet acquainted. Even the punctilious diſtinction of *mine* and *thine* was baniſhed from among that happy race of mortals, and carried with it the very notion of property and obligation, juſtice and injuſtice.

It ſeems evident, that, in ſuch a happy ſtate, every other ſocial virtue would flouriſh, and receive tenfold increaſe; but the cautious, jealous virtue of juſtice would never once have been dreamed of. *For what purpoſe make a partition of goods, where every one has already more than enough? Why give riſe to property, where there cannot poſſibly be any injury?* Why call this ob-

ject

Political, therefore, or *civil*, *liberty*, which is that of a member of ſociety, is no other than *natural liberty*, ſo far *reſtrained* by human laws (and no *farther*) as is neceſſary and expedient for the *general advantage* of the public.

Hence we may collect, that the law, which reſtrains a man from doing miſchief to his fellow citizens, though it diminiſhes the *natural*, increaſes the *civil liberty* of mankind: but every wanton and cauſeleſs reſtraint of the will of the ſubject, whether practiſed by a monarch, a nobility, or a popular aſſembly, *is a degree of tyranny*. —Nay, that even laws themſelves, whether made with or without our conſent, if they regulate and conſtrain our conduct in matters of mere indifference, without *any good end* in view, are laws deſtructive of liberty: whereas, if *any public advantage* can ariſe from obſerving ſuch precepts, the *controul* of our *private* inclinations, in *one* or *two particular points*, will conduce to preſerve our *general freedom* in others of more importance, by ſupporting that ſtate of ſociety which alone can ſecure our independence. —Thus the ſtatute of

ſt *mine*, when, upon the ſeizing of it by another, I need but ſtretch out my nd to poſſeſs myſelf of what is equally valuable? Juſtice, in that caſe, ing totally USELESS, would be an idle ceremonial, and could never poſſi- r have place.

king EDWARD IV. which forbad the fine gentlemen of thoſe times (under the degree of a lord) to wear *pikes* upon their ſhoes or boots of *more* than *two inches in length*, was a law that ſavoured of oppreſſion; becauſe, however ridiculous the faſhion then in uſe might appear, the reſtraining it by pecuniary penalties could ſerve no purpoſe of common utility.—But the ſtatute of king CHARLES II. which preſcribes a thing ſeemingly as indifferent, viz. a dreſs for the dead, who were all ordered to be *buried in woollen*, is a law conſiſtent with public liberty; for it encourages the ſtaple trade, on which in great meaſure depends the univerſal good of the nation.

So that laws, when *prudently framed*, are by no means *ſubverſive*, but rather *introductive*, of *liberty*; for (as Mr. LOCKE has well obſerved) *where* there is *no law* there is *no freedom*.—But then, on the other hand, *that conſtitution or frame of government, that ſyſtem of laws*, is *alone* calculated to maintain *civil liberty*, which leaves the ſubject entire maſter of his own conduct, *except in thoſe points*, wherein the *public good* requires ſome direction or reſtraint.

THE IDEA AND PRACTICE OF THIS POLITICAL OR CIVIL LIBERTY FLOURISH IN THEIR HIGHEST VIGOUR

GOUR IN THESE KINGDOMS, WHERE IT FALLS LITTLE SHORT OF PERFECTION, AND CAN ONLY BE LOST OR DESTROYED BY THE FOLLY OR DEMERITS OF ITS OWNER; the *legiſlature*, and of courſe the *laws of Britain*, being peculiarly adapted to the *preſervation* of this *ineſtimable bleſſing* even in the *meaneſt ſubject*.

This ſpirit of liberty is ſo deeply implanted in our conſtitution, and rooted even in our very ſoil, that a ſlave or a negro, the moment he lands in BRITAIN, *falls under the protection of the laws, and becomes ſo far a freeman.*

Very different from the modern conſtitutions of other ſtates on the continent of Europe, and from the genius of the imperial law; which in general are calculated to veſt an arbitrary and deſpotic power, of controuling the actions of the ſubject, in the prince, or in a few grandees.

The ABSOLUTE RIGHTS *of every Briton* (which, taken in a political and extenſive ſenſe, are uſually called their *liberties)*, as they are founded on nature and reaſon, ſo they are coeval with our form of government; though ſubject at times to *fluctuate* and *change*, their eſtabliſhment (excellent as it is) being ſtill *human*.—At ſome times we have ſeen them depreſſed *by overbearing and tyrannical princes*; at others, ſo luxuriant as even to tend

tend to *anarchy*, *a worſe ſtate than tyranny itſelf*, as any government is better than none at all.—But the *vigour* of our *free conſtitution* has always delivered *the nation* from theſe embarraſſments: and, as ſoon as the convulſions conſequent on the ſtruggle have been over, the *balance* of our rights and liberties has ſettled to its *proper level*; and *their fundamental articles* have been from time to time *aſſerted in parliament*, as often as they were thought to be in danger:

Firſt, by the GREAT CHARTER OF LIBERTIES, which was obtained, ſword in hand, from King JOHN, and afterwards, with ſome alterations, confirmed in parliament by King HENRY III. his ſon.—Which charter contained very few new grants; but, as Sir Edward Coke obſerves, was for the moſt part declaratory of the principal grounds of the fundamental laws of England.

Afterwards, by the ſtatute called CONFIRMATIO CARTARUM, whereby the great charter is directed to be allowed as the common law; all judgments contrary to it are declared void; copies of it are ordered to be ſent to all cathedral churches, and read twice a year to the people; and ſentence of excommunication is directed to be as conſtantly denounced againſt all thoſe that

that by word, deed, or counſel, act contrary thereto, or in any degree infringe it.

Next by a multitude of ſubſequent corroborating ſtatutes (Sir Edward Coke reckons thirty-two), from the FIRST EDWARD to HENRY IV.

Then, after a long interval, by THE PETITION OF RIGHT; which was a *parliamentary declaration of the liberties of the people*, aſſented to by King CHARLES I. in the beginning of his reign.—Which was cloſely *followed* by the ſtill more ample conceſſions made by that unhappy prince to his parliament, before the fatal rupture between them; and by the many ſalutary laws, particularly the *habeas corpus* act, paſſed under CHARLES II.

To theſe *ſucceeded* THE BILL OF RIGHTS, or declaration delivered by the *lords* and *commons* to the PRINCE and PRINCESS of ORANGE, 13th of February, 1688; and *afterwards enacted in parliament*, when they became king and queen: which declaration concludes in theſe remarkable words: "*and they do claim, demand, and inſiſt upon, all and ſingular the premiſes, as their undoubted rights and liberties.*"—And the act of parliament itſelf recogniſes "*all and ſingular the rights and liberties aſſerted and claimed in the ſaid declaration to be the true,*

ancient, and indubitable rights of the people of this kingdom."

Laſtly, theſe liberties were again aſſerted at the commencement of the preſent century, in the ACT OF SETTLEMENT, whereby the crown was limited to his preſent Majeſty's illuſtrious houſe: and ſome new proviſions were added, at the ſame fortunate era, for better ſecuring our *religion*, *laws*, and *liberties*; which the ſtatute declares to be "*the birthright of the people of England*," according to the ancient doctrine of the common law.

Thus much for the *declaration* of our *rights* and *liberties*.—The *rights themſelves*, thus defined by theſe ſeveral ſtatutes, *conſiſt* in the number of *private immunities*; which will appear, from what has been premiſed, to be indeed no other, than either *that reſiduum* of *natural liberty*, *which is not required by the laws of ſociety to be ſacrificed to public convenience*; or elſe thoſe civil privileges, which ſociety hath engaged to provide, in *lieu* of the natural liberties ſo given up by individuals.

Theſe therefore were formerly, either by inheritance or purchaſe, the rights of all mankind; but, in moſt other countries of the world, being now more or leſs debaſed and deſtroyed, they at preſent may be ſaid to remain,

emain, in a peculiar and emphatical manner, THE RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE OF BRITAIN.—And theſe may be reduced to *three* principal or primary articles; THE RIGHT OF PERSONAL SECURITY, THE RIGHT OF PERSONAL LIBERTY, AND THE RIGHT OF PRIVATE PROPERTY: becauſe, as there is no other known method of compulſion, or of abridging man's natural free-will, but by an infringement or diminution of one or other of theſe important rights, the preſervation of theſe inviolate may juſtly be ſaid to include the preſervation of our civil immunities in their largeſt and moſt extenſive ſenſe.

In vain, however, would theſe rights be declared, aſcertained, and protected by the *dead letter of the law*, if the conſtitution had provided *no other method* to ſecure their actual enjoyment.—It has therefore eſtabliſhed certain other *auxiliary ſubordinate rights* of the ſubject, which *ſerve* principally as barriers to *protect* and *maintain inviolate* the *three great* and *primary* rights, of *perſonal ſecurity*, *perſonal liberty*, and *private property*.—Theſe are,

1. THE CONSTITUTION, POWERS, AND PRIVILEGES OF PARLIAMENT.

2. THE LIMITATION OF THE KING'S PREROGATIVE, by bounds ſo certain and notorious, that it is impoſſible he ſhould exceed them without the conſent of the people.

The *former* of theſe keeps the *legiſlative power* in due *health and vigour*, ſo as to make it *improbable that laws ſhould be enacted deſtructive of general liberty:* the *latter* is a *guard* upon the *executive power*, by reſtraining it from acting either beyond or in contradiction to the laws that are framed and eſtabliſhed by the other.

3. A third ſubordinate right of every Briton is that of applying to the courts of juſtice for REDRESS OF INJURIES.

Since the *law* is, in this realm, *the ſupreme arbiter of every man's life, liberty, and property*, courts of juſtice muſt at all times be open to the ſubject, and the law be duly adminiſtered therein.—The emphatical words of *magna charta*, ſpoken in the perſon of the king, who in judgment of law (ſays SIR EDWARD COKE) is ever preſent and repeating them in all his courts, are theſe: *Nulli vendemus, nulli negabimus, aut differemus rectum vel juſtitiam* [a]; "and therefore every ſubject (continues the ſame learned author), for injury done to him *in*

[a] See the end of this paragraph.

bonis,

bonis, in terris, vel perſona [a], by any other ſubject, be he eccleſiaſtical or temporal, without any exception, may take his remedy by the courſe of the law, and have juſtice and right for the injury done to him, *freely without ſale, fully without any denial,* and *ſpeedily without delay.*"

It were endleſs to enumerate all the *affirmative* acts of parliament, wherein *juſtice* is directed to be done *according to the law of the land:* and what that law is, every ſubject knows, or may know if he pleaſes; for *it depends not upon the arbitrary will of any judge; but is permanent, fixed, and unchangeable, unleſs by authority of parliament* [b].

We ſhall however juſt mention a few *negative* ſtatutes, whereby abuſes, perverſions, or delays of juſtice, eſpecially by the *prerogative,* are reſtrained.—It is ordained by *magna charta,* that no freeman ſhall be outlawed, that is, put out of the protection and benefit of the laws, but according to the law of the land.—By 2 EDW. III. c. 8. and 11 RIC. II. c. 10. it is enacted, *that no commands or letters ſhall be ſent under the great*

[a] In goods, in lands, or in perſon.

[b] *Parliament knows not the individuals upon whom its acts will operate; it has no caſes or parties before it; no private deſigns to ſerve: conſequently its reſolutions* will be ſuggeſted by the conſideration of *univerſal effects and tendencies, which always produce impartial, and commonly advantageous regulations.*

ſeal, or the little ſeal, the ſignet or privy ſeal, in diſturbance of the law, or to diſturb or delay common right: and, though ſuch commandments ſhould come, the judges ſhall not ceaſe to do right: which is alſo made a part of their oath by ſtatute 18 EDW. III. ſt. 4.—And by 1 W. & M. ſt. 2. c. 2, it is declared, that the pretended power of ſuſpending or diſpenſing with laws, or the execution of laws, by regal authority without conſent of parliament, is illegal [a].

Not

[a] *To render the ſecurity of our rights ſtill more perfect the judges*, who, before the revolution, held their offices *during the pleaſure of the king*, can *now* only be *deprived of them* by an *addreſs from both houſes of parliament*; as the moſt *regular*, *ſolemn*, and *authentic way*, by which the *diſſatisfaction* of the *people* can be expreſſed.—To make *this independency of the judges complete*, the *public ſalaries* of their office are not only certain both in amount and continuance, *but ſo liberal as to ſecure their integrity from the temptation of ſecret bribes:* which *liberality* anſwers alſo the further purpoſe of preſerving their *juriſdiction* from *contempt*, and their *characters* from *ſuſpicion*; as well as that of rendering the office *worthy of the ambition of men of eminence in their profeſſion.*

The number of the judges is alſo in this country ſmall.—For, beſide that the *violence* and *tumult* inſeparable from *large aſſemblies* are inconſiſtent with the *patience*, *method*, and *attention*, requiſite in judicial inveſtigations; beſide that *all paſſions* and *prejudices* act with *augmented force* upon a *collected multitude*; beſide theſe objections, *judges when they are numerous divide the ſhame of an unjuſt determination*; they ſhelter themſelves under one another's example; each man thinks his *own character hid* in the *crowd:* for which reaſon the judges ought always to be *ſo few*, as that *the conduct of each* may be conſpicuous to publſc obſervation; that *each* may be reſponſible in his ſeparate and particular reputation for the deciſions in which he concurs.

The

Not only the ſubſtantial part, or judicial deciſions, of the law, but alſo the *formal part*, or *method of proceeding*, *cannot be altered but by parliament:* for, if once thoſe outworks were demoliſhed, there would be an inlet to all manner of innovation in the body of the law itſelf.—The king, it is true, may erect new courts of juſtice; but then they muſt proceed according to the old eſtabliſhed forms of the common law.—For which reaſon it is declared in the ſtatute of 16 CAR. I. c. 10,

The proceedings are alſo carried on *in public*; *apertis foribus*; not only before a *promiſcuous concourſe* of byſtanders, but *in the audience* of the *whole profeſſion of the law*.—The opinion of the bar concerning what paſſes will be *impartial*; and will commonly guide that of the public.—The *moſt corrupt judge* will *fear to indulge his diſhoneſt wiſhes* in the *preſence of ſuch an aſſembly:* he muſt encounter what few can ſupport, the *cenſure* of his *equals* and *companions*, together with the *indignation* and *reproaches of his country*.

The law of England, by its *circuit* or *itinerary courts*, contains an excellent proviſion for the diſtribution of private juſtice.—*As the preſiding magiſtrate comes into the country a ſtranger to its prejudices, rivalſhips, and connections, he brings with him none of thoſe attachments and regards, which are ſo apt to pervert the courſe of juſtice, when the parties and the judges inhabit the ſame neighbourhood.* Again, as *this magiſtrate* is uſually one of the judges of the ſupreme tribunals of the kingdom, and *has paſſed his life in the ſtudy and adminiſtration of the laws*, he poſſeſſes, it may be preſumed, thoſe profeſſional qualifications, which befit the dignity and importance of his ſtation. Laſtly, as both he, and the *advocates* who accompany him in his circuit, are employed in the buſineſs of thoſe *ſuperior courts* (to which alſo their proceedings are amenable), they will naturally conduct themſelves by the rules of adjudication, which they have applied, or learnt *there:* and by this means maintain, what conſtitutes a principal *perfection of civil government*, *one law of the land in every part and diſtrict of the empire*.

upon

upon the diſſolution of the court of ſtar-chamber, *that neither his majeſty, nor his privy council, have any juriſdiction, power, or authority, by Engliſh bill, petition, articles, libel* (which were the courſe of proceeding in the ſtar-chamber, borrowed from the civil law), *or by any other arbitrary way whatſoever, to examine, or draw into queſtion, determine, or diſpoſe of the lands or goods of any ſubjects of this kingdom*; *but that the ſame ought to be tried and determined in the ordinary courts of juſtice, and by* COURSE OF LAW [a].

4. If there ſhould happen any uncommon injury, or infringement of the rights before mentioned, which the ordinary courſe of law is too deficient to reach, there ſtill remains a fourth ſubordinate right, appertaining to every individual, namely, THE RIGHT OF PETITION-

[a] *The conſtruction of Engliſh courts of law, in which cauſes are tried by a jury with the aſſiſtance of a judge, combines the two ſpecies together with peculiar ſucceſs. This admirable contrivance unites the wiſdom of a fixed with the integrity of a caſual judicature, and avoids, in a great meaſure, the inconveniencies of both. The judge imparts to the jury the benefit of his erudition and experience; the jury, by their diſintereſtedneſs, check any corrupt partialities which previous application may have produced in the judge.—If the determination was left to the judge, the party might ſuffer under the ſuperior intereſt of his adverſary: if it was left to an uninſtructed jury, his rights would be in ſtill greater danger from the ignorance of thoſe who were to decide upon them.—The preſent wiſe admixture of chance and choice in the conſtitution of the court, in which his cauſe is tried, guards him equally againſt the fear of injury from either of theſe cauſes.*

ING

ING the king, or either houſe of parliament, for the redreſs of grievances [a].

IN RUSSIA we are told, that the Czar Peter eſtabliſhed a law, that no ſubject might petition the throne till he had firſt petitioned two different miniſters of ſtate. In caſe he obtained juſtice from neither, he might then preſent a third petition to the prince; *but upon pain of*

[a] But, laſtly, if ſeveral courts co-ordinate to, and independent of each other, ſubſiſt together in the country, it ſeems neceſſary that the appeals from all of them ſhould meet and terminate in the ſame judicature; in order that one *ſupreme tribunal*, by whoſe final ſentence all others are bound and concluded, may ſuperintend and preſide over the reſt.—This conſtitution is neceſſary for two purpoſes—to preſerve an uniformity in the deciſions of inferior courts, and to maintain to each the proper limits of its juriſdiction.—Without a common ſuperior, different courts might eſtabliſh *contradictory rules* of adjudication, and the *contradiction* be *final* and *without remedy*; the *ſame queſtion* might receive *oppoſite determinations*, according as it was brought before one court or another, and the determination in each be ultimate and irreverſible.

A POLITICIAN, WHO SHOULD SIT DOWN TO DELINEATE A PLAN FOR THE DISPENSATION OF PUBLIC JUSTICE, GUARDED AGAINST ALL ACCESS TO INFLUENCE AND CORRUPTION, AND BRINGING TOGETHER THE SEPARATE ADVANTAGES OF KNOWLEDGE AND IMPARTIALITY, WOULD FIND, WHEN HE HAD DONE, THAT HE HAD BEEN TRANSCRIBING THE JUDICIAL CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND. AND IT MAY TEACH THE MOST DISCONTENTED AMONGST US TO ACQUIESCE IN THE GOVERNMENT OF HIS COUNTRY, TO REFLECT, THAT THE PURE, AND WISE, AND EQUAL ADMINISTRATION OF THE LAWS, FORMS THE FIRST END AND BLESSING OF SOCIAL UNION; AND THAT THIS BLESSING IS ENJOYED BY HIM IN A PERFECTION, WHICH HE WILL SEEK IN VAIN, IN ANY OTHER NATION OF THE WORLD.

death,

death, if found to be in the wrong.—The conſequence of which was, that no one dared to offer ſuch third petition; and grievances ſeldom falling under the notice of the ſovereign, he had little opportunity to redreſs them.—The *reſtrictions*, for ſome there are, which are laid *upon petitioning* IN BRITAIN, are of a nature *extremely different*; and while they promote *the ſpirit of peace*, they are *no check* upon that of *liberty*.—Care only muſt be taken, leſt, under the pretence of petitioning, the ſubject be guilty of any riot or tumult; as happened in the opening of the memorable parliament in 1640; and, to prevent this, it is provided by the ſtatute 13 CAR. II. ſt. 1, c. 5, that *no petition* to the king, or either houſe of parliament, for any alteration in church or ſtate, *ſhall be ſigned by above twenty perſons*, unleſs the matter thereof be approved by three juſtices of the peace, or the major part of the grand jury, in the country; and in London, by the lord mayor, aldermen, and common-council; *nor ſhall any petition be preſented by more than ten perſons at a time*.—But under theſe regulations, it is declared by the ſtatute 1 W. & M. ſt. 2, c. 2, that the ſubject hath a *right to petition*; and that all commitments and proſecutions for ſuch petitioning are illegal.

5. The fifth and laſt auxiliary right of the ſubject, that we ſhall at preſent mention, is that OF HAVING ARMS FOR THEIR DEFENCE, ſuitable to their condition and degree, and ſuch as are allowed by law.—Which is alſo declared by the ſame ſtatute, 1 W. & M. ſt. 2, c. 2, and is indeed a public allowance, under due reſtrictions, of the natural right of reſiſtance and ſelf-preſervation, when the ſanctions of ſociety and laws are found inſufficient to reſtrain the violence of oppreſſion.

In theſe ſeveral articles conſiſt the *rights*, or, as they are frequently termed, *the liberties of Britons: liberties* more generally *talked of* than thoroughly *underſtood*; and yet highly *neceſſary* to be perfectly *known* and *conſidered* by every man of rank or property, leſt his *ignorance* of the points whereon they are founded ſhould hurry him into *faction* and *licentiouſneſs* on the one hand, or a *puſillanimous indifference* and *criminal ſubmiſſion* on the other.—And we have ſeen that theſe rights conſiſt, primarily, in the free enjoyment of PERSONAL SECURITY, of PERSONAL LIBERTY, and of PRIVATE PROPERTY.

So long as theſe remain inviolate, the ſubject is perfectly free; for every ſpecies of compulſive tyranny and op-

preſſion muſt act in oppoſition to one or other of theſe rights, having no other object upon which it can poſſibly be employed.

To preſerve theſe from violation, it is neceſſary that the conſtitution of parliaments be ſupported in its full vigour; and limits, certainly known, be ſet to the royal prerogative.—And laſtly, to vindicate theſe rights, when actually violated or attacked, the ſubjects of Britain are entitled, in the firſt place, *to the regular adminiſtration and free courſe of juſtice in the courts of law*; next, *to the right of petitioning the king and parliament for redreſs of grievances*; and laſtly, *to the right of having and uſing arms for ſelf-preſervation and defence.*

And all theſe *rights* and *liberties* it is our *birthright* to enjoy entire; unleſs where the laws of our country have laid them under *neceſſary* reſtraints; *reſtraints in themſelves ſo gentle and moderate, as will appear, upon farther inquiry, that no man of ſenſe or probity would wiſh to ſee them ſlackened.*—For all of us have it in our choice to do every thing that *a good man* would deſire to do; and are reſtrained from *nothing*, but what would be pernicious either to ourſelves or our fellow citizens.—So THAT THIS REVIEW OF OUR SITUATION MAY FULLY JUSTIFY THE OBSERVATION OF A LEARNED FRENCH

AUTHOR, WHO INDEED GENERALLY BOTH THOUGHT AND WROTE IN THE SPIRIT OF GENUINE FREEDOM; AND WHO HATH NOT SCRUPLED TO PROFESS, EVEN IN THE VERY BOSOM OF HIS NATIVE COUNTRY, THAT THE BRITISH IS THE ONLY NATION IN THE WORLD, WHERE POLITICAL OR CIVIL LIBERTY IS THE DIRECT END OF ITS CONSTITUTION [a].

[a] Blackstone.

SECT. XIX.

ON THE LIBERTY OF THE PRESS.

THE *liberty of the preſs*, however, ſo eſſential to the nature of a free ſtate, conſiſts not in *freedom from cenſure* for any *criminal matter* that may be publiſhed, but in having *no previous reſtraints* laid upon publications.—*Every freeman has undoubtedly a right to lay what ſentiments he pleaſes before the public*; to forbid this, is to deſtroy the freedom of the preſs: but if he publiſhes what is *improper, miſchievous, or illegal, he muſt take the conſequence of his own temerity.*—To ſubject the preſs to the reſtrictive power of a *licenſer*, is to ſubject all freedom of ſentiment to the *prejudices* of *one man*, and make him the arbitrary and infallible judge of all controverted points in learning, religion, and government.—*But to puniſh (as the law does at preſent) any dangerous or offenſive writings which, when publiſhed, ſhall, on a fair and impartial trial, be adjudged of a pernicious tendency, is neceſſary for the preſervation of peace and good order, of government*

government and religion, the only ſolid foundations of civil liberty.—Thus the *will* of individuals is ſtill left *free*; the *abuſe* only of that *free-will* is the object of legal puniſhment.—Neither is any reſtraint hereby laid upon freedom of thought or inquiry; liberty of private ſentiment is ſtill left; the diſſeminating or making public of *bad ſentiments*, deſtructive of the ends of ſociety, is the crime which ſociety corrects.—*A man (ſays a fine writer on this ſubject)* MAY BE ALLOWED TO KEEP POISONS IN HIS CLOSET, BUT NOT PUBLICLY TO VEND THEM AS CORDIALS.—And to this we may add, that the only plauſible argument heretofore uſed for reſtraining the *juſt freedom* of the preſs, "that it was neceſſary to prevent the daily abuſe of it," will intirely loſe its force, when it is ſhown (by a ſeaſonable exertion of the laws) that the preſs cannot be abuſed to any *bad purpoſe* without incurring a ſuitable puniſhment: whereas it can never be uſed to any *good one* when under the controul of an inſpector.—*So true will it be found, that to cenſure the licentiouſneſs, is to maintain the liberty of the preſs* [a].

[a] Blackſtone.

SECT. XX.

ON POPULAR DISCONTENT.

THERE is inſeparably annexed to our very nature and conſtitution, a certain unaccountable *reſtleſſneſs* of mind, and thought, which makes us unſatisfied with what we at preſent poſſeſs and enjoy, and rave after ſomething paſt or to come, which ever troubles, and corrupts, the pleaſures of our ſenſes, and of our imaginations, the enjoyments of our fortunes, or the beſt production of our reaſon, and thereby the content and happineſs of our lives.

This is the true, natural, and common ſource of ſuch perſonal diſſatisfactions, ſuch domeſtic complaints, and ſuch *popular diſcontents*, as afflict not only our private lives, conditions, and fortunes, but even our *civil ſtates* and governments, and thereby conſummates the particular and general infelicity of mankind; which is enough complained of by all that conſider it in common actions and paſſions of life, *but much more in the factions*,

factions, ſeditions, convulſions, and fatal revolutions that have ſo frequently, and in all ages, attended all, or moſt of the governments in the world.

This RESTLESS HUMOUR, ſo general and natural to mankind, is a weed that grows in all ſoils and under all climates, but ſeems to thrive moſt, and grow faſteſt in *the beſt*.—From *this original fountain* iſſue thoſe ſtreams of faction, that with the courſe of time and accident, overflow *the wiſeſt conſtitutions of governments and laws*, and *many times* make men treat the beſt princes and trueſt patriots, like the worſt tyrants and moſt ſeditious diſturbers of their country, and bring ſuch men to ſcaffolds, that deſerved ſtatues, to violent and untimely deaths, that were worthy of the longeſt and the happieſt lives.—If ſuch only as PHALARIS and AGATHOCLES, as MARIUS and CATILINE, had fallen victims to faction, or to popular rage, we ſhould have little to wonder or complain at, but we find the wiſeſt, the beſt of men, have been ſacrificed to the ſame idols.—SOLON and PYTHAGORAS have been allowed as ſuch in their own and ſucceeding ages; and yet the *one* was *baniſhed* and the other *murdered* by faction, which two ambitious men had raiſed in commonwealths, which thoſe two wiſe and excellent men themſelves had framed.—SCIPIO

and

and HANIBAL, the greateſt and moſt glorious captains of their own, or perhaps any other age, and the beſt ſervants of their reſpective commonwealths, were *baniſhed* and *diſgraced* by the factions of their countries: and to come nearer home, BARNEVOLT and DE WIT in *Holland*, Sir THOMAS MOORE, and the Earl of ESSEX, and Sir WALTER RALEIGH, in *England*, men eſteemed the moſt extraordinary of their time, fell all *bloody ſacrifices* to the factions of their courts or their countries.

There is no theme ſo large and ſo eaſy, no diſcourſe ſo common and ſo plauſible, as the faults or corruptions of governments, the miſcarriages or complaints of magiſtrates; none ſo eaſily received, and ſpread, even among good and well-meaning men, none ſo enviouſly raiſed, and employed ſo ill, nor turned to a worſe or more diſguiſed end.—No GOVERNMENTS, NO TIMES WERE EVER FREE FROM THEM, NOR EVER WILL BE FREE, TILL ALL MEN ARE WISE, GOOD, AND EASILY CONTENTED.—No CIVIL OR POLITICAL CONSTITUTION CAN BE PERFECT OR SECURE, WHILST THEY ARE COMPOSED OF MEN, WHO ARE FOR THE MOST PART PASSIONATE, INTERESTED, UNJUST, OR UNTHINKING, GENERALLY AND NATURALLY RESTLESS, AND UNQUIET; DISCONTENTED

DISCONTENTED WITH THE PRESENT, OR WHAT THEY HAVE, RAVING AFTER THE FUTURE, OR SOMETHING THEY WANT, AND THEREBY EVER DISPOSED AND DESIROUS TO CHANGE.

Another cauſe of diſtempers in ſtates, and *diſcontents* under all governments, is *the unequal condition* that muſt neceſſarily fall to the ſhare of ſo many and ſuch different men that compoſe them.—In great multitudes, *few* in compariſon are born to great titles or great eſtates; *few* can be called to public charges and employments of dignity, or power, and *few* by their induſtry and conduct arrive at great degrees of wealth and fortune; *and every one ſpeaks of the fair as his own market goes in it.*—All are eaſily ſatisfied with *themſelves*, and their own merit, though they are not ſo with *their fortune*; and, when they ſee others in *better condition* whom they eſteem *leſs deſerving*, they lay it upon the *ill conſtitution of things*, the *partiality* or *humour* of *princes*, the *negligence* or *corruption of miniſters.*

The common ſort of people who have any leiſure to think always find fault with *the times*, and ſome muſt have reaſon, for the merchant gains by *peace*, and the ſoldier by *war*; the ſhepherd by *wet ſeaſons*, and the ploughman by *dry:* when the city *fills*, the country

decays in another.—In ſuch variety and courſe
men's deſigns and intereſts muſt be oppoſite to
other, and both cannot ſucceed alike: whe
winner laughs or no, *the loſer will complain*, an
than quarrel with *himſelf*, will abuſe the dice,
he plays with.—*When any body is angry, ſome
be blamed*; and thoſe reaſons which cannot be
thoſe accidents that could not be *prevented*, th
carriages that no one could *foreſee*, will be
upon *the government*, and whether right or wr
have the ſame effect of raiſing or increaſing t
MON and POPULAR DISCONTENTS.

In all ſtates there is one univerſal diviſion,
the ſeparation of the *innocent* from the *criminal*
tween ſuch as are in ſome meaſure *contented* w
they poſſeſs by inheritance, or what they exp
their own abilities, induſtry, or parſimony; a
who are *diſſatisfied* with what they have, and n
ing to thoſe innocent ways of acquiring more

hat others legally poſſeſs: *one* loves the preſent ſtate d government, and endeavours to ſecure it; the *other* ſires to end this game, and ſhuffle for a new: *one* ves fixed laws, and the *other* an unſettled power; yet e laſt, when they have gained *enough* by factions and iſorders, by rapine and violence, come then to change *heir principles* with *their fortunes*, and grow friends to ſtabliſhed order and fixed laws.—So the NORMANS of ld, when they had divided the ſpoils of the Engliſh ands and poſſeſſions, grew bold defenders of the com-non law of the land.—So of later days, it was obſerved, that CROMWELL's *officers* in the army, who were the firſt *for burning records*, for *levelling of lands*, while they had none of their own; yet when afterwards they were grown rich and landed men, they fell into the praiſe of the *Engliſh laws*, and cried up the *magna charta* as *our anceſtors had done before with a much better grace.*

Could we ſuppoſe a body politic framed *perfect* in its firſt conception or inſtitution; yet, if *the adminiſtration* be ill, ignorant, or corrupt, too rigid, or too remiſs, too negligent, or ſevere, theſe may juſtly occaſion for *the preſent* ſome *diſcontent.*—Yet this is an evil, to which all ſublunary things are ſubject, not only by accident, but even by natural diſpoſitions, and which can

employments, and many others that are uneaſy or ill entertained at home.—The forward, the buſy, the bold, the ſufficient, purſue their game with more paſſion, endeavour, application, and thereby often ſucceed where better men would fail.—In the courſe of my obſervation I have found no talent of ſo much advantage among men, towards their growing great or rich, as a violent and reſtleſs paſſion; for whoever ſets his heart and thoughts wholly upon ſome one thing muſt have very little wit, or very little luck, to fail.—Yet *all theſe* cover their *ends* with moſt *worthy pretences*, and thoſe noble ſayings, "MEN ARE NOT BORN FOR THEMSELVES, AND MUST SACRIFICE THER LIVES FOR THE PUBLIC, AS WELL AS THEIR TIME AND THEIR HEALTH:" and thoſe who think nothing leſs are ſo uſed to ſay ſuch fine things, that ſuch who *truly believe them* are almoſt aſhamed to own it.—*In the mean time, the noble, the wiſe, the rich, the modeſt, thoſe eaſy in their conditions or their minds, thoſe who know moſt of the world and themſelves, are not only careleſs, but often averſe from entering into public charges or employments, unleſs upon the neceſſities of their country, the commands of their prince, or the inſtances of their friends.*—What is to be done in this caſe, when ſuch as offer themſelves, and purſue, are not *worth having*, and

ſuch

ſuch as are moſt worthy will *neither offer, nor perhaps accept.*

When, upon this occaſion, complaints and diſcontents are ſown among *well meaning men*, they are ſure to be cultivated by *others* that are ill-intentioned and intereſted, and who cover their own ends under thoſe of the public, and, by the good and ſervice of the nation, mean nothing but their own.—The practice begins of knaves and fools, of artificial and crafty men upon the ſimple and the good; theſe eaſily follow, and are caught, while the others lay the trains, and purſue a game, wherein they deſign no other ſhare, than of *toil* and *danger* to their company, but the *gain* wholly to themſelves.—*They blow up ſparks*[a] *wherever they find the ſtubble is dry: they find out miſcarriages wherever they are, and forge them often where they are not; they find fault firſt with the perſons in office, and then with the prince or ſtate*[a]; *ſometimes with the execution of laws, and*

at

[a] It is but *a fooliſh wiſdom*, which is ſo *carefully diſplayed*, in *undervaluing princes*, and placing them on a level with the meaneſt of mankind.—To be ſure, *an anatomiſt* finds no more in the *greateſt monarch* than in the *loweſt peaſant or day-labourer*; and a moraliſt may, perhaps, frequently find leſs. But what do all theſe reflections *tend to?*—We, all of us, *ſtill* retain theſe prejudices in favour of birth and family; and neither in our ſerious occupations, nor moſt careleſs amuſements, can we ever get intirely rid of them.—A

tragedy,

at other times with the inſtitutions, how ancient and ſacred ſoever.—They make alarms paſs for actual dangers, and appearances for truth; repreſent misfortunes for faults, and mole-hills for mountains; and by the perſuaſion of the vulgar, and pretences of patriots, or lovers of their country, at the ſame time that they undermine the credit and authority of the government, they ſet up their own.—This raiſes a faction between thoſe ſubjects that would *ſupport* government, and thoſe that would *ruin* it; or rather between thoſe that poſſeſs honors and advantages of it, and thoſe that, UNDER THE PRETENCE OF REFORMING, deſign only or chiefly to change the hands it is in, and care little what becomes of the reſt.

When this fire is kindled, both ſides inflame it; all care of *the public* is laid aſide, and nothing is purſued but *the intereſt of the factious* [a]; all regard of merit is loſt in perſons,

tragedy, that ſhould repreſent the adventures of *porters*, would preſently diſguſt us; but one that introduces *kings* and *princes*, acquires in our eyes an air of importance and dignity.—*Or ſhould a man be able, by his ſuperior wiſdom, to get intirely above ſuch prepoſſeſſions, he would ſoon, by means of the ſame wiſdom, again bring himſelf down to them, for the ſake of ſociety, whoſe welfare he would perceive to be intimately connected with them.*—Far from endeavouring to undeceive the people in this particular, he would cheriſh ſuch ſentiments of reverence to their princes, as requiſite to preſerve a due ſubordination in ſociety.

[a] Of all men, that diſtinguiſh themſelves by memorable atchievements, the *firſt place of honour* ſeems due to LEGISLATORS *and* FOUNDERS OF STATES, who

employed, and thoſe *only* are choſen, that are *true* PARTY; and the only talent required is, to be *ye heady*, to be true to the ſide he is on.—When

ait a *ſyſtem* of *laws* and *inſtitutions* to ſecure the *peace, happineſs*, and future generations.—The influence of uſeful inventions in the arts s may, perhaps, extend farther than that of wiſe laws, whoſe ef- mited both in time and place; but the benefit ariſing from the for- t ſo ſenſible as that which reſults from the latter.—Speculative , indeed, improve the mind; but this advantage reaches only to a , who have leiſure to apply themſelves to them.—And as to prac- which increaſe the *commodities* and *enjoyments* of life, it is well at *men's happineſs* conſiſts not ſo much in an *abundance* of theſe, *ace and ſecurity with which they poſſeſs them*; and *thoſe bleſſings* can ived from *good government*.—Not to mention, that general virtue orals in a ſtate, which are ſo requiſite to happineſs, can never ariſe oſt refined precepts of philoſophy, or even the ſevereſt injunctions ; but muſt proceed intirely from the *virtuous education of youth*, the *ife laws* and *inſtitutions*.

as LEGISLATORS *and founders of ſtates ought to be honoured and mong men, as much ought the founders of ſects and factions to be de- ated; becauſe the influence of faction is directly contrary to that of ctions ſubvert government, render laws impotent, and beget the fierceſt among men of the ſame nation, who ought to give mutual aſſiſtance lon to each other.*—And what ſhould render the founders of parties as is, the difficulty of extirpating theſe weeds, when once they have in any ſtate.—They naturally propagate themſelves for many cen- d ſeldom end but by the total diſſolution of that government, in are ſown.—*They are, beſides, plants which grow moſt plentifully ſt ſoil*; and though abſolute governments be not intirely free from muſt be confeſſed, that they riſe more eaſily, and propagate them- r *in free governments*, where they always infect the legiſlature itſelf, e could be able, by the ſteady application of rewards and puniſh- eradicate them.

theſe ſtorms are raiſed, the *wiſe* and *good* are intirely laid aſide or retire of themſelves, and leave the ſcene to ſuch as are more active and eager to get upon the ſtage.

From theſe ſeeds grow popular commotions, and at laſt ſeditions, which ſo often end in ſome fatal periods of *the beſt governments*.—I cannot leave this ſubject of *popular diſcontents* without reflecting and bewailing, *how much* and *how often* our country has been infeſted by them; how they have ravaged and defaced *the nobleſt iſland of the world, and which ſeems, from the happy ſituation, the temper of climate, the fertility of ſoil, the numbers and native courage of the inhabitants, to have been deſtined by God and nature, for the greateſt happineſs, or ſecurity at home, and to give laws, or balance at leaſt, to all their neighbours abroad.*

Upon a clear ſurvey of theſe diſpoſitions in mankind, and the condition of all governments, it ſeems much more reaſonable to *pity*, than to envy the fortunes and dignities of princes; and to leſſen or excuſe their venial faults, or at leaſt *their misfortunes*, rather than to increaſe or make them worſe by ill colours or repreſentations.—FOR AS EVERY PRINCE SHOULD GOVERN, AS HE WOULD DESIRE TO BE GOVERNED, IF HE WERE

A SUBJECT, SO EVERY SUBJECT SHOULD OBEY, AS HE WOULD DESIRE TO BE OBEYED, IF HE WERE A PRINCE; AND THIS MORAL DUTY OF DOING AS YOU WOULD BE DONE BY, EQUALLY REACHES AND APPLIES TO THE PEASANT AS THE CROWN [a].

[a] Sir William Temple.



SECT. XXI.

THE MOB.

THIS claſs of men can be brought to act in concert upon no other principles than thoſe of a frantic enthuſiaſm and ungovernable fury; their profound ignorance and deplorable credulity make them proper tools for any man who can inflame their paſſions, or alarm their ſuperſtition; *and as they have nothing to loſe by the total diſſolution of civil ſociety, their rage may be eaſily directed againſt any victim which may be pointed out to them.*—They are altogether incapable of forming a rational judgment either upon the principles or the motives of their own conduct; and whether the object for which they are made to contend, be good or bad, *the brutal arm of power* is all the aſſiſtance they can afford for its accompliſhment.—To ſet in motion this inert maſs, the eccentric vivacity of a madman is infinitely better calculated than the ſober coolneſs of phlegmatic reaſon.—They need only to be provoked and irritated, and they never

never can in any other manner be called into action. In the year 1780, they aſſembled at London to the number of 60,000, under the direction of Lord GEORGE GORDON, and carrying fire and rapine before them, were upon the point of giving the whole city of London to one undiſtinguiſhed devaſtation and deſtruction: and this, *becauſe the parliament had mitigated the ſeverity of a ſanguinary and tyrannical law of perſecution againſt the Roman Catholics.*—Should theſe people be taught that they have a right to do every thing, and that the titles of kings and nobles, and the emoluments of public offices, are all uſurpations and robberies committed upon them, I believe it would not be difficult to rouſe their paſſions, and to prepare them for every work of ruin and deſtruction.—But, when they are once put in motion, they ſoon get beyond all reſtraint and controul.—*The rights of man, to life, liberty, and property, oppoſe but a feeble barrier to them; the beauteous face of nature, and the elegant refinements of art, the hoary head of wiſdom, and the enchanting ſmile of beauty, are all equally liable to become obnoxious to them; and as all their power conſiſts in* DESTRUCTION, *whatever meets with their diſpleaſure muſt be devoted to ruin.*—Could any thing but an imperious, over-ruling neceſſity juſtify any man, or body

body of men, for uſing *a weapon like this* to operate a revolution in government?—Such indeed was the ſituation of the French National Aſſembly, when they directed the electric fluid of this popular frenzy againſt the ancient fabric of their monarchy.—They juſtly thought that no price could purchaſe too dearly the fall of arbitrary power in an individual, but, perhaps, even *they* were not aware of all the conſequences which might follow from committing the exiſtence of the kingdom to the cuſtody of a lawleſs and deſperate rabble.

But do the people of England labour under ſuch intolerable oppreſſion, as would authoriſe any of *their patriots* [a] to employ an arm like this for their relief?—Suppoſe ſixty thouſand men ſhould again aſſemble round Weſtminſter-hall, and with clubs and fire-brands for their *ſole arguments*, ſhould compel the parliament to alter the preſent form of government, what would be the PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES?—Is it clear that ſo large a majority of the people of England have loſt all their attachment to their conſtitution, as to inſure an

[a] *Patriots*, ſays Sir ROBERT WALPOLE, have a growth like muſhrooms. It is but denying a place, or refuſing an unreaſonable demand, and up ſtarts *a patriot*.

acquieſcence in the meaſure throughout the kingdom? Is it certain that one quarter part of the people would obey an act extorted by ſuch violence as this?—*Would not all friends of the preſent government rather rally round the ſtandard of the conſtitution, and would not their duty compel them to defend it with their lives and fortunes?—If it ſhould ſoon appear that they were decidedly the ſtrongeſt party, would not the inſurrection be extinguiſhed in the blood of its leaders?—If the parties ſhould prove to be nearly equal, would not the nation be involved in all the horrors of a long and bloody civil war?*—In whatever point of view, the effects of this ſcheme are contemplated, they preſent nothing but proſpects at which every friend of mankind muſt ſhudder [b].

[b] Mr. Adams.

SECT. XXII.

REASONS FOR CONTENTMENT AND FEAR.

THERE are many invincible arguments, which ſhould induce the *malcontent party* in ENGLAND at this time *to acquieſce entirely in the preſent ſettlement of the conſtitution.*

Is not the *preſent monarchical government*, in its full extent, authorized by *lawyers*, recommended by *divines*, acknowledged by *politicians*, acquieſced in, nay paſſionately cheriſhed, by the *people in general*; and all this during a period of at leaſt a hundred and ſixty years, and *till of late, without the ſmalleſt murmur or controverſy?*—This *general conſent* ſurely, during *ſo long a time*, muſt be ſufficient to render a *conſtitution legal and valid.*—If the origin of all power be derived, as is pretended, from the people; here is *their conſent* in the fulleſt and moſt ample terms that can be deſired or imagined.

They muſt be ſenſible that the *plan of liberty* is *ſettled*; its *happy effects* are *proved* by experience; a *long*

tract

tract of time has given it *ſtability*; and whoever would attempt to overturn it, would, beſides other more criminal imputations, be expoſed to the reproach of faction and innovation.—They muſt be ſenſible that *public liberty, with internal peace and order, has flouriſhed almoſt without interruption: trade and manufactures, and agriculture, have increaſed: the arts, and ſciences, and philoſophy, have been cultivated.—Even religious parties have been neceſſitated to lay aſide their mutual rancour: and* THE GLORY OF THE NATION *has ſpread itſelf all over* EUROPE; *derived equally from our progreſs in the arts of peace, and from valour and ſucceſs in war.*—SO LONG AND SO GLORIOUS A PERIOD NO NATION ALMOST CAN BOAST OF: NOR IS THERE ANOTHER INSTANCE IN THE WHOLE HISTORY OF MANKIND, THAT SO MANY MILLIONS OF PEOPLE HAVE, DURING SUCH A SPACE OF TIME, BEEN HELD TOGETHER, IN A MANNER SO FREE, SO RATIONAL, AND SO SUITABLE TO THE DIGNITY OF HUMAN NATURE.

It is well known, that *every government* muſt come to *a period*, and that *death* is unavoidable to the *political* as well as to the *animal body*.—But, as *one kind of death may be preferable to another*, it may be inquired, whether it be more deſirable for the BRITISH CONSTITUTION to

terminate in a POPULAR GOVERNMENT, or in ABSOLUTE MONARCHY?—Here I would frankly declare, that, though liberty be preferable to ſlavery, in almoſt every caſe; yet I ſhould rather wiſh to ſee an *abſolute monarch* than a REPUBLIC *in this iſland*.—For, let us conſider, what kind of republic we have reaſon to expect.—The queſtion is not concerning any *fine imaginary republic*, of which a man may form a plan in his cloſet.—There is no doubt, but a popular government may be imagined more perfect than abſolute monarchy, or even than our preſent conſtitution.—But what reaſon have we to expect that *any ſuch government* will ever be eſtabliſhed in BRITAIN, upon the diſſolution of our monarchy?—If any ſingle perſon acquire power enough to take our conſtitution to pieces, and put it up a-new, he is really an abſolute monarch; and *we have already had an inſtance of this kind, ſufficient to convince us, that ſuch a perſon will never reſign his power, or eſtabliſh any free government*.—Matters, therefore, muſt be truſted to their natural progreſs and operation; and the houſe of commons, according to *its preſent conſtitution*, muſt be the *only legiſlature* in *ſuch a popular government*.—The INCONVENIENCIES attending ſuch a ſituation of affairs, preſent themſelves by thouſands.—*If the houſe of*

commons,

ns, in ſuch a caſe, ever diſſolve itſelf, which is not xpected, we may look for a civil war every election.— ntinue itſelf, we ſhall ſuffer all the tyranny of a fac- ubdivided into new factions.—And, as ſuch a vio- vernment cannot long ſubſiſt, we ſhall, at laſt, after onvulſions, and civil wars, find repoſe in abſolute hy, which it would have been happier for us to have hed peaceably from the beginning.—ABSOLUTE MO- IY, THEREFORE, IS THE EASIEST DEATH, THE EUTHANASIA OF THE BRITISH CONSTITU-

[a] Hume.

SECT. XXIII.

THE REPUBLIC OF GREECE.

THERE is not any thing more various and undefinable than *perſonable character*.—The ſame man is, at different times, ſo different from himſelf; and ſuch a variety of circumſtances and motives direct or influence his behaviour, that it is difficult to give any ſuch general deſcription of him.—But the *characters of nations* are marked by bolder lines, and glow with warmer colours.—The cauſes and circumſtances which diſcriminate one people from another, muſt be ſuch as are fitted to operate on the multitude, and conſequently of a nature equally powerful and permanent; they are too ſtrong and too palpable ever to be miſtaken; and the difference of ſentiment and action which they introduce, is too conſiderable to eſcape the leaſt attentive obſerver.

When we confine our attention merely to the public tranſactions of the Greeks, and conſider either their wars

with the PERSIANS, in which they ſtruggled for independence againſt a foreign enemy, or their DOMESTIC CONTENTIONS, in which they fought againſt one another for pre-eminence, the *envy*, *diſtruſt*, and *animoſity*, diſcovered on ſuch occaſions, may be eaſily converted, by a little heightening of eloquence, into *emulation*, *patriotiſm*, *and courage.*—*The virtues which animated a few great men, whoſe minds were elevated by the important meaſures which they were called to conduct, and whoſe illuſtrious merit hiſtorians and biographers have been at great pains to deſcribe, are thus conſtrued into general characteriſtics of the nation.*—On ſuch *partial* grounds have authors, equally diſtinguiſhed by genius and learning, deſcribed with admiration the manners and inſtitutions of the Greeks.—In reading their elegant performances on this favourite theme, we ſeem tranſported into a new and unknown country, where the wonders of art, and the virtues of men, vie with the beauties of nature and the climate, and heighten the pleaſures which they afford.—Impreſſed with theſe charming, but *fanciful deſcriptions*, we recal, at the name of Greece, the ideas of taſte, eloquence, liberty, and virtue; and imagine, that we can never exhauſt the praiſes of a people, among whom thoſe inventions and diſcoveries, which form the

chief

chief ornament of human nature, were originally produced; and, being reared with peculiar care, attained full vigour and maturity.—The merit of that ſyſtem of government, in particular, which opened a field of improvement ſo beneficial to man, cannot, we think, be ſufficiently extolled.—If genius be the father of refined arts, *liberty*, it has been aſſerted, is their *mother*.—She not only gives them birth, but nouriſhes and ſupports their infant ſtate; and the advantages moſt glorious for Greece, becauſe peculiar to that country, are commonly aſcribed to the REPUBLICAN INSTITUTIONS firſt eſtabliſhed there, unknown in a great meaſure to the reſt of the ancient world, and never adopted in their full extent by any modern nation.

But when we examine the effect of the Grecian inſtitutions, which afforded ſuch ſcope *to the efforts of genius*, and *to the virtues and abilities of individuals*, on THE HAPPINESS OF THE NATION AT LARGE;—and when, in this view, we contemplate the tranſactions of thoſe celebrated republics in negotiation or war, as enemies, colonies, or allies, our *admiration* is converted into *pity*.—No people ſeem to have paid *leſs attention* to thoſe common but important maxims which have been introduced for the general benefit of ſociety; *and it may*

be

be affirmed, that their condition, even during the moſt brilliant period of their political exiſtence, was more calamitous and afflicted, than that of any other poliſhed nation which hiſtory deſcribes.

The ſituation of a country with regard to its neighbours, and the revolution of public affairs, have doubtleſs a great influence on the manners of its inhabitants.—They are ſplendid and important objects, and have ſeldom failed to attract the attention which they deſerve. —But the internal policy of a ſtate, the abundance or ſcarcity of the things moſt neceſſary for life, the refinement or ſimplicity in which the people are accuſtomed to live, the progreſs of arts whether liberal or mechanical: theſe circumſtances have a no leſs powerful effect in determining the national character; and, as they lie more concealed from ordinary obſervation, have commonly been neglected and forgotten.—In explaining their condition and extent, as well as their effect and tendency, among the Greeks, I ſhall not have occaſion to deſcribe, at any length, the ſingular inſtitutions of LYCURGUS, which had ceaſed in a great meaſure to govern the SPARTANS [a], before the commencement of the period of hiſtory which is the object of the preſent

[a] Xenophon, de Repub. Lacedæm. Iſoc. in Archid.

inquiry.

inquiry.—Before this time, the different ſtates of Greece had been gradually approaching to a near reſemblance; and at the concluſion of the PELOPONNESIAN WAR, they had attained a ſtriking ſimilarity in government, manners, and laws [a].—But the features of the Greek character, which ſufficiently diſtinguiſh the whole nation from every other, were more prominent, if I may ſay ſo, in the ATHENIANS, than in any of the neighbouring people.—*To them*, therefore, my obſervations will more particularly relate; and I ſhall remark, in the progreſs of my diſcourſe, the principal lines of deviation from ATHENIAN MANNERS in the other Grecian republics.

In the extenſive and well regulated kingdoms of modern Europe, men are deterred from injuſtice by the certainty of puniſhment.—Their pretenſions, as well as their obligations, are determined by poſitive inſtitution, and private competitions are ſeldom allowed to diſturb the public tranquillity.—*In the tumultuary governments of ancient Greece the cauſes of diſſenſion were innumerable; while the feeble reſtraint of laws, ill adminiſtered, was unable to counteract their force.—We need only open* XENOPHON, THUCYDIDES, *or* DIODORUS SICULUS, *to ob-*

[a] Xenophon, de Repub. Lacedæm. Iſoc. in Archid.

ſerve

ſerve the perpetual conteſts between rich and poor, between the friends of democracy and the partiſans of ariſtocratical government.—ARISTOTLE *informs us* [a], *that in ſeveral republics, the higher ranks of people bound themſelves by oath to neglect no opportunity of doing wrong to their inferiors.*—*We learn from* XENOPHON [b], *that the populace of Athens commonly behaved to the rich, as if they had acted under the influence of an engagement no leſs atrocious. Amidſt the oppoſition of contending factions in the ſmaller ſtates, near one half of the community were frequently put to death* [c], *or baniſhed by the other*; *and, on many occaſions,*

[a] Polit. [b] De Repub. Athen.

[c] We ſhall mention from DIODORUS SICULUS alone a few maſſacres, which paſſed in the courſe of ſixty years, during the moſt ſhining age of Greece. There were baniſhed from SYBARIS 500 of the nobles and their partizans; lib. xii. p. 77. *ex edit.* RHODOMANNI. Of CHIANS, 600 citizens baniſhed; lib. xiii. p. 189. At EPHESUS, 340 killed, 1000 baniſhed; lib. xiii. p. 223. Of CYRENIANS, 500 nobles killed, all the reſt baniſhed; lib. xiv. p. 263. The CORINTHIANS killed 120, baniſhed 500; lib. xiv. p. 304. PHÆBIDAS the SPARTAN baniſhed 300 BÆOTIANS; lib. xv. p. 342. Upon the fall of the LACEDEMONIANS, democracies were reſtored in many cities, and ſevere vengeance taken of the nobles, after the GREEK manner. But matters did not end there. For the baniſhed nobles, returning in many places, butchered their adverſaries at PHIALÆ, in CORINTH, in MEGARA, in PHILASIA. In this laſt place they killed 300 of the people; but theſe again revolting, killed above 600 of the nobles, and baniſhed the reſt; lib. xv. p. 357. In ARCADIA 1400 baniſhed, beſides many killed. The baniſhed retired to SPARTA and to PALLANTIUM: the latter were delivered up to their countrymen, and all killed; lib. xv. p. 373. Of the baniſhed from ARGOS and THEBES, there were 509 in the SPARTAN

ſions, the vanquiſhed party, reinforced by foreign aſſiſtance, returned back into their country, and retorted ſimilar injuries on their unhappy opponents [a].—*During theſe furious agitations, no more reſpect was paid to what was ſacred than to what is profane.—Secret treachery conſpired with open violence.—Even the principles of aſſaſſination were publicly avowed; and wretches boaſted before numerous aſſemblies, of having inſidiouſly murdered their fellow-citizens* [b].

In the intervals of theſe *violent paroxyſms of party-rage*, *private quarrels* kept the ſtate in perpetual fermentation.—The competitions for civil offices, for military command, for honours at religious ſolemnities, or at public entertainments, oponed an ever-flowing ſource of bitter animoſity [c].—Neighbours were commonly at

army; *id.* p. 574. Here is a detail of the moſt remarkable of AGATHOCLES's cruelties from the ſame author. The people before his uſurpation had baniſhed 600 rebels: lib. xix. p. 655. Afterwards that tyrant, in concurrence with the people, killed 4000 nobles, and baniſhed 6000; *id.* p. 647. He killed 4000 people at GELA; *id.* p. 741. By AGATHOCLES's brother 2000 baniſhed from SYRACUSE; lib. xx. p. 757. The inhabitants of AGRIGENTA, to the number of 45,000, were killed, man, woman, and child; and with tortures, for the ſake of their money; *id.* p. 802. All the relations, *viz.* father, brother, children, grandfather, of his LIBYAN army, killed: *id.* p. 803. He killed 7000 exiles after capitulation; *id.* p. 816. It is to be remarked, that AGATHOCLES is called a man of great ſenſe and courage, and is not to be ſuſpected of wanton cruelty, contrary to the maxims of his age.——HUME.

[a] Diodor. lib. xv. et paſſim.

[b] Lyſias in Agorat.

[c] Lyſias in his Oration relative to a conſecrated Olive.

variance.

variance.—Every one was regarded as an enemy, who had not proved himſelf a friend.—Hereditary reſentments were tranſmitted from one generation to another; and the ſeeds of diſcord being ſown in ſuch abundance, yielded a never-failing produce of libels, invectives, and legal proſecutions [a].

The principal employment of ſix thouſand Athenian citizens conſiſted in deciding law-ſuits.—The courts of juſtice were ſhut on the holidays [b], which engroſſed two months in the year; ſo that during the remaining ten, the judicial office occupied a number of perſons, almoſt equal to a third part of the whole community [c].—Theſe judges

[a] Idem in Alcibiad. Iſoc. ibid.

[b] See Lyſias againſt the Exchequer.

[c] When I meet with perſons who reproach my countrymen, that a man will paſs a whole year at Athens without terminating the affairs which brought him there, whether it depends on the ſenate, or the aſſembly of the people, I have for anſwer—That the ſole cauſe of this delay is the immenſe number of affairs; and ſo great is that number, that Athens is not capable of ſending them all back again, after their buſineſs is concluded.

And how can the Athenians expedite them all? being always obliged to celebrate more feſtivals than any other Grecian ſtates (and on theſe days they have not much time to beſtow on other affairs). They have afterwards to decide a greater number of civil and criminal cauſes than are judged in all the reſt of the univerſe; beſides this the ſenate beſtows much attention to the ſtate of the finances and the war department. Thoſe which are the conſtant cares of a ſtate, ſuch as attention to our allies, the receipt of the tributes, the care of the dockyards and marine arſenals, as well as what relates to religion and its worſhip, occupy a conſiderable portion of their time. Ought one to be ſurpriſed that the Athenians, overwhelmed with ſo many affairs, cannot terminate thoſe of every particular?

judges determined cauſes not only between their fellow-citizens, but between the different ſubjects of the republic, who, comprehended under the various names of colonies, allies, or tributary ſtates, were all equally amenable to the Athenian tribunals [a].—The profits ariſing from courts of juſtice afforded a valuable reſource to the poorer citizens of Athens [b].—The fees to which they

Some reproach us, that there are yet ways left to terminate their affairs at Athens, and that whoever applies to the ſenate or the people, with money in his hand, will never be put off. I confeſs, by this method they finiſh many affairs at Athens, and that if more of the ſolicitors practiſed it, more buſineſs would be done. But I know well beſides, that the Athenians will not ſuffer a numbes of urgent deciſions to be ſettled, whatever bribery may be practiſed.——XENOPHON.

[a] The populace behold with joy our allies coaſting to Athens to prefer their numerous accuſations, for in theſe ſtates they hate any man that is virtuous. The Athenians know that the *ſovereign country* is neceſſarily odious to the *people ſubjected*; and that if they ſuffer in the ſtates the *rich*, or thoſe who through other means *poſſeſs power* to aggrandiſe themſelves, *the empire of the Athenian republic would not be of long continuance*. It is for THIS REASON they deprive *virtuous men* of their property, confiſcate their eſtates, ſend them into exile, and even deprive them of life, at the ſame time they encourage and applaud wicked men. This reaſon is given by the way of apology by XENOPHON!

[b] It appears, they reproach us for having enacted an oppreſſive law, in obliging our allies to try their cauſes *at Athens*. In anſwer to this, it will be proper to enumerate *all the advantages* which reſult to the *populace of Athens*. In the firſt place, the *charges* of theſe ſuits turn immediately to *their profit*, and they receive, during the courſe of the year, juſtly ſpeaking, a daily revenue; they can, moreover, by theſe means, govern all the confederate ſtates, without an Athenian ever quitting his houſe, or putting a veſſel to ſea. They have

they were lawfully entitled, amounted annually to an hundred and fifty talents; *the bribes* which they received, probably exceeded that ſum; and both united, compoſed a ſixth part of the Athenian revenues.—As the far greater proportion of judges among that litigious people were choſen promiſcuouſly from the whole body of the citizens, they excited nothing of that *reſpect*

have alſo, by theſe proceedings in the tribunals, *an opportunity of acquitting thoſe who are attached to them, and to ruin*, on the contrary, *thoſe who are of the oppoſite party*. But if the allied ſtates had each of them their tribunals to decide their own cauſes, as they bear with impatience the yoke which we impoſe on them, they might uſe, perhaps, the ſame means *to ruin thoſe* of their citizens *who are moſt attached to the people of Athens*.

It will be proper to mention here many *other advantages* which accrue to the people, from the neceſſity impoſed on our allies to judge their legal affairs at Athens. The port duty which they levy in Pirea, and which they call the hundredth penny, produces conſiderably to the ſtate. The hire of houſes and ſlaves brings in great profit to the Athenians, who are the proprietors; and theſe voyages of our allies prove very advantageous to us; for the major part of our allies become ſeamen, and are able to work our veſſels as ſoon as they come on board, becauſe they are continually practiſing the art.

If the allies did not try their cauſes at Athens, they would only know, or reſpect, thoſe of the Athenians who viſit their coaſt, as the commanders of the corps of infantry, thoſe of the gallies, and the delegates who are ſent to them. Now each citizen of our allies is obliged to flatter, and conciliate himſelf with *all the populace*; for he foreſees, that whether he has a cauſe at iſſue, or means to commence one, he muſt come to decide it here, not by certain magiſtrates, but by all the people, for ſuch is the law at Athens. He is obliged to acquaint each Athenian in the court, to ſolicit him, and to take him courteouſly by the hand, when he enters. This cuſtom has very much contributed to render our allies, much more than they otherwiſe would have been, the real ſlaves of the people of Athens.——XENOPHON's Defence of the Athenians.

which,

which, in moſt other nations, the exerciſe of judiciary power naturally commands.—Inſtead of magiſtrates elevated above the common rank, and prepared by a long courſe of laborious education for the honourable functions to which they are called, the Athenians inveſted perſons in the *meaneſt ſtation of life*, with a power to *explain the laws*, and to *decide queſtions*, where FORTUNE, LIFE, and LIBERTY, *were at ſtake*.—Theſe judges were in every reſpect on a level with thoſe whoſe differences they determined.—As they were accuſtomed to the ſame manner of life, and engaged in the ſame occupations or amuſements, they were naturally animated by ſimilar feelings, and actuated by ſimilar motives.—Hence the Athenian pleadings wear an air of peculiar liberty; the parties deſcend into ſuch particulars as before no ordinary tribunal could be admitted; and, exhibiting their ſentiments and character without diſguiſe or reſerve, preſent the moſt intereſting, becauſe the moſt genuine picture, of the manners which diſtinguiſh that celebrated age.—From a ſuperficial view of this judicial information, the moſt authentic ſurely that can poſſibly be obtained, it will appear in general, THAT GREECE WAS NOT THAT HAPPY COUNTRY WHICH HAS BEEN OFTEN SO ELOQUENTLY DESCRIBED, NOR

INHABITED

INHABITED BY THAT GENEROUS RACE OF MEN WHO ROSE SUPERIOR TO THE LITTLE PASSIONS OF ORDINARY MORTALS.—In many reſpects thoſe *fierce republicans* differed from the nations with which we are beſt acquainted; but in many particulars alſo they agreed.—*The* AMOR PATRIÆ *was like the patriotiſm of modern times, more frequently pretended than real; their public ſpirit, hypocriſy; and while, in order to deceive one another, they continually talked of virtue and liberty, they had, at bottom, no other object in view, in all their civil conteſts, but private intereſt and ambition*[a].

Their orations enable us not only to deſcribe the Athenian character, but to point out the circumſtances which chiefly contributed to form it.—In order to have a more complete view of this ſubject, we may conſider the different claſſes of men in Athens as citizens, ſtrangers, and ſlaves; and examine the manners which naturally reſulted from each particular condition.—In a republic, where hereditary honours were unknown, and where the magiſtrates, appointed by lot, or elected by ſuffrage, returned at the year's end to a private ſtation, diſtinction of ranks could only be founded, either

[a] See Lyſias's defence of a citizen accuſed of deſtroying the ancient government.

on the perſonal merit, or private fortunes, of individuals. —Ancient writers continually ſpeak of the *rich* and *poor* as the *two* principal diviſions in the ſtate.—They formed indeed *two diſtinct parties*[a]; each of which had *its particular views* and *ſeparate intereſts* —I ſhall hereafter have occaſion to aſſign more particularly the limits of Athenian fortunes; it is ſufficient for the preſent purpoſe to regard thoſe as rich, whoſe eſtates yielded the neceſſary comforts of life.—This claſs of citizens, as well as the poorer ſort, till the age of ſorty, were bound by the duty of perſonal ſervice in defence of the republic.—When relieved from this oppreſſive taſk, they were loaded with the ſtill ſeverer burden of public contributions.—On all extraordinary occaſions they were obliged to ſupply the deficiencies of the exchequer[b]: it was their province to exerciſe every public office attended with expence[c]; and many private acts of generoſity were rather extorted from them, than ſolicited, by thoſe

[a] The Athenians never ſuffered any one to ridicule, in their comedies, *the maſs of the people*, or ſpeak diſreſpectfully of them, for they cannot bear to be ſatiriſed *themſelves*. But they authorize, what did I ſay? they excite the comic actors to diſplay their humour in what particular they pleaſe, as they know the object of their irony will be, not a man of the popular party, or of the lower claſs of the Athenians, *but a rich citizen of a good and noble family*.——XENOPHON.

[b] Iſocrates on reforming the government of Athens.

[c] Xenophon. de repub. Athen.

who

who ſtood in need of their aſſiſtance[a].—When called a ſecond time to the performance of the ſame duties which had *already half ruined their fortunes*, no argument, how well ſoever it might be founded, and with whatever art it might be urged, was ſufficient to excuſe them.—They were compelled either to ſubmit to the taſk, which their countrymen had impoſed, or to exchange their eſtates with ſuch as offered to undertake it[b].

Amidſt *theſe* oppreſſive regulations, *two* circumſtances were fitted to give peculiar uneaſineſs.—If the money required of the rich had been employed either for the relief of the diſtreſſed, or for the general intereſt of the community, good citizens might have conſoled themſelves by the proſpect of *public benefits* for the loſs of private fortune.—But it was not with a view to equip a fleet, to levy ſoldiers, to portion the daughters of the poor, or to employ their ſons in agriculture and commerce, that the heavieſt contributions were demanded[c].—A man might have performed all theſe generous offices, without being entitled to the public approbation.—*When an accuſation was brought againſt him by thoſe who envied*

[a] Lyſias concerning the goods of Ariſtoph.

[b] Iſoc. ibid.

[c] Lyſias concerning the goods of Ariſtoph.

his proſperity, and when his liberty and life were in danger, he ſolicited in vain the protection of his judges, unleſs he could deſcribe his magnificence in religious feſtivals, in theatrical entertainments, in ſhows and figured dances exhibited for the amuſement of the people[a].—*The ſums laid out for theſe extravagant purpoſes were the moſt profitably expended; and for theſe alone, he had reaſon to expect the higheſt returns of favour*[b].

[a] Lyſias in defence of a citizen accuſed of bribery.

[b] In order to recommend his client to the favour of the people, DEMOSTHENES enumerates all the ſums he had expended. When χορηγος, 30 minas; Upon a chorus of men 20 minas; εισπυξιχιδας, 8 minas; αυλητας χορηγων, 50 minas; κυκλιω χορω, 3 minas; Seven times, trierarch, where he ſpent 6 talents: Taxes, once 30 minas, another time 40; γυμνασιαρχων, 12 minas; χορηγω παιδικω χορω, 15 minas; κωμωδοις χορηγων, 18 minas; πυρριχιστας αγωνισας, 7 minas; τριηρει αμιλλωμενω, 15 minas: ραψωδοις, 30 minas: In the whole ten talents 38 minas.—An immenſe ſum for an ATHENIAN fortune, and, what alone would be eſteemed great riches, *Orat.* 20.—It is true, he ſays, the law did not *oblige him abſolutely* to be at ſo much expence, not above a fourth.—But without *the favour* of the people, *no body was ſo much as ſafe*; and this was *the* ONLY *way to gain it.*—See farther, *Orat.* 24. *de pop. ſtatu.*—In another place, he introduces a ſpeaker, who ſays that he had ſpent his whole fortune, and an immenſe one, eighty talents, for the people.—*Orat.* 25. *de prob.* EVANDRI.—The μετοικοι, or ſtrangers, find, ſays he, if they do not contribute largely enough to the people's fancy, that they have reaſon *to repent it.*—*Orat.* 30. *contra* PHIL.—You may ſee with what care DEMOSTHENES diſplays his expences of this nature, when he pleads for himſelf *de corona*; and how he exaggerates MIDIAS's ſtinginess in this particular, in his accuſation of that criminal.—All this, by the by, *is a mark of a very iniquitous judicature:* And yet the ATHENIANS valued themſelves on having the *moſt legal* and *regular adminiſtration* of any people in GREECE.—HUME.

But

But with regard to the money which he had been ordered to contribute for the defence of the ſtate, he had no ſecurity that it ſhould ever be applied for this beneficial purpoſe.—*The rapacity of the treaſurers*[a] *was as unbounded*, as *the injuſtice of the public was intolerable.*—The *latter* was open and avowed, and the citizens were ſo well accuſtomed to it, that they began to conſider it in the ſame light with ſickneſs, old rage, or any other natural calamity[b].—*The embezzlement of their magiſtrates, indeed, they bore not with equal patience.*—This is always ſpoken of with great warmth and indignation.—But reiterated complaints could not *correct the diſorder.*—The only conſolation left, was that thoſe rapacious demagogues, after they had ſufficiently enriched themſelves by the plunder of their country, would in all probability be plundered in their turn, and baniſhed, perhaps, or put to death[c].

I have already hinted at the irregularity of the Athenian tribunals; and the rich were the ordinary victims of their injuſtice.—Theſe corrupt aſſemblies were liable to every ſpecies of undue influence.—The parties

[a] Lyſias in defence of a citizen accuſed of bribery.

[b] Lyſias againſt the exchequer;

[c] Oration againſt Ergocles, in the Life of Lyſias.

came into court attended by their friends, relations, and ſometimes by almoſt all thoſe of the ſame ward or diſtrict[a]: they endeavoured to *ſeduce*, when they could not *intimidate*; perjury and falſe witneſſes were extremely frequent[b]; and while the plaintiff and defendant uſed every diſhonourable art for accompliſhing their deſigns, *the judges gave looſe reins to the moſt diſorderly paſſions*.—They were biaſſed by particular affections or perſonal reſentments; guided by the capricious fury of the vulgar, *they puniſhed with uncommon rigour the criminals who were firſt brought before them; when their rage began to ſubſide, they afterwards became as weakly compaſſionate, as they had been before unjuſtly ſevere; they relented of their cruelty, and allowed, perhaps, the accomplices of thoſe whom they had already condemned, or ſuch, at leaſt, as were tried for the ſame crimes, to eſcape unpuniſhed*[c].

By the irregular adminiſtration of juſtice between one man and another, *property was rendered ſo precarious*, that the poſſeſſion of it could not afford any conſiderable *enjoyment*.—But it was always attended with *extreme inconvenience*.—The *wealthy man* lay at the mercy of every invidious accuſer who might traduce his character, and

[a] Life of Lyſias. [b] Lyſias concerning the goods of Ariſtoph.
[c] Lyſias, ibid. et paſſim.

arraign

arraign his conduct.—Before he entered on the different offices, which he was obliged to undertake, the whole tenour of his behaviour, public and private, was carefully examined by his country[a].—After he had executed theſe offices, he was called to *a ſtrict account* of his adminiſtration; and, till he had ſatisfied his judges in that particular, he could neither alienate, nor remove, any part of his fortune; he could not travail into foreign countries; and the loſs of liberty was added to complete the ſum of his misfortunes[b].—It was diſputed at Athens, not without reaſon, whether the condition of the *rich* or *poor* was the moſt diſagreeable; and *general opinion gave it againſt the rich*, though they themſelves, from the avarice natural to man, were often unwilling to be diveſted of thoſe poſſeſſions which only expoſed them to innumerable hardſhips[c].

When we conſider the unhappy ſituation of this claſs of citizens, it is not to be ſuppoſed that they bore any ſincere affection to the government under which they lived.—They found it neceſſary, indeed, to aſſume the appearance, and to employ the cant, of patriotiſm, on all public occaſions.—" The ſureſt revenue of the ſtate

[a] Lyſias againſt Evander. [b] Æſchines in Cteſiphont.

[c] Xenophon. Sympoſ.

is proved that, under *unjuſt pretences*, he frequently extorted money from the Athenian allies.—ERGOCLES, his friend, who had aſſiſted him in re-eſtabliſhing the democracy, and who had been an accomplice in many of his crimes, was impeached by LYSIAS, tried by the Athenian aſſembly, and condemned to death, after being ſtripped of the immenſe ſum of thirty talents, which he had amaſſed by injuſtice [a].—THRASYBULUS, by dying abroad, eſcaped a ſimilar proſecution, which would probably have terminated in as diſagreeable a puniſhment.

Few Athénians have been more generally admired than THERAMENES, who died rather than concur in the meaſures of the thirty tyrants [b].—XENOPHON records his ſayings in his laſt moments, when he diſplayed an alacrity and firmneſs of mind which deſerve not to be found in any character that is not *truly virtuous*.—But the puniſhment of THERAMENES, we are aſſured, was juſtly inflicted.—*He overturned the democracy; betrayed his country to the Lacedæmonians; and he is accuſed of breach of friendſhip, of perfidy, and of murder* [c].—After

[a] See Lyſias againſt Ergocles in the life of Lyſias.

[b] See introduction to the orations againſt Agoratus and Eratoſthenes.

[c] Lyſias againſt Eratoſthenes.

theſe

theſe patriots of the firſt magnitude, it is unneceſſary to mention more obſcure names;—to inſiſt on the inhumanity of THEOMNESTUS, the injuſtice of EVANDER, the treachery of the younger ALCIBIADES, the rapacity of PHILOCRATES, the cruelty of PHILO[a]; all of whom, though they pretended to the *higheſt political virtue*, and aſpired to the firſt offices of ſtate, *were convicted of crimes, which, in any modern country of Europe, would have ſubjected them to an infamous death.*

If ſuch was the character of too many of thoſe who were ſtyled the *better ſort* of people[b], it is not to be expected that their *inferiors in rank and fortune* ſhould have behaved *more honourably*.—The greater part of the Athenian citizens were reduced to extreme indigence[c]. —Although landed property was divided among more proprietors in Greece than in any modern country, *yet five thouſand citizens of Athens are ſaid to have enjoyed no immoveable poſſeſſions*.—Deſtitute of patrimony or income,

[a] The orations of Lyſias, paſſim. [b] Xenoph. De Repub. Athen.

[c] There is no ſtate where perſonal freedom is more tolerated than at Athens, both to ſlaves and ſtrangers. It is not permitted here to beat a ſlave, nor will he even give way to you on the road for you to paſs. I will ſhew *the ſource* of this local cuſtom. If the law ſuffered a free man to beat a ſlave, a ſtranger, or a freed man, *he might lay violent hands on a citizen of Athens, taking him for a ſlave; for here the populace are not better habited than the ſlaves or ſtrangers; they have no exterior diſtinction*.—XENOPHON.

ſufficient to procure the means of a decent ſubſiſtence, they were *too lazy* to acquire them by their own induſtry. —MANY *led a liſtleſs inſignificant life, ſauntering about the public places, inquiring after news, ſatisfied with the gleanings of profit to be picked up in the courts of juſtice, or with the wretched ſubſiſtence allowed them by the treaſury —Their dreſs was frequently ſo mean and dirty, that it was difficult to diſtinguiſh them from ſlaves*[a].—"*And how is it poſſible,*" adds ISOCRATES, "*that thoſe who are deprived of the common neceſſaries of life, ſhould give themſelves any trouble about the government?*"—We find, accordingly, that they were exceedingly *ill-qualified* for executing thoſe offices with which they were too often entruſted. —As they had in a great meaſure engroſſed the adminiſtration of juſtice, it was not uncommon at Athens to bribe the clerks employed in tranſcribing the laws of Solon, to abridge, interpolate, and corrupt them.—What is ſtill more extraordinary, ſuch a groſs device frequently ſucceeded; nor was the artifice diſcovered until the parties came into court with contradictory laws[b].

This loweſt claſs of Athenian citizens, which, as we learn from Iſocrates[c], was by far the moſt numerous,

[a] Xenoph. de repub. Athen. [b] Life of Lyſias.
[c] Oration on reforming the Government of Athens.

endeavoured to alleviate the miſery of their condition by a very criminal conſolation.—They perſecuted their ſuperiors, baniſhed them their country, confiſcated their eſtates, and behaved with unexampled licentiouſneſs in the public aſſemblies[a].—It has been ſaid, that though they were entitled to the firſt offices of ſtate, they ſeldom attempted to obtain them[b].—But this obſervation is only true when confined to offices attended *with expence.—When any profit could be reaped, they were ever ready to graſp it.*—The management of the exchequer was the moſt *lucrative* employment in the republic; and to be entruſted with this charge, was the *high ambition* of all the popular demagogues.—Yet we have a liſt of treaſurers, regularly ſucceeding one another, who were raiſed to this confidential office from the meaneſt ranks in life.—*Low cunning and noiſy impudence elevated* EUCRATES, *a ſeller of wool, to this important ſtation.—He was ſucceeded by* LYSICLES, *a dealer in cattle, who excelled him in theſe accompliſhments.*—HYPERBOLUS, *a maker of lamps, adding profligate debauchery to his other eminent qualities, was taken into high favour; but every competitor gave way to the matchleſs effrontery and bare-faced lies of* CLEON, *a*

[a] Iſocrates on the Peace. [b] L'Eſprit des Loix, b. i.

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[a] Iſocrates on the Peace. [b] L'Eſprit des Loix, b. i.

currier, and the ſon of a man who had long exerciſed the ſame liberal profeſſion [a].—It appears, therefore, that although the Athenians were ſometimes directed by the juſtice of an ARISTIDES, the abilities of a PERICLES, or the virtue of a PHOCION, they more frequently liſtened to men of an oppoſite character [b].—*The moſt turbulent, diſſolute, and licentious, commonly prevailed in the aſſembly; and ſpecious qualities carried off the rewards due to real merit.*—ISOCRATES [c] aſſures us of the fact; and XENOPHON [d] aſſirms, that it is perfectly agreeable to the nature and principles of the Athenian conſtitution [e].—From

[a] Ariſtoph. Equit. et Veſp.

[b] I can poſitively aſſert, ſays Zenophon, that the people of Athens know very well who are the virtuous, and who are the factious citizens; but from this knowledge it reſults, that they attach themſelves more to thoſe *who ſuit them*, whom they know are at *their diſpoſal*, however great their roguery. They thoroughly deteſt every one who poſſeſſes virtuous ſentiments, as they are perſuaded the virtue of their fellow citizens (far from being advantageous) will be prejudicial to *them*. If they protected *the moderate men*, they ſtrengthened a party the *moſt oppoſite* to their projects. For in any ſtate they are not men of the moſt exemplary character who favour popular caprice; on the contrary, they are ſupported by thoſe who are *the moſt factious*. And it is natural each have a kind of ſympathy of action, and the ſame principles bind them to each other.

[c] Oration on reforming the Government of Athens.

[d] De Repub. Athen.

[e] But the populace are never ſolicitous to obtain thoſe important employments, on which depend the ſole ſafety of the Republic, or that would threaten it

From the manners of thoſe elected into the firſt offices, we may diſcover the general character of the electors. —*It was a compound of cruelty, fraud, drunkenneſs, debauchery, and every vice degrading to human nature*[a].

The moſt miſerable and moſt numerous claſs of inhabitants in Athens, were THE SLAVES.—Theſe were treated with great ſeverity in all the Grecian republics. —Deprived of every privilege belonging to them as men, they were puniſhed, inſulted, and tormented, at the will of a capricious maſter.—It was even cuſtomary to afflict them with wanton and unprovoked cruelty, and to ſubject them, without any offence on their part, to ſtripes and blows; that every ſpark of ingenuous nature being extinguiſhed, they might be the better fitted for ſubmitting to an entire and unreſerved obedience.

Such was their general treatment over all Greece; but at SPARTA it was ſtill more intolerable.—As the citi-

it with any danger, whether theſe employs are lucrative or burthenſome; there are no perſons among the moſt numerous claſs of the people, who think they have intereſt enough to obtain the command of the different corps of infantry or cavalry; all of them know perfectly well, that it is their intereſt not to interfere in theſe eſtabliſhments, but to reſign them to more conſiderable citizens: *at the ſame time, there are* NONE *but will endeavour to procure the other principal employments in the Republic, from which they may derive emolument, and make their private fortune.*—XENOPHON.

[a] See Lyſias againſt Simon. Wound from Malice aforethought, &c.

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zens of that republic, when unemployed in war or political affairs, wholly addicted themſelves to hunting and other amuſements, the ground was cultivated, and all mechanical profeſſions exerciſed, by ſlaves only.—Theſe increaſed to ſuch a pitch, as to become formidable to the ſtate.—Hence they were watched with uncommon attention, and *murdered by way of ſport*, or *to inure the young Spartans to blood*; and when any danger ſeemed to ariſe from them, *butchered by thouſands, in a manner too ſhocking to be deſcribed*[a].—The conduct of the ATHENIANS with regard to their ſlaves was reckoned more gentle than that of any of their neighbours.—DEMOSTHENES aſſerts, that it was better to be a ſlave in Athens, than a denizen in many other republics[b].—But this is ſpoken like an orator; for he allows that his countrymen commonly preferred the evidence of ſlaves, which was always extorted *by torture*, as a more infallible method of diſcovering the truth, than the teſtimony of freemen[c].—LYSIAS frequently takes notice of the ſame barbarous practice.—The Athenian citizens were fond of wearing *long hair*, which was *therefore forbidden to ſlaves.—Theſe unhappy men were depreſſed by every other mortifying diſ-*

[a] Plut. in Lycurg. [b] Philip. II.

[c] In Oniter.

tinction,

tinction, treated as creatures of an inferior ſpecies, and might be uſed, as LYSIAS *affirms, in any manner that ſeemed good to their maſters*[a].—Such was the boaſted gentleneſs of the Athenian inſtitutions; and the effects of them on the character of *maſters* and *ſlaves* were equally pernicious.—The *former*, being accuſtomed to treat with ſevere harſhneſs thoſe who were ſubject to their authority, could not be expected to entertain very humane ſentiments for their fellow-citizens. The *latter*, expoſed as they were to continual indignities, and degraded below the condition of human nature, became inſenſible to every manly feeling; and, governed by hatred, reſentment, malice, and all the worſt paſſions incident to the human frame, "they were always more deſirous of obtaining liberty by the deſtruction of their maſters, than by the merit of their own ſervices[b]."—HENCE THE MANNERS OF THE WHOLE NATION WERE TAINTED WITH A SAVAGE FEROCITY, OF WHICH IT IS NOT EASY, IN THE PRESENT AGE, TO FORM AN IDEA: AND EVEN THE BEST GREEK WRITERS, INFECTED BY THE GENERAL CONTAGION, DESCRIBE WITH A

[a] Wound from Malice aforethought.

[b] Life of Lyſias. Lyſias's Oration relative to a conſecrated Olive.

CALM,

CALM, UNFEELING INDIFFERENCE, SUCH ATROCIOUS BARBARITIES AS OUGHT NATURALLY TO EXCITE HORROR.

The hoſpitality of ancient times, which was deemed ſo important a virtue by private families [a], was little regarded by the public.—The *ſtrangers* who reſided in Athens, though extremely numerous, were reduced to a condition nearly reſembling that of emancipated ſlaves. —Poſſeſſed of perſonal freedom, they enjoyed no political or civil rights.—They had a patron indeed, who defended them from the injuries of others, but who was entitled to much deference and reſpect, and to many important ſervices, in return for the aſſiſtance which he afforded.—If they neglected to perform theſe ſervices, *their patron withdrew his protection*; *in conſequence of which, their whole property was confiſcated to the Athenian republic* [b].—Beſides this misfortune, which frequently befel them, they were obliged to pay *ten drachmas* [c] *annuall to the exchequer*; and if they failed in making this acknowledgment at the appointed time, they were immediately *ſold as* SLAVES *by the officers of the revenue* [d].

[a] Aul. Gell. lib. v. c. 13.

[b] Lyſias againſt Philo.

[c] Heſychius.

[d] Demoſthen. Orat. 1. in Ariſtogit.

Before

Before this actually took place, they were, in one material point, on the ſame footing with thoſe ſubjected to domeſtic ſervitude.—*Strangers*, as well as *ſlaves*, were liable to be put to the queſtion, and to have their evidence extorted BY TORTURE [a].—As foreigners were more numerous in Athens than in any other of the Grecian ſtates, it is probable, that every where elſe they were treated ſtill more rigorouſly; and the ſituation of exiles, we may ſuppoſe, was ſtill more miſerable than that of other ſtrangers.—Hence the continual lamentations of thoſe who are in danger of *baniſhment*; *a penalty thought equal to death itſelf* [b].—Hence likewiſe we may obſerve the rigour of the Grecian laws, particularly THE OSTRACISM, which prevailed not only in Athens, but in all the democratical ſtates [c].—*By this inſtitution, any citizen deemed formidable on account of his power, his riches, or his eloquence, might be baniſhed during ten years, and reduced, of courſe, to the wretched condition above deſcribed* [d].

The wealth of individuals, in all the ſtates of Greece, was extremely inconſiderable, when compared with the

[a] Lyſias againſt Simon.

[b] Lyſias, paſſim.

[c] Ariſtot. Polit. lib. iii. c. 13.

[d] Plut. in Vit. Ariſtid.

opulence of the modern inhabitants of Europe.—The narrow circumſtances of the Athenians afford ſufficient evidence of the exceſſive poverty of their neighbours.—SOLON divided his fellow-citizens into four claſſes[a].—Thoſe of the firſt poſſeſſed as much land as was ſufficient to produce annually five hundred *medimni*[b] of grain; the eſtates of the ſecond produced three hundred; thoſe of the third, two hundred; and the loweſt claſs were either entirely deſtitute of immoveable property, or poſſeſſed ſuch ſmall ſhares of land as were of very inconſiderable value.—In the time of LYSIAS, there were no leſs than five thouſand citizens who had no landed eſtates[c]; and the farms cultivated by others could not afford them any better ſubſiſtence than that of the meaneſt cottagers[d].—The income indeed of a few great families much exceeded what was neceſſary, by the regulations of SOLON, to conſtitute them of the firſt claſs.—But even the richeſt Athenians were by no means poſſeſſed of what would be at preſent deemed a magnificent fortune.—The eſtate of CONON, who had

[a] Plut. in Solon. [b] Thirteen *medimni* are equal to fourteen buſhels.
[c] Lyſias. [d] Lyſias againſt the Exchequer.

been

been employed in many ſucceſsful expeditions againſt the enemies of his country, exceeded not 9000l. —That of Nicophemus, which the Athenians were at great pains to appropriate for the public ſervice, ſcarcely amounted to 4000l.—HIPPONICUS, who is called by Xenophon[a] and by Iſocrates[b] the richeſt of the Greeks, was not worth 38,000l., admitting the computation of thoſe who had an intereſt to exaggerate his wealth.—And even the ſplendid ALCIBIADES, whoſe magnificence is ſo highly extolled by all Greek writers, was never maſter of 20,000l.[c]—*Although we make allowance, therefore, for the high value of money in ancient times, we muſt ſtill entertain a very mean idea of Grecian opulence.*—The *wealthy few* enjoyed but *moderate fortunes*, while *by far the greater part lived in very ſtraitened and miſerable circumſtances.*

Agreeably to theſe obſervations, we may remark, in the deſcriptions of ancient writers, an extreme ſimplicity of manners in every thing relative to private life.—*The Grecian houſes, furniture, table, dreſs, were all of the*

[a] Œconom. [b] In defence of Alcibiades.

[c] Lyſias's Oration relative to the Goods of Ariſtophanes.

meaneſt kind Their houſes commonly conſiſted of *two floors*, the *lower* of which was often employed as *a magazine* for holding the proviſions neceſſary for the family[a]. —In the habitations of the richer citizens, the apartments of the women were ſeparated from thoſe of the men, and the bath was frequently ſituated between them.—There is a ſtriking example in LYSIAS of the little value which the middling ranks of people put upon their dwellings.—*A man, rather in affluent circumſtances for an Athenian, ſucceeds to the houſe of his brother.—He continues in it a year, until the proviſions ſtored in the ground-floor are conſumed, and then abandons it to go elſewhere*[b].—The furniture of their houſes, excepting pictures and ſtatues (of which hereafter), appears to have been of the plaineſt kind.—The LACEDÆMONIANS made uſe of no other inſtruments but the *ſaw* and the *hatchet* in preparing their houſehold accommodations[c]. —Their more improved neighbours ſeem to have been ſo little acquainted with what the rudeſt nations in modern Europe regard as the conveniencies of life, that,

[a] Xenophon. Œconom. Lyſias againſt Eratoſth.

[b] Lyſias againſt Diogeiton. [c] Plut. in Lycurg.

n latter times, they were ignorant of *the uſe of beds*, ere ſatisfied with repoſing on the ground[a].—*Their was entirely of woollen*, which originally coſt them ittle; but *the dirtineſs of it* put them afterwards to l deal of expence in the article of PERFUMES[b].— Athenians indeed were much given to the pleaſures table, which XENOPHON conſiders as an effect of extenſive commerce.—They imported, he ſays, uxuries of ITALY, SICILY, CYPRUS, LYDIA, us, and PELOPONNESUS.—*But the greater part of izens*, as both XENOPHON[c] and ISOCRATES[d] ob- could not afford *theſe delicacies*; and they ſeldom ided to give any *private entertainments*; they con- l themſelves with *public feaſts*, which were cele- d with greater expence in proportion as the intervals een them were more diſtant.

very, as it has been obſerved, prevailed over all ce; but the ſlaves were principally occupied in arts, ufactures, or agriculture, and rarely employed as uments of luxury or oſtentation.—Even the better

[a] Idem in Pelopid. [b] Lyſias, ibid. [c] De Repub. Athen.
[d] Diſcourſe on Reforming the Government of Athens.

ſort

ſort of people at Athens ſubmitted to the meaneſt domeſtic offices.—Their ordinary manner of life was extremely uniform.—Part of *every morning* was commonly ſpent in public acts of religion.—The bulk of citizens frequented, in *the forenoon*, the public aſſembly, or the different courts of juſtice.—Thoſe whoſe preſence was unneceſſary there, and who diſdained to be employed in any mechanical occupation, amuſed themſelves with their military exerciſes, ſauntered in the public walks, or loitered in the ſhops of muſicians, and other artiſts, in which they are ſaid to have thrown away the greateſt part of their time [a].

As *the morning* was dedicated to religion, and *the forenoon* to buſineſs, ſo *the evening* was the time of pleaſure and diſſipation.—*They had no great variety of thoſe amuſements which are found neceſſary in poliſhed ſocieties to divert languor, and to fill up the vacuities of a liſtleſs life.*—Games of hazard are always mentioned with ſuch diſgrace, that they muſt not have been in general uſe; and none but the moſt profligate and abandoned ſeem to have been much addicted to them [b].—The men ſupped

[a] Life of Lyſias. Iſocrates in Acrop. [b] Lyſias againſt Alcibiades, et paſſim.

apart

apart from the women: thoſe of better fortune commonly invited a few friends[a]; and THE BOTTLE appears to have formed a material part of the entertainment.—PLATO[b] allows the *free uſe of wine* in theſe convivial ſuppers; as nothing, he ſays, has a greater tendency to diſpoſe the mind to that benevolence which often terminates in friendſhip.—Even SOCRATES is repreſented drinking in LARGE GLASSES with Agathon and Ariſtophanes till *early in the morning*.—The converſation, on ſuch occaſions, was often lively and agreeable, but ſometimes as licentious as the debauchery was exceſſive[c]; and ſo little *aſhamed* were the Greeks of *their vices*, that they affected to practiſe them as duties of religion.—Their ſolemn feſtivals commonly ended with a ſupper, at which they thought themſelves obliged to *get drunk* in honour of the gods[d].—This circumſtance had, doubtleſs, its effect, in diſtinguiſhing their ſuperſtition from that of the eaſtern nations, from whom they had borrowed the moſt eſſential parts of their religious belief.—The worſhip of the EGYPTIANS was dark and gloomy; that of the GREEKS, gay and

[a] Lyſias againſt Eratoſthenes, p. 423. [b] Sympoſ.
[c] Idem, ibid. [d] Ariſtot. ad Nichom. lib. viii.

cheerful.

cheerful.—Even the Egyptian hymns were melancholy, and conſiſted of complaints and lamentations; but the Grecian ſolemnities concluded with ſongs of triumph and exultation [a].—It had been fortunate for the Greeks, had they confined their debaucheries to ſtated times of convivial merriment; BUT THEY FREQUENTLY INTOXICATED THEMSELVES AT ALL HOURS OF THE DAY; and their exceſſes in a vice peculiarly hurtful in a warm climate to the powers of the underſtanding, led them to commit *ſuch follies* and *abſurdities* as are ſcarcely to be credited [b].

From this ſhort deſcription of their manner of life, it is natural to conclude, that they had made but ſmall progreſs in the arts of ſociety.—Theſe flouriſh in cities, and the moſt poliſhed people of Greece much affected a country life.—XENOPHON's beautiful deſcription of rural happineſs, proves that he had felt its charms; and both THUCYDIDES [c] and ISOCRATES [d] aſſure us, that the Athenians of the firſt rank ſeldom lived in the city.—Hence *agriculture* was reckoned an honourable employ-

[a] Apuleius de genio Socratis.

[b] Lyſias, Wound from Malice. Againſt Simon, &c.

[c] Lib. ii. [d] In Areopag.

ment;

ment; but the rules of it were little attended to, and leſs underſtood [a].—*Commerce* was ſtill more neglected.—That of the Athenians, though comparatively great, muſt have been extremely inconſiderable in itſelf.—There could be little competition between traders, when a ſhip often doubled the value of her cargo by a voyage from Athens to the Adriatic [b].—The ſpirit of induſtry was checked by the abſurd mode of taxation; *credit, the ſoul of commerce, was deſtroyed by the Grecian inſtitutions, which rendered property precarious*; and not only the public, but private perſons, were obliged to pay an exorbitant intereſt for the money which they had occaſion to borrow [c].

The wants and luxuries, however, of one climate are not the ſame with thoſe of another.—*A comfortable dwelling, abundance of the neceſſaries of life, and all thoſe domeſtic conveniencies which induſtry and commerce may procure, are deemed, in northern countries, eſſential to happineſs.—Deprived of the advantages which theſe objects afford, human life would be expoſed to innumerable hardſhips; and to obtain them in great plenty, and in high perfection, is, therefore, the main aim of induſtrious applica-*

[a] Xenophon. Œconom. [b] Lyſias againſt Diogeiton.
[c] Lyſias in Ariſtoph.

tion.—But in Greece, the ingenuity of man can impart few additions to the happy influence of the climate.—Nature, requiring little, has given almoſt all that ſhe requires; and art is leſs employed in warding off inconveniencies which are weakly felt, than in procuring delights which are highly reliſhed.—The pleaſures of the eye and the ear obtain a preference to other gratifications; and poetry, painting, muſic, ſtatuary, and eloquence, furniſh the moſt eſſential articles of luxury.—*Notwithſtanding the unhappy policies*, therefore, which prevailed in that country, and the inconſiderable progreſs of the Greeks in what are called the *uſeful arts*, they acquired unrivalled fame in thoſe which are merely *ornamental.—The rage of foreign war*, as well as *the turbulence of domeſtic faction*, both of which were deeply rooted in the nature of the Grecian inſtitutions, produced ſuch effects on the progreſs of refined arts, as could neither have been foreſeen nor expected.—The *former* encouraged *valour*, the *latter eloquence*; and wherever theſe qualities are called forth, and exerted in an eminent degree, talents, both military and civil, muſt attain a proportionable improvement.—The concurring influence of accidental cauſes promoted the ſame beneficial end, and favoured the dawning efforts of

Grecian genius.—A delightful climate, a picturesque country, an harmonious language, a poetical religion; the effect of these, singly, was great; but much greater when united; and conspiring harmoniously together, they operated not only with full force, but in proper direction.

When we contemplate, however, the high attainments of the nation in general, in all the *refined arts*, we examine their character in the most favourable light in which it can possibly be viewed.—*Their magnificence in public solemnities, religious processions, and theatrical entertainments*, followed as a natural consequence; and *these matters are continually insisted on by the fond admirers of antiquity*.—But it is evident, from what has been already observed in this discourse, that neither the general improvement of manners, nor the arts of conversation and society, kept pace with the progress of those splendid, but useless amusements; and if we consider the *treatment* and character of *the fair sex*, even among the most cultivated people of Greece, the same conclusion will be rendered still more apparent.

During the early ages of society, men are either employed in acquiring the means of subsistence, or in invading their enemies and repelling their attacks.—The

natural delicacy and timidity of women render them leſs qualified for theſe occupations.—Hence, among rude nations, they are treated with neglect, and often reduced into ſervitude.—But when civilization has been carried to a certain pitch; when arts, manufactures, and commerce, have made known the conveniencies and refinements of poliſhed life, talents of the agreeable kind come to be in general requeſt, and are ſoon univerſally eſteemed.—In all theſe, women are fitted by nature to excel.—The imperfections of their ſex gradually diſappear; they become the objects of affection, acquire reſpect, and aſſume that diſtinguiſhed ſtation in ſociety, which is not demanded with more juſtice on the one ſide, than yielded with readineſs on the other.

Theſe obſervations ſeem natural and obvious; and are juſtified, I believe, by the general hiſtory of mankind.—Yet they are not conformable to what actually took place in Greece.—Among the Athenians, a people famous indeed on account of their martial ſpirit, but unrivalled in the arts of peace, not more learned than polite, *according to the ideas of that age*, and diſtinguiſhed by an exceſſive paſſion for thoſe refined entertainments which prevail in poliſhed nations, and which they enjoyed in peculiar elegance and perfection, *the treatment*

of

of women was moſt ungenerous and unnatural.—Excluded from the public ſhows and amuſements, deprived even of the pleaſures of domeſtic ſociety, and ſcarcely venturing to open their lips in the preſence of their neareſt relations[a], *they were confined with the utmoſt rigour to the moſt retired apartments of the family, employed in the meaneſt offices, and conſidered in every reſpect rather as the ſervants than as the equals of their fathers or huſbands.—It was thought indecent for them to venture abroad, unleſs to accompany a funeral*[b], *to be preſent at a ſacrifice, or to aſſiſt at ſome other religious ſolemnity.—Even on theſe occaſions they were generally accompanied by perſons who watched their behaviour.—The moſt innocent freedom was conſtrued into a breach of modeſty; and their reputation, once ſullied by the ſmalleſt reproach, could never afterwards be retrieved.*

If ſuch ſeverities had been exerciſed againſt them from *that jealouſy* which often attends *a violent love*, and of which a certain degree is, perhaps, inſeparable from *a delicacy* in the paſſion between the ſexes, their condition, though not leſs miſerable, would have been leſs contemptible.—*But this could not be the caſe; the Athenians were utter ſtrangers to that refinement of ſentiment with*

[a] Lyſias againſt Diogeiton. [b] Lyſias, p. 420.

regard

regard to the fair ſex [c], *which renders them the objects of a timid but reſpectful paſſion.*—Married or unmarried, the Athenian women were kept in equal reſtraint; no pains were taken to render them, at any one period of their lives, *agreeable members of ſociety*; and their education was either *entirely neglected*, or confined, at leaſt, *to ſuch objects as, inſtead of elevating and enlarging the mind, tended only to humble and to debaſe it.*—The uncommon rigour with which they were confined, was not therefore with a view to promote their own advantage, but only to render them better qualified for thoſe ſervices which the Athenians required them to perform.

Though neither fitted for appearing with honour in ſociety, nor for keeping company with their huſbands, they were thought capable of ſuperintending their domeſtic œconomy, of acting as ſtewards in the family, and thus relieving the men from a multiplicity of *little cares*, which they conſidered as unworthy of their attention and unſuitable to their dignity.—The whole burden of ſuch neceſſary, but humble concerns, being impoſed on the women, their early treatment and firſt inſtructions were adapted to that *lowlife ſtate*, beyond which

[c] Lyſias, p. 435.

they

they could never afterwards aſpire.—Nothing was allowed to divert their minds from thoſe ſervile occupations, in which it was intended that their whole lives ſhould be ſpent; no liberal idea was preſented to their imagination, that might raiſe them above the mechanical and vulgar arts, in which they were ever deſtined to labour: above all, no liberty of thought or fancy was permitted them; the ſmalleſt familiarity with ſtrangers was deemed a dangerous offence, and any attachment beyond their own family, a heinous crime.—When they were fit for the ſtate of wedlock, which, in the climate of Greece, happened long before their reaſon and underſtanding had arrived at maturity, they were given in marriage by *their relations*, WITHOUT BEING CONSULTED ON THE SUBJECT; and by entering into this new ſituation, they only exchanged the ſevere guardianſhip of a father for the *abſolute government* of a huſband.—As the Athenians ſeldom married but from motives of *conveniency*, and at a more advanced period of life than is ordinary in other countries [a], their good-will and affection could only be excited by the birth of an heir, or gradually acquired by a careful œconomy and conſtant circumſpection [b].—

[a] Ariſtoph. Lyſiſtrat. [b] Lyſias, p. 420.

Even

Even the laws of Athens favoured this unjuſt treatment of women, ſo inconſiſtent with all the rules of modern gallantry; and without attending to the condition of the fair ſex in that republic, it is impoſſible to underſtand the ſpirit of their laws.

SOCRATES is introduced in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*[a] converſing with ISCHOMACHUS, an Athenian citizen, who, by his good ſenſe and great worth, had obtained univerſal eſteem.—The philoſopher deſires to know, how he had acquired the favourable opinion of a people by no means famous for viewing one another's action's in the moſt advantageous light.—ISCHOMACHUS endeavours to ſatisfy him, by explaining in what manner he managed his family —*His wife, he obſerves, is an excellent œconomiſt, or houſewife; and little thanks to herſelf; for he had taken care to form her to ſo uſeful an office.—She was married before fifteen years of age; and the chief attention beſtowed on her before that period, had conſiſted in allowing her to ſee as little, to hear as little, and to aſk as few queſtions as poſſible.—What ſhe knew, therefore, was next to nothing.—He began to inſtruct her, by ſaying, that it was the leaſt part of his deſign in marrying her to have a*

[a] Lib. v. De adminiſt. domeſtic.

bed-fellow;

bed-fellow; becauſe this might be eaſily obtained by far leſs trouble and formality.—His main object was to have a perſon, in whoſe diſcretion he could confide, who would take proper care of his ſervants and houſehold, and lay out his money uſefully and ſparingly.—Yet this ISCHOMACHUS, who directed *his wife* to *theſe gentle occupations*, had been at different times *trierarch*, had been appointed to execute ſeveral other of the *moſt expenſive offices in the ſtate*, and was reckoned *exceedingly rich*[a].—*By ſuch ungenerous treatment were the moſt amiable part of the human ſpecies degraded, among a people in many reſpects the moſt improved of all antiquity.—They were excluded from thoſe convivial entertainments and that ſocial intercourſe which Nature had fitted them to adorn.—Inſtead of leading the taſte and directing the ſentiments of men, their own value was eſtimated, like that of the moſt indifferent objects, only by the profit which they brought.—Their chief virtue was reſerve, and their point of honour, œconomy.*

Thus have I endeavoured to explain the inſtitutions and cuſtoms which prevailed in the Grecian ſtates, as well as the condition and character of the different claſſes which compoſed them.—I have not attempted to em-

[a] Lyſias, p. 409.

belliſh the portrait, much leſs to delineate an *ideal beauty*.—If there is any merit in the picture, it conſiſts in *its reſemblance to the original.*

But it would be injuſtice to theſe celebrated republics to omit an obſervation which is made by many Greek writers, and which is founded on undoubted truth.—When the Athenian[a] orators had excited the reſentment of their audience, by loading them with a multitude of reproaches, they often ſoothed their angry paſſions by talking of the glory of their anceſtors.—Athens, they aſſerted, was diſtinguiſhed above all cities in the world for producing men of an elevated and refined genius, fitted to excel alike in the career of arts and arms, and to command reſpect by the nobleſt virtues of the mind.—This, indeed, is the peculiar glory of all Greece, that, amidſt the turbulence of democratical faction, the general corruption, and ferocious barbarity of the times, *many characters were formed which do honour to human nature.*—For the moſt improved ſtate of ſociety is not always moſt favourable to the higheſt perfection of the individual: where the *fermentation* is moſt violent, the *pureſt ſpirits* are ſometimes extracted; and the boldeſt

[a] Iſoc. and Demoſth. paſſim.

and

and moſt creative geniuſes have flouriſhed in the rudeſt and leaſt cultivated ages.—*Theſe extraordinary men* were not carried along by the torrent of popular opinion; they were ſenſible of the vices and follies of their countrymen; they perceived the ſource of their errors, and foretold their effects.—On every ſubject they thought differently from the vulgar, and particularly on religion, government, and manners.

But it is not the object of this diſcourſe to deſcribe the *characters of great men*.—I have endeavoured to exhibit the *general manners of the people*; and, from the whole, it ſeems reaſonable to conclude, that, *if* theſe republicans excelled the modern inhabitants of Europe in mental vigour and abilities, *they fell ſhort of them in every indulgent and amiable virtue*: if they ſurpaſſed all mankind in ardour, eloquence, and the talents which are required on extraordinary occaſions, *they were little acquainted with the agreeable improvements of ordinary intercourſe and converſation*; and if they attained unrivalled perfection in the refined arts, *they were extremely deficient in thoſe which contribute to the comfort and happineſs of private life.*—Their beſt qualities were all of the *ſplendid* kind.—Their behaviour on the great theatre of war and politics excites *admiration*.—Their hiſtory exhibits a *pompous*

than to have been expoſed to its violence [a].

[a] GILLIES.

SECT. XXIV.

THE ROMAN REPUBLIC.

THE ROMANS, after having baniſhed their KINGS, appointed CONSULS *annually*; a circumſtance which contributed to raiſe them to ſo exalted a pitch.—In the lives of all princes there are certain periods of ambition, and theſe are afterwards ſucceeded by other paſſions, and even by indolence; but the commonwealth being governed by magiſtrates, who were changed *every year*, and who endeavoured to ſignalize themſelves in their employment, in the view of obtaining new ones, *ambition had not a moment to loſe*.—Hence it was that theſe magiſtrates were ever perſuading the ſenate *to ſtir up the people to war*, and pointed out to them new enemies every day.

This body (the ſenate) was inclined enough to do this of their own accord; for, being quite *tired* of the *complaints* and *demands of the people*, they endeavoured to remove the occaſion of their diſquiet, and to employ them in foreign wars.

Now, the *common people* were generally *pleaſed* with war, becauſe a method had been found to make it *beneficial to them*, by the judicious diſtribution that was made of the ſpoils.

Rome being a city in which neither trade nor arts flouriſhed, the ſeveral individuals had no other way of enriching themſelves but BY RAPINE.

In fine, thoſe citizens who ſtaid at home ſhared *alſo* in the fruits of the victory; for part of the conquered lands was confiſcated, and this was ſubdivided into *two* portions, *one* of which was ſold for the benefit of the public, and the *other* divided by the commonwealth among ſuch citizens as were but in poor circumſtances.

As the conſuls had no other way of obtaining the honour of a triumph than by a conqueſt or a victory, this made them ruſh into the field with unparalleled impetuoſity; they marched directly to the enemy, when force immediately decided the conteſt.

ROME was therefore engaged in an *eternal* and *ever-obſtinate war* [a].——Now, a nation that is always

[a] The more ancient Romans lived in perpetual war with all their neighbours: and in old LATIN, the term HOSTIS, expreſſed both a ſtranger and an

ways at war, and that too from the very frame and eſſence of its government, muſt neceſſarily *be deſtroyed*, or *ſubdue all other nations*; but theſe being ſometimes at war, and at other times in peace, could never be *ſo able* to invade others, nor ſo well prepared to defend themſelves.

By this means the *Romans* attained a perfect knowledge in the military arts: in tranſient wars moſt of *the examples are loſt*; peace ſuggeſts different ideas, and we forget not only our faults but even virtues.

Another conſequence of the maxim of waging perpetual war, was, that the *Romans* never concluded a peace

an enemy. This is remarked by CICERO; but by him is aſcribed to the humanity of his anceſtors, who ſoftened, as much as poſſible, the denomination of an enemy, by calling him by the ſame appellation which ſignified a ſtranger. *De Off.* lib. ii. It is, however, much more probable, from the manners of the times, that the ferocity of thoſe people was ſo great as to make them regard all ſtrangers as enemies, and call them by the ſame name. It is not, beſides, conſiſtent with the moſt common maxims of policy or of nature, that any ſtate ſhould regard its public enemies with a friendly eye, or preſerve any ſuch ſentiments for them as the ROMAN orator would aſcribe to his anceſtors. Not to mention, that the early ROMANS really exerciſed piracy, as we learn from their firſt treaties with CARTHAGE, preſerved by POLYBIUS, lib. iii. and conſequently, like the SALLEE and ALGERINE rovers, were actually at war with moſt nations, and a ſtranger and an enemy were with them almoſt ſynonymous.—HUME.

The *Romans* conſidered foreigners as enemies: *Hoſtis*, according to *Varro de Lingua Lat. lib.* 4. ſignified at firſt a foreigner who lived according to his own laws.—MONTESQUIEU.

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but when they were victorious; and, indeed, to what purpoſe would it be to make an ignominious peace with one nation, and afterwards go and invade another?

In this view their pretenſions roſe always in proportion to their defeat; by this they *ſurpriſed* the conquerors; and laid themſelves under a *greater neceſſity* of conquering.

Being for ever obnoxious to the moſt ſevere vengeance, *perſeverance* and *valour* became *neceſſary virtues*: and theſe could not be diſtinguiſhed, among them, from ſelf-love, from the love of one's family, of one's country, and of whatever is deareſt among men.

The world in that age was not like the world in ours: voyages, conqueſt, traffic; the eſtabliſhment of mighty ſtates; the invention of poſt-offices, of the ſea-compaſs, and of printing; theſe, with a certain general polity, have made correſpondence much eaſier, and given riſe, among us, to an art, called by the name of POLITICS: every man ſees at one glance whatever is tranſacting in the whole univerſe; and if a people diſcover but ever ſo little ambition, all the nations round them are immediately terrified.

It was manifeſtly ſeen, during the ſhort time that the *tyranny* of the DECEMVIRS laſted, how much the aggrandizing

grandizing of *Rome* depended on its liberty.—The government ſeemed to have loſt the [a] ſoul which animated even to the minuteſt part of it.

There remained at that time but *two* ſorts of people in the city, *thoſe who ſubmitted to ſlavery*, and *thoſe who, for their own private intereſt, endeavoured to enſlave the reſt.*—The ſenators withdrew from *Rome* as from a foreign city; and the neighbouring nations did not meet with the leaſt reſiſtance from any quarter.

As the people of EUROPE, in this age, have very near the ſame arts, the ſame arms, the ſame diſcipline, and the ſame manner of making war; the prodigious fortune to which the ROMANS attained, ſeems incredible to us. Beſides, power is at this time divided ſo diſproportionably, that it is not poſſible for a petty ſtate to raiſe itſelf, merely by its own ſtrength, from the low condition in which Providence has placed it.

This merits ſome reflections, otherwiſe we might behold ſeveral events without being able to account for them; and for want of having a perfect idea of the *different ſituation of things*, we ſhould believe, in peruſing

[a] Theſe *Decemviri*, upon pretence of giving written laws to the people, ſeized upon the government. See *D. Halicarnaſſ. Lib.* 11.

antient hiſtory, that we view a ſet of men different from ourſelves.

Experience has ſhewn perpetually, that an *European prince* who has a million of ſubjects, cannot, without deſtroying himſelf, keep up and maintain above ten thouſand ſoldiers; conſequently, great nations only are poſſeſſed of armies.

But the caſe was different antiently with regard to COMMONWEALTHS: for this proportion between the ſoldiers and the reſt of the people, which is now as one to an hundred, might, in thoſe times, be, pretty near, as *one* is to *eight*.

The *avarice* of ſome particular perſons, and the *laviſh profuſeneſs* of others, occaſions the lands to become the property of a *few*; immediately arts are introduced to ſupply the reciprocal wants of the rich and poor; by which means there were but very few ſoldiers ſeen; for the revenues of the lands that had before been employed to ſupport theſe, are now beſtowed wholly on *ſlaves* and *artificers*, who adminiſter to the luxury of the new proprietors: and it is impoſſible that people of *this caſt* ſhould be *good ſoldiers*, they being *cowardly* and *abject*; already *corrupted* by the *luxury of cities*, and often by the *very art they profeſſed*; not to mention, that as they could

not

not properly call any country their own, and reaping the fruits of their induſtry in *every clime*, they had very little either *to loſe or keep*.

A MONARCHY is not dragged nearer to the brink of ruin, by the *tyranny* of a prince, than a COMMONWEALTH, by a *lukewarmneſs* and indifference for the general good.—The *advantage* of a *free ſtate* is, to have its revenues employed to better purpoſes, but where the reverſe of this happens! The *advantage* of a *free ſtate* is, to be free from favourites; but when the contrary is ſeen! And that inſtead of the friends and relations of a prince, *great fortunes* muſt be *amaſſed for* the *friends* and *relations* of *all perſons who have any ſhare in the government*; in this caſe an *univerſal ruin* muſt enſue; the laws are then eluded more dangerouſly, than when infringed by a *ſovereign prince*, who being always *the greateſt citizen in the ſtate*, is moſt concerned to labour at its preſervation.

During the courſe of mighty proſperity, in which it is uſual for mankind to *forget themſelves*, the SENATE *continued to act* with the *ſame depth of judgment*; and whilſt their armies were ſpreading an univerſal terror, they would not ſuffer thoſe to *riſe* who were once caſt to the ground.

A TRIBUNAL exiſted which judged *all nations:* at the cloſe of every war it determined the *rewards* or *puniſhments* which every one had merited: it took away from the vanquiſhed people part of their lands, and gave them to their allies, in which it did two things; it engaged in the intereſts of ROME, *princes* from whom they had *little to fear*, and *much to hope*; and they *weakened others* from whom they had nothing *to hope*, and every thing *to fear*.

In warring with an enemy they made uſe of their allies, but immediately *extirpated* the *deſtroyers*. PHILIP was overcome by the aſſiſtance of the ÆTOLIANS, who were *deſtroyed preſently after*, for having joined themſelves to ANTIOCHUS.—THIS KING was overcome by the aſſiſtance of the RHODIANS; but after the moſt conſpicuous rewards had been beſtowed upon them, they were *depreſſed for ever*, upon *pretence* that they had demanded to have a peace concluded with PERSIUS.

When the ROMANS were oppoſed by ſeveral enemies at the ſame time, *they* granted a truce to the *weakeſt*, who thought themſelves happy in obtaining it; conſidering it as a great advantage, that their ruin had been ſuſpended.

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When *they* were engaged in a mighty war, the SENATE winked at wrongs of every kind, and ſilently waited the ſeaſon proper for chaſtiſement: if at any time a people *ſent them* the *offenders*, they refuſed to puniſh them, chuſing rather to conſider the *whole nation as guilty*, and to reſerve themſelves a USEFUL vengeance.

As they made their enemies ſuffer *inexpreſſible evils*, very few leagues were formed againſt them; for he who was at the greateſt diſtance from the danger, did not care to come near it.

For *this* reaſon *war was ſeldom denounced againſt them*, but themſelves always made it at a ſeaſon, in the manner, and with a people, as beſt ſuited their intereſt; and among the great number of nations they invaded, there were very few but would have ſubmitted to injuries of every kind, provided they could but be ſuffered to live in peace.

As it was uſual for them to deliver themſelves always in a magiſterial way, ſuch ambaſſadors as they ſent to nations who had not yet felt the weight of their power, were ſure to meet with *ill treatment*, which furniſhed them with a ſure [a] pretence to engage in a new war.

[a] See an example of this, in their war with the *Dalmates*. See *Polybius*.

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As they never concluded a peace with ſincerity and integrity, and intended a general invaſion, their *treaties* were properly but ſo many SUSPENSIONS FROM WAR; they inſerted ſuch conditions in them, as always paved the way to the ruin of thoſe ſtates who accepted them: they uſed to ſend the garriſons out of the ſtrong-holds; they regulated the number of the land forces, or had the horſes and elephants delivered up to them; and, in caſe this people were powerful at ſea, they obliged them to burn their ſhips, and ſometimes to remove higher up in the country.

After having deſtroyed the armies of a prince, *they drained his treaſury*, by impoſing a heavy tribute, or taxing him immoderately, under colour of making him defray the expence of the war: *a new ſpecies of tyranny, which obliged him to oppreſs his ſubjects, and thereby loſe their affection.*

Whenever they granted a peace to ſome prince, they uſed to take one of his brothers or children *by way of hoſtage*, which gave them an opportunity of raiſing, at pleaſure, commotions in his kingdom: when they had the *next heir* among them, it was their cuſtom to intimidate the *poſſeſſor*: had they only a prince of a remote degree,

degree, they made uſe of him to foment the inſurrections of the populace.

Whenever *any prince* or *any people* had *withdrawn from their allegiance*, they immediately indulged them with the title of [a] *Ally* to the ROMANS; and by this means they became ſacred and inviolable; *ſo that there was no monarch, how formidable ſoever, who could rely one moment upon his ſubjects, or even upon his own family.*

Although the title of their ally was a kind of ſervitude, it [b] yet was very much ſought after; for thoſe who enjoyed it were ſure to receive *no injuries but from them*, and had reaſon to flatter themſelves they would be leſs grievous; hence nations and kings were ready to undertake any kind of ſervices, and ſubmitted to the meaneſt and moſt groveling acts, merely for the ſake of obtaining it.

When they permitted any cities the enjoyment of their liberties, they immediately *raiſed two* [c] *factions in them, one* of which defended the laws and liberties of the country, whilſt the *other* aſſerted, that the will of the

[a] See particularly their Treaty with the *Jews* in the *1ſt* Book of the *Maccabees, ch.* 8.

[b] *Ariarathes* offered a ſacrifice to the gods, ſays *Polybius*, by way of thanks for having obtained their alliance.

[c] See *Polybius* on the Cities of *Greece.*

Romans was the only law; and as the latter faction was always the moſt powerful, it is plain ſuch a liberty could be but a mere name.

They ſometimes poſſeſſed themſelves of a country upon *pretence* of being *heirs* to it: they entered *Aſia*, *Bithynia*, and *Libya*, by the laſt wills of ATTALUS, of NICOMEDES[a], and of APPION; and *Egypt* was enſlaved by that of the king of CYRENE.

To keep *great princes* for ever in a *weak condition*, they would not ſuffer them to conclude an alliance with thoſe nations to whom they had granted theirs[b], and as they did not refuſe it to any people who bordered upon a powerful prince, this condition, inſerted in a treaty of peace, deprived him of all his allies.

Beſides, when they had overcome any conſiderable prince, one of the articles of the treaty was, that he ſhould not make war, upon account of any feuds of his own, with the allies of the *Romans* (that is to ſay, generally with all his neighbours); but ſhould ſubmit them to *arbitration*, which deprived him of a military power for the time to come.

And in order to keep the ſole poſſeſſion of it in their own hands, they bereaved their very allies of this force;

[a] The ſon of *Philopator*.

[b] This was *Antiochus*'s caſe.

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the inſtant theſe had the leaſt conteſt, they ſent ambaſſadors, who obliged them to conclude a peace: we need but conſider the manner in which they terminated the wars of ATTALUS and PRUSIAS.

When any prince had gained ſuch a conqueſt as *had exhauſted him*, immediately a ROMAN ambaſſador came and *wreſted it out of his hands:* among a multitude of examples, we may remember how they, with a ſingle word, drove ANTIOCHUS out of *Egypt*.

When they ſaw *two nations* engaged in *war*, although *they were not in alliance*, nor had any conteſt with either of them, they nevertheleſs appeared upon the ſtage of action, and, like our knight-errants, always ſided with the *weakeſt:* it was an [a] antient cuſtom, ſays *Dionyſius Halicarnaſſus*, for the *Romans* to grant ſuccour to all who came to implore it.

THESE CUSTOMS OF THE ROMANS WERE NOT CERTAIN PARTICULAR INCIDENTS, WHICH HAPPENED BY CHANCE, BUT WERE SO MANY INVARIABLE PRINCIPLES; AND THIS IS EASY TO PERCEIVE, FOR THE MAXIMS THEY PUT IN PRACTICE AGAINST THE GREATEST MONARCHS WERE EXACTLY THE SAME

[a] A fragment of *Dionyſius*, copied from the extract of embaſſies, made by *Conſtantine Porphyrogennecta*.

WITH THOSE THEY HAD EMPLOYED, IN THEIR INFANT STATE, AGAINST THE LITTLE CITIES WHICH STOOD AROUND THEM.

Whenever there happened *any feud in a ſtate*, they immediately judged the affair, and thereby were ſure of having *that party only* whom they *condemned* for their *enemy*.—If *princes* of the *ſame blood* were *at variance for the crown*, they ſometimes declared them *both kings*, and by this means cruſhed the power of both: If *one of them* was a [a] *minor*, they declared in *his favour*, and made themſelves *his guardians* in quality of protectors of the world; for they had carried matters to ſo high a pitch, that nations and kings were their ſubjects, without knowing directly upon *what right* or *title*; it being a maxim, that the bare hearing of their names was ſufficient for a people to acknowledge them their ſovereigns.

When any ſtate compoſed too formidable a body from its ſituation or union, they never failed *to divide it*.—The republic of ACHAIA was formed by an *aſſociation* of free cities; the ſenate declared, that *every city* ſhould from that time be governed by its own laws, *independent* on the *general authority*.

[a] To enable themſelves to ruin *Syria*, in quality of guardians, they declared in favour of the ſon of *Antiochus*, who was but a child, in oppoſition to *Demetrius* who was their hoſtage, and conjured them to do him juſtice, crying, that *Rome* was his mother, and the *ſenators* his fathers.

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The commonwealth of *Bœotia* roſe likewiſe from a league made between ſeveral cities; but, as in the war of PERSEUS, *one city* declared for *that prince*, and *others* for the *Romans*, the *latter* received them into favour when the common alliance was diſſolved.

Macedonia was ſurrounded by inacceſſible mountains: the ſenate divided it into *four parts*; declared thoſe *free*; prohibited them every kind alliance among *themſelves* by marriage; carried off *all the nobles* into *Italy*, and by that means reduced this power to nothing.

The ROMANS never engaged in *far-diſtant wars*, till they had firſt made an alliance with ſome power *contiguous* to the enemy they invaded, who might unite his troops to the army they ſent; and as this was never conſiderable with regard to numbers, they always had [a] another in that province which lay neareſt the enemy, and a third in *Rome*, ever ready to march at a moment's warning.—In this manner they never hazarded but a ſmall part of their forces, whilſt their enemy ventured all his.

They ſometimes inſidiouſly abuſed the ſubtlety of the words of their language: they deſtroyed *Carthage* upon pretence that they had promiſed to preſerve the *civitas*,

[a] This was their conſtant practice, as appears from hiſtory.

not the *urbs*[a].—It is well known in what manner the *Ætolians*, who had abandoned themſelves to their faith, were impoſed upon; the *Romans* pretended that the ſignification of theſe words, *abandon one's ſelf to the faith of an enemy*, implied the loſs of all things; of perſons, lands, cities, temples, and even of burial places.

The *Romans* would even go ſo far, as to give arbitrary explanations to treaties: thus, when they were reſolved to depreſs the *Rhodians*, they declared, that they had formerly given them *Lycia*, not by way of preſent, but as a friend and ally.

When one of their generals concluded a peace merely to preſerve his army, which was juſt upon the point of being cut to pieces, the ſenate, who did not ratify it, took advantage of this peace, and continued the war.—Thus when JUGURTHA had ſurrounded an army of *Romans*, and permitted them to march away unmoleſted, *upon the faith of a treaty*, theſe very troops he had ſaved were employed againſt him: and when the NUMANTINES had reduced *twenty thouſand Romans*, juſt periſhing with hunger, to the neceſſity of ſuing for peace; this peace, which had ſaved the lives of ſo many

[a] There is ſometimes this difference between *civitas* and *urbs*; the *former* ſignifies the *inhabitants*, the *latter* the *buildings*.

thouſand

thouſand citizens, *was broke at Rome*, and the *public faith* was eluded by [a] ſending back *the conſul* who had ſigned it.

They ſometimes would *conclude a peace* with a monarch upon *reaſonable conditions*, and the *inſtant he had executed them*, they *added others* of ſo injurious a nature, that he was forced to renew the war.—Thus, when they had forced JUGURTHA to [b] *deliver up his elephants*, his *horſes*, *his treaſures*, and *his deſerters*, they required him to ſurrender up *his perſon*, which being the greateſt calamity that can befall a prince, cannot for that reaſon be ever made an article of peace.

In fine, they ſet up *a tribunal* over kings, whom they judged for their particular vices and crimes: they heard the complaints of all perſons who had any diſpute with PHILIP: they ſent deputies with them by way of ſafeguard, and obliged PERSEUS to appear before theſe, to anſwer for certain murders and certain quarrels he had with ſome inhabitants of the confederate cities.

[a] After *Claudius Glycias* had granted the *Corſicans* a peace, the ſenate gave orders for renewing the war againſt them, and delivered up *Glycias* to the inhabitants of the iſland, who would not receive him.—Every one knows what happened at the *Furcæ Caudinæ*.

[b] They acted the ſame part with regard to *Viriatus*: after having obliged him to give up the deſerters, he was ordered to ſurrender up his arms; to which neither himſelf nor his army could conſent.—*Fragment of Dion.*

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As men judged of the glory of a general by the quantity of the gold and ſilver carried in his triumph, the ROMANS *ſtripped the vanquiſhed enemy of all things—Rome* was for ever enriching itſelf; and every war they engaged in, enabled them to undertake a new one.

All the nations who were *either friends* or *confederates*, quite [a] *ruined themſelves* by the *immenſely rich preſents they made*, in order to procure the continuance of the favours already beſtowed upon them, or to obtain greater; and half the monies which uſed to be ſent upon theſe occaſions to the *Romans*, would have ſufficed to conquer them.

BEING MASTERS OF THE UNIVERSE, THEY ARROGATED TO THEMSELVES ALL THE TREASURES OF IT; AND WERE LESS UNJUST ROBBERS, CONSIDERED AS CONQUERORS, THAN CONSIDERED AS LEGISLATORS.—Hearing that PTOLEMY king of *Cyrus* was poſſeſſed of immenſe wealth, they [b] enacted a law, propoſed by a tribune, by which they gave to themſelves the inheritance of a man ſtill living, and confiſcated to their own uſe the eſtates of a confederate prince.

[a] The preſents which the ſenate uſed to ſend kings were mere trifles; as a chair and an ivory ſtaff, or a robe like to that worn by their magiſtrates.

[b] *Divitiarum tanta fama erat*, ſays *Florus*, *ut victor gentium populus, & donare regna conſultus, ſocii virique regis confiſcationem mandaverit.*—Lib. iii. c. 9.

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In a little time the greedineſs of *particular perſons* quite devoured whatever had eſcaped the *public* avarice; magiſtrates and governors uſed to ſell their injuſtice to kings: two competitors would ruin one another, for the ſake of purchaſing an ever-dubious protection againſt a rival who was not quite undone; FOR THE ROMANS HAD NOT EVEN THE JUSTICE OF ROBBERS, WHO DISCOVER A CERTAIN PROBITY IN THE EXERCISE OF GUILT.—In fine, as rights, whether lawful or uſurped, were maintained by money only; princes, to obtain it, deſpoiled temples, and confiſcated the poſſeſſions of the wealthieſt citizens; a thouſand crimes were committed, purely for the ſake of giving to the ROMANS all the money in the univerſe.

BUT NOTHING WAS OF GREATER ADVANTAGE TO THIS PEOPLE THAN THE AWE WITH WHICH THEY STRUCK THE WHOLE EARTH: IN AN INSTANT, KINGS WERE PUT TO SILENCE, AND SEEMED AS THOUGH THEY WERE STUPID; NO REGARD WAS HAD TO THEIR EMINENCE, BUT THEIR VERY PERSONS WERE ATTACKED; TO HAZARD A WAR, WAS TO EXPOSE THEMSELVES TO CAPTIVITY, TO DEATH, TO THE INFAMY OF A TRIUMPH.—THUS KINGS, WHO LIVED IN THE MIDST OF POMPS AND PLEASURES, DID NOT DARE TO

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FIX THEIR EYES STEDFASTLY ON THE ROMAN PEOPLE; AND THEIR COURAGE FAILING THEM, THEY HOPED TO SUSPEND A LITTLE THE MISERIES WITH WHICH THEY WERE THREATENED, BY THEIR PATIENCE AND GROVELING ACTIONS.

Obſerve, I intreat you, the conduct of the *Romans*.—After the defeat of *Antiochus* they were poſſeſſed of AFRICA, ASIA, and GREECE, without having ſcarce a ſingle city in theſe countries that were immediately their own.—They *ſeemed* to conquer with no other view but *to beſtow*; but then they obtained ſo complete a ſovereignty, that whenever they engaged in war with any prince, they oppreſſed him, as it were, with the weight of the whole univerſe.

The time proper for ſeizing upon the conquered countries was not yet come.—Had the *Romans* kept the cities they took from PHILIP, the *Greeks* would have ſeen at once into their *deſigns:* had they, after the ſecond *Punic* war, or that with ANTIOCHUS, poſſeſſed themſelves of lands in [a] AFRICA and in ASIA, they could never have preſerved conqueſts ſo ſlightly eſtabliſhed.

[a] They did not dare to venture their colonies in thoſe countries; but choſe rather to raiſe an eternal jealouſy between the *Carthaginians* and *Maſſiniſſa*, and to make both thoſe powers aſſiſt them in the conqueſt of *Macedonia* and *Greece*.

It was the intereſt of the Romans to wait till all nations were accuſtomed to obey, as free and as confederate, before they ſhould attempt to command over them as ſubjects; and to let them blend and loſe themſelves, as it were, by little and little, in the Roman commonwealth.

This was *a ſlow way of conquering:* after overcoming a nation, they contented themſelves with weakening it; they impoſed ſuch conditions as conſumed it inſenſibly: if it recovered, they depreſſed it ſtill more, and it became ſubject, without there being a poſſibility of dating the æra of its ſubjection.

Whilſt ROME was conquering the world, a *hidden war* was carrying on within its walls: theſe were fires like thoſe of volcanos, which break out the inſtant they are fed by ſome combuſtible ſubſtance.

After the *expulſion of the kings*, the government became *ariſtocratical*: the patrician families, only, obtained all the employments and dignities in the [a] ſtate, and conſequently all honours civil and military.

The *patricians* being determined to prevent, if poſſible, the return of the kings, endeavoured to *foment the*

[a] The patricians were inveſted, in ſome meaſure, with a ſacred character, and they only were allowed to take the auſpices.—See in *Livy*, Book VI. the Speech of *Appius Claudius*.



reſtleſs principle which now prevailed in the minds of the people; *but they did more than they would willingly have done:* by attempting to inſpire them with a *hatred for kings*, they fired them with an *inordinate thirſt for liberty.* —As the royal authority had devolved entirely upon the conſuls, the people found they were far from poſſeſſing that liberty they were taught to idolize: they therefore ſought for methods by which they might depreſs the *conſulate*; and procure *Plebeian* magiſtrates; and ſhare the *Curules*, or greater employments, with the nobles.— The patricians were forced to comply with all the demands of the people; for in a city, where wealth, that clandeſtine path to power, was deſpiſed, neither birth nor dignities could beſtow any great advantages: it was therefore neceſſary for power to fall into the hands of the greater number, and for ariſtocracy to change by inſenſible degrees into a *popular ſtate.*

Thoſe who are ſubordinate to a king, are leſs tortured with envy and jealouſy than ſuch as live under an hereditary ariſtocracy: the prince is at ſo great a diſtance from his ſubjects that he is ſcarce ſeen by them, and is raiſed ſo far above them, that they cannot conceive any relation capable of giving them diſguſt: but when the nobles preſide in a ſtate, they are expoſed to the eyes of all

all men, and are not ſeated ſo high as to prevent odious compariſons from being made perpetually; and, indeed, *the people have deteſted nobles in this and in all ages.*—Such commonwealths in which birth does not beſtow any ſhare in the legiſlature, are the happieſt in *this reſpect*; for it is natural that the people ſhould not bear ſo much envy to an authority which they beſtow on whom they think proper and reſume at will.

The people being diſguſted at the patricians, withdrew to the ſacred hill (*Mons ſacer*), whither deputies being ſent, they were appeaſed: and as they all made a promiſe to aſſiſt one another, in caſe the patricians ſhould not perform their [a] engagement; which would have created ſeditions every moment, and diſturbed all the magiſtrates in the exerciſe of their functions, it was judged better to create an officer, [b] who might protect the people againſt any injuſtice that ſhould be done them: *but by a malady for ever incident to man, the plebeians, who had obtained* TRIBUNES *merely to defend them, employed thoſe very magiſtrates to annoy others*; ſo that they ſtripped, by inſenſible degrees, the patricians of all their privileges.—This gave riſe to everlaſting conteſts.—The PEOPLE were ſupported, or rather animated, by their *tribunes*; and

[a] *Zonaras*, Lib. II.

[b] Origin of the tribunes of the people.

the

the PATRICIANS were defended by the *ſenate*, the greateſt part of which conſiſted of patricians, who were more inclined to favour the ancient maxims, and afraid that the populace would raiſe ſome tribune to arbitrary power.

The *people* employed in the defence of this magiſtrate their own ſtrength, and the ſuperiority they had in the ſuffrages; their refuſal to march into the field; their threats to go quite away; the partiality of their laws; in fine, their ſentences pronounced againſt thoſe who had oppoſed them too vigorouſly: the *ſenate* defended themſelves by their wiſdom, their juſtice, and the love they inſpired for one's country; by their beneficence, and the prudent diſtribution of the treaſures of the commonwealth; by the veneration which the people had for the glory of the principal [a] families, and the virtue of illuſtrious perſonages; by religion itſelf, the ancient in-

[a] The people had ſo great a veneration for the chief families, that although they had obtained the privilege of creating plebeian military tribunes, who were inveſted with the ſame power as the conſuls, they nevertheleſs always made choice of patricians for this employment.—They were obliged to put a conſtraint upon themſelves, and to enact, that there ſhould ever be a plebeian conſul; and when any plebeian families were raiſed to employments in the ſtate, they afterwards were always carried: it was with difficulty that the people, notwithſtanding the perpetual deſire they had to depreſs the nobility, depreſſed them in reality; and when they raiſed to honours ſome perſon of mean extraction, as *Varro* and *Marius*, it coſt them very great ſtruggles.

ſtitutions,

ſtitutions, and the prohibition of days of public meeting, upon pretence that the auſpices had not been favourable; by their clients; by the oppoſition of one tribune to another; by the creation of a [a] dictator, the occupations of a new war, or the misfortunes and calamities which united all parties: in a word, by a paternal condeſcenſion, in granting the people part of their demands, purpoſely to make them relinquiſh the reſt; and by that ſtedfaſt maxim, of preferring the ſafety of the republic to the prerogatives of any order or public employment whatſoever.

In proceſs of time, when the plebeians had depreſſed the patricians to ſuch a degree, that this [b] diſtinction of families was empty and fruitleſs, and that both were indiſcriminately raiſed to honours, *new conteſts aroſe* between the populace, whom their tribunes ſpirited up, and the chief families, whether patrician or plebeian, which latter were ſtyled nobles, and were favoured by

[a] The patricians, to defend themſelves, uſed to create a dictator, which proved of the greateſt advantage to them; but the plebeians having obtained the privilege of being elected conſuls, could alſo be elected dictators, which quite diſconcerted the patricians.—See in *Livy*, Lib. viii. in what manner *Publius Philo* depreſſed them in his dictatorſhip.—He enacted three laws, by which they received the higheſt prejudice.

[b] The patricians referred to themſelves only a few offices belonging to the prieſthood, and the privilege of creating a magiſtrate called *Inter-rex*.

the

the ſenate that was compoſed of them: but, as the ancient manners ſubſiſted no more; as particular perſons were poſſeſſed of immenſe wealth, and that it is impoſſible but wealth muſt give power; theſe nobles made a ſtronger reſiſtance than the patricians had done, *which occaſioned the death of the* GRACCHI, *and of* [a] *ſeveral perſons who followed their plan.*

I muſt take notice of an office which greatly diſtinguiſhes the polity of *Rome*; it was that of the *cenſors.*

M. LIVIUS [b] *cenſured* the *people themſelves*, and degraded *thirty-four tribes* out of the *thirty-five* to the rank of thoſe who had no ſhare in the privileges of the city; for *(ſaid this Roman) you firſt condemned me, and afterwards raiſed me to the conſulate and the cenſorſhip; you therefore muſt either have prevaricated once in puniſhing me, or twice, in creating me conſul and afterwards cenſor* [c].

Author

[a] As *Saturninus* and *Glaucias.* [b] *Livy*, Lib. xxix.

[c] I am perſuaded (ſays the celebrated Spaniſh traveller, the Rev. Mr. TOWNSEND) that ours is, and that *none* but a *mixed government* can be *free.*—Under the Roman kings, the patricians and plebeians were not free; under the decemvirs, the plebeians were miſerably oppreſſed; the tribunes of the people, in their turn, ſacrificed the patricians; and when the power of the conſuls happened to balance that of the tribunes, every thing ſtood ſtill, or fell into ſuch anarchy and confuſion, that the conſuls were obliged to name a dictator

Authors enlarge very copiouſly on the *diviſions* which proved the deſtruction of *Rome*, but their readers ſeldom diſcover *thoſe diviſions to have been always neceſſary and inevitable*.—Diſſenſions were not to be prevented; and *thoſe martial ſpirits*, which were ſo *fierce* and *formidable abroad*, could not be habituated to any *conſiderable moderation at home*.—Thoſe who expect in a free ſtate to ſee *the people undaunted in war, and puſillanimous in peace*, are certainly deſirous of *impoſſibilities*; and it may be advanced as a general rule, that whenever a *perfect calm is viſible*, in a ſtate that calls itſelf a *republic*, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY NO LONGER SUBSISTS.

Union, in a body politic, is a very equivocal term: *true union* is ſuch a harmony as makes all the particular parts, as oppoſite as they may ſeem to us, concur to the general welfare of the ſociety, in the ſame manner as *diſcords* in muſic contribute to the general melody of ſound.—*Union* may prevail in a ſtate full of ſeeming commotions; or, in other words, there may be an harmony from whence reſults proſperity, which alone is true peace, and may be conſidered in the ſame view as the various parts of this univerſe, which are eternally

for the time, with deſpotic power.—Theſe ever have been, and ever muſt be, the miſerable effects of power, when not *properly balanced*, as in *the conſtitution of our government*.—*Vide* Free Thoughts on Deſpotic Governments.

connected

connected by the *operations* of ſome, and the *reactions* of others.—Hence the *oppoſition party* is no defect in the conſtitution of the BRITISH GOVERNMENT, unleſs it be deſirous of *ſubverting* the *mixed form*.

I am of opinion that the ſect of *Epicurus*, which began to be propagated at *Rome* towards the cloſe of the republic, was very prejudicial to the minds and genius of the people[a].—The *Greeks* had been infatuated with its doctrines long before, and conſequently were corrupted much *earlier* than the *Romans*.—We are aſſured by *Polybius*, [b] that *oaths*, in his time, could not induce any perſon to place confidence in a GREEK, whereas they were conſidered by a *Roman* as inviolable obligations upon his conſcience.

There is a paſſage in one of *Cicero*'s *letters* to [c] *Atticus*, which manifeſtly diſcovers how much the *Romans had degenerated in this particular* ſince the time of *Polybius*.

[a] *Cyneas* having diſcourſed of the doctrines of this ſect at the table of *Pyrrhus*, *Fabricius* ſaid, he wiſhed the *enemies* of *Rome* would all embrace ſuch kind of principles.—Life of *Pyrrhus*.

[b] If you lend a talent to a *Greek*, and bind him to the repayment, by ten engagements, with as many ſecurities, and witneſſes to the loan, it is impoſſible to make them regard their word; whereas, among the *Romans*, whether it be owing to their obligation of accounting for the public and private money, they are always punctual to the oaths they have taken.—For which reaſon, the apprehenſions of infernal torments were wiſely eſtabliſhed, and it is altogether irrational to oppoſe them at this time.—*Polyb.* l. vi.

[c] Lib. iv. let. 18.

MEMMIUS

MEMMIUS (ſays he) imparted to the ſenate the agreement *he* and his *fellow-candidate* had made with the *nſuls*, by which *theſe* ſtipulated to favour the *others* in eir ſolicitations for the conſulſhip the enſuing year; d *theſe* obliged themſelves to pay four hundred thouand ſeſterces to the conſuls, if they did not furniſh them th *three augurs*, who ſhould declare they themſelves ere preſent when the PEOPLE MADE THE CURIATIAN AW[a], *though in reality it had not been enacted*; and *two rmer conſuls*, who ſhould affirm *they* had aſſiſted at gning the EDICT OF THE SENATE WHICH REGUATED THE STATE OF THE PROVINCES ASSIGNED TO HE PRESENT CONSULS, *notwithſtanding no ſuch edict as in being*.—What an admirable ſet of people do we iſcover in a ſingle contract!

The grandeur of the ſtate, in general, conſtituted *the eatneſs of its particular members*; but as AFFLUENCE nſiſts in *conduct*, and not in *riches*; that wealth of the omans, which had *certain limitations*, introduced a luxy and profuſion which had *no bounds*.—Thoſe who

[a] The *Curiatian* law diſpoſed of the military power, and the edict of the ate regulated the troops, the money, and officers, that were to be allotted the governors: now *the conſuls*, in order to accompliſh theſe particulars to eir own ſatisfaction, contrived a *falſe law* and a *falſe edict of the ſenate*.

had been at firſt corrupted by their opulence, received the ſame taint in their *poverty*, by *aſpiring after acquiſitions that no way comported with private life*; it was difficult to be a GOOD CITIZEN under the influence of ſtrong deſires and the regret of a large fortune that had been loſt: people, in this ſituation, were prepared for any deſperate attempt; and, as *Saluſt* [a] ſays, there was, at THAT TIME, a generation of men, who, as they had no patrimony of their own, could not endure to ſee others more proſperous than themſelves [b].

The chief difference between the *domeſtic* œconomy of the ancients and that of the moderns conſiſts in the practice of SLAVERY, which prevailed among the former, and which has been aboliſhed for ſome centuries throughout the greateſt part of EUROPE.—Some paſſionate admirers of the ancients cannot forbear regretting the loſs of this inſtitution; and whilſt they brand all ſubmiſſion to the government of a ſingle perſon with the harſh denomination of Slavery, they would gladly reduce the greateſt part of mankind to *real* ſlavery and ſubjection.—

[a] *Ut merito dicatur genitos eſſe, qui nec ipſi habere poſſent vos familiares nec alios pati.*—Fragment of *Saluſt*, cited by *Auguſtin* in his book of *The City of God*, Lib. ii. c. 18.—See alſo CATALINE's ſpeech againſt the *wicked rich men* of the ſtates. [b] Monteſquieu.

But

but to one who conſiders coolly on the ſubject it will appear, that human nature, in general, really enjoys more *liberty at preſent, in the moſt arbitrary government of Europe*, than it ever did during the moſt *flouriſhing period of ancient times*.—As much as ſubmiſſion to a petty prince, whoſe dominions extend not beyond a ſingle city, is more grievous than obedience to a great monarch; ſo much is domeſtic ſlavery more cruel and oppreſſive than any civil ſubjection whatſoever.—The more the maſter is removed from us in place and rank, the greater liberty we enjoy; the leſs are our actions inſpected and controlled; and the fainter that cruel compariſon becomes between our own ſubjection, and the freedom, and even dominion of another.—The remains which are found of domeſtic ſlavery in the AMERICAN colonies, and among ſome EUROPEAN nations, would never ſurely create a deſire of rendering it more univerſal.—*The little humanity*, commonly obſerved in perſons accuſtomed from their infancy to exerciſe ſo great authority over their fellow-creatures, and to trample upon human nature, were *ſufficient alone* to diſguſt us with that unbounded dominion.—*Nor can a more probable reaſon be aſſigned for the ſevere, I might ſay, barbarous manners of ancient times, than the practice of domeſtic ſlavery*; *by which*

every man of rank was rendered a petty tyrant, and educated amidſt the ſubmiſſion and low debaſement of his ſlaves.

The cuſtom of expoſing *old*, *uſeleſs*, or *ſick ſlaves*, in an iſland of the TYBER, there to ſtarve, ſeems to have been *pretty common* in ROME; and whoever recovered, after having been ſo expoſed, had his liberty given him, by an edict of the emperor CLAUDIUS; where it was likewiſe forbidden to kill any ſlave merely for old age or ſickneſs [a].—But ſuppoſing that this edict was ſtrictly obeyed, would it better the domeſtic treatment of ſlaves, or render their lives much more comfortable? We may imagine what others would practiſe, when it was the profeſſed maxim of the elder CATO, to ſell his ſuperannuated ſlaves for any price, rather than maintain what he eſteemed a uſeleſs burden [b].

The ERGASTULA, or dungeons, where ſlaves in chains were forced to work, were very common all over *Italy*.—COLUMELLA [c] adviſes, that they be always built under ground; and recommends [d] it as the duty of a careful overſeer, to call over every day the names of theſe ſlaves, like the muſtering of a regiment or ſhip's company, in

[a] SEUTONIUS in vita CLAUDII. [b] PLUT. in vita CATONIS.
[c] Lib. i. c. 6. [d] Id. lib. xi. c. 1.

order

order to know preſently when any of them had deſerted. As a proof of the frequency of theſe *ergaſtula*, and of the great number of ſlaves uſually confined in them, SICILY, ſays FLORUS[a], was full of *ergaſtula*, and was cultivated by labourers in chains.—EUNUS and ATHENIO excited the ſervile war, by breaking up theſe monſtrous priſons, and giving liberty to 60,000 ſlaves.—The younger POMPEY augmented his army in *Spain* by the ſame expedient[b].

SENECA, when drawing a picture of that diſorderly luxury which changes day into night, and night into day, and inverts every ſtated hour of every office in life, among other circumſtances, ſuch as diſplacing the meals and times of bathing, mentions, that, regularly about the third hour of the night, the *neighbours* of one, who indulges this falſe refinement, *hear the noiſe of whips and laſhes*; and, upon enquiry, find that he is *then* taking an account of the conduct of his ſervants, and giving them due correction and diſcipline.—This is not remarked as *an inſtance of cruelty*, but *only of diſorder*, which, even in actions the moſt uſual and methodical, changes the fixed hours that an eſtabliſhed cuſtom had aſſigned for them.

[a] Lib. iii. c. 19. [b] Id. lib. iv. c. 8.

The

The term for a ſlave, born and bred in the family, was VERNA [a]; and theſe ſlaves ſeem to have been entitled by cuſtom to privileges and indulgences beyond others; a ſufficient reaſon why the maſters would not be fond of rearing many of that kind [b].—It is well known that DEMOSTHENES,

[a] As *ſervus* was the name of the genus, and *verna* of the ſpecies, without any correlative, this forms a ſtrong preſumption that the latter were by far the leaſt numerous.—It is an univerſal obſervation which we may form upon language, that where two related parts of a whole bear any proportion to each other, in numbers, rank, or conſideration, there are always correlative terms invented, which anſwer to both the parts, and expreſs their mutual relation.—If they bear no proportion to each other, the term is only invented for the leſs, and marks its diſtinction from the whole.—Thus *man* and *woman*, *maſter* and *ſervant*, *father* and *ſon*, *prince* and *ſubject*, *ſtranger* and *citizen*, are correlative terms: but the words *ſeaman*, *carpenter*, *ſmith*, *taylor*, &c. have no correſpondent terms, which expreſs thoſe who are no ſeaman, no carpenter, &c.—Languages differ very much with regard to the particular words where this diſtinction obtains; and may thence afford very ſtrong inferences concerning the manners and cuſtoms of different nations.—The military government of the ROMAN emperors had exalted the ſoldiery ſo high, that they balanced all the other orders of the ſtate: hence *miles* and *paganus* became relative terms; a thing, till then, unknown to ancient, and ſtill ſo to modern languages.—Modern ſuperſtition exalted the clergy ſo high, that they overbalanced the whole ſtate: hence *clergy* and *laity* are terms oppoſed in all modern languages; and in theſe alone.—And from the ſame principles I infer, that if the number of ſlaves bought by the ROMANS from foreign countries, had not extremely exceeded thoſe bred at home, *verna* would have had a correlative, which would have expreſſed the former ſpecies of ſlaves.—But theſe, it would ſeem, compoſed the main body of the ancient ſlaves, and the latter were but a few exceptions.

[b] *Verna* is uſed by ROMAN writers as a word equivalent to *ſcurra*, on account of the petulance and impudence of thoſe ſlaves.—MART. lib. i. ep. 42.

—HORACE

DEMOSTHENES, in his nonage, had been defrauded of a large fortune by his tutors, and that afterwards he recovered, by a proſecution at law, the value of his patrimony.—His orations, on that occaſion, ſtill remain, and contain an exact detail of the whole ſubſtance left by his father[a], in money, merchandize, houſes, and ſlaves, together with the value of each particular.—Among the reſt were *fifty-two ſlaves*, handicraftſmen, *viz.* 32 ſword-cutlers, and 20 cabinet-makers[b]; all males; not a word of any wives, children, or family, which they certainly would have had, had it been a common cuſtom at ATHENS to breed from the ſlaves: and the value of the whole muſt have much depended on that circumſtance. —No female ſlaves are even ſo much as mentioned, except ſome houſe-maids, who belonged to his mother.—This argument has great force, if it be not altogether concluſive.

Conſider this paſſage of PLUTARCH[c], ſpeaking of the Elder CATO.—"He had a great number of ſlaves, "whom he took care to buy at the ſales of *priſoners of*

—HORACE alſo mentions the *vernæ procaces*; and PETRONIUS, cap. xxiv. *vernula urbanitas.*—SENECA, *de provid.* c. i. *vernularum licentia.*

[a] In *Amphobum orat.* i.

[b] ἀλιτουργοῖσι, makers of thoſe beds which the ancients lay upon at meals.

[c] In vita CATONIS.

" *war*; and he choſe them young, that they might " eaſily be accuſtomed to any diet or manner of life, " and be inſtructed in any buſineſs or labour, as men " teach any thing to *young dogs* or *horſes*.—And eſteem- " ing *love* the chief ſource of all diſorders, he allowed " the male ſlaves to have a commerce with the female " in his family, upon paying a certain ſum for this " privilege: but he ſtrictly forbade all intrigues out of his " family."—Are there any ſymptoms in this narration of that care, which is ſuppoſed in the ancients, of the marriage and propagation of their ſlaves? If that was a common practice, founded on general intereſt, it would ſurely have been embraced by CATO, who was a *great œconomiſt*, and lived in times when the ancient frugality and ſimplicity of manners were ſtill in credit and reputation.

It is expreſsly remarked by the writers of the ROMAN law, that ſcarcely any ever purchaſe ſlaves with a view of breeding from them[a].

XENOPHON in his œconomics, where he gives directions for the management of a farm, recommends a ſtrict

[a] " Non temere ancillæ ejus rei cauſa comparantur ut pariant."—*Digeſt.* lib. v. tit. 3. *de hæred. petit. lex* 27.

care

care and attention of laying the male and the female ſlaves at a diſtance from each other.—He ſeems not to ſuppoſe that they are *ever married*.—The only ſlaves among the GREEKS that appear to have continued their own race, were the HELOTES, who had houſes apart, and were more the ſlaves of the public than of individuals[a].

VARRO as well as COLUMELLA[b], recommends it as requiſite to give a wife to the overſeer, in order to attach him the more ſtrongly to his maſter's ſervice.—This was therefore a *peculiar indulgence* granted to a ſlave in whom ſo great confidence was repoſed.

HISTORY MENTIONS A ROMAN NOBLEMAN WHO HAD 400 SLAVES UNDER THE SAME ROOF WITH HIM: AND HAVING BEEN ASSASSINATED AT HOME BY THE FURIOUS REVENGE OF ONE OF THEM, THE LAW WAS EXECUTED WITH RIGOUR, AND ALL WITHOUT EXCEPTION WERE PUT TO DEATH.

Nothing ſo common in trials, even of civil cauſes, as to call for the evidence of ſlaves; which was always extorted by the moſt *exquiſite torments*.—DEMOSTHENES ſays[c], that, where it was poſſible to produce, for the

[a] STRABO, lib. viii. [b] Lib. i. c. 18. [c] In *Oniterem orat.* 1.

ſame fact, either freemen or ſlaves as witneſſes, *the judges always preferred the torturing of ſlaves, as a more certain evidence* [a].

[a] The ſame practice was very common in ROME; but CICERO ſeems not to think this evidence ſo certain as the teſtimony of free citizens.—*Pro Cælio.*

The *inhuman ſports* exhibited at ROME, may juſtly be conſidered as an effect of the people's contempt for their vanquiſhed enemies, or ſlaves, and was alſo a great cauſe of the general inhumanity of their princes and rulers.—Who can read the accounts of the amphitheatrical entertainments without horror? Or who is ſurpriſed that the rulers ſhould treat that people in the ſame way the people treated their fellow creatures? One's humanity, on that occaſion, is apt to renew the barbarous wiſh of CALIGULA, that the people had but one neck: a man could almoſt be pleaſed, by a ſingle blow, to put an end to *ſuch a race of monſters.*—HUME.

SECT.

SECT. XXV.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE ANCIENT REPUBLICS.

We may obſerve, that the ancient republics were almoſt always in *perpetual war*, a natural effect of their martial ſpirit, their love of liberty, their mutual emulation, and that hatred which generally prevails among nations that live in cloſe neighbourhood.—Now, war in a ſmall ſtate is much more deſtructive than in a great one; both becauſe *all the inhabitants*, in the former caſe, muſt ſerve in the armies; and becauſe the whole ſtate is frontier, and is all expoſed to the inroads of the enemy.

The maxims of *ancient war* were much more *deſtructive* than thoſe of modern; chiefly by that diſtribution of plunder, in which the ſoldiers were indulged.—The private men in our armies are ſuch a low ſet of people, that we find any abundance, beyond their ſimple pay, breeds confuſion and diſorder, and a total diſſolution of

diſcipline.—The very wretchedneſs and meanneſs of thoſe who fill the modern armies, render them leſs deſtructive to the countries which they invade: one inſtance, among many, of the deceitfulneſs of firſt appearances in all political reaſonings.

Ancient battles were much more *bloody*, by the very nature of the weapons employed in them.—The ancients drew up their men 16 or 20, ſometimes 50 men deep, which made a narrow front; and it was not difficult to find a field in which both armies might be marſhalled, and might engage with each other.—Even where any body of the troops was kept off by hedges, hillocks, woods, or hollow ways, the battle was not ſo ſoon decided between the contending parties, but that the others had time to overcome the difficulties which oppoſed them, and take part in the engagement.—And as the whole army was thus engaged, and each man cloſely buckled to his antagoniſt, the battles were commonly very bloody, and great ſlaughter was made on both ſides, eſpecially on the vanquiſhed.—The long thin lines required by fire-arms, and the quick deciſion of the fray, render our modern engagements but partial rencounters, and enable the general, who is foiled in the beginning of the day,

to draw off the greateſt part of his army ſound and entire.

The battles of antiquity, both by their duration, and their reſemblance of ſingle combats, were wrought up to *a degree of fury* quite unknown to later ages.—Nothing could then engage the combatants to *give quarter*, but the hopes of profit, by making ſlaves of their priſoners.—In civil wars, as we learn from TACITUS [a], the battles were the moſt bloody, becauſe the priſoners were not ſlaves.

What a ſtout reſiſtance muſt be made, where the vanquiſhed expected ſo hard a fate! How inveterate the rage, where the maxims of war were, in every reſpect, ſo bloody and ſevere!

Inſtances are frequent, in ancient hiſtory, of cities beſieged, whoſe inhabitants, rather than open their gates, murdered their wives and children, and ruſhed themſelves on a voluntary death, ſweetened perhaps by a little proſpect of revenge upon the enemy.—GREEKS [b], as well as BARBARIANS, have often been wrought up to this degree of fury.—And the ſame determined ſpirit and

[a] Hiſt. lib. ii. c. 44.

[b] As ARYDUS, mentioned by LIVY, lib. xxxi. c. 17, 18. and POLYB. lib. xvi.—As alſo the XANTHIANS, APPIAN. *de bell. civil.* lib. iv.

cruelty

cruelty muſt, in other inſtances, leſs remarkable, have been deſtructive to human ſociety, in thoſe petty commonwealths, which lived in cloſe neighbourhood, and were engaged in perpetual wars and contentions.

Sometimes the wars in GREECE, ſays PLUTARCH[a], were carried on entirely by *inroads*, and *robberies*, and *piracies*.—Such a method of war muſt be more deſtructive, in ſmall ſtates, than the bloodieſt battles and ſieges.

By the laws of the twelve tables, poſſeſſion during two years formed a preſcription for land; one year for moveables[b]: an indication, that there was not in ITALY, at that time, much more order, tranquillity, and ſettled police, than there is at preſent among the TARTARS.

The only cartel I remember in ancient hiſtory, is, that between DEMETRIUS POLIORCETES and the RHODIANS; when it was agreed, that a free citizen ſhould be reſtored for 1000 *drachmas*, a ſlave bearing arms for 500[c].

It appears alſo that *ancient manners* were more unfavourable than the modern, not only in times of *war*, but alſo in thoſe of *peace*; and that too in every reſpect. —To exclude FACTION from a free government is very

[a] *In vita* ARATI. [b] INST. lib. ii. c. 6.
[c] DIOD. SICUL. lib. xx.

difficult,

difficult, if not altogether *impracticable*.—In ancient hiſtory we may always obſerve, where one party prevailed, whether the nobles or people (for I can obſerve no difference in this reſpect[a]) that they immediately *butchered* all of the oppoſite party who fell into their hands, and baniſhed ſuch as had been ſo fortunate as to eſcape their fury.—*No form of proceſs, no law, no trial, no pardon.*—A fourth, a third, perhaps near a half of the city was ſlaughtered, or expelled, every revolution; and the exiles always joined foreign enemies, and did all the miſchief poſſible to their fellow-citizens, till fortune put it in their power to take full revenge by a new revolution.—*And as theſe were frequent in ſuch violent governments, the diſorder, diffidence, jealouſy, enmity, which muſt prevail, are not eaſy for us to imagine in this age of the world.*

There are only *two revolutions* I can recollect in ancient hiſtory, which paſſed without great ſeverity, and great effuſion of blood in maſſacres and aſſaſſinations; namely the reſtoration of the *Athenian democracy* by THRASYBULUS, and the ſubduing of the *Roman republic*

[a] LYSIAS, who was himſelf of the popular faction, and very narrowly eſcaped from the thirty tyrants, ſays, that the *Democracy* was as violent a government as the Oligarchy.—*Orat.* 24. *de ſtatu popul.*

by

by CÆSAR.—We learn from ancient hiſtory, that THRASYBULUS paſſed a general amneſty for all paſt offences; and firſt introduced that word, as well as practice, into GREECE [c].—It appears, however, from many orations of LYSIAS [b], that the chief, and even ſome of the ſubaltern offenders, in the preceding tyranny, were tried, and capitally puniſhed.—This is a difficulty not cleared up, and even not obſerved by antiquarians and ſome hiſtorians.—And as to CÆSAR's clemency, though much celebrated, it would not gain great applauſe in the preſent age.—He butchered, for inſtance, all CATO's ſenate, when he became maſter of *Utica* [c]; and theſe, we may readily believe, were not the moſt worthleſs of the party.—All thoſe who had borne arms againſt that uſurper, were attainted; and, by *Hirtius's* law, declared incapable of all public offices.

The utmoſt energy of the nervous ſtyle of THUCYDIDES, and the copiouſneſs and expreſſion of the GREEK language, ſeem to ſink under that hiſtorian, when he attempts to deſcribe the diſorders, which aroſe from FAC-

[a] CICERO, PHILIP. I.

[b] As *orat.* 11. *contra* ERATOST. *orat.* 12. *contra* AGORAT. *orat.* 15. pro MANTITH.

[c] APPIAN. *de bell. civ.* lib. ii.

TION,

tion throughout all the *Grecian commonwealths*.—You would imagine, that he ſtill labours with a thought greater than he can find words to communicate.—And he concludes his pathetic deſcription with an obſervation, which is at once refined and ſolid.—" *In theſe contraſts*," ſays he, " *thoſe who were the dulleſt and moſt ſtupid, and* " *had the leaſt foreſight, commonly prevailed: for being* " *conſcious of this weakneſs, and dreading to be over-* " *reached by thoſe of greater penetration, they went to work* " HASTILY, WITHOUT PREMEDITATION, BY THE " SWORD AND PONIARD, AND THEREBY GOT THE " START OF THEIR ANTAGONISTS, WHO WERE FORM- " ING FINE SCHEMES AND PROJECTS FOR THEIR DE- " STRUCTION [a]."

Not to mention *Dionyſius* [b] the Elder, who is computed to have butchered in cold blood above 10,000 of his fellow-citizens; or *Agathocles* [c], *Nabis* [d], and others, ſtill more bloody than he; the tranſactions, even in free governments, were extremely violent and deſtructive.—At ATHENS, the thirty tyrants and the nobles, in a twelvemonth, murdered, *without trial*, about 1200 of

[a] Lib. iii. [b] PLUT. *de virt. & fort.* ALEX.
[c] DIOD. SIC. lib. xviii, xix. [d] TIT. LIV. lib. xxxi, xxxiii, xxxiv.

the people, and baniſhed above the half of the citizens that remained [a].—In ARGOS, near the ſame time, the people killed 1200 of the nobles; and afterwards their *own demagogues*, becauſe they had refuſed to carry their proſecutions farther [b].—The people alſo in CORCYRA killed 1,500 of the nobles, and baniſhed a thouſand [c].—Theſe numbers will appear the more ſurpriſing, if we conſider the extreme ſmallneſs of theſe ſtates.—But all ancient hiſtory is full of ſuch inſtances [d].

When

[a] DION. SIC. lib. xiv. ISOCRATES ſays there were only 5000 baniſhed.—He makes the number of thoſe killed amount to 1500.—AREOP. ÆSCHINES *contra* CTESIPH. aſſigns preciſely the ſame number.—SENECA (*de tranq. anim.* c. 5.) ſays 1300.

[b] DION. SIC. lib. xv. [c] DION. SIC. lib. xiii.

[d] We ſhall mention from DIODORUS SICULUS alone a few maſſacres, which paſſed in the courſe of ſixty years, during the moſt ſhining age of GREECE.—There were baniſhed from SYBARIS 500 of the nobles and their partizans; lib. xii. p. 77. *ex edit.* RHODOMANNI.—Of CHIANS, 600 citizens baniſhed; lib. xiii. p. 189.—At EPHESUS, 340 killed, 1000 baniſhed; lib. xiii. p. 223.—Of CYRENIANS, 500 nobles killed, all the reſt baniſhed; lib. xiv. p. 263.—The CORINTHIANS killed 120, baniſhed 500; lib. xiv. p. 304.—PHÆBIDAS the SPARTAN baniſhed 300 BÆOTIANS; lib. xv. p. 342.—Upon the fall of the LACEDEMONIANS, democracies were reſtored in many cities, and ſevere vengeance taken of the nobles, after the GREEK manner.—But matters did not end there.—For the baniſhed nobles, returning in many places, butchered their adverſaries at PHIALÆ, in CORINTH, in MEGARA, in PHLIASIA.—In this laſt place they killed 300 of the people; but theſe again revolting, killed above 600 of the nobles, and baniſhed the

When *Alexander* ordered all the exiles to be reſtored throughout all the cities, it was found, that the whole amounted to 20,000 men[a]; the remains, probably, of ſtill greater ſlaughters and maſſacres.—WHAT AN ASTONISHING MULTITUDE IN SO NARROW A COUNTRY AS ANCIENT GREECE! AND WHAT DOMESTIC CONFUSION, JEALOUSY, PARTIALITY, REVENGE, HEART-BURNINGS, MUST TEAR THOSE CITIES, WHERE FACTIONS WERE WROUGHT UP TO SUCH A DEGREE OF FURY AND DESPAIR!

e reſt; lib. xv. p. 357.—In ARCADIA 1400 baniſhed, beſides many killed. -The baniſhed retired to SPARTA and to PALLANTIUM: the latter were livered up to their countrymen, and all killed; lib. xv. p. 373.—Of e baniſhed from ARGOS and THEBES, there were 509 in the SPARTAN my; *id.* p. 374.—Here is a detail of the moſt remarkable of AGATHOLES's cruelties, from the ſame author.—The people, before his uſurpation, d baniſhed 600 nobles; lib. xix. p. 655.—Afterwards that tyrant, in conrrence with the people, killed 4000 nobles, and baniſhed 6000; *id.* p. 647. He killed 4000 people at GELA; *id.* p. 741.—By AGATHOCLES's broer 8000 baniſhed from SYRACUSE; lib. xx. p. 757.—The inhabitants of EGESTA, to the number of 40,000, were killed, man, woman, and child; d with tortures, for the ſake of their money; *id.* p. 802.—All the relations, z. father, brother, children, grandfather, of his LIBYAN army, killed; *id.* 803.—He killed 7000 exiles after capitulation; *id.* p. 816.—It is to be marked, that AGATHOCLES is called a man of great ſenſe and courage, d is not to be ſuſpected of wanton cruelty, contrary to the maxims of : age.

[a] DIOD. SIC. lib. xviii.

It would be eaſier, ſays *Iſocrates* to *Philip*, to raiſe an army in GREECE at preſent from the *vagabonds* than from the cities.

Even when affairs came not to ſuch extremities (which they failed not to do almoſt in every city *twice* or *thrice every century*) property was rendered very precarious by the maxims of ancient government.—XENOPHON, in the banquet of SOCRATES, gives us a natural unaffected deſcription of the tyranny of the ATHENIAN people.—" In my poverty," ſays CHARMIDES, " I am " much more happy than I ever was while poſſeſſed of " riches; as much as it is happier to be in ſecurity than " in terrors, free than a ſlave, to receive than to pay " court, to be truſted than ſuſpected.—Formerly I was " obliged to careſs every informer; ſome impoſition " was continually laid upon me; and it was never al- " lowed me to travel, or be abſent from the city —At " preſent, when I am poor I look big, and threaten " others.—The rich are afraid of me, and ſhow me " every kind of civility and reſpect; and I am become a " kind of tyrant in the city [a]."

In one of the pleadings of LYSIAS [b], the orator very

[a] Page 885. *ex edit.* LEUNCLAV. [b] *Orat.* 29. *in* NICOM.

cooly

cooly ſpeaks of it, by the by, as a maxim of the ATHENIAN people, that whenever they wanted money, *they put to death ſome of the rich citizens, as well as ſtrangers, for the ſake of the forfeiture.*—In mentioning this, he ſeems not to have *any intention of blaming them*; ſtill leſs of *provoking them*, who were *his audience* and *judges*.

Whether a man was a citizen or a ſtranger among that people, it ſeems indeed requiſite, either that he ſhould impoveriſh himſelf, or the people would impoveriſh him, and perhaps kill him into the bargain —The orator laſt mentioned gives a pleaſant account of an eſtate laid out in the public ſervice; that is, above the third of it in raree-ſhows and figured dances.

Beſides many other obvious reaſons for the inſtability of ancient monarchies, the equal diviſion of property among the brothers in private families muſt, by a neceſſary conſequence, contribute to unſettle and diſturb the ſtate.—The univerſal preference given to the elder by modern laws, though it increaſes the inequality of fortunes, has, however, this good effect, that it accuſtoms men to the ſame idea in public ſucceſſion, and cuts off all claim and pretenſion of the younger.

The new ſettled colony of *Heraclea*, falling immediately into faction, applied to *Sparta*, who ſent HERIPIDAS with full authority to quiet their diſſenſions —

This man, not provoked by *any oppoſition*, not inflamed by *party rage*, knew no better expedient than immediately *putting to death about* 500 *of the citizens*[a].—A ſtrong proof how deeply rooted theſe *violent maxims of government* were throughout all GREECE.

If ſuch was the diſpoſition of men's minds among *that refined people*, what may be expected in the commonwealths of ITALY, AFRIC, SPAIN, and GAUL, which were denominated *barbarous?* Why otherwiſe did the GREEKS ſo much value themſelves on *their humanity, gentleneſs*, and *moderation, above all other nations?* This reaſoning ſeems very natural.—But unluckily the hiſtory of the ROMAN commonwealth, in its earlier times, if we give credit to the received accounts, preſents an oppoſite concluſion.—No blood was ever ſhed in any ſedition at ROME till the murder of the GARCCHI.—DIONYSIUS HALICARNASSÆUS[b], obſerving the ſingular humanity of the ROMAN people in this particular, makes uſe of it as an argument, that they were originally of GRECIAN extraction: whence we may conclude, that the factions and revolutions in the *barbarous republics were uſually more violent* than even thoſe of GREECE above mentioned.

[a] DIOD. SIC. lib. xiv. [b] Lib. i.

IF THE ROMANS WERE SO LATE IN COMING TO BLOWS, THEY MADE AMPLE COMPENSATION AFTER THEY HAD ONCE ENTERED UPON THE BLOODY SCENE; AND APPIAN'S HISTORY OF THEIR CIVIL WARS CONTAINS THE MOST FRIGHTFUL PICTURE OF MASSACRES, PROSCRIPTIONS, AND FORFEITURES, THAT EVER WAS PRESENTED TO THE WORLD.—WHAT PLEASES MOST, IN THAT HISTORIAN, IS, THAT HE SEEMS TO FEEL A PROPER RESENTMENT OF THESE BARBAROUS PROCEEDINGS; AND TALKS NOT WITH THAT PROVOKING COOLNESS AND INDIFFERENCE, WHICH CUSTOM HAD PRODUCED IN MANY OF THE GREEK HISTORIANS[a].

One

[a] The authorities cited above, are all hiſtorians, orators, and philoſophers, whoſe teſtimony is unqueſtioned.—It is dangerous to rely upon writers who deal in ridicule and ſatire.—What will poſterity, for inſtance, infer from this paſſage of Dr. SWIFT: "I told him, that in the kingdom of TRIBNIA "(BRITAIN) by the natives called LANGDON (LONDON) where I had ſo-"journed ſome time in my travels, the bulk of the people conſiſt, in a man-"ner, wholly of diſcoverers, witneſſes, informers, accuſers, proſecutors, evi-"dences, ſwearers, together with their ſeveral ſubſervient and ſubaltern in-"ſtruments, all under the colours, the conduct, and pay of miniſters of ſtate "and their deputies.—The plots in that kingdom are uſually the workman-"ſhip of thoſe perſons," &c.—GULLIVER's *Travels*.—Such a repreſentation might ſuit the government of ATHENS, but not that of ENGLAND, which is remarkable, even in modern times, for *humanity*, *juſtice*, and *liberty*.—Yet the doctor's ſatire, though carried to extremes, as is uſual with him, even

One general cauſe of the diſorders, ſo frequent in all ancient governments, ſeems to have conſiſted in the great difficulty of eſtabliſhing any ARISTOCRACY in thoſe ages, and the perpetual diſcontents and ſeditions of the people, whenever even the meaneſt and moſt beggarly were excluded from the legiſlature and from public offices.—The very quality of a *freeman* gave ſuch a rank, being oppoſed to that of *ſlave*, that it ſeemed to entitle the poſſeſſor to every power and privilege of the commonwealth.—SOLON's [a] laws excluded no freeman from votes or elections, but confined ſome magiſtracies to a particular *cenſus*; yet were the people never ſatisfied till thoſe laws were repealed.—By the treaty with ANTIPATER [b], no ATHENIAN was allowed a vote whoſe *cenſus* was leſs than 2000 *drachmas* (about 60 *l. ſterling*). —And though ſuch a government would to us appear ſufficiently democratical, it was ſo *diſagreeable to that people*, that above two-thirds of them immediately left their country [c].—CASSANDER reduced that *cenſus* to the half [d];

even beyond other ſatirical writers, did not altogether want an object.—The Biſhop of ROCHESTER, who was his friend, and of the ſame party, had been baniſhed a little before by a bill of attainder, with *great juſtice*, but without ſuch a proof as was legal, or according to the ſtrict forms of common law.

[a] PLUTARCHUS *in vita* SOLON. [b] DIOD. SIC. lib. xviii.
[c] Id. ibid. [d] Id. ibid.

yet

yet ſtill the government was conſidered as an oligarchical tyranny, and the effect of foreign violence.

SERVIUS TULLIUS's[a] laws ſeem equal and reaſonable, by fixing the power in proportion to the property: yet the ROMAN people could never be brought quietly to ſubmit to them.

In thoſe days there was NO MEDIUM *between a ſevere, jealous ariſtocracy, ruling over diſcontented ſubjects; and a* TURBULENT, FACTIOUS, TYRANNICAL DEMOCRACY.

There are many *other circumſtances*, in which ancient nations ſeem inferior to the modern, both for the happineſs and increaſe of mankind.—Trade, manufactures, induſtry, were nowhere, in former ages, ſo flouriſhing as they are at preſent in EUROPE.—The only garb of the ancients, both for males and females, ſeems to have been a kind of flannel, which they wore commonly white or grey, and which *they ſcoured as often as it grew dirty*.—I do not remember a paſſage in any ancient author, where the growth of the city is aſcribed to the eſtabliſhment of *a manufacture*.—The commerce, which is ſaid to flouriſh, is chiefly the exchange of thoſe com-

[a] TIT. LIV. lib. i. c. 43.

modities, for which different ſoils and climates were ſuited.—The ſale of wine and oil into AFRICA, according to DIODORUS SICULUS [a], was the foundation of the riches of AGRIGENTUM.—The ſituation of the city of SYBARIS, according to the ſame author [b], was the cauſe of its immenſe populouſneſs; being built near the two rivers CRATHYS and SYBARIS.—But theſe two rivers, we may obſerve, are not navigable; and could only produce ſome fertile vallies, for agriculture and huſbandry; an advantage ſo inconſiderable, that a modern writer would ſcarcely have taken notice of it.

The barbarity of the ancient tyrants, together with the extreme love of liberty, which animated thoſe ages, muſt have baniſhed every merchant and manufacturer, and have quite depopulated the ſtate, had it ſubſiſted upon induſtry and commerce.—While the cruel and ſuſpicious *Dionyſius* was carrying on his butcheries, who, that was not detained by his landed property, and could have carried with him any art or ſkill to procure a ſubſiſtence in other countries, would have remained expoſed to ſuch implacable barbarity? The perſecutions of

[a] Lib. xiii. [b] Lib. xii.

Philip

Philip II. and *Lewis* XIV. filled all EUROPE with the manufacturers of FLANDERS and of FRANCE.

I grant, that *agriculture* is the ſpecies of induſtry chiefly requiſite to the ſubſiſtence of multitudes; and it is poſſible, that this induſtry may flouriſh, even were manufactures and other arts unknown and neglected.—*Swiſſerland* is at preſent a remarkable inſtance; where we find, at once, the moſt ſkilful huſbandmen, and the moſt bungling tradeſmen, that are to be met with in EUROPE.—That agriculture flouriſhed in *Greece* and *Italy*, at leaſt in ſome parts of them, and at ſome periods, we have reaſon to preſume; and whether the mechanical arts had reached the ſame degree of perfection, may not be eſteemed ſo material; eſpecially, if we conſider the great equality of riches in the ancient republics, where each family was obliged to cultivate, with the greateſt care and induſtry, its own little field, in order to its ſubſiſtence.

But is it juſt reaſoning, becauſe agriculture may, in ſome inſtances, flouriſh without trade or manufactures, to conclude, that, in any great extent of country, and for any great tract of time, it would ſubſiſt alone? *The moſt natural way, ſurely, of encouraging huſbandry, is, firſt,*

to excite other kinds of induſtry, and thereby afford the labourer a ready market for his commodities, and a return of ſuch goods as may contribute to his pleaſure and enjoyment. —This method is infallible and univerſal; and, as it prevails more in modern government than in the ancient, it affords a preſumption of the ſuperior populouſneſs of the former.

Every man, ſays *Xenophon*[a], may be a farmer: no art or ſkill is requiſite: all conſiſts in induſtry, and in attention to the execution.—A *ſtrong proof*, as COLUMELLA hints, that agriculture was but little known in the age of XENOPHON.

All our later improvements and refinements, have they done nothing towards the eaſy ſubſiſtence of men, and conſequently towards their propagation and increaſe? *Our ſuperior ſkill in the mechanics; the diſcovery of new worlds, by which commerce has been ſo much enlarged; the eſtabliſhment of poſts; and the uſe of bills of exchange: theſe ſeem all extremely uſeful to the encouragement of art, induſtry, and populouſneſs.*—Were we to ſtrike off theſe, what a check ſhould we give to every

[a] Oecon.

kind

kind of buſineſs and labour, and what multitudes of families would immediately periſh from want and hunger? And it ſeems not probable, that we could ſupply the place of theſe new inventions by any other regulation or inſtitution.

Have we reaſon to think, that the police of ancient ſtates was anywiſe comparable to that of modern, or that men had then equal ſecurity, either at home, or in their journeys by land or water? I queſtion not but every impartial examiner would give us the preference in this particular.

Thus, upon comparing the whole, it ſeems impoſſible to aſſign any juſt reaſon, why the world ſhould have been *more proſperous* and *populous* in ancient than in modern times.—The equality of property among the ancients, liberty, and the ſmall diviſions of their ſtates, were indeed circumſtances favourable to the propagation of mankind; BUT THEIR WARS WERE MORE BLOODY AND DESTRUCTIVE, THEIR GOVERNMENTS MORE FACTIOUS AND UNSETTLED, COMMERCE AND MANUFACTURES MORE FEEBLE AND LANGUISHING, AND THE GENERAL POLICE MORE LOOSE AND IRREGULAR.—THESE LATTER DISADVANTAGES SEEM

TO FORM A SUFFICIENT COUNTERBALANCE TO THE FORMER ADVANTAGES; AND RATHER FAVOUR THE OPPOSITE OPINION TO THAT WHICH COMMONLY PREVAILS WITH REGARD TO THIS SUBJECT[a].

[a] Hume.

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

THE

OLITICIAN's CREED;

OR,

POLITICAL EXTRACTS:

BEING

AN ANSWER TO THESE QUESTIONS,

What is the beſt Form of Government?

AND

What is the beſt Adminiſtration of a Government?

BY A LOVER OF SOCIAL ORDER.

VOL. II.

PHILOSOPHY conſiſts not
In airy ſchemes, or idle ſpeculations:
The rule and conduct of all ſocial life
Is her great province. Not in lonely cells
Obſcure ſhe lurks, but holds her *heav'nly light*
To ſenates and to kings, to guide her councils,
And teach them to reform and bleſs mankind.
THOMSON.

LONDON:
Printed for ROBINSONS, Paternoſter-Row; T. COX, St. Thomas's-ſtreet, Borough; DILLY in the Poultry; MURRAY and HIGHLEY, Fleet-ſtreet; RICHARDSON, Cornhill; WHITE, Fleet-ſtreet; BECKET, and EDWARDS, Pall Mall; HOOKHAM and CARPENTER, Bond-ſtreet; and H. D. SYMONDS, No. 20, Paternoſter-Row.

1799.

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PREFACE.

In the preceding Volume the Editor of The Politician's Creed has attempted to give *the eſſence* or *forms* of different Governments, and, as far as could be done, conſiſtent with the general deſign of this work, to aſcertain *our* mixed Form *of Government.*

In theſe we are not to conſider, whence *power* is derived; but the *acts* of *Legiſlation:* not what *conſtitutes a Government*; but what are the *emanations* of *eſtabliſhed Forms.*

The writer of The Politician's Creed wiſhes the reader carefully to diſcriminate between *Acts*

of Legiſlation and *Forms of Government.*—Thus a *chancellor* may be corrupt, a *particular jury* may be prejudiced, a *miniſter* improvident, a *commander* indiſcreet; nevertheleſs theſe *offices* or *forms* are as much a ſubject of *admiration* as before.

As, on the one hand, *all parties* have approved *our* MIXED FORM *of Government*, and here our *political knowledge* was reduced to a *ſcience*; ſo on the other hand, as the *practical part* muſt depend much upon *circumſtances*, we ſee opened a wide and endleſs field for diſputation.

Some general maxims, however, concerning COMMERCE, TREATIES, TAXES, WAR, &c. are attempted, and *hereafter* theſe ſeveral ſections may be better filled up by ſome enlightened politician, whom the Editor wiſhes the *ſame motive*, that has guided him in this work—a bias to TRUTH,

rather than to any prevailing party, and the heartfelt pleaſure of beſtowing the PROFITS on perſons deſerving of the firſt conſideration; it being intended that the profits of this work ſhould go to the fund for the relief of the widows and orphan children of thoſe brave men, who may die fighting for their king and country, during *this* war, againſt an ambitious power, that wiſhes to overſtride all Europe.

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THE ADMINISTRATION

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

7

SECT. I.

OF THE BALANCE OF POWER.

It is a queſtion, whether the *idea* of THE BALANCE OF POWER be owing entirely to *modern policy*, or whether the *phraſe only* has been *invented* in *theſe latter ages?* It is certain, that XENOPHON*, in his Inſtitution of CYRUS, repreſents the combination of the ASIATIC powers to have ariſen from a jealouſy of the increaſing force of the MEDES and PERSIANS; and though that elegant compoſition ſhould be ſuppoſed altogether a romance, this ſentiment, aſcribed by the author to the *eaſtern princes*, is at leaſt a proof of the prevailing notion of ancient times.

In all the politics of GREECE, the anxiety, with regard to *the balance of power*, is apparent, and is expreſsly pointed out to us, even by the ancient hiſtorians. THUCYDIDES† repreſents the league, which was form-

* Lib. i. † Lib. i.

ed againſt *Athens*, and which produced the *Peloponneſian war*, as entirely owing to this principle.—And after the decline of *Athens*, when the *Thebans* and *Lacedemonians* diſputed for ſovereignty, we find, that the *Athenians* (as well as many other republics) always threw themſelves into the *lighter ſcale*, and *endeavoured to preſerve the balance*.—They ſupported *Thebes* againſt *Sparta*, till the great victory gained by EPAMINONDAS at *Leuctra*; after which they immediately went over to the conquered from generoſity, as they *pretended*, but, *in reality*, *from their jealouſy of the conquerors* *.

Whoever will read DEMOSTHENES's oration for the *Megalopolitans*, may ſee the utmoſt refinements on this principle, that ever entered into the head of a VENETIAN or ENGLISH ſpeculatiſt, and upon the firſt riſe of the *Macedonian power*, this orator immediately diſcovered the danger, *ſounded the alarm through all Greece*, and at laſt aſſembled that *confederacy* under the banners of *Athens*, which fought the great and deciſive battle of *Chaeronea*.

It is true, the GRECIAN wars are regarded by hiſtorians as wars of *emulation* rather than of *politics*; and each

* XENOPH. Hiſt. GRAEC. lib. vi. & vii.

ſtate

ate ſeems to have had more in view the honour of leading the reſt, than any well-grounded hopes of authority and dominion.—If we conſider, indeed, the ſmall number of inhabitants in any one republic, compared to the whole, the great difficulty of forming ſieges in thoſe times, and the extraordinary bravery and diſcipline of every freeman among that people; we ſhall conclude, that the balance of power was, of itſelf, ſufficiently ſecured in GREECE, and needed not to have been guarded with that caution which may be requiſite in other ages.—But whether to aſcribe the *ſhifting of ſides* in all the GRECIAN republics to *jealous emulation* or *cautious politics*, the effects were alike, and every *prevailing power* was ſure to meet with a *confederacy* againſt it, and that often compoſed of its *former friends* and *allies*.

The ſame principle, call it envy or prudence, which produced the OSTRACISM of *Athens*, and PETALISM of *Syracuſe*, and expelled every citizen whoſe fame or power overtopped the reſt; the ſame principle, I ſay, naturally diſcovered itſelf in foreign politics, and ſoon raiſed enemies to the *leading* ſtate, however moderate in the exerciſe of its authority.

The *Perſian monarch* was really, in his force, a petty prince, compared to the GRECIAN republics; and there-

fore it behoved him, from views of ſafety more than from emulation, to intereſt himſelf in their quarrels, and to ſupport the weaker ſide in every conteſt.—This was the advice given by ALCIBIADES to TISSAPHERNES*, and it prolonged near a century the date of the PERSIAN empire; till the neglect of it for a moment, after the firſt appearance of the aſpiring genius of PHILIP, brought that lofty and frail edifice to the ground, with a rapidity of which there are few inſtances in the hiſtory of mankind.

The ſucceſſors of ALEXANDER ſhowed great jealouſy of *the balance of power*; a jealouſy founded on true politics and prudence, and which preſerved diſtinct for ſeveral ages the partitions made after the death of that famous conqueror.—The fortune and ambition of ANTIGONUS† threatened them anew with a univerſal monarchy; but their combination, and their victory at *Ipſus* ſaved them.—And in after times, we find, that, as the Eaſtern princes conſidered the *Greeks* and *Macedonians* as the only real military force, with whom they had any intercourſe, they kept always a *watchful eye* over that part of the world.—The PTOLEMIES, in par-

* THUCYD. lib. viii. † DIOD. SIC. lib. xx.

ticular,

cular, ſupported firſt ARATUS and the *Achaeans*, and ıen CLEOMENES king of *Sparta*, from no other view ıan as a *counterbalance* to the *Macedonian monarchs*.— 'or this is the account which POLYBIUS gives of the *:gyptian politics**.

The reaſon, why it is ſuppoſed, that the ancients were ntirely ignorant of *the balance of power*, ſeems to be rawn from the ROMAN hiſtory more than the GRE-:IAN; and as the tranſactions of the former are general-y the moſt familiar to us, we have thence formed all our ɔncluſions.—It muſt be owned, that the ROMANS ne-:r met with any ſuch general combination or confede-ıcy againſt them, as might naturally have been expect-l from their rapid conqueſts and declared ambition; *ut were allowed peaceably to ſubdue their neighbours, one fter another, till they extended their dominion over the 'hole known world*.—Not to mention the fabulous hiſ-ɔry of their ITALIC wars; there was, upon HANNI-AL's invaſion of the ROMAN ſtate, a remarkable criſis, 'hich ought to have called up the attention of all civi-zed nations.—It appeared afterwards (nor was it diffi-

* Lib. ii. cap. 51.

cult to be obſerved at the time) * that this was a conteſt for *univerſal empire*; and *yet* no prince or ſtate ſeems to have been in the leaſt alarmed about the event or iſſue of the quarrel.—PHILIP of *Macedon* remained neuter, till he ſaw the victories of HANNIBAL; and then moſt imprudently formed an alliance with the conqueror, upon terms ſtill more imprudent.—He ſtipulated, that he was to aſſiſt the *Carthaginian* ſtate in their conqueſt of *Italy*; after which they engaged to ſend over forces into *Greece*, to aſſiſt him in ſubduing the *Grecian commonwealths* †.

The *Rhodian* and *Achaean* republics are much celebrated by ancient hiſtorians for their wiſdom and ſound policy; yet both of them aſſiſted the *Romans* in their wars againſt PHILIP and ANTIOCHUS.—And what may be eſteemed ſtill a ſtronger proof, that this maxim was not *generally known* in thoſe ages; no ancient author has remarked the *imprudence of theſe meaſures*, nor has even blamed that *abſurd treaty* above mentioned, made by PHILIP with the *Carthaginians*.—Princes and ſtateſmen,

* It was obſerved by ſome, as appears by the ſpeech of AGELAUS of NAUPACTUM, in the general congreſs of GREECE. See POLYB. lib. v. cap. 104.

† TITI LIVII, lib. iii. cap. 33.

in

in all ages, may, *before-hand*, be blinded in their reaſonings with regard to events: but it is ſomewhat extraordinary, that hiſtorians, *afterwards*, ſhould not form a ſounder judgment of them.

MASSINISSA, ATTALUS, PRUSIAS, in gratifying their *private paſſions*, were, all of them, the inſtrument of the *Roman greatneſs*; and never ſeem to have ſuſpected, that they were forging their own chains, while they advanced the conqueſts of their ally.—A ſimple treaty and agreement between MASSINISSA and the *Carthaginians*, ſo much required by mutual intereſt, would have barred the *Romans* from all entrance into *Africa*, and preſerved liberty to mankind.

The only prince we met with in the ROMAN hiſtory, who ſeems to have underſtood *the balance of power*, is HIERO king of *Syracuſe*.—Though the ally of ROME, he ſent aſſiſtance to the CARTHAGINIANS, during the war of the auxiliaries; "*Eſteeming it requiſite*," ſays POLYBIUS*, "*both in order to retain his dominions in* "*Sicily, and to preſerve the Roman friendſhip, that* CAR-"THAGE *ſhould be ſafe; leſt by its fall the remaining* "*power ſhould be able, without contraſt or oppoſition, to* "*execute every purpoſe and undertaking.—And here he*

" *acted with great wiſdom and prudence.—For that is ne-*
" *ver, on any account, to be overlooked*; *nor ought ſuch a*
" *force ever to be thrown into one hand, as to incapacitate*
" *the neighbouring ſtates from defending their rights againſt*
" *it.*"—Here is the aim of MODERN POLITICS pointed out in expreſs terms.

In ſhort, the maxim of preſerving *the balance of power* is founded ſo much on *common ſenſe* and *obvious reaſoning*, that it is impoſſible it could *altogether* have eſcaped antiquity, where we find in other particulars ſo many marks of deep penetration and diſcernment.—If it was not ſo *generally* known and acknowledged as *at preſent*, it had, at leaſt, an influence on all the wiſer and more experienced princes and politicians.—And indeed, even at preſent, however generally known and acknowledged among *ſpeculative reaſoners*, it has not, *in practice*, an authority much more extenſive among thoſe who govern the world.

After the fall of the ROMAN empire, the form of government, eſtabliſhed by the northern conquerors, incapacitated them, in a great meaſure, for farther conqueſts, and long maintained each ſtate in its proper boundaries.—But when vaſſalage and the feudal militia were aboliſhed, mankind were anew alarmed by the danger of *univerſal*

monarchy, from the union of ſo many kingdoms and principalities in the perſon of the emperor CHARLES.—But the power of the houſe of *Auſtria*, founded on extenſive but divided dominions, and their riches, derived chiefly from mines of gold and ſilver, were more likely to decay, of themſelves, from internal defects, than to overthrow all the bulwarks raiſed againſt them.—In leſs than a century, the force of that violent and haughty race was ſhattered, their opulence diſſipated, their ſplendor eclipſed.—*A new power ſucceeded*, more *formidable* to *the liberties* of EUROPE, poſſeſſing all the advantages of the former, and labouring under none of its defects; except a ſhare of that ſpirit of bigotry and perſecution, with which the houſe of AUSTRIA was ſo long infatuated.

In the general wars, maintained againſt *this ambitious power*, BRITAIN has ſtood *foremoſt*; and ſhe ſtill maintains her ſtation.—*Beſide advantages of riches and ſituation, her people are animated with ſuch a national ſpirit, and are ſo fully ſenſible of the bleſſings of their government, that we may hope their vigour never will languiſh in ſo neceſſary and ſo juſt a cauſe.*—On the contrary, if we may judge by the paſt, *their paſſionate ardour* ſeems rather to require ſome moderation; and they have oftener erred from a *laudable exceſs* than from a *blamable deficiency*.

Theſe

Theſe exceſſes, to which we have been carried, are *prejudicial*; and may, perhaps, in time, become *ſtill more prejudical* another way, by begetting, as is uſual, the *oppoſite extreme*, and rendering us totally *careleſs* and *ſupine* with regard to the *fate* of *our Neighbours*.—The *Athenians*, from the moſt buſtling, intriguing, warlike people of GREECE, finding their *error* in thruſting themſelves into every quarrel, *abandoned all attention to foreign affairs*; and in no conteſt, ever took part on either ſide, except by their flatteries and complaiſance to the victor *.—They repented of this folly when it was too late.

UPON THE WHOLE IT APPEARS THEN, THAT ALLIANCES ARE PROPER, AND AS THE AMBITION OF EXTENSIVE DOMINION IS MORE PREDOMINANT IN THE BREASTS OF RULERS, THAN GENERAL PHILANTHROPY, WHICH WILL EVER BE THE CASE, AS LONG AS MANKIND PERSIST IN APPLAUDING THEIR DESTROYERS, RATHER THAN THEIR BENEFACTORS, NATIONS OUGHT TO HAVE A JEALOUS EYE ON EACH OTHER, AND TO CONFEDERATE TOGETHER TO SUPPRESS THE RISING FLAME OF INORDINATE AMBITION, WHICH OTHERWISE, LIKE THE CHARIOT OF PHAETON, MIGHT CONFLAGRATE THE WHOLE WORLD.

* Hume.

SECT.

SECT. II.

OF THE BALANCE OF TRADE.

It is very uſual, in nations *ignorant* of *the nature of commerce*, to prohibit the *exportation* of commodities, and to preſerve among themſelves whatever they think valuable and uſeful.—They do not conſider that, in this prohibition, they act directly *contrary* to *their intention*; and that the more is *exported* of any commodity, the more will be *raiſed at home*, of which they themſelves will always have the firſt offer.

It is well known to the learned, that the ancient laws of ATHENS rendered the *exportation* of figs criminal; that being ſuppoſed a ſpecies of fruit ſo excellent in ATTICA, that the ATHENIANS deemed it too delicious for the palate of any foreigner.—There are proofs in many old acts of parliament of the *ſame ignorance* in the nature of commerce, particularly in the reign of EDWARD III.—And to this day, in FRANCE, the exportation of *corn* is almoſt always prohibited; in order, as

wines, for which they paid ready money. The conſequence of this ſituation, which muſt be owned to be diſadvantageous, was, that, in a courſe of three years, the current money of IRELAND, from 500,000*l.* was reduced to leſs than two.—And at preſent, I ſuppoſe, in a courſe of 30 years, it is abſolutely nothing.—Yet I know not how that opinion of the *advance of riches in* IRELAND, which gave the Doctor ſo much indignation, ſeems ſtill to continue, and gain ground with every body.

In ſhort, this apprehenſion of the wrong balance of trade, appears of ſuch a nature, that it diſcovers itſelf, wherever one is *out of humour with the miniſtry, or is in low ſpirits*; and as it can never be refuted by a particular detail of all the exports, which counterbalance the imports, it may here be proper to form a general argument, that may prove the impoſſibility of this even, as long as we preſerve our people and our induſtry.

Suppoſe four-fifths of all the money in BRITAIN *to be annihilated in one night, and the nation reduced to the ſame condition, with regard to ſpecie, as in the reigns of the* HARRYS *and* EDWARDS, *what would be the conſequence? Muſt not the price of all labour and commodities ſink in*

proportion, and every thing be ſold as cheap as they were in thoſe ages?—What nation could then diſpute with us in any foreign market, or pretend to navigate or to ſell manufactures at the ſame price, which to us would afford ſufficient profit?—In how little time, therefore, muſt this bring back the money which we had loſt, and raiſe us to the level of all the neighbouring nations?—Where, after we have arrived, we immediately loſe the advantage of the cheapneſs of labour and commodities; and the farther flowing in of money is ſtopped by our fulneſs and repletion.*

Again, *ſuppoſe that all the money of* BRITAIN *were multiplied fivefold in a night, muſt not the contrary effect follow?—Muſt not all labour and commodities riſe to ſuch an exorbitant height, that no neighbouring nations could afford to buy from us; while their commodities, on the other hand, became comparatively ſo cheap, that, in ſpite of all the laws which could be formed, they would be run in upon us, and our money flow out; till we fall to a level with foreigners, and loſe that great ſuperiority of riches, which had laid us under ſuch diſadvantages.*

Now, it is evident, that the ſame cauſes, which would *correct* theſe exorbitant inequalities, were they to

* Like a poor man, we ſhould be able to *ſell* every thing, but *buy* nothing.

happen

our ſpecie, and draw to themſelves a larger ſhare of the Weſt Indian treaſures.—We need not have recourſe to a phyſical attraction, in order to explain the neceſſity of this operation.—*There is a moral attraction, ariſing from the intereſts and paſſions of men, which is full as potent and infallible.*

How is the balance kept in the provinces of every kingdom among themſelves, but by the force of this principle, which makes it impoſſible *for money to loſe its level*, and either to riſe or ſink beyond the proportion of the labour and commodities which are in each province? Did not long experience make people eaſy on this head, what a fund of gloomy reflections might calculations afford to a melancholy *Yorkſhireman*, while he computed and magnified the ſums drawn to London by taxes, abſentees, commodities, and found on compariſon the oppoſite articles ſo much inferior?—And no doubt, had the *Heptarchy* ſubſiſted in *England*, the legiſlature of each ſtate had been continually alarmed by the fear of a *wrong balance*; and as it is probable that the mutual hatred of theſe ſtates would have been extremely violent on account of their cloſe neighbourhood, they would have *loaded* and *oppreſſed all commerce*, by a *jealous* and *ſuperfluous caution*.—Since the union has removed the barriers

barriers between *Scotland* and *England*, which of theſe nations gains from the other by this free commerce?—Or if the former kingdom has received any increaſe of riches, can it reaſonably be accounted for by any thing but the *increaſe* of its *art* and *induſtry*?—It was a common apprehenſion in *England*, before the union, as we learn from L'ABBE DU BOS*, that *Scotland* would ſoon drain them of their treaſure, were an open trade allowed; and on the other ſide the *Tweed* a contrary apprehenſion prevailed: with what juſtice in both, *time has ſhewn.*

What happens in ſmall portions of mankind, muſt take place in greater.—The provinces of the Roman empire, no doubt, kept their balance with each other, and with Italy, independent of the legiſlature: as much as the ſeveral counties of Britain, or the ſeveral pariſhes of each county.—And any man who travels over Europe at this day, may ſee, by the prices of commodities, that money, in ſpite of the abſurd jealouſy of princes and ſtates, has brought itſelf nearly to a level; and that the difference between one kingdom and another is not greater in this reſpect, than it is often between different

* *Les interets d'* ANGLETERRE *mal-entendus.*

provinces of the ſame kingdom.—*Men naturally flock to capital cities, ſea-ports, and navigable rivers.—There we find more men, more induſtry, more commodities, and conſequently more money; but ſtill the latter difference holds proportion with the former, and the level is preſerved*.*

Our jealouſy and our hatred of *France* are without bounds; and the former ſentiment, at leaſt, muſt be acknowledged reaſonable and well-grounded.—Theſe paſſions have occaſioned innumerable barriers and obſtructions upon commerce, where we are accuſed of being commonly the aggreſſors.—But what have we gained by the bargain?—We loſt the French market for our woollen manufactures, and transferred the commerce of wine to Spain and Portugal, where we buy

* It muſt carefully be remarked, that throughout this diſcourſe, wherever HUME ſpeaks of the level of money, he means always its proportional level to the commodities, labour, induſtry, and ſkill, which is in the ſeveral ſtates.—And he aſſerts, that where theſe advantages are double, triple, quadruple, to what they are in the neighbouring ſtates, the money infallibly will alſo be double, triple, quadruple. The only circumſtance that can obſtruct the exactneſs of theſe proportions, is the expence of tranſporting the commodities from one place to another; and this expence is ſometimes unequal.—Thus the corn, cattle, cheeſe, butter, of Derbyſhire, cannot draw the money of London, ſo much as the manufacture of London draw the money of Derbyſhire.—But this objection is only a ſeeming one: for ſo far as the tranſport of commodities is expenſive, ſo far is the communication between the place obſtructed an imperfect.

worſe liquor at a higher price.—*There are few Engliſhmen who would not think their country abſolutely ruined, were French wines ſold in England ſo cheap and in ſuch abundance as to ſupplant, in ſome meaſure, all ale, and home-brewed liquors: but could we lay aſide prejudice, it would not be difficult to prove, that nothing could be more innocent, perhaps advantageous.—Each new acre of vineyard planted in France, in order to ſupply England with wine, would make it requiſite for the French to take the produce of an Engliſh acre, ſown in wheat or barley, in order to ſubſiſt themſelves; and it is evident, that we ſhould thereby get command of the better commodity.*

There are many edicts of the French king, prohibiting the planting of *new vineyards*, and ordering all thoſe which are lately planted to be grubbed up: ſo ſenſible are they, in that country, of the ſuperior value of *corn*, above every other product.

Mareſchal Vauban complains often, and with reaſon, of the abſurd duties which load the entry of thoſe wines of Languedoc, Guienne, and other ſouthern provinces, that are imported into Britanny and Normandy.—He entertained no doubt but theſe latter provinces could preſerve their balance, notwithſtanding the open commerce which he recommends.—And it is evident, that a few

It is not to be doubted, but the great plenty of *bullion* in France is, in a great meaſure, owing to the want of *paper-credit*.—The French have no banks: merchants' bills do not there circulate as with us: uſury, or lending on intereſt, is not directly permitted; ſo that many have large ſums in their coffers: *great quantities of plate are uſed in private houſes*; *and all the churches are full of it*.—By this means, *proviſions* and *labour* ſtill remain *cheaper among them*, than in nations that are not *half ſo rich* in gold and ſilver.—*The advantages of this ſituation, in point of trade as well as in great public emergencies, are too evident to be diſputed* *.

The ſame faſhion a few years ago prevailed in Genoa, which ſtill has place in *England* and *Holland*, of uſing ſervices of china-ware inſtead of plate; but the ſenate, foreſeeing the conſequence, prohibited the uſe of that brittle commodity beyond a certain extent; while the uſe of *ſilver-plate* was left unlimited.—And, I ſuppoſe, in their late diſtreſſes, they felt the good effect of this ordinance.—*Our tax on plate* is, perhaps, in this view, ſomewhat unpolitic.

* This has appeared in their late revolution, when the NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ſanctioned the uſe of *aſſignats* for their *internal* commerce; and employed in their *trade to America* and in their *armies* the *precious metals*, as they are called.

Before

Before the introduction of *paper money* into our colonies, they had gold and ſilver ſufficient for their circulation.—Since the introduction of that commodity, the leaſt inconveniency that has followed is the total baniſhment of the precious metals.—And after the abolition of paper, can it be doubted but money will return, while theſe colonies poſſeſs manufactures and commodities, the only thing valuable in commerce, and for *whoſe ſake alone all men deſire money.*

What pity LYCURGUS *did not think of paper credit, when he wanted to baniſh gold and ſilver from* Sparta!—*It would have ſerved his purpoſe better than the lumps of iron he made uſe of as money; and would alſo have prevented more effectually all commerce with ſtrangers, as being of ſo much leſs real and intrinſic value.*

It muſt, however, be confeſſed, that, as all theſe queſtions of trade and money are extremely complicated, there are certain lights, in which this ſubject may be placed, ſo as to repreſent the *advantages* of PAPER CREDIT and BANKS to be ſuperior to their *diſadvantages.* —That they baniſh ſpecie and bullion from a ſtate is undoubtedly true; and whoever looks no *farther* than this circumſtance does well to condemn them; but ſpecie and bullion are not of ſo great conſequence as not

to

to admit of a compenſation, and even an overbalance from the increaſe of induſtry and of credit, which may be promoted by the *right uſe* of PAPER-MONEY.—It is well known of what advantage it is to a merchant to be able to diſcount his bills *upon occaſion*; and every thing that *facilitates* this ſpecies of traffic is favourable to the general commerce of a ſtate.

There was an invention of this kind, which was fallen upon ſome years ago by the banks of *Edinburgh*; and which, as it is one of the moſt ingenious ideas that has been executed in commerce, has alſo been thought advantageous to *Scotland*.—*It is there called a* BANK-CREDIT; *and is of this nature.—A man goes to the bank and finds ſurety to the amount, we ſhall ſuppoſe, of five thouſand pounds.—This money, or any part of it, he has the liberty of drawing out whenever he pleaſes, and he pays only the ordinary intereſt for it, while it is in his hands.—He may, when he pleaſes, repay any ſum ſo ſmall as twenty pounds, and the intereſt is diſcounted from the very day of the repayment.—The advantages, reſulting from this contrivance, are manifold.—As a man may find ſurety nearly to the amount of his ſubſtance, and his bank-credit is equivalent to ready money, a merchant does hereby in a manner coin his houſes, his houſehold furniture, the goods*

in

in his warehouſe, the foreign debts due to him, his ſhips at ſea; and can, upon occaſion, employ them in all payments, as if they were the current money of the country.—If a man borrow five thouſand pounds from a private hand, beſides that it is not always to be found when required, he pays intereſt for it, whether he be uſing it or not: his bank-credit coſts him nothing except during the very moment, in which it is of ſervice to him: and this circumſtance is of equal advantage as if he had borrowed money at much lower intereſt.—Merchants, likewiſe, from this invention, acquire a great facility in ſupporting each other's credit, which is a conſiderable ſecurity againſt bankruptcies.—A man, when his own bank-credit is exhauſted, goes to any of his neighbours who is not in the ſame condition; and he gets the money, which he replaces at his convenience.

After this practice had taken place during ſome years at *Edinburgh*, ſeveral companies of merchants at *Glaſgow* carried the matter *farther*.—They aſſociated themſelves into different banks, and iſſued notes ſo low as *ten ſhillings*, which they uſed in all payments for goods, manufactures, tradeſmen's labour of all kinds; and theſe notes, from the *eſtabliſhed credit* of the com-

panics, *paſſed as money* in all payments throughout the country.—By this means, a ſtock of five thouſand pounds was able to perform the ſame operations as if it were ten or twenty; and merchants were thereby enabled to trade to a *greater extent*, and to require *leſs profit* in all their tranſactions.—But whatever other advantages reſult from theſe inventions, it muſt ſtill be allowed *that they baniſh the precious metals*; and nothing can be a more evident proof of it, than a compariſon of the paſt and preſent condition of Scotland in that particular.—It was found, upon the recoinage made after the union, that there was near *a million of ſpecie in that country:* but notwithſtanding the great increaſe of riches, commerce, and manufactures of all kinds, it is thought, that, even where there is no extraordinary drain made by England, the current ſpecie will not NOW amount to *a third of that ſum.*

But as our projects of PAPER-CREDIT are almoſt the only expedient, by which we can *ſink* money *below its level*; ſo, in my opinion, the only expedient, by which we can *raiſe* money *above it*, is a practice which we ſhould all exclaim againſt as deſtructive, namely, the gathering of large ſums into a public treaſure, *locking*

them

n up, and abſolutely preventing their circulation.—
e fluid, not communicating with the neighbouring
nent, may, by ſuch an artifice, be raiſed to what
ght we pleaſe.—To prove this, we need only return
our firſt ſuppoſition, of annihilating the half or any
t of our caſh; where we found, that the immediate
ſequence of ſuch an event would be the attraction of
equal ſum from all the neighbouring kingdoms.—
or does there ſeem to be any neceſſary bounds ſet, by
: nature of things, to this practice of hoarding.—A
ll city, like Geneva, continuing this policy for ages,
ght engroſs nine-tenths of the money of Europe.—
ere ſeems, indeed, in the nature of man, an invin-
e obſtacle to that immenſe growth of riches.—A
AK STATE, *with an enormous treaſure, will ſoon be-
e a prey to ſome of its poorer, but more powerful, neigh-
rs.*—A GREAT STATE *would diſſipate its wealth in
gerous and ill-concerted projects; and probably deſtroy,
b it, what is much more valuable, the induſtry, morals,
! numbers of its people.*—The fluid, in this caſe, raiſed
oo great a height, burſts and deſtroys the veſſel that
tains it; and mixing itſelf with the ſurrounding ele-
nt, ſoon falls to its proper level.

From theſe principles we may learn what judgment

we ought to form of thoſe numberleſs bars, obſtructions, and impoſts, which all nations of EUROPE, and *none more* than ENGLAND, have put upon trade; from an exorbitant deſire of amaſſing money, which never will heap up beyond its level, while it circulates; or from an ill-grounded apprehenſion of loſing their ſpecie, which never will ſink below it.—Could any thing ſcatter our riches, it would be ſuch *unpolitic contrivances*.—But this general ill effect, however, reſults from them, that they deprive *neighbouring* nations of that *free communication* and *exchange* which the AUTHOR OF THE WORLD has *intended*, by *giving them* ſoils, climates, and geniuſes, ſo *different* from each other.

Our MODERN POLITICS *embrace the only method of* BANISHING *money, the uſing of paper-credit*; they *reject the only method of* AMASSING *it, the practice of hoarding; and they adopt a hundred contrivances*, which ſerve to no purpoſe but to *check induſtry*, and to *rob ourſelves* and *our neighbours* of the *common benefits* of ART *and* NATURE.

All taxes, however, upon foreign commodities, are not to be regarded as prejudicial or uſeleſs, but thoſe only which are founded on *the jealouſy* above mentioned.—*A tax on* GERMAN *linen encourages home manufactures, and thereby multiplies our people and induſtry.—A tax on*

BRANDY

RANDY *increaſes the ſale of rum, and ſupports our uthern colonies.*—And as it is neceſſary, that impoſts ould be levied, for the ſupport of government, it may : thought more convenient to lay them on foreign mmodities, which can eaſily be intercepted at the port, d ſubjected to the impoſt.—We ought, however, al-ays to remember the maxim of Dr. SWIFT, that, in he arithmetic of the cuſtoms, two and two make not our, but often make only one.—It can ſcarcely be oubted, but if the duties on wine were *lowered* to a hird, they would yield much more to the government an at preſent: our people might thereby afford to rink commonly a *better* and more *wholeſome liquor*; and o prejudice would enſue to *the balance of trade*, of which re are *ſo jealous*.—The manufacture of ale beyond the griculture is but inconſiderable, and gives employment o few hands.—The tranſport of wine and corn would ot be much inferior.

But are there not frequent inſtances, you will ſay, of tates and kingdoms, which were formerly rich and opulent, and are now poor and beggarly?—Has not the noney left them, with which they formerly abounded? —I anſwer, If they loſe their *trade*, *induſtry*, and *people*, hey cannot expect to keep their gold and ſilver: for

the profits and money which arose from it.—
seat of government is transferred, where e:
mies are maintained at a distance, where gre
possessed by foreigners; there naturally fo
these causes a diminution of the specie.—Bu
may observe, are violent and forcible metho
ing away money, and are in time commor
with the transport of people and industry.—
these remain, and the drain is not continued,
always finds its way back again, by a hundre
which we have no notion or suspicion.—*W*
treasures have been spent, by so many nations
DERS, *since the revolution, in the course of three*
More money perhaps than the half of what is
EUROPE.—*But what has now become of it?—*
narrow compass of the AUSTRIAN *provinces?—*
it has most of it returned to the several countri
came, and has followed that art and industry,

FACTURES.—ITS MINUTE. IT MAY SAFELY TRUST THE COURSE OF HUMAN AFFAIRS. WITHOUT AR OR JEALOUSY.—[illegible] IT EVER GIVE ATTENTION TO THIS LATTER CIRCUMSTANCE, IT OUGHT LY TO BE SO FAR AS IT AFFECTS THE FOR-R*.

* [illegible]

SECT.

SECT. III.

OF THE JEALOUSY OF TRADE.

HAVING endeavoured to remove *one* ſpecies of *ill-founded jealouſy*, which is ſo prevalent among commercial nations, it may not be amiſs to mention *another*, which ſeems *equally groundleſs*.—Nothing is more uſual, among ſtates which have made ſome advances in commerce, than to look on the progreſs of their neighbours with a ſuſpicious eye, *to conſider all trading ſtates as their rivals, and to ſuppoſe that it is impoſſible for any of them to flouriſh, but at their expence*.—In oppoſition to this narrow and malignant opinion, I will venture to aſſert, *that the increaſe of riches and commerce in any one nation, inſtead of hurting, commonly promotes the riches and commerce of all its neighbours; and that a ſtate can ſcarcely carry its trade and induſtry very far, where all the ſurrounding ſtates are buried in ignorance, ſloth, and barbariſm.*

It is obvious, that the *domeſtic induſtry* of a people cannot be hurt by the *greateſt proſperity* of their neighbours;

and as this branch of commerce is undoubtedly
oft important in any extenſive kingdom, we are ſo
noved from all reaſon of jealouſy.—But I go far-
and obſerve, that *where an open communication is*
ed among nations, it is impoſſible but the *domeſtic*
y of every one muſt receive an increaſe from the
vements of the others.—Compare the ſituation of
AT BRITAIN at preſent, with what it was two cen-
ago.—All the arts both of agriculture and manu-
es were then extremely rude and imperfect.—Every
vement, which we have ſince made, has ariſen
our imitation of foreigners; and we ought ſo far to
i it happy, that they had previouſly made advances
s and ingenuity.—But this intercourſe it ſtill up-
o our great advantage: notwithſtanding the ad-
d ſtate of our manufactures, we daily adopt, in
art, the inventions and improvements of our neigh-
—The commodity is firſt imported from abroad,
great diſcontent, while we imagine that it drains
our money: afterwards, the art itſelf is gradually
ted, to our *viſible advantage*: yet we continue ſtill
ine, that our neighbours ſhould poſſeſs any art,
ry, and invention; forgetting that, had they not
ıſtructed us, we ſhould have been at preſent bar-

barians; and did they not ſtill continue their inſtructions, the arts muſt fall into a ſtate of languor, and loſe that emulation and novelty, which contribute ſo much to their advancement.

The increaſe of *domeſtic induſtry* lays the foundation of foreign commerce.—Where a great number of commodities are raiſed and perfected for the home-market, there will always be found ſome which can be exported with advantage.—But if our neighbours have no art or cultivation, they cannot take them; becauſe they will have nothing to give in exchange.—In this reſpect, ſtates are in the ſame condition as individuals.—A ſingle man can ſcarcely be induſtrious, where all his fellow-citizens are idle.—The riches of the ſeveral members of a community contribute to increaſe my riches, whatever profeſſion I may follow.—They conſume the produce of my induſtry, and afford me the produce of theirs in return.

Nor needs any ſtate entertain apprehenſions, that their neighbours will improve to ſuch a degree in every art and manufacture, as to have no demand from them.—*Nature, by giving a diverſity of geniuſes, climates, and ſoils, to different nations, has ſecured their mutual intercourſe and commerce, as long as they all remain induſtrious and civilized.*

ſtated.—Nay, the more the arts increaſe in any ſtate, the more will be its demands from its induſtrious neighbours.—The inhabitants, having become opulent and ſkilful, deſire to have every commodity in the utmoſt perfection; and as they have plenty of commodities to give in exchange, they make large importations from every foreign country.—The induſtry of the nations, from whom they import, receives encouragement: their own is alſo increaſed, by the ſale of the commodities which they give in exchange.

But what if a nation has *any ſtaple commodity*, ſuch as the woollen manufactory is in ENGLAND?—Muſt not the interfering of their neighbours in *that manufacture* be a loſs to them?—I anſwer, that, when any commodity is denominated the ſtaple of a kingdom, it is ſuppoſed that this kingdom has ſome peculiar and natural advantages for raiſing the commodity; and if, notwithſtanding theſe advantages, they loſe ſuch a manufactory, they ought to blame their own idleneſs, or expenſive government, not the induſtry of their neighbours.—It ought alſo to be conſidered, that, by the increaſe of induſtry among the neighbouring nations, the conſumption of every particular ſpecies of commodity is alſo increaſed; and though foreign manufactures interfere with us in the market,

the demand for our product may ſtill continue, or even increaſe.—And ſhould it diminiſh, ought the conſequence to be eſteemed ſo fatal?—If *the ſpirit of induſtry* be preſerved, it may eaſily be diverted from one branch to another; and the manufacturers of wool, for inſtance, be employed in linen, ſilk, iron, or any other commodities, for which there appears to be a demand.—We need not apprehend, that *all* the *objects of induſtry* will be *exhauſted*, or that our manufacturers, while they remain on an equal footing with thoſe of our neighbours, will be in danger of wanting employment.—The emulation among rival nations ſerves rather to keep induſtry alive in all of them: and any people is happier who poſſeſs a variety of manufactures, than if they enjoyed one ſingle great manufacture, in which they are all employed.—Their ſituation is leſs precarious; and they will feel leſs ſenſibly thoſe revolutions and uncertainties, to which every particular branch of commerce will always be expoſed *.

WERE OUR NARROW AND MALIGNANT POLITICS TO MEET WITH SUCCESS, WE SHOULD REDUCE ALL OUR NEIGHBOURING NATIONS TO THE SAME STATE OF SLOTH AND IGNORANCE THAT PREVAILS IN Mo-

* HUME.

ROCCO

ROCCO AND THE COAST OF BARBARY.—BUT WHAT WOULD BE THE CONSEQUENCE?—THEY COULD SEND US NO COMMODITIES: THEY COULD TAKE NONE FROM US: OUR DOMESTIC COMMERCE ITSELF WOULD LANGUISH FOR WANT OF EMULATION, EXAMPLE, AND INSTRUCTION: AND WE OURSELVES SHOULD SOON FALL INTO THE SAME ABJECT CONDITION, TO WHICH WE HAD REDUCED THEM.—I SHALL THEREFORE VENTURE TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT, NOT ONLY AS A MAN, BUT AS A BRITISH SUBJECT, I PRAY FOR THE FLOURISHING COMMERCE OF GERMANY, SPAIN, ITALY, AND EVEN FRANCE ITSELF.—I AM AT LEAST CERTAIN, THAT GREAT BRITAIN, AND ALL THOSE NATIONS, WOULD FLOURISH MORE, DID THEIR SOVEREIGNS AND MINISTERS ADOPT SUCH ENLARGED AND BENEVOLENT SENTIMENTS TOWARDS EACH OTHER.

SECT.

SECT. IV.

OF PUBLIC CREDIT.

It appears to have been the common practice of antiquity, to make proviſion, during peace, for the neceſſities of war, and to hoard up treaſures before-hand, as the inſtruments either of conqueſt or defence; without truſting to extraordinary impoſitions, much leſs to borrowing, in times of diſorder and confuſion.—Beſides the immenſe ſums above mentioned*, which were amaſſed by ATHENS, and by the PTOLEMIES, and other ſucceſſors of Alexander; we learn from Plato †, that the frugal *Lacedæmonians* had alſo collected a great treaſure and Arrian ‡ and Plutarch ‖ take notice of the riches which ALEXANDER got poſſeſſion of on the conqueſt of *Suſa* and *Ecbatana*, and which were reſerved, ſome of them, from the time of Cyrus.—If I remember right,

* Sect. III. † ALCIB. I. ‡ Lib. iii.

‖ PLUT. *in vita* ALEX. He makes theſe treaſures amount to 80,000 talents, or about 15 millions ſterling. QUINTUS CURTIUS (lib. v. cap. 2.) ſays, that Alexander found in Suſa above 50,000 talents.

the

the ſcripture alſo mentions the treaſure of HEZEKIAH and the Jewiſh princes; as profane hiſtory does tha tof PHILIP and PERSEUS, kings of *Macedon*.—The ancient republics of *Gaul* had commonly large ſums in reſerve* Every one knows the treaſure ſeized in *Rome* by JULIUS CÆSAR, during the civil wars; and we find afterwards, that the wiſer emperors, AUGUSTUS, TIBERIUS, VESPASIAN, SEVERUS, &c *always diſcovered the prudent foreſight, of ſaving great ſums againſt any public exigency.*

On the contrary, our MODERN EXPEDIENT, *which has become very general, is to mortgage the public revenues, and to truſt that poſterity will pay off the incumbrances contracted by their anceſtors: and they, having before their eyes ſo good an example of their wiſe fathers, have the ſame prudent reliance on their poſterity; who, at laſt, from neceſſity more than choice, are obliged to place the ſame confidence in a new poſterity.*—But not to waſte time in declaiming againſt a practice which appears ruinous, beyond all controverſy; it ſeems pretty apparent, that the ANCIENT MAXIMS are, in this reſpect, more prudent than the MODERN; even *though the latter had been confined within ſome reaſonable bounds, and had ever, in any inſtance, been attended with*

* STRABO, lib. iv.

ſuch

ſuch frugality, in time of peace, as to diſcharge the debts incurred by an expenſive war.—To truſt to chances and temporary expedients, is, indeed, what the neceſſity of human affairs frequently renders unavoidable; but whoever voluntarily depend on ſuch reſources, have not neceſſity, but their own folly, to accuſe for their misfortunes, when any ſuch befall them.

If the abuſes of treaſures be dangerous, either by engaging the ſtate in raſh enterprizes, or making it neglect military diſcipline, in confidence of its riches; the abuſes of mortgaging are more certain and inevitable; poverty, impotence, and ſubjection to foreign powers

According to MODERN POLICY *war is attended with every deſtructive circumſtance; loſs of men, increaſe of taxes, decay of commerce, diſſipation of money, deva ſtation by ſea and land.*—According to ANCIENT MAXIMS, the opening of the public treaſure, as it produced an uncommon affluence of gold and ſilver, ſerved as a temporary encouragement to induſtry, and atoned, in *ſome degree*, for the *inevitable calamities* of war.

IT IS VERY TEMPTING TO A MINISTER TO EMPLOY SUCH AN EXPEDIENT, AS ENABLES HIM TO MAKE A GREAT FIGURE DURING HIS ADMINISTRATION, WITHOUT OVERBURTHENING THE PEOPLE WITH

TAXES, OR EXCITING ANY IMMEDIATE CLAMOURS AGAINST HIMSELF.—THE PRACTICE, THEREFORE, OF CONTRACTING DEBT WILL ALMOST INFALLIBLY BE ABUSED, IN EVERY GOVERNMENT.—IT WOULD SCARCELY BE MORE IMPRUDENT TO GIVE A PRODIGAL SON A CREDIT IN EVERY BANKER'S SHOP IN LONDON, THAN TO IMPOWER A STATESMAN TO DRAW BILLS, IN THIS MANNER, UPON POSTERITY.

What then ſhall we ſay to the NEW PARADOX, that *public incumbrances* are, of themſelves, *advantageous*, independent of the neceſſity of contracting them; and that any ſtate, even though it were not preſſed by a foreign enemy, could not poſſibly have embraced a *wiſer expedient* for *promoting commerce* and *riches*, than to *create funds*, and *debts*, and *taxes*, *without limitation?*—Reaſonings, ſuch as theſe, might naturally have paſſed for trials of wit among rhetoricians, like the panegyrics on folly and a fever, on BUSIRIS and NERO, had we not ſeen *ſuch abſurd maxims patronized by great miniſters*, and by *a whole party* among us.

Let us examine the conſequences of public debts, both in our *domeſtic* management, by their influence on commerce and induſtry; and in our *foreign* tranſactions, by

Firſt, It is certain, that national debts *cauſe a mighty confluence of people and riches to the capital*, by the great ſums, levied in the provinces to pay the intereſt; and perhaps, too, by the advantages in trade above mentioned, which they give the merchants in the capital above the reſt of the kingdom.—The queſtion is, whether, in our caſe, it be for the public intereſt, that ſo many privileges ſhould be conferred on LONDON, which has already arrived at ſuch an enormous ſize, and ſeems ſtill increaſing?—Some men are apprehenſive of the conſequences.—For my own part, I cannot forbear thinking, that, though the head is undoubtedly too large for the body, yet that great city is ſo happily ſituated, that its exceſſive bulk cauſes leſs inconvenience than even a ſmaller capital to a greater kingdom.—There is more difference between the prices of all proviſions in Paris and Languedoc, than between thoſe in London and Yorkſhire.—*The immenſe greatneſs, indeed, of* LONDON, *under a government which admits not of diſcretionary power, renders the people factious, mutinous, ſeditious, and even perhaps rebellious.*—But to this evil the *national debts* themſelves tend to provide a remedy.—The firſt viſible eruption, or even immediate danger, of public diſorders, muſt alarm all the ſtock-holders, whoſe pro-

perty is the moſt precarious of any; and will make them fly to the ſupport of government, whether menaced by Jacobitiſh violence or democratical frenzy.

Secondly, Public ſtocks, being a kind of paper-credit, have all the diſadvantages attending that ſpecies of money. —*They baniſh gold and ſilver from the moſt conſiderable commerce of the ſtate, reduce them to common circulation, and by that means render all proviſions and labour dearer than otherwiſe they would be.*

Thirdly, The taxes, which are levied to pay the intereſts of theſe debts, are apt either to *heighten the price of labour*, or be *an oppreſſion on the poorer ſort.*

Fourthly, As foreigners poſſeſs a great ſhare of our national funds, they render the public, in a manner, tributary to them, and may in time occaſion the tranſport of our people and our induſtry.

Fifthly, The greateſt part of public ſtock being always in the hands of *idle people*, who live on their revenue, our funds give great encouragement to an *uſeleſs*, *gambling*, and *unactive life.*

But though the injury that ariſes to commerce and induſtry from our public funds, will appear, upon balancing the whole, not inconſiderable, it is trivial, in compariſon of the prejudice that reſults to the ſtate con-

ſidered as a body politic, which muſt ſupport itſelf in the ſociety of nations, and have various tranſactions with other ſtates.—The ill, there, is pure and unmixed, without any favourable circumſtance to atone for it; and it is an ill too of a nature the higheſt and moſt important.

We have, indeed, been *told*, that the public is no weaker upon account of its debts; ſince they are moſtly due among ourſelves, and bring as much property to one as they take from another.—*It is like transferring money from the right hand to the left; which leaves the perſon neither richer nor poorer than before.*—Such looſe reaſonings and ſpecious compariſons will always paſs, where we judge not upon principles.—I aſk, Is it poſſible, in the nature of things, to overburthen a nation with taxes, even where the ſovereign reſides among them?—*The very doubt ſeems extravagant*; ſince it is requiſite, in every community, that there be a certain proportion obſerved between the laborious and the idle part of it.—*But if all our preſent taxes be mortgaged, muſt we not invent new ones? And may not this matter be carried to a length that is ruinous and deſtructive?*

In every nation, there are always ſome methods of levying money more eaſy than others, agreeably to the

way

way of living of the people, and the commodities they make uſe of.—In Britain, the exciſes upon malt and beer afford a large revenue; becauſe the operations of malting and brewing are tedious, and are impoſſible to be concealed; and at the ſame time, theſe commodities are not ſo abſolutely neceſſary to life, as that the raiſing their price would very much affect the poorer ſort.—*Theſe taxes being all mortgaged, what difficulty to find new ones! what vexation and ruin of the poor!*

It will ſcarcely be aſſerted, that no bounds ought ever to be ſet to national debts; and that the public would be no weaker, were twelve or fifteen ſhillings in the pound, land-tax, mortgaged, with all the preſent cuſtoms and exciſes.—There is ſomething, therefore, in the caſe, beſide the mere transferring of property from one hand to another.

Suppoſe the public once fairly brought to that condition, to which it is haſtening with ſuch amazing rapidity; ſuppoſe the land to be taxed eighteen or nineteen ſhillings in the pound; for it can never bear the whole twenty; ſuppoſe all the exciſes and cuſtoms to be ſcrewed up to the utmoſt which the nation can bear, without entirely loſing its commerce and induſtry; and ſuppoſe that all thoſe funds are mortgaged in perpetuity, and that the invention and wit of all our projectors

projectors can find no new impoſition, which may ſerve as the foundation of a new loan; and let us conſider the neceſſary conſequences of this ſituation.—Though the imperfect ſtate of our political knowledge, and the narrow capacities of men, make it difficult to foretel the effects which will reſult from any untried meaſure, the ſeeds of ruin are here ſcattered with ſuch profuſion as not to eſcape the eye of the moſt careleſs obſerver.

Though a reſolution ſhould be formed by the legiſlature never to impoſe any tax which hurts commerce and diſcourages induſtry, it will be impoſſible for men, in ſubjects of *ſuch extreme delicacy*, to reaſon ſo juſtly as never to be miſtaken, or, amidſt *difficulties ſo urgent*, never to be ſeduced from their reſolution.—The continual fluctuations in commerce require continual alterations in the nature of the taxes; which expoſes the legiſlature every moment to the danger both of wilful and involuntary error.—And any great blow given to trade, whether by injudicious taxes or by other accidents, throws the whole ſyſtem of government into confuſion.

I muſt confeſs, that there is a ſtrange ſupineneſs, from long cuſtom, creeped into all ranks of men, with regard to public debts, not unlike what divines ſo vehemently complain of with regard to their religious doctrines.—

We

e all own, that the moſt ſanguine imagination cannot
e, either that this or any future miniſtry will be poſ-
ed of ſuch rigid and ſteady frugality, as to make a
ſiderable progreſs in the payment of our debts; or
t the ſituation of foreign affairs will, for any long
e, allow them leiſure and tranquillity for ſuch an
lertaking.—*What then is to become of us?*—Were we
r ſo good Chriſtians, and ever ſo reſigned to Provi-
ıce; this, methinks, were a curious queſtion, even
ıſidered as a ſpeculative one, and what it might not
altogether impoſſible to form ſome conjectural ſolu-
ı of.—The events here will depend little upon the
ıtingencies of battles, negociations, intrigues, and fac-
ıs.—There ſeems to be a natural progreſs of things,
ıich may guide our reaſoning.—As it would have re-
ired but a moderate ſhare of prudence, when we firſt
gan this practice of mortgaging, to have foretold, from
e nature of men and of miniſters, that things would
eceſſarily be carried to the length we ſee; ſo now, that
ıey have at laſt happily reached it, it may not be dif-
ıcult to gueſs at the conſequences.—IT MUST, IN-
DEED, BE ONE OF THESE TWO EVENTS; EITHER
THE NATION MUST DESTROY PUBLIC CREDIT, OR
PUBLIC CREDIT WILL DESTROY THE NATION.—It
is

is impoſſible that they can both ſubſiſt, after the manner they have been hitherto managed, in this, as well as in ſome other countries.—*But it is more probable, that the breach of national faith will be the neceſſary effect of wars, defeats, misfortunes, and public calamities, or even perhaps of victories and conqueſts.*—I MUST CONFESS, WHEN SEE PRINCES AND STATES FIGHTING AND QUARRELLING, AMIDST THEIR DEBTS, FUNDS, AND PUBLIC MORTGAGES, IT ALWAYS BRINGS TO MY MIND A MATCH OF CUDGEL-PLAYING FOUGHT IN A CHINA SHOP!!

How can it be expected, that ſovereigns will ſpare a ſpecies of property, which is pernicious to themſelves and to the public, when they have ſo little compaſſion on lives and properties, that are uſeful to both?—Let the time come (and ſurely it will come) when the *new funds*, created for the exigencies of the year, are not ſubſcribed to, and raiſe not the money projected.—Suppoſe, either that the caſh of the nation is exhauſted; or that our faith, which has been hitherto ſo ample, begins to fail us.—Suppoſe that, in this diſtreſs, the nation is threatened with an invaſion; a rebellion is ſuſpected or broken out at home; a ſquadron cannot be equipped for want of pay, victuals, or repairs; or even a foreign

ſubſidy

ubſidy cannot be advanced.—What muſt a prince or miniſter do in ſuch an emergency?—The right of ſelf-reſervation is unalienable in every individual, much more in every community.—And the folly of our ateſmen muſt then be greater than the folly of thoſe ho firſt contracted debt, or, what is more, than that f thoſe who truſted, or continue to truſt, this ſecurity, f theſe ſtateſmen have the means of ſafety in their ands, and do not employ them.—The funds, created nd mortgaged, will, by that time, bring in a large year-y revenue, ſufficient for the defence and ſecurity of the ation: money is perhaps lying in the exchequer, ready or the diſcharge of the quarterly intereſt: *Neceſſity calls, ar urges, reaſon exhorts, compaſſion alone exclaims: the oney will immediately be ſeized for the current ſervice, nder the moſt ſolemn proteſtations, perhaps, of being im-ediately replaced.*—But no more is requiſite.—*The hole fabric, already tottering, falls to the ground, and ries thouſands in its ruins.*—And this, I think, may be lled the NATURAL DEATH of public credit: for to is period it tends as *naturally* as an animal body to its ſolution and deſtruction.

So great dupes are the generality of mankind, that, twithſtanding ſuch a violent ſhock to public credit,

as a voluntary bankruptcy in England would occaſion, it would not probably be long, ere credit would again revive in as flouriſhing a condition as before.—The late king of France, during the laſt war, borrowed money at lower intereſt than ever his grandfather did; and as low as the Britiſh parliament, comparing the natural rate of intereſt in both kingdoms.—And though men are commonly more governed by what they have ſeen, than by what they foreſee, with whatever certainty; yet promiſes, proteſtations, fair appearances, with the allurements of preſent intereſt, have ſuch powerful influence as few are able to reſiſt.—Mankind are, in all ages, caught by the ſame baits: the ſame tricks, played over and over again, ſtill trepan them.—The heights of popularity and patriotiſm are ſtill the beaten road to power and tyranny; flattery to treachery; ſtanding armies to arbitrary government; and the glory of God to the temporal intereſt of the clergy.—The fear of an everlaſting deſtruction of credit, allowing it to be an evil, is a needleſs bugbear.—A prudent man, in reality, would rather lend to the public immediately after they had taken a ſpunge to their debts, than at preſent; as much as an opulent knave, even though one could not force him to pay, is a preferable debtor to an honeſt bankrupt;

upt: for the former, in order to carry on buſineſs, ind it his intereſt to diſcharge his debts, where they xt exorbitant; the latter has it not in his power.— reaſoning of Tacitus*, as it is eternally true, is pplicable to our preſent caſe.—Sed vulgus ad magnem beneficiorum aderat: ſtultiſſimus quiſque pe- mercabatur: Apud ſapientes caſſa habebantur, neque dari neque accipi, ſalva republica, poterant. *public is a debtor, whom no man can oblige to pay.— only check which the creditors have upon her, is the ſt of preſerving credit; an intereſt, which may eaſily rbalanced by a great debt, and by a difficult and extinary emergence, even ſuppoſing that credit irrecover-* —Not to mention, that a preſent neceſſity often s ſtates into meaſures, which are, ſtrictly ſpeaking, ſt their intereſt.

ieſe two events, ſuppoſed above, are calamitous, ıot the moſt calamitous —Thouſands are thereby ıced to the ſafety of millions.—But we are not withanger, that the contrary event may take place, and nillions may be ſacrificed for ever to the temporary of thouſands.—Our popular government, perhaps, ender it difficult or dangerous for a miniſter to ven-

* Hiſt. lib. iii.

ture on ſo deſperate an expedient, as that of a *voluntary bankruptcy*.—And though the Houſe of Lords be altogether compoſed of proprietors of land, and the Houſe of Commons chiefly; and conſequently neither of them can be ſuppoſed to have great property in the funds: yet the connections of the members may be ſo great with the proprietors, as to render them more tenacious of public faith, than prudence, policy, or even juſtice, ſtrictly ſpeaking, requires.—And perhaps too, our foreign enemies may be ſo politic as to diſcover, that our ſafety lies in deſpair, and may not, therefore, ſhow the danger, open and barefaced, till it be inevitable.—*The balance of power in* EUROPE, *our grandfathers, our fathers, and we, have all eſteemed too unequal to be preſerved without our attention and aſſiſtance.—But our children, weary of the ſtruggle, and fettered with incumbrances, may ſit down ſecure, and ſee their neighbours oppreſſed and conquered; till, at laſt, they themſelves and their creditors lie both at the mercy of the conqueror.*—And this may properly enough be denominated the VIOLENT DEATH of our public credit *.

THESE SEEM TO BE THE EVENTS, WHICH ARE NOT VERY REMOTE, AND WHICH REASON FORESEES AS

* HUME.

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LY ALMOST AS SHE CAN DO ANY THING THAT
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PULAR MADNESS AND DELUSION.

SECT.

SECT. V.

OF PUBLIC DEBTS.

In that rude ſtate of ſociety which precedes the extenſion of commerce and the improvement of manufactures, when thoſe expenſive luxuries which commerce and manufactures can alone introduce are altogether unknown, the perſon who poſſeſſes a large revenue, can ſpend or enjoy that revenue in no other way than by maintaining nearly as many people as it can maintain.—An *hoſpitality* in which there is *no luxury*, and a liberality in which there is *no oſtentation*, occaſion, in this ſituation of things, the principal expences of the rich and the great.—But theſe are expences by which people are not very apt to ruin themſelves.—There is not, perhaps, any ſelfiſh pleaſure ſo frivolous, of which the purſuit has not ſometimes ruined even ſenſible men.—A paſſion for cock-fighting has ruined many.—But the inſtances, I believe, are not very numerous of people who have been ruined by a hoſpitality or liberality of this kind; though the hoſpitality of luxury and the libera-

lity of oſtentation have ruined many. Among our feudal anceſtors, the long time during which eſtates uſed to continue in the ſame family, ſufficiently demonſtrates the general diſpoſition of people to live within their income.

In a commercial country abounding with every ſort of expenſive luxury, the ſovereign, in the ſame manner as almoſt all the great proprietors in his dominions, naturally ſpends a great part of his revenue in purchaſing luxuries.—His own and the neighbouring countries ſupply him abundantly with all the coſtly trinkets which compoſe the ſplendid, but inſignificant, pageantry of a court. — His ordinary expence becomes equal to his ordinary revenue, and it is well if it does not frequently exceed it.—The amaſſing of treaſure can no longer be expected, and when extraordinary exigencies require extraordinary expences, he muſt neceſſarily call upon his ſubjects for an extraordinary aid.—The late King of Pruſſia and his father are the only great princes of Europe, who, ſince the death of Henry IV. of France in 1610, are ſuppoſed to have amaſſed any conſiderable treaſure.—The parſimony which leads to accumulation has become almoſt as rare in *republican* as in monarchical governments.—The Italian republics, the United Provinces

vinces of the Netherlands, are all in debt.—The canton of Berne is the ſingle republic in Europe which has amaſſed any conſiderable treaſure.—The other Swiſs republics have not.—The taſte for ſome ſort of pageantry, for ſplendid buildings, at leaſt, and other public ornaments, frequently prevails as much in the apparently ſober ſenate-houſe of a little republic, as in the diſſipated court of the greateſt king.

The want of parſimony in time of peace, impoſes the neceſſity of contracting debt in time of war.—When war comes, there is no money in the treaſury but what is neceſſary for carrying on the ordinary expence of the peace eſtabliſhment.—In war an eſtabliſhment of three or four times that expence becomes neceſſary for the defence of the ſtate, and conſequently a revenue three or four times greater than the peace revenue.—Suppoſing that the ſovereign ſhould have, what he ſcarce ever has, the immediate means of augmenting his revenue in proportion to the augmentation of his expence, yet ſtill the produce of the taxes, from which this increaſe of revenue muſt be drawn, will not begin to come into the treaſury till perhaps ten or twelve months after they are impoſed.—But the moment in which war begins, or rather the moment in which it appears likely to begin, the army muſt

muſt be augmented, the fleet muſt be fitted out, the garriſoned towns muſt be put into a poſture of defence; that army, that fleet, thoſe garriſoned towns, muſt be furniſhed with arms, ammunition, and proviſions.—An immediate and great expence muſt be incurred in that moment of immediate danger, which will not wait for the gradual and ſlow returns of the new taxes.—In this exigency government can have no other reſource but in *borrowing*.

A country abounding with merchants and manufacturers, neceſſarily abounds with a ſet of people through whoſe hands not only their own capitals, but the capitals of all thoſe who either lend them money, or truſt them with goods, paſs as frequently, or more frequently, than the revenue of a private man, who, without trade or buſineſs, lives upon his income, paſſes through his hands. —The revenue of ſuch a man can regularly paſs through his hands only once in a year.—But the whole amount of the capital and credit of a merchant, who deals in a trade of which the returns are very quick, may ſometimes paſs through his hands two, three, or four times, in a year.—A country abounding with merchants and manufacturers, therefore, neceſſarily abounds with a ſet of people who have it at all times in their

power to advance, if they chooſe to do ſo, a very large ſum of money to government.—*Hence the ability in the ſubjects of a commercial ſtate to lend.*

Commerce and manufactures can ſeldom flouriſh long in any ſtate which does not enjoy a regular adminiſtration of juſtice, in which the people do not feel themſelves ſecure in the poſſeſſion of their property, in which the faith of contracts is not ſupported by law, and in which the authority of the ſtate is not ſuppoſed to be regularly employed in enforcing the payment of debts from all thoſe who are able to pay.—Commerce and manufactures, in ſhort, can ſeldom flouriſh in any ſtate in which there is not a certain degree of confidence in the juſtice of government.—The ſame confidence which diſpoſes great merchants and manufacturers, upon ordinary occaſions, to truſt their property to the protection of a particular government, diſpoſes them, upon extraordinary occaſions, to truſt that government with the uſe of their property.—By lending money to government, they do not even for a moment diminiſh their ability to carry on their trade and manufactures.—On the contrary, they commonly augment it.—The neceſſities of the ſtate render government upon moſt occaſions willing to borrow upon terms extremely advanta-

geous to the lender.—The ſecurity which it grants to the original creditor, is made transferable to any other creditor, and, from the univerſal confidence in the juſtice of the ſtate, generally ſells in the market for more than was originally paid for it.—The merchant or monied man makes money by lending money to government, and inſtead of diminiſhing, increaſes his trading capital.—He generally conſiders it as a favour, therefore, when the adminiſtration admits him to a ſhare in the firſt ſubſcription for a new loan.—*Hence the inclination or willingneſs in the ſubjects of a commercial ſtate to lend.*

THE GOVERNMENT OF SUCH A STATE IS VERY APT TO REPOSE ITSELF UPON THIS ABILITY AND WILLINGNESS OF ITS SUBJECTS TO LEND THEIR MONEY ON EXTRAORDINARY OCCASIONS.—IT FORESEES THE FACILITY OF BORROWING, AND THEREFORE DISPENSES ITSELF FROM THE DUTY OF SAVING.

In a rude ſtate of ſociety there are no great mercantile or manufacturing capitals.—The individuals, who hoard whatever money they can ſave, and who conceal their hoard, do ſo from a diſtruſt of the juſtice of government, from a fear that if it was known that they had a hoard, and where that hoard was to be found, they would quickly be plundered.—In ſuch a ſtate of things few

people would be able, and nobody would be willing, to lend their money to government on extraordinary exigencies.—The ſovereign feels that he muſt provide for ſuch exigencies by ſaving, becauſe he foreſees the abſolute impoſſibility of borrowing.—This foreſight increaſes ſtill further his natural diſpoſition to ſave.

THE PROGRESS OF THE ENORMOUS DEBTS WHICH AT PRESENT OPPRESS, AND WILL IN THE LONG-RUN PROBABLY RUIN, ALL THE GREAT NATIONS OF EUROPE, HAS BEEN PRETTY UNIFORM.—Nations, like private men, have generally begun to borrow upon what may be called perſonal credit, without aſſigning or mortgaging any particular fund for the payment of the debt; and when this reſource has failed them, they have gone on to borrow upon aſſignments or mortgages of particular funds.

In Great Britain the annual land and malt taxes are regularly anticipated every year, by virtue of a borrowing clauſe conſtantly inſerted into the acts which impoſe them.—The bank of England generally advances at an intereſt, which ſince the revolution has varied from eight to three *per cent.* the ſums for which thoſe taxes are granted, and receives payment as their produce gradually comes in.—If there is a deficiency, which there always

always is, it is provided for in the ſupplies of the enſuing year.—The only conſiderable branch of the public revenue which yet remains unmortgaged is thus regularly ſpent before it comes in.—*Like an improvident ſpendthrift, whoſe preſſing occaſions will not allow him to wait for the regular payment of his revenue, the ſtate is in the conſtant practice of borrowing of its own factors and agents, and of paying intereſt for the uſe of its own money.*

In the reign of King WILLIAM, and during a great part of that of Queen ANNE, before we had become ſo familiar as we are now with the practice of perpetual funding, the greater part of the new taxes were impoſed but for a ſhort period of time (for four, five, ſix, or ſeven years only), and a great part of the grants of every year conſiſted in loans upon *anticipations* of the produce of thoſe taxes.—The produce being frequently inſufficient for paying within the limited term the principal and intereſt of the money borrowed, deficiencies aroſe, to make good which it became neceſſary to prolong the term.

In conſequence of different ſubſequent acts, the greater part of the taxes which before had been anticipated only for a ſhort term of years, were rendered *perpetual* as a fund

fund for paying, *not the capital*, but *the intereſt only*, of the money which had been borrowed upon them by different ſucceſſive anticipations.

Had money never been raiſed but by anticipation, the courſe of a few years would have liberated the public revenue, without any other attention of government beſides that of not overloading the fund by charging it with more debt than it could pay within the limited term, and of not anticipating a ſecond time before the expiration of the firſt anticipation.—*But the greater part of European governments have been incapable of thoſe attentions.*—They have frequently overloaded the fund even upon the firſt anticipation; and when this happened not to be the caſe, they have generally taken care to overload it, by anticipating a ſecond and a third time before the expiration of the firſt anticipation.—The fund becoming in this manner altogether inſufficient for paying both principal and intereſt of the money borrowed upon it, it became neceſſary to charge it with the *intereſt* only, or a perpetual annuity equal to the intereſt, and ſuch unprovident *anticipations* neceſſarily gave birth to the more ruinous practice of *perpetual funding*.—But though this practice neceſſarily puts off the liberation of the public revenue from a fixed period to one ſo indefinite

finite THAT IT IS NOT VERY LIKELY EVER TO ARRIVE; yet as a greater ſum can in all caſes be raiſed by this new practice than by the old one of anticipations, the former, when men have once become familiar with it, has in the great exigencies of the ſtate been univerſally preferred to the latter.—*To relieve the preſent exigency is always the object which principally intereſts thoſe immediately concerned in the adminiſtration of public affairs.—The future liberation of the public revenue, they leave to the care of poſterity.*

Beſides thoſe two methods of borrowing, by anticipations and by perpetual funding, there are two other methods, which hold a ſort of middle place between them.—Theſe are, that of borrowing upon annuities for terms of years, and that of borrowing upon annuities for lives.

In England, the ſeat of government being in the greateſt mercantile city in the world, the merchants are generally the people who advance money to government.—By advancing it they do not mean to diminiſh, but, on the contrary, to increaſe their mercantile capitals; and unleſs they expected to ſell with ſome profit their ſhare in the ſubſcription for a new loan, they never would ſubſcribe.

The

The ordinary expence of the greater part of modern governments in time of peace being equal or nearly equal to their ordinary revenue, when WAR *comes*, they are both *unwilling* and *unable* to increaſe their revenue in proportion to the increaſe of their expence.—*They are* UNWILLING, *for fear of offending the people, who by ſo great and ſo ſudden an increaſe of taxes, would ſoon be diſguſted with the war*; *and they are* UNABLE, *from not well knowing what taxes would be ſufficient to produce the revenue wanted.*—The facility of *borrowing* delivers them from the embarraſſment which this fear and inability would otherwiſe occaſion.—By means of *borrowing* they are enabled, with a very moderate increaſe of taxes, to raiſe, from year to year, money ſufficient for carrying on the war, and by the practice of perpetual funding they are enabled, with the ſmalleſt poſſible increaſe of taxes, to raiſe annually the largeſt poſſible ſum of money.

The return of peace, indeed, ſeldom relieves the nation from the greater part of the taxes impoſed during war.—Theſe are mortgaged for *the intereſt* of the debt contracted in order to carry it on.—If, over and above paying the intereſt of this debt, and defraying the ordinary expence of government, the old revenue, together with

with the new taxes, produce ſome ſurplus revenue, it may *perhaps* be converted into a *ſinking fund* for paying off the debt.—But, in the firſt place, this ſinking fund, even ſuppoſing it ſhould be applied to no other purpoſe, is generally altogether inadequate for paying, in the courſe of any period during which it can reaſonably be expected that peace ſhould continue, the whole debt contracted during the war; and, in the ſecond place, this fund is almoſt always applied to other purpoſes.

The new taxes were impoſed for the ſole purpoſe of paying the intereſt of the money borrowed upon them. —If they produce more, it is generally ſomething which was neither intended nor expected, and is therefore ſeldom very conſiderable.

During the moſt profound peace, various events occur which require an extraordinary expence, and government finds it always more convenient to defray this expence by *miſapplying* the *ſinking fund* than by impoſing a *new tax*.—Every new tax is immediately felt more or leſs by the people.—It occaſions always ſome murmur, and meets with ſome oppoſition.—The more taxes may have been multiplied, the higher they may have been raiſed upon every different ſubject of taxation; the more loudly the people complain of every new tax, the more

difficult it becomes too either to find out new ſubjects of taxation, or to raiſe much higher the taxes already impoſed upon the old.—A momentary ſuſpenſion of the payment of debt is not immediately felt by the people, and occaſions neither murmur nor complaint.—*To borrow of the ſinking fund is always an obvious and eaſy expedient for getting out of the preſent difficulty.*—The more the public debts may have been accumulated, the more neceſſary it may have become to ſtudy to reduce them, the more dangerous, the more ruinous it may be to miſapply any part of the ſinking fund; the leſs likely is the public debt to be reduced to any conſiderable degree, the more likely, the more certainly is the ſinking fund to be miſapplied towards defraying all the extraordinary expences which occur in time of peace.—When a nation is already overburdened with taxes, nothing but the neceſſities of a new war, nothing but either the animoſity of national vengeance, or the anxiety for national ſecurity, can induce the people to ſubmit, with tolerable patience, to a new tax.—*Hence the uſual miſapplication of the ſinking fund.*

Were the expence of war to be defrayed always by a revenue raiſed within the year, the taxes from which that extraordinary revenue was drawn would laſt no longer

the war.—The ability of private people to
, though leſs during the war, would have
r during the peace than under the ſyſtem of
War would not neceſſarily have occaſioned
tion of any old capitals, and peace would have
the accumulation of many more new.—*Wars*
general be *more ſpeedily concluded*, and *leſs*
ndertaken.—The people feeling, during the
e of war, the complete burden of it, would
weary of it, and government, in order to
em, would not be under the neceſſity of car-
longer than it was neceſſary to do ſo.—The
f the heavy and unavoidable burdens of war
ler the people from wantonly calling for it,
: was no real or ſolid intereſt to fight for.
unding, beſides, has made a certain progreſs,
lication of taxes which it brings along with it
impairs as much the ability of private people
ate even in time of peace, as the other ſyſtem
ime of war.—The peace revenue of Great
ounts at preſent to more than ten millions a
ree and unmortgaged, it might be ſufficient,
r management, and without contracting a
new debt, to carry on the moſt vigorous war.
—The

—The private revenue of the inhabitants of Great Britain is at preſent as much encumbered in time of peace, their ability to accumulate it as much impaired as it would have been in the time of the moſt expenſive war, had the pernicious ſyſtem of funding never been adopted.

In the payment of the intereſt of the public debt, it has been ſaid, "it is the right hand which pays the left. "The money does not go out of the country. It is "only a part of the revenue of one ſet of the inhabitants "which is transferred to another; and the nation is not "a farthing the poorer."—*This apology* is founded altogether in the *ſophiſtry* of the *mercantile ſyſtem**.—It ſuppoſes, beſides, that the whole public debt is owing to the inhabitants of the country, which happens not to be true; the Dutch, as well as ſeveral other foreign nations, having a very conſiderable ſhare in our public funds.—But though the whole debt were owing to the inhabitants of the country, it would not upon that account be *leſs pernicious*.

LAND and CAPITAL STOCK are the two original

* This is proved a little further on. "To TRANSFER *from—to*, &c." which ſee page 78.

ſources

ſources of all revenue both private and public.—Capital ſtock pays the wages of productive labour, whether employed in agriculture, manufactures, or commerce.—The management of thoſe two original ſources of revenue belongs to two different ſets of people; the proprietors of land, and the owners or employers of capital ſtock.

The proprietor of LAND is intereſted for the ſake of his own revenue to keep his eſtate in as good condition as he can, by building and repairing his tenants houſes, by making and maintaining the neceſſary drains and enclоſures, and all thoſe other expenſive improvements which it properly belongs to the landlord to make and maintain.—But by different land-taxes the revenue of the landlord may be ſo much diminiſhed; and by different duties upon the neceſſaries and conveniencies of life, that diminiſhed revenue may be rendered of ſo little real value, that he may find himſelf altogether unable to make or maintain thoſe expenſive improvements.—When the landlord, however, ceaſes to do his part, it is altogether impoſſible that the tenant ſhould continue to do his.—As the diſtreſs of the landlord increaſes, the farm, or town houſe, muſt neceſſarily decline.

When, by different taxes upon the neceſſaries and conveniencies

conveniencies of life, *the owners* and *employers* of CAPITAL STOCK find, that whatever revenue they derive from it, will not, in a particular country, purchaſe the ſame quantity of thoſe neceſſaries and conveniencies which an equal revenue would in almoſt any other, they will be diſpoſed to remove to ſome other.—And when, in order to raiſe thoſe taxes, all or the greater part of merchants and manufacturers, that is, all or the greater part of the employers of great capitals, come to be continually expoſed to the mortifying and vexatious viſits of the tax-gatherers, this diſpoſition to remove will ſoon be changed into an actual removal.—The induſtry of the country will neceſſarily fall with the removal of the capital which ſupported it, and the ruin of trade and manufactures will follow the declenſion of agriculture.

To TRANSFER *from* the owners of thoſe two great ſources of revenue, land and capital ſtock, *from* the perſons immediately intereſted in the good condition of every particular portion of land, and in the good management of every particular portion of capital ſtock, *to* another ſet of perſons *(the creditors of the public,* who have *no ſuch particular intereſt)*, the greater part of the revenue ariſing from either muſt, in the long-run, occaſion both

both the neglect of land, and the waſte or removal of capital ſtock.—A creditor of the public has no doubt a general intereſt in the proſperity of the agriculture, manufactures, and commerce of the country; and conſequently in the good condition of its lands, and in the good management of its capital ſtock.—Should there be any general failure or declenſion in any of theſe things, the produce of the different taxes might no longer be ſufficient to pay him the annuity or intereſt which is due to him.—But a creditor of the public, conſidered merely as ſuch, has no intereſt in the good condition of any particular portion of land, or in the good management of any particular portion of capital ſtock.—As a creditor of the public he has no knowledge of any ſuch *particular* portion.—He has no inſpection of it.—He can have no care about it.—Its ruin may in ſome caſes be unknown to him, and cannot directly affect him.

The practice of funding has gradually enfeebled every ſtate which has adopted it.—The ITALIAN republics ſeem to have begun it.—GENOA and VENICE, the only two remaining which can pretend to an independent exiſtence, have both been enfeebled by it.—SPAIN ſeems to have learned the practice from the Italian republics,

and (its taxes being probably leſs judicious than theirs) it has, in proportion to its natural ſtrength, been ſtill more enfeebled.—The debts of Spain are of very old ſtanding.—It was deeply in debt before the end of the ſixteenth century, about a hundred years before England owed a ſhilling.—FRANCE, notwithſtanding all its natural reſources, languiſhed under an oppreſſive load of the ſame kind.—The republic of the UNITED PROVINCES is as much enfeebled by its debts as either Genoa or Venice.—Is it likely that in GREAT BRITAIN alone a practice, which has brought either weakneſs or deſolation into every other country, ſhould prove altogether innocent?

The ſyſtem of taxation eſtabliſhed in thoſe different countries, it may be ſaid, is inferior to that of England. —I believe it is ſo.—But it ought to be remembered, that when the wiſeſt government has exhauſted all the *proper ſubjects of taxation*, it muſt, in caſes of urgent neceſſity, have recourſe to *improper ones*.—The wiſe republic of HOLLAND has upon ſome occaſions been obliged to have recourſe to taxes as inconvenient as the greater part of thoſe of SPAIN.—*Another war begun before any conſiderable liberation of the public revenue had been brought about, and growing in its progreſs as expenſive as*

the

the laſt war, may, from irreſiſtible neceſſity, render the Britiſh ſyſtem of taxation as oppreſſive as that of HOLLAND, *or even as that of* SPAIN.—To the honour of our preſent ſyſtem of taxation, indeed, it has *hitherto* given ſo little embarraſſment to induſtry, that, during the courſe even of the moſt expenſive wars, the frugality and good conduct of individuals ſeem to have been able, by ſaving and accumulation, to repair all the breaches which the *waſte* and *extravagance* of GOVERNMENT had made in the general capital of the ſociety.—At the concluſion of the late war, the moſt expenſive that GREAT BRITAIN ever waged *, her agriculture was as flouriſhing, her manufacturers as numerous and as fully employed, and her commerce as extenſive, as they had ever been before.—The capital, therefore, which ſupported all thoſe different branches of induſtry, muſt have been equal to what it had ever been before. — Since the peace, agriculture has been ſtill further improved, the rents of houſes have riſen in every town and village of the country, a proof of the increaſing wealth

* It has proved more expenſive than any of our former wars; and has involved us in an additional debt of more than *one hundred millions!* During a profound peace of eleven years, little more than *ten millions* of debt was paid; during a war of ſeven years, more than *one hundred millions* was contracted.

and revenue of the people; and the annual amount of the greater part of the old taxes, of the principal branches of the exciſe and cuſtoms in particular, has been continually increaſing; an equally clear proof of an increaſing conſumption, and conſequently of an increaſing produce, which could alone ſupport that conſumption.—GREAT BRITAIN *ſeems to ſupport with eaſe, a burden which, half a century ago, nobody believed her capable of ſupporting.*—LET US NOT, HOWEVER, UPON THIS ACCOUNT RASHLY CONCLUDE THAT SHE IS CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING ANY BURDEN; NOR EVEN BE TOO CONFIDENT THAT SHE COULD SUPPORT, WITHOUT GREAT DISTRESS, A BURDEN A LITTLE GREATER THAN WHAT HAS ALREADY BEEN LAID UPON HER *.

* Adam Smith.

SECT.

SECT. VI.

ON WAR.

IN *ancient times*, men went to war without much ceremony or pretence: it was thought reaſon good enough to juſtify the deed, *if one man liked what another man had*; and *war* and *robbery* were the *honourable* profeſſions; nothing was *diſhonourable* but the arts of *peace* and *induſtry*; this is HERODOTUS's account of the manner of living of the *barbarians* of *Thrace:* and this, with very ſmall alterations, might ſerve to characteriſe *all other barbarians*, either of *ancient* or *modern times*.

But at preſent, *we*, who chooſe to call ourſelves *civilized nations*, generally affect a more *ceremonious parade*, and *many pretences*.—Complaints are firſt made of ſome injury received, ſome right violated, ſome encroachment, detention, or uſurpation, *and none will acknowledge themſelves the aggreſſors*; nay, a ſolemn appeal is made to

HEAVEN for the *truth* of *each aſſertion*, and the FINAL AVENGER OF THE OPPRESSED, and SEARCHER OF ALL HEARTS, is called upon *to maintain* the *righteous cauſe*, and to *puniſh* the *wrong-doer*.—Thus it is with *both parties*; and while *neither* of them will own the *true motives*, perhaps it is *apparent to all the world*, that, on *one ſide*, if not on *both*, A THIRST OF GLORY, A LUST OF DOMINION, THE CABALS OF STATESMEN, OR THE RAVENOUS APPETITES OF INDIVIDUALS FOR POWER OR PLUNDER, FOR WEALTH WITHOUT INDUSTRY, AND GREATNESS WITHOUT TRUE MERIT, *were the only real and genuine ſprings of action.*

Now the aims of *princes* in theſe wars are partly the *ſame* with, and partly *different* from, thoſe of their *ſubjects*; as far as RENOWN is concerned, their views are *alike*, for heroiſm is the wiſh and envy of all mankind; and to be a nation of heroes, under the conduct of an heroic leader, is regarded both by prince and people, as the ſummit of all earthly happineſs.

It is really aſtoniſhing to think with what applauſe and eclat the feats of ſuch inhuman monſters are tranſmitted down, in all the pomp of proſe and verſe, to diſtant generations: nay, let a prince but feed his ſubjects with the empty diet of military fame, it matters not what he does beſides, in

regard

regard to themſelves as well as others; *for the lives and liberties, and every thing that can render ſociety a bleſſing, are willingly offered up as a ſacrifice to this idol*, GLORY.—Were the fact to be examined into, you would find, perhaps without *a ſingle exception*, that the *greateſt conquerors abroad* have proved the *heavieſt tyrants at home*.—However, as *victory*, like charity, covereth a multitude of ſins, thus it comes to paſs that reaſonable beings will be content to be *ſlaves themſelves*, provided they may *enſlave others*; and while the people can look up to the glorious hero on the throne, they will be *dazzled* with the ſplendour that ſurrounds him, and forget the deeds of the oppreſſor.

Now, from this view of things, one would be tempted to imagine, that a practice ſo univerſally prevailing was founded in the courſe and conſtitution of nature.—One would be tempted to ſuppoſe, that mankind were created *on purpoſe* to be engaged in deſtructive wars, and to worry and devour one another.—And yet, when we examine into this affair, neither REASON nor EXPERIENCE will give the leaſt countenance to this ſuppoſition.

The REASON of the thing we will conſider now, and reſerve THE FACT till by and by.—Thus, for example, the inhabitants of one county, or one city, have not ſo

much as an idea, that A BEING OVERFLOWING WITH BENEVOLENCE has made them the conſtitutional foes of another county or city under the *ſame* government: nor do we at all conceive, that this or that particular town, or diſtrict, can grow rich, or proſper, only by the diſtricts or towns around it being reduced to poverty, or made a dreary waſte.—*On the contrary*, we naturally conclude, and juſtly too, that their intereſts are inſeparable from our own; and were their numbers to be diminiſhed, or their circumſtances altered from affluence to want, we ourſelves, in the rotation of things, ſhould ſoon feel the bad effects of ſuch a change.

If, therefore, this is the caſe with reſpect to *human governments*; and if *they*, notwithſtanding all their faults and failings, can regulate matters ſo much for the better; how then comes it to paſs, that we ſhould aſcribe ſo much imperfection, ſuch want of benevolence, ſuch partiality, nay, ſuch premeditated miſchief, to that great and equal government which preſideth *over all?*—Is it, do you think, that ALMIGHTY GOD cannot make two large diſtricts, *France* and *England* for example, happy but by the miſery of the other?—Or is it, that he has ſo egregiouſly blundered in the firſt framing the conſtitution of things as to render thoſe exploits, called *Wars*, neceſſary

neceſſary for the good of the whole under *his* adminiſtration, which you would juſtly conſider to be a diſgrace to *yours*, and ſeverely puniſh as an outrage?—Surely no; and we cannot, without blaſphemy, aſcribe that conduct to THE BEST OF BEINGS, which is almoſt *too bad* to be ſuppoſed of the *worſt*: ſurely it is much more conſonant to the dictates of unbiaſſed reaſon to believe, *that* OUR COMMON PARENT, *and* UNIVERSAL LORD, *regards all his children and ſubjects with an eye of equal tenderneſs and good-will*; *and to be firmly perſuaded, that in his plan of government the political intereſt of nations cannot be repugnant to thoſe moral duties of humanity and love, which he has ſo univerſally preſcribed.*—So much as to THE REASON of the thing: let us now conſider the FACT, and be determined by experience.

Princes expect to get by ſucceſsful wars, and a ſeries of conqueſts, either *more territory*, or *more ſubjects*, or a *more ample revenue*; or perhaps, which is generally the caſe, they expect to obtain all three.

1. Now, in regard to TERRITORY, if mere ſuperficies were the thing to be aimed at, it muſt be allowed, that a country of a million of ſquare miles is more in *quantity* than one of half that extent.—But if countries are not to be valued by acres, but by the *cultivation* and the *produce*

duce of thoſe acres, then it follows, that *ten acres* may be better than a *thouſand*, or perhaps *ten thouſand* *.

2. As to NUMBERS OF SUBJECTS, ſurely war and conqueſt are not the moſt likely means of attaining this end; and a ſcheme, which conſiſts in the deſtruction of the human ſpecies, is a very ſtrange one indeed to be propoſed for their increaſe and multiplication; nay, granting that numbers of ſubjects might be acquired, together with the acceſſion of territory, ſtill theſe new ſubjects would add no real ſtrength to the ſtate; becauſe new acquiſitions would require more numerous defences, and becauſe a people ſcattered over an immenſe tract of country are, in fact, much weaker than half their num-

* My notion of national improvement, ſecurity, and happineſs, tends not ſo much to the extending of our commerce, or increaſing the number of our manufactures, as to the encouragement of an hardy and, comparatively ſpeaking, innocent race of peaſants, *by making corn to grow on millions of acres of land, where none has ever grown before.* From a late computation of Sir JOHN SINCLAIR, it appears that in Great Britain there are 22,351,000 acres of waſte land. Let us but once have as many Britons in the kingdom, as the lands of Great Britain are able to ſuſtain, and we ſhall have little to regret in the loſs of *America*; nothing to apprehend from the *partitioning* policy of all the continental deſpots in Europe. I enter not into the queſtion concerning the population of the country: for whatever may be the preſent number of the inhabitants of Great Britain, there is no one who has thought upon the ſubject, but muſt admit, THAT WERE OUR LANDS BROUGHT TO THEIR PROPER STATE OF CULTIVATION, THEY WOULD AFFORD MAINTENANCE TO TWICE AS MANY AS AT PRESENT EXIST IN THIS COUNTRY. *The Biſhop of Landaff.*

bers

bers acting in concert together, and able by their vicinity to ſuccour one another.

Moreover, as to the affair of THE REVENUE, and the produce of taxes, the ſame arguments conclude equally ſtrong in this caſe as in the former: and the indiſputable fact is, that an ill-peopled country, though large and extenſive, neither produces ſo great a revenue as a ſmall one well cultivated and populous: nor if it did, would the neat produce of ſuch a revenue be equal to that of the other, becauſe it is, in a manner, ſwallowed up in *governments*, *guards*, and *garriſons*, in *ſalaries* and *penſions*, and all the concurring *perquiſites* and *expences* attendant on *diſtant provinces*.

In reference to the views of the people; as far as ſuch views coincide with thoſe of the prince, ſo they have been conſidered already: but ſeeing that the thirſt of inordinate riches in private ſubjects, which puſhes them on to wiſh ſo vehemently for war, has ſomething in it diſtinct from *the avarice of princes*; let us now examine, whether this trade of war is a likely method to make a people *rich*, and let us conſider every plea that can be offered.—" Surely, ſay theſe men, to return home laden " with the ſpoils of wealthy nations is a compendious " way of getting wealth; ſurely we cannot be deceived

" in ſo plain a caſe: for we ſee that what has been ga-
" thering together and accumulating for years, and per-
" haps for ages, thus becomes our own at once; and
" more might be acquired by a happy victory within the
" compaſs of a day, perhaps of an hour, than we could
" otherwiſe promiſe to ourſelves by the tedious purſuits
" of induſtry through the whole courſe of a long labo-
" rious life."

Now, in order to treat with this people in their own way, I would not awake them out of their preſent golden dream; I would therefore ſuppoſe, that they might ſucceed to their hearts deſire, though there is a chance at leaſt of being diſappointed, and of meeting with captivity inſtead of conqueſt: I will wave likewiſe all conſiderations drawn from the intoxicating nature of riches, when ſo rapidly got, and improperly acquired: I will alſo grant, that great ſtores of gold and ſilver, of jewels, diamonds, and precious ſtones, may be brought home; and yet the treaſures of the univerſe may, if you pleaſe, be made to circulate within the limits of our own little country: and if this were not enough, I would ſtill grant more, did I really know what could be wiſhed for or expected more.

The *ſoldier of fortune*, being made thus *rich*, ſits down

to

to enjoy the fruits of his conqueſt, and to gratify his wiſhes after ſo much fatigue and toil: but, alas! he preſently finds, that *in proportion* as this heroical ſpirit and thirſt for glory have diffuſed themſelves among his countrymen, in *the ſame proportion* as *the ſpirit of induſtry hath ſunk and died away*; *every neceſſary and every comfort and elegance of life are grown dearer than before, becauſe there are fewer hands and leſs inclination to produce them*; *at the ſame time his own deſires, and artificial wants, inſtead of being leſſened, are greatly multiplied*; *for of what uſe are riches to him, unleſs enjoyed?*—Thus, therefore, it comes to paſs, that his heaps of treaſure are like the ſnow in ſummer, continually melting away; ſo that *the land of heroes* ſoon becomes *the country of beggars.*—His riches, it is true, ruſhed in upon him like a flood: but, as he had no means of retaining them, every article he wanted or wiſhed for, drained away his ſtores like the holes in a ſieve, till the bottom became quite dry: in ſhort, in this ſituation the ſums, which are daily and hourly iſſuing out, are not to be replaced but by *a new war*, and *a new ſeries* of *victories*; and *theſe new wars* and *new victories* do all enhance the *former evils*; ſo that the relative poverty of the inhabitants of this warlike country becomes ſo much the greater, in proportion to

their ſucceſs, in the very means miſtakenly propoſed for enriching them.

A few, indeed, incited by the ſtrong inſtinct of an avaricious temper, may gather and ſcrape up what the many are ſquandering away; and ſo the impoveriſhment of the community may become the enrichment of the individual.—But it is utterly impoſſible, that the great majority of any country can grow wealthy by that courſe of life, which renders them both very extravagant, and very idle.

To illuſtrate this train of reaſoning, let us have recourſe to FACTS: but let the facts be ſuch as my opponents in this argument would wiſh, of all others, to have produced on this occaſion: and as the example of the ROMANS is eternally quoted, from the pamphleteer in the garret, to the patriot in the ſenate, as extremely worthy of the imitation of BRITONS; let their example decide the diſpute.—"The brave Romans! That glo-"rious! that god-like people! The conquerors of the "world! who made the moſt haughty nations to ſub-"mit! who put the wealthieſt under tribute, and "brought all the riches of the univerſe to center in the "imperial city of Rome!"

Now *this people*, at the beginning of their ſtate, had a territory not ſo large as one of our middling counties, and

and neither healthy nor fertile in its nature; yet, by means of frugality and induſtry, they not only procured a comfortable ſubſiſtence, but alſo were enabled to carry on their petty wars without burden to the ſtate, or pay to the troops; each huſbandman or little freeholder ſerving *gratis*, and providing his own clothes and arms during the ſhort time that was neceſſary for him to be abſent from his cottage and family on ſuch expeditions.

But when their neighbours were all ſubdued, and *the ſeat of war* removed to more *diſtant countries*, it became impoſſible for them to draw their ſubſiſtence from their own farms; or, in other words, to ſerve *gratis any longer*; and therefore they were under a neceſſity to accept of *pay*.—Moreover, as they could ſeldom viſit their little eſtates, theſe farms were unavoidably neglected, and conſequently were ſoon diſpoſed of to engroſſing purchaſers: and *thus it came to paſs that the lands about Rome were monopolized into a few hands by dint of their very conqueſts and ſucceſſes:* and thus alſo *the ſpirit of induſtry* began to decline, in proportion as *the military genius* gained the aſcendant.—A proof of this we have in LIVY, even ſo far back as the time of their laſt king *Tarquinius Superbus:* for one of the complaints brought againſt that prince

prince was couched in the following terms, that having employed his ſoldiers in making drains and common ſewers, " *they thought it an high diſgrace to warriors to be* " *treated as mechanics, and that the conquerors of the neigh-* " *bouring nations ſhould be degraded into ſtone-cutters and* " *maſons,*" though theſe works are not *the monuments of unmeaning folly*, or the works of *oſtentation*, but evidently calculated for *the health* of the citizens, and *the convenience* of the public.—*Had he led forth theſe indignant heroes to the extirpation of ſome neighbouring ſtate, they would not have conſidered that as a diſhonour to their character.*

But to proceed: the genius of ROME being formed for war, the Romans puſhed their conqueſts over nations ſtill more remote: but alas! the *Quirites*, the body of the people, were ſo far from reaping any advantage from theſe new triumphs, that they generally found themſelves to be poorer at the end of their moſt glorious wars than before they began them.—At the cloſe of each ſucceſsful war it was cuſtomary to divide a part of the lands of the vanquiſhed among the veteran ſoldiers, and to grant them a diſmiſſion in order to cultivate their new acquiſitions.—But ſuch eſtates being *far diſtant from the city*, became in fact ſo much the leſs valuable; and the

new

new proprietor had leſs inclination than ever to forſake the capital, and to baniſh himſelf to theſe diſtant provinces.—(For here let it be noted, that Rome was become, by this time, the theatre of pleaſure, as well as the ſeat of empire, where all who wiſhed to act a part on the ſtage of ambition, popularity, or politics; all who wanted to be engaged in ſcenes of debauchery, or intrigues of ſtate; all, in ſhort, who had any thing to ſpend, or any thing to expect, made Rome their rendezvous, and reſorted thither as to a common mart).—This being the caſe, it is not at all ſurpriſing, that theſe late acquiſitions were deſerted and ſold for a very trifle; nor is it any wonder, that the maſs of the Roman people ſhould be ſo immerſed in debt, as we find by their own hiſtorians they continually were, when we reflect, that their military life indiſpoſed them for agriculture or manufactures, and that their notions of conqueſt and of glory rendered them extravagant, prodigal, and vain.

However, in this manner they went on, continuing to extend their victories and their triumphs; and after the triumph, ſubſiſting for a while by the ſale of the lands above mentioned, or by their ſhares in the diviſion of the booty: but when theſe were ſpent, as they quickly were, then they ſunk

ſunk into a more wretched ſtate of poverty than before, eagerly wiſhing for a new war as the only means of repairing their deſperate fortunes, and clamouring againſt every perſon that would dare to appear as an advocate for peace: and thus they increaſed their ſufferings inſtead of removing them.

At laſt they ſubdued the world, as far as it was known at that time, or thought worth ſubduing, and then both the tribute and the plunder of the univerſe were imported into *Rome*; then, therefore, the bulk of the inhabitants of that city muſt have been exceedingly wealthy, had wealth conſiſted in heaps of gold and ſilver; and then likewiſe, if ever, the bleſſings of victory muſt have been felt, had it been capable of producing any.—*But alas! whatever riches a few grandees, the leaders of armies, the governors of provinces, the minions of the populace, or the harpies of oppreſſion, might have amaſſed together, the great majority of the people were poor and miſerable beyond expreſſion: and while the vain wretches were ſtrutting with pride, and elated with inſolence, as the maſters of the world, they had no other means of ſubſiſting, when peace was made and their prize-money ſpent, than to receive a kind of alms in corn from the public granaries, or to carry about their bread-baſkets, and beg from door to*

—Moreover, ſuch among them as had chanced to
a piece of land left unmortgaged, or ſomething va-
e to pledge, found, to their ſorrow, that the in-
of money (being hardly ever leſs than twelve *per*
and frequently more) would ſoon eat up their little
ince, and reduce them to an equality with the reſt
eir illuſtrious brother beggars.—*Nay, ſo extremely*
was the credit of theſe maſters of the world, that they
truſted with the payment of their intereſt no longer than
month to month;—*than which there cannot be a more*
g proof, both of the abject poverty, and of the cheat-
ſpoſitions of theſe heroic citizens of imperial Rome.—
this being the UNDOUBTED FACT, every humane
enevolent man, far from conſidering theſe people
ects worthy of imitation, will look upon them with
abhorrence and indignation; and every wiſe ſtate,
lting the good of the whole, will take warning by
fatal example, and ſtifle, as much as poſſible, the
eginning of ſuch a *Roman ſpirit* in its ſubjects.
ie caſe of the *ancient Romans* having thus been con-
d at large, leſs may be requiſite as to what is to
v.—AND THEREFORE SUFFICE IT TO OBSERVE,
T THE WARS OF EUROPE FOR THESE TWO
RED YEARS LAST PAST, BY THE CONFESSION

OF ALL PARTIES, HAVE REALLY ENDED IN THE ADVANTAGE OF NONE, BUT TO THE MANIFEST DETRIMENT OF ALL.—SUFFICE IT FARTHER TO REMARK, THAT HAD EACH OF THE CONTENDING POWERS EMPLOYED THEIR SUBJECTS IN CULTIVATING AND IMPROVING SUCH LANDS AS WERE CLEAR OF ALL DISPUTED TITLES, INSTEAD OF AIMING AT MORE EXTENDED POSSESSIONS, THEY HAD CONSULTED BOTH THEIR OWN AND THEIR PEOPLE'S GREATNESS MUCH MORE EFFICACIOUSLY, THAN BY ALL THE VICTORIES OF A CÆSAR OR AN ALEXANDER.

Upon the whole, therefore, it is evident to a demonſtration, that nothing can reſult from ſuch ſyſtems as theſe, however ſpecious and plauſible in appearance, but *diſappointment*, *want*, and *beggary*.—*For the great laws of* PROVIDENCE, *and the courſe of nature, are not to be reverſed or counteracted by the feeble efforts of wayward man, nor will the rules of ſound politics ever bear a ſeparation from thoſe of true and genuine morality* —Not to mention, that the *victors themſelves* will experience it to their coſts, ſooner or later, that in *vanquiſhing others* they are only *preparing a more magnificent tomb* for the interment of their *liberty*.

In very deed the *good providence* of GOD hath, as it were,

were, taken *peculiar pains* to preclude mankind from having *any plauſible pretence* for purſuing either *this* or *any other ſcheme of depopulation.*—And the traces of ſuch *preventing endeavours*, if I may ſo ſpeak, are perfectly legible both in the natural, and in the moral worlds.

In the natural world, our bountiful CREATOR *hath formed different* SOILS, *and appointed different* CLIMATES, *whereby the inhabitants of different countries may ſupply each other with their reſpective fruits and products, ſo that by exciting a reciprocal induſtry, they may carry on an intercourſe mutually beneficial, and univerſally benevolent.*

Nay more, even where there is no remarkable difference of ſoil or of climates, we find a great difference of TALENTS; and, if I may be allowed the expreſſion, a wonderful variety of ſtrata in the human mind.—Thus, for example, the alteration of latitude between *Norwich* and *Mancheſter*, and the variation of ſoil, are not worth naming; moreover, the materials made uſe of in both places, wool, flax, and ſilk, are juſt the ſame; yet *ſo different* are the productions of their reſpective looms, that countries which are thouſands of miles apart could hardly exhibit a greater contraſt.—Now had *Norwich* and *Mancheſter* been the capitals of two neighbouring kingdoms, inſtead of *love* and *union*, we ſhould have

heard of nothing but *jealouſies* and *wars*; each would have prognoſticated, that the flouriſhing ſtate of the one portended the downfal of the other; each would have had their reſpective complaints, uttered in the moſt doleful accents, concerning their own loſs of trade, and of the formidable progreſs of their rivals; and, if the reſpective governments were in any degree popular, *each* would have had a ſet of *patriots* and *orators* cloſing their inflammatory harangues with a DELENDA EST CARTHAGO.—" We muſt deſtroy our rivals, our competi-" tors and commercial enemies, or be deſtroyed by " them; for our intereſts are oppoſite, and can never " coincide."—And yet, notwithſtanding all theſe *canting phraſes*, it is as clear as the meridian ſun, that in caſe theſe cities had belonged to different kingdoms (*France* and *England* for example) there would then have been no more need for either of them to have gone to war than there is at preſent.

'*In ſhort, if mankind would but open their eyes, they might plainly ſee, that there is no one argument for inducing different nations to fight for the ſake of trade, but which would equally oblige every country, town, village, nay, and every ſhop among ourſelves, to be engaged in civil and inteſtine wars for the ſame end: nor, on the contrary, is there any motive*

motive of intereſt or advantage that can be urged for reſtraining the parts of the ſame government from theſe unnatural and fooliſh conteſts, but which would conclude equally ſtrong againſt ſeparate and independent nations making war with each other on the like pretext.

Moreover, the inſtinct of curioſity, and the thirſt of novelty, which are ſo univerſally implanted in human nature, whereby various nations and different people ſo ardently wiſh to be cuſtomers to each other, is another proof that the curious manufactures of one nation will never want a vent among the richer inhabitants of another, provided they are reaſonably *cheap* and *good*; ſo that the richer one nation is, the more it has to ſpare, and the more it will certainly lay out on the produce and manufactures of its ingenious neighbour.—Do you object to this? *Do you envy the wealth, or repine at the proſperity, of the nations around you?*—If *you do*, conſider what is *the conſequence*, viz. that you *wiſh to keep a ſhop*, but *hope to have only* BEGGARS *for your cuſtomers.*

As to the moral and political world, PROVIDENCE has ſo ordained, that every nation may increaſe in *frugality* and *induſtry*, and conſequently in *riches*, if they pleaſe; becauſe it has given a power to every nation to make good laws, and wiſe regulations, for their internal government:

government: and none can juſtly blame them on this account.—Should, for example, the POLES, or the TARTARS, grow weary of their preſent wretched ſyſtems, and reſolve upon a better conſtitution; ſhould they prefer employment to ſloth, liberty to ſlavery, and trade and manufactures to theft and robbery; ſhould they give all poſſible freedom and encouragement to induſtrious artificers, and lay heavy diſcouragements on idleneſs and vice, by means of judicious taxes; and laſtly, ſhould they root out all notions of beggarly pride, and of the glory of making marauding incurſions;—what a mighty, what a happy change would ſoon appear in the face of thoſe countries!—And what could then be ſaid to be wanting in order to render ſuch nations truly *rich* and *great?*

Perhaps ſome neighbouring ſtate (entertaining a fooliſh jealouſy) would take the alarm, that their trade was in danger.—But if they attempted to invade ſuch a kingdom, they would find, to their coſt, that an induſtrious ſtate, abounding with people and with riches, having its magazines well ſtored, its frontier towns well fortified, the garriſons duly paid, and the whole country full of villages and encloſures; I ſay, they would feel to their coſt, that ſuch a ſtate is the ſtrongeſt of all others, and

the moſt difficult to be ſubdued: not to mention that other potentates would naturally riſe up for its defence and preſervation; becauſe, indeed, it would be for their intereſt that ſuch a ſtate as this ſhould not be ſwallowed up by another, and becauſe they themſelves might have *many things* to *hope* from it, and *nothing* to *fear*.

But is this ſpell, this witchcraft of the jealouſy of trade never to be diſſolved? And are there no hopes that mankind will recover their ſenſes as to theſe things?—For of all abſurdities, that of going to war for the ſake of getting trade is the moſt abſurd; and nothing in nature can be ſo extravagantly fooliſh.

Perhaps you cannot digeſt this; you do not believe it.—Be it ſo.—Grant, therefore, that you ſubdue your rival by force of arms: will that circumſtance render your goods *cheaper* at market than they were before?—And if it will not, nay if it tends to render them much dearer, what have you got by ſuch a victory?—I aſk further, what will be the conduct of foreign nations, when your goods are brought to their markets?—They will not inquire, whether you were victorious or not; but only, whether you will ſell *cheaper*, or at leaſt as *cheap* as others?—Try and ſee, whether any perſons, or any nations, ever yet proceeded upon any other plan; and

and if they never did, and never can be ſuppoſed to do ſo, then it is evident to a demonſtration, that trade will always follow *cheapneſs*, and not *conqueſt*.—Nay, conſider how it is with yourſelves at home: do *heroes* and *bruiſers* get *more cuſtomers* to their ſhops, *becauſe* they are *heroes* and *bruiſers*; or would not you yourſelf rather deal with *a feeble perſon*, who will *uſe you well*, than with a *brother hero*, ſhould *he demand a higher price?*

Now *all theſe facts* are ſo very *notorious*, that none can diſpute the truth of them.—And throughout the hiſtories of all countries, and of all ages, there is not a ſingle example to the contrary.

JUDGE, THEREFORE, FROM WHAT HAS BEEN SAID, WHETHER ANY ONE ADVANTAGE CAN BE OBTAINED TO SOCIETY, EVEN BY THE MOST SUCCESSFUL WARS, THAT MAY NOT BE INCOMPARABLY GREATER, AND MORE EASILY PROCURED, BY THE ARTS OF PEACE.

As to thoſe who are always clamouring for war, and ſounding the alarm to battle, let us conſider who they are, and what are their motives; and then it will be no difficult matter to determine concerning the deference that ought

ught to be paid to their *opinions*, and the merit of their *atriotic zeal.*

1. The firſt on the liſt here in *Britain* (for different ountries have different ſorts of firebrands), I ſay the irſt here in Britain is the *mock patriot* and *furious anti-ourtier* —He always begins with ſchemes of œconomy, nd a zealous promoter of national frugality.—He loudly leclaims againſt even a ſmall, annual, parliamentary army, both on account of its expence, and its danger; and pretends to be ſtruck with a panic at every red coat that he ſees.—By perſevering in theſe laudable endea-vours, and by ſowing the ſeeds of jealouſy and diſtruſt among the ignorant and unwary, he prevents ſuch a number of forces, by ſea and land, from being kept up, s are prudently neceſſary for the common ſafety of the ingdom: this is one ſtep gained.—In the next place, fter having thrown out ſuch a tempting bait for fo-eigners to catch at, on any trifling account he is all on ire; his breaſt beats high with the love of his country, nd his ſoul breathes vengeance againſt the foes of Britain: very popular topic, and every inflammatory harangue s immediately put into rehearſal; and, O liberty! O my ountry! is the continual theme. —The fire then preads; the ſouls of the noble Britons are enkindled at

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firſt ſtarts the game; he explores the reigning humour and whim of *the populace*, and by frequent trials diſcovers the part where the miniſtry are moſt vulnerable.—But, above all, he never fails to put the mob in the mind, of what indeed they believed before, *that politics is a ſubject which every one underſtands*....EXCEPT—*the miniſtry*, and that nothing is ſo eaſy as to bring the king of France to ſue for peace on his knees at the bar of a Britiſh houſe of commons, were—ſuch——and ſuch——at the helm, as honeſt and uncorrupt as they ought to be. This is delightful; and this, with the old ſtories of Agincourt and Creſſy, regales, nay intoxicates the mob, and inſpires them with an enthuſiaſm bordering upon madneſs.—The ſame ideas return; the former battles are fought over again; and we have already taken poſſeſſion of the gates of Paris in the warmth of a frantic imagination; though it is certain that even were this circumſtance ever to happen, we ourſelves ſhould be the greateſt loſers; for the conqueſt of France by England, in the event of things, would come to the ſame point as the conqueſt of England by France; becauſe the ſeat of empire would be transferred to the greater kingdom, and the leſſer would be made a province to it.

3. Near akin to this man, is that other monſter of modern times, who is perpetually declaiming againſt a peace,

peace, viz. *the broker*, and *the gambler of Change-alley*. Letters from the Hague, wrote in a garret at home for half a guinea;.... the firſt news of a battle fought (it matters not how improbable) with a liſt of the ſlain and priſoners, their cannon, colours, &c..... great firings heard at ſea between ſquadrons not yet out of port;.... a town taken before the enemy was near it;.... an intercepted letter that never was wrote;.... a forged gazette;.... or, in ſhort, any thing elſe that will elate or depreſs the minds of the undiſcerning multitude, ſerves the purpoſe of the bear or the bull, to ſink or raiſe the price of ſtocks, according as he wiſhes either to buy or ſell, and by theſe vile means the wretch, who perhaps the other day came up to London in the waggon to be an under clerk or meſſage boy in a warehouſe, acquires ſuch a fortune as ſets him on a par with the greateſt nobles of the land.

4. The *news writers* are a fourth ſpecies of political firebrand: a ſpecies which abound in this country more than in any other; for as men are in this kingdom allowed greater liberty to ſay, or write, what they pleaſe; ſo likewiſe is *the abuſe* of that bleſſing carried to a higher pitch.—In fact theſe people may be truly ſaid to *trade in blood:* for a war is their harveſt; and a bloody battle produces

produces a crop of an hundred fold: how then can it be ſuppoſed that they can ever become the friends of peace? —And how can you expect that any miniſters can be their favourites, but the miniſters of death?—Yet theſe are the men who may be truly ſaid to govern the minds of the good people of England, and to turn their affections whitherſoever they pleaſe; who can render any ſcheme unpopular which they diſlike, and whoſe approbation or frown are regarded by thouſands, and almoſt by millions, as the ſtandard of right and wrong, of truth or falſehood; for it is a fact, an indiſputable fact, that this country is as much news-mad and news-ridden now, as ever it was popery-mad or prieſt-ridden in the days of our forefathers.

5. The *jobbers* and *contractors of all kinds* and *of all degrees* for our *fleets* and *armies*:—the clerks and pay-maſters in the ſeveral departments belonging to war:.... and every other agent, who has the fingering of the *public money*, may be ſaid to conſtitute a diſtinct brood of *vultures*, who prey upon their *own ſpecies*, and fatten upon *human gore*.—It would be endleſs to recount the various arts and ſtratagems by which this tribe of devourers have amaſſed to themſelves aſtoniſhing riches from very ſlender beginnings, through the continuance and extent of the

war;

war; conſequently, as long as any proſpect could remain of ſqueezing ſomewhat more out of the pockets of an *exhauſted*, but *infatuated people*; ſo long the *war-hoop* would be the cry of theſe inhuman ſavages; and ſo long would they ſtart and invent objections to every propoſition that could be made for the reſtoring peace.....becauſe government bills would yet bear ſome price in the alley, and omnium and ſcrip would ſtill ſell at market.

6. *Many* of *the dealers* in *exports* and *imports*, and *ſeveral* of *the traders in the colonies*, are too often found to be aſſiſtants in promoting the cry for every new war: and when war is undertaken, in preventing any overtures towards a peace.—You do not fathom the depth of this policy; you are not capable to comprehend it.—Alas! it is but too eaſily explained; and, when explained, but too well proved from experience.—*The general intereſt of trade*, and *the intereſt of particular traders*, are *very diſtinct things*; nay, are very often *quite oppoſite* to each other.—The intereſt of general trade ariſes from *general induſtry*; and therefore can only be promoted by the arts of peace: but the misfortune is, that during a peace the prices of goods ſeldom fluctuate, and there are few or no opportunities of getting ſuddenly rich.—A

war,

war, on the contrary, unſettles all things, and opens a wide field for *ſpeculations*; therefore a lucky hit, or the engroſſing a commodity, when there is but little at market.....A rich capture.....or a ſmuggling, I ſhould rather ſay, a traiterous, intercourſe with the enemy, ſometimes by bribes to governors and officers, and ſometimes through other channels:—or, perhaps, the hopes of coming in for *a ſhare* in *a lucrative job*, or a *public contract*; theſe, and many ſuch like notable expedients, are cheriſhed by the warmth of war, like plants in a hot-bed; but they are chilled by the cold languid circulation of peaceful induſtry.

This being the caſe, the warlike zeal of theſe men, and their declamations againſt all reconciliatory meaſures, are but too eaſily accounted for; and while the dulcis amor lucri is the governing principle of trade, what other conduct are you to expect?

But what if the men of *landed property*, and the numerous band of *Engliſh artificers* and *manufacturers*, who conſtitute, beyond all doubt, the great body of the kingdom, and whoſe real intereſt muſt be on the ſide of peace; what if *they* ſhould not be as military in their diſpoſition as theſe gentlemen would wiſh they were?—Why then all arts muſt be uſed, and indefatigable pains

be

be taken to perſuade them, that *this particular war* is calculated for their benefit; and that the conqueſt of ſuch or ſuch a place would infallibly redound both to the advantage of the landed intereſts, and the improvement and extenſion of manufactures.—"Should (for example) the Engliſh once become maſters of CANADA, "the importation of ſkins and beavers, and the manufacture of fine hats, would extend prodigiouſly; every "man might afford to wear a beaver hat if he pleaſed, "and every woman be decorated in the richeſt furs; in "return for which our coarſe woollens would find ſuch "a vent throughout our immenſe northern regions, as "would make ample ſatisfaction for all our expences." Well, *Canada* is taken, and is now all our own; but what is the conſequence, after a trial of ſome years poſſeſſion, let thoſe declare who can, and as they were before ſo laviſh in their promiſes, let them at laſt prove their aſſertions, by appealing to fact and experience.—Alas! they cannot do it: nay, ſo far from it, that beaver, and furs, and hats, are *dearer than ever:* and all the woollens, which have been conſumed in thoſe countries by the *native inhabitants*, do hardly amount to a greater quantity than thoſe very ſoldiers and ſailors would have

worn and conſumed, who were loſt in the taking, defending, and garriſoning of thoſe countries.

" However, if Canada did not anſwer our ſanguine " expectations, ſure we were, that the ſugar countries " would make amends for all: and, therefore, if the im- " portant iſlands of GAUDALOUPE and MARTINICO " were to be ſubdued, then ſugars, and coffee, and cho- " colate, and indigo, and cotton, &c. &c. would become " as cheap as we could wiſh; and both the country gen- " tleman and the manufacturer would find their account " in ſuch conqueſts as theſe." Well, *Gaudaloupe* and *Martinico* are both taken, and many other iſlands beſides are added to our empire, whoſe produce is the very ſame with theirs.—*Yet, what elegance of life, or what ingredient for manufacture, is thereby become the cheaper? and which of all theſe things can be purchaſed at a lower rate at preſent than before the war?*—Not one can be named.—On the contrary, the man of landed property can tell but too circumſtantially, that *taxes* are riſen higher than ever—that the intereſt of money is greater—that every additional load of national debt is a new mortgage on his exhauſted and impoveriſhed eſtate—and that, if he happens to be a member of parliament, he runs the riſk of being

being bought out of his family borough, by ſome upſtart gambler, jobber, or contractor.

The *Engliſh manufacturer* likewiſe both ſees and feels, that *every foreign material*, of uſe in his trade, is grown *much dearer*,——that all hands are become extremely *ſcarce*, their *wages* prodigiouſly raiſed,—the goods, of courſe, badly and ſcandalouſly manufactured,———and yet *cannot* be afforded at the *ſame price as heretofore*—— that, therefore, the ſale of Engliſh manufactures has greatly decreaſed in foreign countries ſince the commencement of war;——and, what is worſe than all, that induſtry at home is diminiſhed —All theſe things, I ſay, the *Engliſh manufacturer* both *ſees* and *feels:* and IS NOT THIS ENOUGH?

7. The *land* and *ſea officers* are, of courſe, the invariable advocates for war.—Indeed it is their trade, their bread, and the ſure way to get promotion; therefore no other language can be expected from them: and yet, to do them juſtice, of all the adverſaries of peace, they are the faireſt and moſt open in their proceedings; they uſe no art of colouring, and you know their motive, you muſt allow for it accordingly.

But after all, what have I been doing? and how can

I hope for proſelytes by this kind of writing——It is true, in regard to the points attempted to be proved, I have certainly proved them.—" NEITHER PRINCES " NOR PEOPLE CAN BE GAINERS BY THE MOST SUC- " CESSFUL WARS:——TRADE, IN PARTICULAR, WILL " MAKE ITS WAY TO THE COUNTRY WHERE GOODS " ARE MANUFACTURED THE BEST AND CHEAPEST: " —BUT CONQUERING NATIONS NEITHER MANU- " FACTURE WELL NOR CHEAP:—AND CONSEQUENT- " LY MUST SINK IN TRADE IN PROPORTION AS THEY " EXTEND IN CONQUEST."—Theſe things are now inconteſtibly clear, if any thing ever was ſo.—But, alas! who will thank me for ſuch leſſons as theſe? The *ſeven claſſes* of men juſt enumerated certainly will not; and as to *the mob*, the blood-thirſty mob, no arguments, and no demonſtrations whatever, can perſuade them to withdraw their veneration from their grim idol, the god of ſlaughter.—On the contrary, to knock a man on the head, is to take from him his all at once.—This is a compendious way, and this they underſtand.—*But to excite that man* (whom perhaps they have long called their enemy) *to greater induſtry and ſobriety, to conſider him as a cuſtomer to them, and themſelves as cuſtomers*

cuſtomers to him, ſo that the richer both are, the better it may be for each other; and, in ſhort, to promote a mutual trade to mutual benefit: this is a kind of reaſoning, as unintelligible to their comprehenſions as the antipodes themſelves *.

SOME FEW, PERHAPS A VERY FEW INDEED, MAY BE STRUCK WITH THE FORCE OF THESE TRUTHS, AND YIELD THEIR MINDS TO CONVICTION.——POSSIBLY IN A LONG COURSE OF TIME THEIR NUMBERS MAY INCREASE—AND POSSIBLY, AT LAST, THE TIDE MAY TURN; SO THAT OUR POSTERITY MAY REGARD THE PRESENT MADNESS OF GOING TO WAR FOR THE SAKE OF TRADE, RICHES, OR DOMINION, WITH THE SAME EYE OF ASTONISHMENT AND PITY, THAT WE DO THE MADNESS OF OUR FOREFATHERS IN FIGHTING UNDER THE BANNER OF THE PEACEFUL CROSS.

* Dean TUCKER.

SECT.

SECT. VII.

ON TAXES.

BEFORE I enter upon the examination of the effects of ſome particular taxes, it may be neceſſary to premiſe the four following maxims with regard to taxes in general.

1. *The ſubjects of every ſtate ought to contribute towards the ſupport of the government, as nearly as poſſible, in proportion to their reſpective abilities*; that is, in proportion to the revenue which they reſpectively enjoy under the protection of the ſtate.—The expence of government to the individuals of a great nation, is like the expence of management to the joint tenants of a great eſtate, who are all obliged to contribute in proportion to their reſpective intereſts in the eſtate.—In the obſervation or neglect of this maxim conſiſts, what is called the EQUALITY or INEQUALITY of taxation.

2. *The tax which each individual is bound to pay ought*

to be certain —The *time* of payment, the *manner* of payment, the *quantity* to be paid, ought all to be clear and plain to the contributor, and to every other perſon.—Where it is otherwiſe, every perſon ſubject to the tax is put more or leſs in the power of the tax gatherer, who can either aggravate the tax upon any obnoxious contributor, or extort, by the terror of ſuch aggravation, ſome preſent or perquiſite to himſelf.—The uncertainty of taxation encourages the inſolence and favours the corruption of an order of men who are naturally unpopular, even where they are neither inſolent nor corrupt. —The certainty of what each individual ought to pay is, in taxation, a matter of ſo great importance, that a very conſiderable degree of *inequality*, it appears, I believe, from the experience of all nations, is not near ſo great an evil as a very ſmall degree of *uncertainty*.

3. *Every tax ought to be levied at the time, or in the manner, in which it is moſt likely to be convenient for the contributor to pay it.*—A tax upon the rent of land or of houſes, payable at the ſame term at which ſuch rents are uſually paid, is levied at the time when it is moſt likely to have wherewithal to pay.—Taxes upon ſuch conſumable goods as are articles of luxury, are all *finally* paid by the

the conſumer *, and generally in a manner that is very convenient for him.--He pays them by little and little, as he has occaſion to buy the goods.—As he is at liberty to buy, or not to buy, as he pleaſes, it muſt be his own fault if he ever ſuffers any conſiderable inconvenience from ſuch taxes.

4. *Every tax ought to be ſo contrived as both to take out*

* It is an opinion, zealouſly promoted by ſome political writers, that ſince all taxes, as they pretend, fall *ultimately* upon *land*, it were better to lay them originally *there*, and aboliſh every duty upon conſumptions. But we deny, that all taxes fall ultimately upon land. If a duty be laid upon any *commodity* conſumed by an artificer, he has two obvious expedients for paying it; he may retrench ſomewhat of his expenſe, or he may increaſe his labour. *Both theſe reſources* are *more eaſy* and *natural*, than *that* of *heightening his wages*. We ſee that, in years of *ſcarcity*, the weaver either *conſumes leſs* or *labours more*, or employs both theſe expedients of frugality and induſtry, by which he is enabled to reach the end of the year. *By what contrivance can he raiſe the price of his labour?* The manufacturer who employs him will not give him more: neither can he, becauſe the merchant, who exports the cloth, cannot raiſe its price, being limited by the price which it yields in foreign markets. Every man, to be ſure, is deſirous of puſhing off from himſelf the burden of any tax which is impoſed, and of laying it upon others: but as every man has the ſame inclination, and is upon the *defenſive*, no ſet of men can be ſuppoſed to prevail altogether in this conteſt. And why the landed gentleman ſhould be the victim of the whole, and ſhould not be able to defend himſelf, as well as others are, I cannot readily imagine. All tradeſmen, indeed, would willingly prey upon him, and divide him among them, if they could: but this inclination they always have, though no taxes were levied; and the ſame methods, by which he guards againſt the impoſition of tradeſmen before taxes, will ſerve him afterwards, and make them ſhare the burden with him.—HUME.

and

and to keep out of the pockets of the people as little as poſſible, over and above what it brings into the public treaſury of the ſtate.—A tax may either take out or keep out of the pockets of the people a great deal more than it brings into the public treaſury, in the four following ways.—FIRST, the levying of it may require a great number of officers, whoſe ſalaries may eat up the greater part of the produce of the tax, and whoſe perquiſites may impoſe another additional tax upon the people.—SECONDLY, it may obſtruct the induſtry of the people, and diſcourage them from applying to certain branches of buſineſs which might give maintenance and employment to great multitudes.—While it obliges the people to pay, it may thus diminiſh, or perhaps deſtroy, ſome of the funds which might enable them more eaſily to do ſo.—THIRDLY, by the forfeitures and other penalties which thoſe unfortunate individuals incur who attempt unſucceſsfully to evade the tax, it may frequently ruin them, and thereby put an end to the benefit which the community might have received from the employment of their capitals.—An injudicious tax offers a great temptation to ſmuggling.—But the penalties of ſmuggling muſt riſe in proportion to the temptation.—The law, contrary to all the ordinary principles of juſtice, firſt creates

the temptation, and then puniſhes thoſe who yield to it; and it commonly enhances the puniſhment too in proportion to the very circumſtance which ought certainly to alleviate it, the temptation to commit the crime *.—FOURTHLY, by ſubjecting the people to the frequent viſits and the odious examination of the tax-gatherers, it may expoſe them to much unneceſſary trouble, vexation, and oppreſſion; and though vexation is not, ſtrictly ſpeaking, expence, it is certainly equivalent to the expence at which every man would be willing to redeem himſelf from it.

IT IS IN SOME ONE OR OTHER OF THESE FOUR DIFFERENT WAYS THAT TAXES ARE FREQUENTLY SO MUCH MORE BURDENSOME TO THE PEOPLE THAN THEY ARE BENEFICIAL TO THE SOVEREIGN.

The beſt taxes are ſuch as are levied upon *conſumptions*, eſpecially thoſe of *luxury*; becauſe ſuch taxes are leaſt felt by the people.—They ſeem, in ſome meaſure, voluntary; ſince a man may chooſe how far he will uſe the commodity which is taxed: they are paid gradually and inſenſibly: they naturally produce ſobriety and frugality, if judiciouſly impoſed: and being confounded

* See Sketches of the Hiſtory of Man, page 474, & ſeq.

with

with the natural price of the commodity, they are ſcarcely perceived by the conſumers.—Their only diſadvantage is, that they are expenſive in the levying.—Another thing is, a duty upon commodities checks itſelf; and a miniſter will ſoon find, that an increaſe of the impoſt is no increaſe of the revenue. It is not eaſy, therefore, for a people to be altogether ruined by ſuch taxes.

Taxes upon *poſſeſſions* are levied without expence; but have every other diſadvantage.—Moſt ſtates, however, are obliged to have recourſe to them, in order to ſupply the deficiencies of the other.

As *taxes* take nothing out of a country; as they do not diminiſh the public ſtock, only vary the diſtribution of it, they are not *neceſſarily* prejudicial to happineſs.—If the ſtate exact money from certain members of the community, ſhe diſpenſes it alſo amongſt other members of the ſame community.—They who contribute to the revenue, and they who are ſupported or benefited by the expences of government, are to be placed one againſt the other; and, whilſt what the ſubſiſtence of one part is profited by receiving, compenſates for what that of the other ſuffers by paying, the common fund of the ſociety is not leſſened.—This is true: but it muſt

be obſerved, that although the ſum diſtributed by the ſtate be always EQUAL to the ſum collected from the people, yet the gain and loſſes to the means of ſubſiſtence may be very UNEQUAL; and *the balance will remain on the wrong or the right ſide of the account, according as the money paſſes by taxation from the induſtrious to the idle, from the many to the few, from thoſe who want to thoſe who abound, or in a contrary direction.*

For inſtance, a tax upon *coaches*, to be laid out in the repair of *roads*, would probably *improve* the happineſs of a neighbourhood; a tax upon *cottages*, to be ultimately expended in the purchaſe and ſupport of *coaches*, would certainly *diminiſh* it.

In like manner, a tax upon *wine* or *tea*, diſtributed in bounties to *fiſhermen* or *huſbandmen*, would *augment* the proviſion of a country; a tax upon *fiſheries* and *huſbandry*, however indirect or concealed, to be converted, when raiſed, to the procuring of *wine* or *tea* for the idle and opulent, would naturally *impair* the public ſtock.

The EFFECT, therefore, of *taxes* upon the means of ſubſiſtence depends not ſo much upon the amount of the ſum levied, as upon the *object* of the tax, and *the application.*

Taxes likewiſe may be ſo adjuſted as to conduce to the reſtraint of *luxury*, and the *correction* of *vice* *; to the *encouragement*

* When the expediency of laying a further tax on diſtillation of ſpirituous liquors was canvaſſed before the Houſe of Commons ſome years ago, it was ſaid of the diſtillers with great truth, "*They take the bread from the people, and convert it into poiſon.*" Yet is this manufacture of diſeaſe permitted to continue, as appears by its paying into the treaſury above 900,000 l. near a million of money annually.

It is generally allowed, "*that government is for the benefit of the governed and not the governors,*" and no deviation ſhould exiſt to this fundamental principle. *Get money*, was the advice of a father to his ſon,—honeſtly if you can,—if not,—*Get money*. It is alſo a queſtion, How far the king's patent to quack remedies is expedient, as it diſcourages an uſeful body of men, favours impoſition, begets incredulity, and is the deſtruction of the lives and the health of thouſands. *Get money* can never be an excuſe in a free government, where *happineſs in the ſubject* is its avowed principle.

MONOPOLIES and CHARTERS.—*James* the Firſt granted many of theſe, and his *ſon* followed his example. Between them *both* almoſt every trade was confined in a few hands; but theſe *monopoliſts* paid heavy ſums for becoming the *elder children* of a *partial father*. *Monopolies* had crept in during the reign of Queen ELIZABETH; but that great queen, finding that the Houſe of Commons was uneaſy, called in moſt of theſe grants. The Houſe of Commons, ſtruck with this generoſity of the queen, in meeting their deſires, and anticipating their requeſts, deputed one hundred and forty of their members to wait upon her with their thanks. To their addreſs the queen returned an anſwer, which, as flowing from her heart, made the deepeſt impreſſion on her ſubjects. —I ſhall ſubjoin a part:

"GENTLEMEN,

"I owe you hearty thanks and commendations, for your ſingular good will towards me, not only in your heart and thoughts, but which you have openly expreſſed and declared, whereby you have recalled me from an error proceeding from my *ignorance*, not my *will*. Theſe things had undeſervedly turned

encouragement of *induſtry*, *trade*, *agriculture*, and *marriage*. —Taxes thus contrived become *rewards* and *penalties*; not only SOURCES OF REVENUE, but INSTRUMENTS OF POLICE.—Vices indeed themſelves cannot be taxed without holding forth ſuch a conditional toleration of them as to deſtroy men's perception of their guilt: a tax comes in time to be conſidered as a commutation: the materials, however, and incentives of vice may.—Although, for inſtance, drunkenneſs would be, on this account, an unfit object of taxation, yet public-houſes and ſpirituous liquors are very properly ſubject to heavy impoſts.

Nevertheleſs, although it may be true, that taxes cannot be pronounced to be detrimental to happineſs, by any abſolute neceſſity in their nature; and though, un-

turned to my diſgrace (to whom nothing is more dear than the ſafety and love of my people), had not ſuch harpies and horſe-leeches as theſe been diſcovered to me by you. I HAD RATHER MY HEART OR HAND SHOULD PERISH, THAN THAT EITHER MY HEART OR HAND SHOULD ALLOW SUCH PRIVILEGES TO MONOPOLISTS, AS MAY BE PREJUDICIAL TO THE BODY OF MY PEOPLE. The ſplendour of regal majeſty hath not ſo blinded mine eyes, that LICENTIOUS POWER ſhould prevail with me more than JUSTICE. *I know that the commonwealth is to be governed for the good and advantage of* THOSE *that are committed to me, not of* MYSELF, *to whom it is intruſted; and that an account is one day to be given before another judgment ſeat.* I think myſelf moſt happy, that, by GOD's aſſiſtance, I have hitherto ſo proſperouſly governed the commonwealth in all reſpects; and that I have *ſuch ſubjects*, as for their good I would willingly leave both my kingdom and my life." &c. &c.

der

der ſome modifications, and when urged only to a certain extent, they may even operate in favour of it; yet it will be found, *in a great plurality of inſtances*, that their tendency is noxious.—*Let it be ſuppoſed that nine families inhabit a neighbourhood, each poſſeſſing barely the means of ſubſiſtence, or of that mode of ſubſiſtence which cuſtom hath eſtabliſhed among ſt them; let a tenth family be quartered upon theſe, to be ſupported by a tax raiſed from the nine; or rather let one of the nine have his income augmented by a ſimilar deduction from the incomes of the reſt: in either of theſe caſes, it is evident that the whole diſtrict would be broken up.*—For as the *entire income* of each is ſuppoſed to be *barely ſufficient* for the eſtabliſhment which it maintains, a *deduction* of *any part* deſtroys *that eſtabliſhment.*—Now it is no anſwer to this objection, it is no apology for the grievance, to ſay, "*that nothing is taken out of the neighbourhood; that the ſtock is not diminiſhed.*" —The miſchief is done by *deranging* the *diſtribution.*—Nor, again, is the luxury of *one* family, or even the maintenance of an additional family, a recompenſe to the country for the ruin of *nine* others.—Nor, laſtly, will it alter the effect, though it may conceal the cauſe, that the diſtribution, inſtead of being levied directly upon

each day's wages, is mixed up in the price of ſome article of conſtant uſe and conſumption; as in a tax upon candles, malt, leather, or fuel.

It ſeems neceſſary, however, to diſtinguiſh between the operation of a *new tax*, and the effect of taxes which have been long eſtabliſhed.—In the courſe of circulation the money may flow back to the hands from which it was taken.—The proportion between the ſupply and the expence of ſubſiſtence, which had been diſturbed by the tax, may at length recover itſelf again.—In the inſtance juſt now ſtated, the addition of a tenth family to the neighbourhood, or the enlarged expences of one of the nine, may, in ſome ſhape or other, ſo advance the profits, or increaſe the employment of the reſt, as to make full reſtitution for the ſhare of their property, of which it deprives them: or, what is more likely to happen, a reduction may take place in their mode of living, ſuited to the abridgment of their incomes.—*Yet ſtill the ultimate and permanent effect of taxation, though diſtinguiſhable from the impreſſion of a new tax, is generally adverſe to induſtry.*—The *proportion* above ſpoken of, can only be reſtored by one ſide or other of the following alternative; *by the people either* CONTRACTING THEIR WANTS,

which

which at the ſame time diminiſhes conſumption and employment ; *or by* RAISING THE PRICE OF LABOUR, *which neceſſarily adding to the price of the productions and manufactures of the country, checks their ſale at foreign markets.*

A nation which is *burthened* with *taxes*, muſt always be *underſold* by a nation which is *free* from them, unleſs the difference be made up by ſome ſingular advantage of climate, ſoil, ſkill, or induſtry.—*This quality belongs to all taxes which affect the maſs of the community, even when impoſed upon the propereſt objects, and applied to the faireſt purpoſes.*—BUT ABUSES ARE INSEPARABLE FROM THE DISPOSAL OF PUBLIC MONEY.—AS GOVERNMENTS ARE USUALLY ADMINISTERED, THE PRODUCE OF PUBLIC TAXES IS EXPENDED UPON A TRAIN OF GENTRY, IN THE MAINTAINING OF POMP, OR IN THE PURCHASE OF INFLUENCE.—The converſion of property, which *taxes* effectuate, when they are employed in this manner, is attended with *obvious evils.*—IT TAKES FROM THE INDUSTRIOUS TO GIVE TO THE IDLE ; IT INCREASES THE NUMBER OF THE LATTER; IT TENDS TO ACCUMULATION ; IT SACRIFICES THE CONVENIENCY OF MANY TO THE LUXURY OF A FEW ; IT MAKES NO RETURN TO THE PEOPLE, FROM WHOM

THE TAX IS DRAWN, THAT IS SATISFACTORY OR INTELLIGIBLE; IT ENCOURAGES NO ACTIVITY WHICH IS USEFUL OR PRODUCTIVE.

The ſum to be raiſed being ſettled, a *wiſe ſtateſman* will contrive his taxes principally with a view to their effect upon general happineſs, that is, he will ſo adjuſt them, as to give the leaſt poſſible obſtruction to thoſe means of ſubſiſtence by which the maſs of the community are maintained.—We are accuſtomed to an opinion "*that a tax, to be juſt, ought to be accurately proportioned to the circumſtances of the perſons who pay it.*"—The point to be regarded, IS NOT WHAT MEN HAVE, BUT WHAT THEY CAN SPARE; and it is evident that a man who poſſeſſes a *thouſand pounds* a year can more eaſily give up a *hundred*, than a man with a *hundred pounds* a year can part with *ten*; that is, *thoſe habits of life* which are *reaſonable* and *innocent*, and upon the ability to continue which the formation of families depends, will be much leſs affected by the one deduction than the other: it is ſtill more evident, that a man of a hundred pounds a year would not be ſo much diſtreſſed in his ſubſiſtence by a demand from him of ten pounds, as a man of ten pounds a year would be by the loſs of one: to which we muſt add, that the

the population of every country being repleniſhed by the marriages of the *loweſt ranks* of the ſociety, *their accommodation* and *relief* becomes of *more importance* to the ſtate, than *the conveniency* of any *higher* but *leſs numerous order* of its citizens.—But whatever be the proportion which public expediency directs, whether the ſimple, the duplicate, or any higher or intermediate proportion of men's incomes, it can never be attained by any ſingle tax; as no ſingle object of taxation can be found, which meaſures the ability of the ſubject with ſufficient generality and exactneſs.—It is only by a ſyſtem and variety of taxes mutually balancing and equalizing one another, that a due proportion can be preſerved.—For inſtance, if a tax upon lands preſs with greater hardſhip upon thoſe who live in the country, it may be properly counterpoiſed by a tax upon the rent of houſes, which will affect principally the inhabitants of large towns.—Diſtinctions may alſo be framed in ſome taxes, which ſhall allow abatements or exemptions to married perſons; to the parents of a certain number of legitimate children; to the education of youth; to improvers of the ſoil; to particular modes of cultivation, as to tillage in preference to paſ-

turage; and in general to that induſtry which is immediately *productive*, in preference to that which is only *inſtrumental*; but above all, which may leave the heavieſt part of the burthen upon the methods, whatever they be, of acquiring wealth without induſtry, or even of ſubſiſting in idleneſs*.

* Paley.

SECT.

SECT. VIII.

ON THE ADVANTAGES OF SOCIETY, AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF LABOUR.

Do you think, that without ſociety you or any man could have been born?—Without ſociety, when born, could you have been brought to maturity?—Had your parents then had no ſocial affections towards you in that perilous ſtate, that tedious infancy (ſo much longer than the longeſt of other animals), you muſt have inevitably periſhed through want and inability.—You perceive then that to ſociety you and every man are indebted, not only for the beginning of being, but for the continuance.

Suppoſe then we paſs from this birth and infancy of man, to his maturity and perfection.——Is there any age, think you, ſo ſelf-ſufficient as that in it he feels no wants?—In the firſt and principal place that of food; then perhaps that of raiment; and after this, a dwelling

or

or defence againſt the weather.—Theſe wants are ſurely natural at all ages.—And is it not agreeable to nature that they ſhould at all ages be ſupplied?—And is it not more agreeable to have them well ſupplied, than ill?—And moſt agreeable to have them beſt ſupplied?—If there be then any one ſtate better than all others for the ſupplying theſe wants, this ſtate of all others muſt needs be moſt natural.

And what ſupply of theſe wants ſhall we eſteem the meaneſt which we can conceive?—Would it not be ſomething like this? Nothing beyond acorns for food, beyond a rude ſkin for raiment, or beyond a cavern or hollow tree to provide us with a dwelling?—Indeed this would be bad enough.—And do you not imagine, as far as this, we might each ſupply ourſelves, though we lived in woods, mere ſolitary ſavages?

Suppoſe then that our ſupplies were to be mended—for inſtance, that we were to exchange acorns for bread.—Would our *ſaving character* be ſufficient here?—Muſt we not be a little better diſciplined?—Would not ſome art be requiſite?—The baker's, for example.—And previouſly to the baker's, that of the miller?—And previouſly to the miller's, that of the huſbandman?—Three

ts then appear neceſſary, even upon the loweſt eſti-
ation.

But a queſtion farther—Can the huſbandman work,
ink you, without his tools?—Muſt he not have his
ough, his harrow, his reap-hook, and the like?—And
uſt not thoſe other artiſts too be furniſhed in the ſame
anner?—And whence muſt they be furniſhed? From
ieir own arts.—Or are not the making tools, and the
ing them, two different occupations?—Does agricul-
ire make its own plough, its own harrow?—Or does it
ot apply to other arts for all neceſſaries of this kind?—
gain—Does the baker build his own oven, or the mil-
r frame his own mill?

What a tribe of mechanics then are advancing upon
?—Smiths, carpenters, maſons, mill-wrights—and all
eſe to provide the ſingle neceſſary of bread.—Not leſs
an ſeven or eight arts, we find, are wanting at the
weſt.—And what if, to the providing a comfortable
ttage, and raiment ſuitable to an induſtrious hind, we
low a dozen arts more?—It would be eaſy, by the ſame
ſoning, to prove the number double.

If ſo it ſhould ſeem, that towards a tolerable ſupply of
e three primary and common neceſſaries, FOOD, RAI-

MENT,

MENT, and a DWELLING, not leſs than twenty arts were, on the loweſt account, requiſite.

And is one man equal, think you, to the exerciſe of theſe twenty arts?—If he had even genius, which we can ſcarce imagine, is it poſſible he ſhould find leiſure?—If ſo, then a ſolitary unſocial ſtate can never ſupply tolerably the common neceſſaries of life.

But what if we paſs from the *neceſſaries* of life to the *elegancies*?—To muſic, ſculpture, painting, and poetry?—What if we paſs from all arts, whether neceſſary or elegant, to the large and various tribe of Sciences? To logic, mathematics, aſtronomy, phyſics?—Can one man, imagine you, maſter all this?—And yet in this cycle of ſciences and arts ſeem included the comforts as well as ornaments of life.

What then muſt be done? In what manner muſt we be ſupplied?—I know not how, unleſs we make a diſtribution.—Let one exerciſe one art, and another a different—let this man ſtudy ſuch a ſcience, and that man another.—Thus the whole cycle may be carried eaſily into perfection.

Now we ſee a new face of things.—The *ſavages*, with their ſkins and their caverns, diſappear.—In their place I behold a fair community riſing.—No longer woods,

no longer ſolitude; but all is ſocial, civil, and cultivated. —And can we doubt any farther whether ſociety be natural?—Is not this evidently the ſtate which can beſt ſupply the primary wants?—And did we not agree ſome time ſince, that this ſtate, whatever we found it, would be certainly of all others the moſt agreeable to our nature?—We did.—And have we not added, ſince this, to the weight of our argument, by paſſing from the neceſſary arts to the elegant; from the elegant to the ſciences? We have.—The more we conſider, the more ſhall we be convinced, that all theſe, the nobleſt honours and ornaments of the human mind, without that leiſure, that experience, that emulation, that reward, which the *ſocial ſtate* alone we know is able to provide them, could never have found exiſtence, or been in the leaſt recognized.

LET IT NOT BE FORGOTTEN THEN, IN FAVOUR OF SOCIETY, THAT TO IT WE OWE, NOT ONLY THE BEGINNING AND CONTINUATION, BUT THE WELL-BEING, AND (IF I MAY USE THE EXPRESSION) THE VERY ELEGANCE AND RATIONALITY OF OUR EXISTENCE.

And what then, if ſociety be thus agreeable to our nature, is there nothing, think you, within us to ex-

cite and lead us to it? No impulſe, no preparation of faculties?—It would be ſtrange if there ſhould not.—It would be a ſingular exception with reſpect to all other herding ſpecies.—Let us however examine—*pity, benevolence, friendſhip, love; the general diſlike of ſolitude, and deſire of company*; are they natural affections which come of themſelves; or are they taught us by art, like muſic and arithmetic?—And are not the powers and capacities of ſpeech the ſame? Are not all men naturally formed to expreſs their ſentiments by ſome kind of language?

If then theſe ſeveral powers and diſpoſitions are natural, ſo ſhould ſeem too their exerciſe.—And if their exerciſe, then ſo too that ſtate where alone they can be exerciſed.—And what is this ſtate but the ſocial?—Or where elſe is it poſſible to converſe, or uſe our ſpeech; to exhibit actions of *pity, benevolence, friendſhip*, or *love*; to relieve our averſion to ſolitude, or gratify our deſire of being with others?

You ſee then a preparation of faculties is not wanting. We are fitted with *powers* and *diſpoſitions* which have only *relation* to ſociety; and which, out of ſociety, can no where elſe be exerciſed.—You have ſeen, too, the

the ſuperior advantages of the ſocial ſtate above all others.

LET THIS THEN EVER BE REMEMBERED, REMEMBERED AS A FIRST PRINCIPLE IN OUR IDEAS OF HUMANITY, THAT MAN BY NATURE IS TRULY A SOCIAL ANIMAL *.

The effects of *the diviſion of labour*, in the general buſineſs of ſociety, will be more eaſily underſtood by conſidering in what manner it operates in ſome particular manufactures.—It is commonly ſuppoſed to be carried fartheſt in ſome very *trifling* ones; not perhaps that it really is carried further in them than in others of more *importance*: but in thoſe trifling manufactures which are deſtined to ſupply the ſmall wants of but a ſmall number of people, the whole number of workmen muſt neceſſarily be ſmall; and thoſe employed in every different branch of the work can often be collected into the ſame workhouſe, and placed at once under the view of the ſpectator.—In thoſe *great manufactures*, on the contrary, which are deſtined to ſupply the great wants of the great body of the people, every different branch of the work employs ſo great a number of workmen,

* *Harris.*

that it is impoſſible to collect them all into the ſame workhouſe.—We can ſeldom ſee more, at one time, than thoſe employed in one ſingle branch.—Though in ſuch manufactures, therefore, the work may really be divided into a much greater number of parts than in thoſe of a more trifling nature, the diviſion is not near ſo obvious, and has accordingly been much leſs obſerved.

But to take an example from a very trifling manufacture; but one in which the diviſion of labour has been very often taken notice of, the trade of the *pin-maker*; a workman not educated to this buſineſs (which the diviſion of labour has rendered a diſtinct trade), nor acquainted with the uſe of the machinery employed in it (to the invention of which the ſame diviſion of labour has probably given occaſion), could ſcarce, perhaps, with his utmoſt induſtry, make *one* pin in a day, and certainly could not *twenty*.—But in the way in which this buſineſs is now carried on, not only the whole work is a peculiar trade, but it is divided into a number of branches, of which the greater part are likewiſe peculiar trades.—*One man draws out the wire, another ſtraights it, a third cuts it, a fourth points it, a fifth grinds it at the top for receiving the head; to make the head requires two or three diſtinct operations; to put it*

on

on is a peculiar buſineſs, to whiten the pins is another; it is even a trade by itſelf to put them into the paper; and the important buſineſs of making a pin is, in this manner, divided into about *eighteen* diſtinct operations, which, in ſome manufactories, are all performed by diſtinct hands, though in others the ſame man will ſometimes perform two or three of them.—I have ſeen a ſmall manufactory of this kind where ten men only were employed, and where ſome of them conſequently performed two or three diſtinct operations.—But though they were very poor, and therefore but indifferently accommodated with the neceſſary machinery, they could, when they exerted themſelves, make among them about *twelve pounds of pins in a day*.—There are in a pound upwards of *four thouſand* pins of a middling ſize.—Thoſe ten perſons, therefore, could make among them upwards of *forty-eight thouſand* pins in a day.—Each perſon, therefore, making a tenth part of forty-eight thouſand pins, might be conſidered as making *four thouſand eight hundred* pins in a day.—But if they had all wrought ſeparately and independently, and without any of them having been educated to this peculiar buſineſs, they certainly could not each of them have made *twenty*, perhaps not *one* pin in a day; that is, certainly, not the two hundred

hundred and fortieth, perhaps not the four thouſand eight hundredth part of what they are at preſent capable of performing, IN CONSEQUENCE *of a proper diviſion and combination of their different operations.*

In every other art and manufacture, the effects of *the diviſion of labour* are ſimilar to what they are in this very trifling one; though in many of them the labour can neither be ſo much ſubdivided, nor reduced to ſo great a ſimplicity of operation.—The diviſion of labour, however, ſo far as it can be introduced, occaſions in every art a proportionable increaſe of the productive powers of labour.—The ſeparation of different trades and employments from one another, ſeems to have taken place in conſequence of this advantage.—This ſeparation too is generally carried furtheſt in thoſe countries which enjoy the higheſt degree of induſtry and improvement; what is the work of one man in a rude ſtate of ſociety being generally that of ſeveral in an improved one.—In every improved ſociety the farmer is generally nothing but a farmer, the manufacturer nothing but a manufacturer. —The labour too which is neceſſary to produce any one complete manufacture, is almoſt always divided among a great number of hands.—How many different trades are employed in each branch of the linen and woollen

manufactures, from the growers of the flax and the wool to the bleachers and ſmoothers of the linen, or to the dyers and dreſſers of the cloth!

The great increaſe in the quantity of work which, IN CONSEQUENCE of *the diviſion of labour*, the ſame number of people are capable of performing, is owing to *three* different circumſtances.

1. To the increaſe of *dexterity* in every particular workman.

2. To the *ſaving of* the *time* which is commonly loſt in paſſing from one ſpecies of work to another.

And 3. To the invention of a great number of *machines* which facilitate and abridge labour, and enable one man to do the work of many.

FIRST, the improvement of the *dexterity* of the workman neceſſarily increaſes the quantity of the work he can perform; and the diviſion of labour, by reducing every man's buſineſs to ſome one ſimple operation, and by making this operation the ſole employment of his life, neceſſarily increaſes very much the dexterity of the workman.

A *common ſmith*, who, though accuſtomed to handle the hammer, has never been uſed to make nails, if upon ſome particular occaſion he is obliged to attempt it, will

will ſcarce, I am aſſured, be able to make above *two* or *three hundred nails* in a day, and thoſe too very bad ones.

A *ſmith* who has been accuſtomed to make nails, but whoſe ſole or principal buſineſs has not been that of a nailer, can ſeldom with his utmoſt diligence make more than *eight hundred* or a *thouſand nails* in a day.

I have ſeen ſeveral boys under twenty years of age who had never exerciſed any other trade but that of making nails, and who, when they exerted themſelves, could make each of them upwards of two thouſand three hundred nails in a day.

The making of a nail, however, is by no means one of the ſimpleſt operations.—The ſame perſon blows the bellows, ſtirs or mends the fire as there is occaſion, heats the iron, and forges every part of the nail: in forging the head too he is obliged to change his tools.—The different operations into which the making of a pin, or of a metal button, is ſubdivided, are all of them much more ſimple, and the dexterity of the perſon, of whoſe life it has been the ſole buſineſs to perform them, is uſually much greater.—The rapidity with which ſome of the operations of thoſe manufactures are performed, exceeds

teeds what the human hand could, by thoſe who had never ſeen them, be ſuppoſed capable of acquiring.

SECONDLY, the advantage which is gained *by ſaving the time commonly loſt in paſſing from one ſort of work to another*, is much greater than we ſhould at firſt view be apt to imagine it.—It is impoſſible to paſs very quickly from one kind of work to another, that is carried on in a different place, and with quite different tools.—A country weaver, who cultivates a ſmall farm, muſt loſe a good deal of time in paſſing from his loom to the field, and from the field to his loom.—When the two trades can be carried on in the ſame workhouſe, the loſs of time is, no doubt, much leſs.—It is even in this caſe, however, very conſiderable.—A man commonly ſaunters a little in turning his hand from one ſort of employment to another.—When he firſt begins the new work he is ſeldom very keen and hearty; his mind, as they ſay, does not go to it, and for ſome time he rather trifles than applies to good purpoſe.—The habit of ſauntering, and of indolent careleſs application, which is naturally, or rather neceſſarily, acquired by every country workman who is obliged to change his work and his tools every half hour, and to apply his hand in twenty different

ways almoſt every day of his life; renders him almoſt always ſlothful and lazy, and incapable of any vigorous application even on the moſt preſſing occaſions.—Independent, therefore, of his deficiency in point of dexterity, *this cauſe alone* muſt always reduce conſiderably the quantity of work which he is capable of performing.

THIRDLY, and laſtly, every body muſt be ſenſible how much labour is facilitated and abridged by the application of proper *machinery*.—It is unneceſſary to give any example.—I ſhall only obſerve, therefore, that the invention of all thoſe machines by which labour is ſo much facilitated and abridged, ſeems to have been originally owing to the diviſion of labour *.—Men are much

* A *broad-wheeled waggon*, attended by two men, and drawn by eight horſes, in about ſix weeks time carries and brings back between London and Edinburgh near four ton weight of goods. In about the ſame time a ſhip, navigated by ſix or eight men, and ſailing between the ports of London and Leith, frequently carries and brings back two hundred ton weight of goods. *Six* or *eight* men, therefore, by the help of WATER-CARRIAGE, can carry and bring back in the ſame time the ſame quantity of goods between London and Edinburgh, as *fifty broad-wheeled waggons*, attended by a *hundred men*, and drawn by *four hundred horſes*. Upon two hundred tons of goods, therefore, carried by the cheapeſt land-carriage from London to Edinburgh, there muſt be charged the maintenance of a hundred men for three weeks, and both the maintenance, and, what is nearly equal to the maintenance, the wear and tear of four hundred horſes as well as of fifty great waggons. *Whereas, upon the ſame quantity of goods carried by water, there is to be charged only the maintenance*

much more likely to diſcover eaſier and readier methods of attaining any object, when the whole attention of their minds is directed towards that ſingle object, than when it is diſſipated among a great variety of things.—But in conſequence of the diviſion of labour, the whole of every man's attention comes naturally to be directed towards ſome one very ſimple object.—It is naturally to be expected, therefore, that ſome one or other of thoſe who are employed in each particular branch of labour ſhould ſoon find out eaſier and readier methods of performing their own particular work, wherever the nature of it admits of ſuch improvement.—A great part of

tenance of ſix or eight men, and the wear and tear of a ſhip of two hundred tons burthen, together with the value of the ſuperior riſk, or the difference of the inſurance between land and water-carriage. Were there no other communication between thoſe two places, therefore, but by land-carriage, as no goods could be tranſported from the one to the other, except ſuch whoſe price was very conſiderable in proportion to their weight, they could carry on but a ſmall part of that commerce which at preſent ſubſiſts between them, and conſequently could give but a ſmall part of that encouragement which they at preſent mutually afford to each other's induſtry. There could be little or no commerce of any kind between the diſtant parts of the world. What goods could bear the expence of land-carriage between London and Calcutta? Or if there were any ſo precious as to be able to ſupport this expence, with what ſafety could they be tranſported through the territories of ſo many barbarous nations? Thoſe two cities, however, at preſent carry on a very conſiderable commerce with each other, and by mutually affording a market, give a good deal of encouragement to each other's induſtry.

the machines made uſe of in thoſe manufactures in which labour is moſt ſubdivided, were originally the inventions of common workmen, who, being each of them employed in ſome very ſimple operation, naturally turned their thoughts towards finding out eaſier and readier methods of performing it.—Whoever has been much accuſtomed to viſit ſuch manufactures, muſt frequently have been ſhewn very pretty machines which were the inventions of ſuch workmen, in order to facilitate and quicken their own particular part of the work. —*In the firſt fire-engines a boy was conſtantly employed to open and ſhut alternately the communication between the boiler and the cylinder, according as the piſton either aſcended or deſcended.—One of thoſe boys, who loved to play with his compaaions, obſerved that, by tying a ſtring from the handle of the valve which opened this communication to another part of the machine, the valve would open and ſhut without his aſſiſtance, and leave him at liberty to divert himſelf with his play-fellows.*—One of the greateſt improvements that has been made upon this machine ſince it was firſt invented, was in this manner the diſcovery of a *boy* who wanted to ſave his own labour.

All the improvements in machinery, however, have by no means been the inventions of thoſe who had oc-

caſion to uſe the machines.—Many improvements have been made by the ingenuity of the makers of the machines, when to make them became the buſineſs of a peculiar trade; and ſome by that of thoſe who are called philoſophers, or men of ſpeculation, whoſe trade it is not to do any thing, but to obſerve every thing; and who, upon that account, are often capable of *combining* together the powers of the moſt diſtant and diſſimilar objects.—In the progreſs of ſociety, *philoſophy* or *ſpeculation* becomes, like every other employment, the principal or ſole occupation of a particular claſs of citizens.—Like every other employment too, it is ſubdivided into a great number of different branches, each of which affords occupation to a peculiar tribe or claſs of philoſophers; and this ſubdiviſion of employment in philoſophy, as well as in every other buſineſs, improves dexterity, and ſaves time.—Each individual becomes more expert in his own peculiar branch, more work is done upon the whole, and the quantity of ſcience is conſiderably increaſed by it.

IT IS THE GREAT MULTIPLICATION OF THE PRODUCTIONS OF ALL THE DIFFERENT ARTS, IN CONSEQUENCE OF THE DIVISION OF LABOUR, WHICH OCCASIONS, IN A WELL-GOVERNED SOCIETY, THAT UNIVERSAL

VERSAL OPULENCE WHICH EXTENDS ITSELF TO THE LOWEST RANKS OF THE PEOPLE.—EVERY WORKMAN HAS A GREAT QUANTITY OF HIS OWN WORK TO DISPOSE OF BEYOND WHAT HE HIMSELF HAS OCCASION FOR; AND EVERY OTHER WORKMAN BEING EXACTLY IN THE SAME SITUATION, HE IS ENABLED TO EXCHANGE A GREAT QUANTITY OF HIS OWN GOODS FOR A GREAT QUANTITY, OR, WHAT COMES TO THE SAME THING, FOR THE PRICE OF A GREAT QUANTITY OF THEIRS.—HE SUPPLIES THEM ABUNDANTLY WITH WHAT THEY HAVE OCCASION FOR, AND THEY ACCOMMODATE HIM AS AMPLY WITH WHAT HE HAS OCCASION FOR, AND A GENERAL PLENTY DIFFUSES ITSELF THROUGH ALL THE DIFFERENT RANKS OF THE SOCIETY.

Obſerve the *accommodation* of the moſt common artificer or day-labourer in a civilized and thriving country, and you will perceive that the number of people of whoſe induſtry a part, though but a ſmall part, has been employed in procuring him this accommodation, exceeds all computation.—*The woollen coat, for example, which covers the day-labourer, as coarſe and rough as it may appear, is the produce of the joint labour of a great multitude of workmen.—The ſhepherd, the ſorter of the wool, the wool-*

wool-comber or carder, the dyer, the ſcribbler, the ſpinner, the weaver, the fuller, the dreſſer, with many others, muſt all join their different arts in order to complete even this homely production.—How many merchants and carriers, beſides, muſt have been employed in tranſporting the materials from ſome of thoſe workmen to others, who often live in a very diſtant part of the country! how much commerce and navigation in particular; how many ſhip-builders, ſailors, ſail-makers, rope-makers, muſt have been employed in order to bring together the different drugs made uſe of by the dyer, which often come from the remoteſt corners of the world! What a variety of labour too is neceſſary in order to produce the tools of the meaneſt of thoſe workmen! To ſay nothing of ſuch complicated machines as the ſhip of the ſailor, the mill of the fuller, or even the loom of the weaver, let us conſider only what a variety of labour is requiſite in order to form that very ſimple machine, the ſhears with which the ſhepherd*

* In civilized ſociety man ſtands at all times in need of the co-operation and aſſiſtance of *great multitudes*, while his *whole life* is ſcarce *ſufficient* to gain the *friendſhip* of a *few perſons*. In almoſt every other race of animals, each individual, when it is grown up to maturity, is entirely independent, and in its natural ſtate has occaſion for the aſſiſtance of no other living creature. But man has almoſt conſtant occaſion for the help of his brethren, and it is in vain for him to expect it from their *benevolence* only. He will be more likely to prevail if he can intereſt their *ſelf-love* in his favour, and ſhew them that it is for their own advantage to do for him what he requires of them.—*Vide the Sect. on the Principle of Trade.*

clips

clips the wool.—The miner, the builder of the furnace for ſmelting the ore, the feller of the timber, the burner of the charcoal to be made uſe of in the ſmelting-houſe, the brick-maker, the brick-layer, the workmen who attend the furnace, the mill-wright, the forger, the ſmith, muſt all of them join their different arts in order to produce them.—Were we to examine, in the ſame manner, all the different parts of his *dreſs* and *houſehold furniture*, the *coarſe linen ſhirt* which he wears next his ſkin, the *ſhoes* which cover his feet, the *bed* which he lies on, and all the different parts which compoſe it, the *kitchen-grate* at which he prepares his victuals, the *coals* which he makes uſe of for that purpoſe, dug from the bowels of the earth, and brought to him perhaps by a long ſea and a long land carriage, all the other *utenſils* of his kitchen, all the *furniture* of his table, the *knives* and *forks*, the *earthen* or *pewter plates* upon which he ſerves up and divides his victuals, the different hands employed in preparing his *bread* and his *beer*, the *glaſs window* which lets in the heat and the light, and keeps out the wind and the rain, with all the knowledge and art requiſite for preparing that beautiful and happy invention, without which theſe northern parts of the world could ſcarce have afforded a very comfortable habitation, together with the *tools* of all the different workmen

workmen employed in producing thoſe different conveniencies; if we examine, I ſay, all theſe things, and conſider what a variety of labour is employed about each of them, we ſhall be ſenſible that *without* the aſſiſtance and *co-operation* of *many thouſands*, the very *meaneſt perſon* in a *civilized country* could not be provided, even according to, what we very falſely imagine, the eaſy and ſimple manner in which he is commonly accommodated.—Compared, indeed, with the more extravagant luxury of the great, his accommodation muſt no doubt appear extremely ſimple and eaſy; and yet it may be true, perhaps, that the accommodation of an European prince does not always ſo much exceed that of an induſtrious and frugal peaſant, as the accommodation of the latter exceeds that of many *an African king*, the abſolute maſter of the lives and liberties of ten thouſand naked ſavages *.

* Adam Smith.

SECT. IX.

ON THE INTRODUCTION OF MONEY.

WHEN *the diviſion of labour* has been once thoroughly eſtabliſhed, it is but a very ſmall part of a man's wants which the produce of his own labour can ſupply.—He ſupplies the far greater part of them by exchanging that ſurplus part of the produce of his own labour, which is over and above his own conſumption, for ſuch parts of the produce of other men's labour as he has occaſion for.—Every man thus lives by *exchanging*, or becomes in ſome meaſure a merchant, and the ſociety itſelf grows to be what is properly a commercial ſociety.

But when the diviſion of labour *firſt* began to take place, this power of exchanging muſt frequently have been very much clogged and embarraſſed in its operations.—One man, we ſhall ſuppoſe, has more of a certain commodity than he himſelf has occaſion for, while another has leſs.—The former conſequently would be glad

glad to diſpoſe of, and the latter to purchaſe, a part of this ſuperfluity.—But if this latter ſhould chance to have nothing that the former ſtands in need of, no exchange can be made between them.—The butcher has more meat in his ſhop than he himſelf can conſume, and the brewer and the baker would each of them be willing to purchaſe a part of it.—But they have nothing to offer in exchange, except the different productions of their reſpective trades, and the butcher is already provided with all the bread and beer which he has immediate occaſion for.—No exchange can, in this caſe, be made between them.—He cannot be their merchant, nor they his cuſtomers; and they are all of them thus mutually leſs ſerviceable to one another.—*In order to remove the inconveniency of ſuch ſituations*, every prudent man in every period of ſociety, after the firſt eſtabliſhment of the diviſion of labour, muſt naturally have endeavoured to manage his affairs in ſuch a manner, as to have at all times by him, beſides the peculiar produce of his own induſtry, a certain quantity of ſome one commodity or other, ſuch as he imagined few people would be likely to refuſe in exchange for the produce of their induſtry.

Many different commodities, it is probable, were ſuc-

ceſſively both thought of and employed for this purpoſe. —In the rude ages of ſociety, cattle are ſaid to have been the common inſtrument of commerce; and, though they muſt have been a moſt inconvenient one, yet in old times we find things were frequently valued according to the number of cattle which had been given in exchange for them.—The armour of Diomede, ſays Homer, coſt only *nine oxen*; but that of Glaucus coſt *an hundred oxen.*—*Salt* is ſaid to be the common inſtrument of commerce and exchanges in ABYSSINIA; a ſpecies of *ſhells* in ſome parts of the COAST of INDIA; dried *cod* at NEWFOUNDLAND; *tobacco* in VIRGINIA; *ſugar* in ſome of our WEST INDIA COLONIES; *hides* or *dreſſed leather* in ſome other countries; and there is at this day a village in SCOTLAND where it is not uncommon, I am told, for a workman to carry *nails* inſtead of money to the baker's ſhop or the ale-houſe.

In all countries, however, men ſeem at laſt to have been determined by irreſiſtible reaſons to give the preference, for this employment, to metals above every other commodity.—Metals can not only be kept with as little loſs as any other commodity, ſcarce any thing being leſs periſhable than they are, but they can likewiſe, without any loſs, be divided into any number of parts, as by fuſion thoſe

parts

parts can eaſily be reunited again; a quality which no other equally durable commodities poſſeſs, and which more than any other quality renders them fit to be the inſtruments of commerce and circulation.—The man who wanted to buy ſalt, for example, and had nothing but cattle to give in exchange for it, muſt have been obliged to buy ſalt to the value of a whole ox, or a whole ſheep, at a time.—He could ſeldom buy leſs than this, becauſe what he was to give for it could ſeldom be divided without loſs; and if he had a mind to buy more, he muſt, for the ſame reaſons, have been obliged to buy double or triple the quantity, the value, to wit, of two or three oxen, or of two or three ſheep.—If, on the contrary, inſtead of ſheep or oxen, he had *metals* to give in exchange for it, he could eaſily *proportion* the quantity of the metal to the preciſe quantity of the commodity which he had immediate occaſion for*.

IT IS IN THIS MANNER THAT MONEY HAS BECOME IN ALL CIVILIZED NATIONS THE UNIVERSAL INSTRUMENT OF COMMERCE, BY THE INTERVENTION OF WHICH GOODS OF ALL KINDS ARE BOUGHT AND SOLD, OR EXCHANGED FOR ONE ANOTHER.

* ADAM SMITH.

SECT.

SECT. X.

OF THE PRICE OF COMMODITIES.

In that early and rude ſtate of ſociety which precedes both the accumulation of ſtock and the appropriation of land, the proportion between the quantities of labour neceſſary for acquiring different objects ſeems to be the only circumſtance which can afford any rule for exchanging them for one another.—If among a nation of hunters, for example, *it uſually coſts twice the labour* to kill a beaver which it does to kill a deer, *one beaver* ſhould naturally exchange for, or be worth *two deer*.—It is natural that what is uſually the produce of two days or two hours labour, ſhould be worth double of what is uſually the produce of one day's or one hour's labour.

If the one ſpecies of labour ſhould be *more ſevere* than the other, ſome allowance will naturally be made for this ſuperior hardſhip; and the produce of one hour's labour

labour in the one way may frequently exchange for that of two hours labour in the other.

Or if the one ſpecies of labour requires *an uncommon degree* of *dexterity* and *ingenuity*, the eſteem which men have for ſuch talents, will naturally give a value to their produce, ſuperior to what would be due to the time employed about it.—Such talents can ſeldom be acquired but in conſequence of long application, and the ſuperior value of their produce may frequently be no more than a reaſonable compenſation for the time and labour which muſt be ſpent in acquiring them.

In the price of CORN, *one part* pays the rent of the landlord, *another* pays the wages or maintenance of the labourers and labouring cattle employed in producing it, and *the third* pays the profit of the farmer.—Theſe *three* parts ſeem either immediately or ultimately to make up the *whole price* of corn.—A *fourth* part, it may perhaps be thought, is neceſſary for replacing the ſtock of the farmer, or for compenſating the wear and tear of his labouring cattle, and other inſtruments of huſbandry.

In the price of FLOUR or MEAL we muſt add to the price of the corn, the profits of the miller, and the wages of his ſervants; in the price of BREAD, the profits of the baker, and the wages of his ſervants; and in the

price of *both*, the labour of tranſporting the corn from the houſe of the farmer to that of the miller, and from that of the miller to that of the baker, together with the profits of thoſe who advance the wages of that labour.

The price of FLAX reſolves itſelf into the ſame three parts as that of corn.—In the price of LINEN we muſt add to this price the wages of the flax-dreſſer, of the ſpinner, of the weaver, of the bleacher, &c. together with the profits of their reſpective employers.

A gentleman who *farms* a part of his own eſtate, after paying the expence of cultivation, ſhould gain both the rent of the *landlord* and the profit of the *farmer*.—He is apt to denominate, however, his whole gain, *profit*, and thus confounds rent with profit, at leaſt in common language.

Common farmers ſeldom employ any overſeer to direct the general operations of the farm. They generally too work a good deal with their own hands, as ploughmen, harrowers, &c.—What remains of the crop after paying the rent, therefore, ſhould not only replace to them their ſtock employed in cultivation, together with its ordinary profits, but pay them the wages which are due to them, both as *labourers* and *overſeers*.—Whatever remains,

mains, however, after paying the rent and keeping up the ſtock, is called profit,—but *wages* evidently make a part of it.—The farmer, *by ſaving theſe wages*, muſt neceſſarily *gain them.*—Wages, therefore, are in this caſe confounded with profit.

An *independent manufacturer*, who has ſtock enough both to purchaſe materials, and to maintain himſelf till he can carry his work to market, ſhould gain both the wages of a journeyman who works under a maſter, and the profit which that maſter makes by the ſale of the journeyman's work.—His whole gains, however, are commonly called profit, and wages are, in this caſe too, confounded with profit.

A *gardener* who cultivates his own garden with his own hands, unites in his own perſon the three different characters, of *landlord*, *farmer*, and *labourer*.—His produce, therefore, ſhould pay him the rent of the *firſt*, the profit of the *ſecond*, and the wages of the *third*.—The whole, however, is commonly conſidered as the earnings of his labour.—Both rent and profit are, in this caſe, confounded with wages.

An apothecary charges in his drugs the expence of his education, his houſe, his carriage if he has one, his conſtant attendance to the wiſhes of his employers, &c.—

But the whole is confounded in the idea of the value of the articles employed.

It is ſhameful to ſee the confuſion at preſent exiſting with reſpect to MEDICINE.—*Quacks* are riding in their coaches, while many of the *regular faculty* abſolutely ſtarve.—*Phyſicians* inſtead of directing the *apothecary* write now for the *druggiſt*, and *druggiſts* in return have uſurped the privilege of *medical advice*.—*Man-midwives* and *dentiſts* call themſelves *ſurgeons*.—*Apothecaries*, nay *ſurgeons*, preſcribe like *phyſicians*, and accept the fee as ſuch, and we find, *even* in capital towns, the union of OCCULIST — SURGEON — DENTIST — MAN-MIDWIFE — APOTHECARY—and DRUGGIST, in the ſame perſon, which deſtroys altogether the advantage which reſults to ſociety from the *proper diſtribution of labour*.

Why does not government interfere in regulating the practice of medicine?—The *chemiſt*, by not including *medical advice*, ſhould demand leſs than the *apothecary*, who includes his attendance and ſkill in the drug. It would be certainly much to the advantage of the public, were the employments of *druggiſt* and *apothecary* ſeparate, were the latter INSPECTORS of the ſhops of the former, and only, in fact, MEDICAL ADVISERS.—Drugs would not then be improperly heaped on the patient,

and

and the *apothecary* and *phyſician* might ſtill be diſtinguiſhed, by their education and fee.—The fears of colluſion between the *doctor* and *apothecary*, too often unjuſtly entertained, would ceaſe, and *the practice of medicine would be put on a more liberal and gentleman-like footing* *.

* Adam Smith.

SECT. XI.

OF THE PRINCIPLE OF TRADE.

THIS diviſion of labour, from which ſo many advantages are derived, is not originally the effect of any human wiſdom, which foreſees and intends that general opulence to which it gives occaſion.—It is the neceſſary, though very ſlow and gradual, conſequence of a certain propenſity in human nature which has in view no ſuch extenſive utility; it ariſes from *ſelf-love*.

In civilized ſociety man ſtands at all times in need of the co-operation and aſſiſtance of great multitudes, while his *whole life* is ſcarce ſufficient to gain the *friendſhip* of a few perſons.—In almoſt every other race of animals, each individual, when it is grown up to maturity, is entirely independent, and in its natural ſtate has occaſion for the aſſiſtance of no other living creature.—*But man has almoſt conſtant occaſion for the help of his brethren*, and it is in vain for him to expect it from *their benevolence only*.

only.—He will be more likely to prevail if he can intereſt their SELF-LOVE in his favour, and ſhew them that it is for *their own advantage* to do for him what he requires of them.—Whoever offers to another a bargain of any kind, propoſes to do this: "*Give me that which I want, and you ſhall have this which you want,*" is the meaning of every ſuch offer; and it is in this manner that we obtain from one another the far greater part of thoſe good offices which we ſtand in need of.—It is not from the *benevolence* of the *butcher*, the *brewer*, or the *baker*, that we *expect* our *dinner*, but from their regard to their own intereſt.—We addreſs ourſelves, not to their *humanity*, but to their *ſelf-love*; and never talk to them of *our own neceſſities*, but of their *advantages*.—Nobody but a beggar chooſes to depend chiefly upon the benevolence of his fellow-citizens.—Even a beggar does not depend upon it entirely.—The charity of well-diſpoſed people, indeed, ſupplies him with the whole fund of his ſubſiſtence.—But though this principle ultimately provides him with them as he has occaſion for them, the greater part of *his* occaſional wants are *ſupplied in the ſame manner* as thoſe of other people, by *treaty*, by *barter*, and by *purchaſe*.—With the money which one man gives him he purchaſes food.—The old clothes which

another beſtows upon him he exchanges for other old clothes which ſuit him better, or for lodging, or for food, or for money, with which he can buy either food, clothes, or lodging, as he has occaſion *.

* ADAM SMITH.

In the ſame manner our government (as was ſhewn in the chapter on the Reform of Parliament) depends not on the *patriotiſm* of the legiſlature: but on a more *certain foundation*—SELF-INTEREST—or *the balance of powers*. This is not ſaid to *decry* virtue: *for honeſty is the beſt policy, and when we deviate from the path of rectitude we act againſt our proper intereſt.* There is undoubtedly a certain kind of *honour* in trade, or fear of univerſal cenſure, and of the reſentment of the injured: but for all this, it is argued, that the *general* principle of trade is not generoſity and humanity, or Chriſtian philanthropy, but SELF-INTEREST; nor can it be imputed as a crime, that a man loves himſelf better than a neighbour, or perhaps a ſtranger, who has obliged him in nothing. To make every thing *run even*, the ſpring of activity ſhould be ſuch as has an influence on all deſcriptions of men.

SECT.

SECT. XII.

ON LUXURY.

LUXURY is a word of an uncertain ſignification, and may be taken in a *good* as well as in a *bad ſenſe*.—In general, it means great refinement in the gratification of the ſenſes; and *any degree of it* may be *innocent* or *blameable*, according to the age, or country, or condition of the perſon.—The bounds between virtue and vice cannot here be exactly fixed.—To imagine, that the gratifying of any ſenſe, or the indulging of any delicacy in meat, drink, or apparel, is of itſelf a vice, can never enter into a head that is not diſordered by the frenzies of enthuſiaſm.—I have, indeed, heard of a monk abroad, who, becauſe the windows of his cell opened upon a noble proſpect, made a covenant with his eyes never to turn that way, or receive *ſo ſenſual a gratification*.—And ſuch is the crime of drinking Champagne or Burgundy, preferable to ſmall beer or porter.—*Theſe indulgences are only vices, when they are purſued at the expence of ſome virtue*,

tue, as liberality or charity; in like manner as they are fallies, when for them a man ruins his fortune, and reduces himſelf to want and beggary —Where they entrench upon no virtue, but leave ample ſubject whence to provide for friends, family, and every proper object of generoſity or compaſſion, they are entirely innocent, and have in every age been acknowledged ſuch by almoſt all moraliſts.

Human happineſs, according to the moſt received notions, ſeems to conſiſt in three ingredients;

ACTION,
PLEASURE, and
INDOLENCE.

And though theſe ingredients ought to be mixed in different proportions, according to the particular diſpoſition of the perſon; yet no one ingredient can be entirely wanting, without deſtroying, in ſome meaſure, the reliſh of the whole compoſition.—*Indolence*, or repoſe, indeed, ſeems not of itſelf to contribute much to our enjoyment; but, like ſleep, is requiſite as an indulgence to the weakneſs of human nature, which cannot ſupport an uninterrupted courſe of buſineſs or pleaſure.—That quick march of the ſpirits, which takes a man from himſelf, and chiefly gives ſatisfaction, does in the end exhauſt the mind, and requires ſome intervals of repoſe,

:poſe, which, though agreeable for a moment, yet, if rolonged, beget a languor and lethargy, that deſtroys all enjoyment.—Education, cuſtom, and example, have a mighty influence in turning the mind to any of theſe purſuits; and it muſt be owned, that, where they promote a reliſh for *action* and *pleaſure*, they are ſo far favourable to human happineſs.—*In times when induſtry and the arts flouriſh, men are kept in perpetual occupation, and enjoy, as their reward,* THE OCCUPATION ITSELF, *as well as* THOSE PLEASURES *which are the fruit of their labour.*—The mind acquires new vigour; enlarges its powers and faculties; and by an aſſiduity in honeſt induſtry, both ſatisfies its natural appetites, and prevents the growth of unnatural ones, which commonly ſpring up, when nouriſhed by eaſe and idleneſs.—Baniſh thoſe arts from ſociety, you deprive men both of action and of pleaſure; and leaving nothing but indolence in their place, you even deſtroy the reliſh of indolence, which never is agreeable, but when it ſucceeds to labour, and recruits the ſpirits, exhauſted by too much application and fatigue.

Another advantage of induſtry and of refinements in the mechanical arts, is, that they commonly produce ſome refinements in the *liberal*; nor can one be carried to per-

fection, without being accompanied, in ſome degree, with the other.—The ſame age, which abounds with ſkilful weavers and ſhip-carpenters, uſually produces great philoſophers and politicians, renowned generals and poets.—The ſpi it of the age affects all the arts; and the minds of men, being once rouſed from their lethargy, and put into a fermentation, turn themſelves on all ſides, and carry improvements into every art and ſcience.—*Profound ignorance* is totally baniſhed, and men enjoy the privilege of rational creatures, to think as well as to act, to cultivate the pleaſures of the mind as well as thoſe of the body.

The more theſe refined arts advance, the more *ſociable* men become; nor is it poſſible, that, when enriched with ſcience, and poſſeſſed of a fund of converſation, they ſhould be contented to remain in ſolitude, or live with their fellow-citizens in that diſtant manner, which is peculiar to ignorant and barbarous nations.—They flock into cities; love to receive and communicate knowledge; to ſhew their wit or their breeding; their taſte in converſation or living, in clothes or furniture.—Curioſity allures the wiſe; vanity the fooliſh; and pleaſure both.—Particular clubs and ſocieties are every where formed: both ſexes meet in an eaſy and ſociable manner;

ner; and the tempers of men, as well as their behaviour, refine apace.—So that, beſide the improvements which they receive from knowledge and the liberal arts, it is impoſſible but they muſt feel an increaſe of humanity, from the very habit of converſing together, and contributing to each other's pleaſure and entertainment. Thus INDUSTRY, KNOWLEDGE, and HUMANITY, are linked together by an *indiſſoluble* chain, and are found, from experience as well as reaſon, to be *peculiar* to the *more poliſhed*, and, what are commonly denominated, *the more luxurious ages*.

Nor are THESE ADVANTAGES attended with *diſadvantages*, that bear *any proportion to them*.—The more men refine upon pleaſure, the leſs will they indulge in exceſſes of any kind; becauſe nothing is more deſtructive to true pleaſure than ſuch exceſſes.—One may ſafely affirm, that the *Tartars* are oftener guilty of *beaſtly gluttony*, when they feaſt on their dead horſes, than *European courtiers* with all their refinements of cookery.—And if libertine love, or even infidelity to the marriage-bed, be more frequent in polite ages; *drunkenneſs*, on the other hand, is much leſs common.

But INDUSTRY, KNOWLEDGE, and HUMANITY, are not advantageous in *private life* alone: they diffuſe their

beneficial influence on *the public*, and render the government as great and flouriſhing as they make individuals happy and proſperous.—The increaſe and conſumption of all the commodities, which ſerve to the ornament and pleaſure of life, are advantageous to ſociety; becauſe, at the ſame time that they multiply thoſe innocent gratifications to individuals, they are a kind of ſtorehouſe of labour, which, in the exigencies of ſtate, may be turned to the public ſervice.—In a nation, where there is no demand for ſuch ſuperfluities, men ſink into indolence, loſe all enjoyment of life, and are uſeleſs to the public, which cannot maintain or ſupport its fleets and armies, from the induſtry of ſuch ſlothful members.

The bounds of all the *European* kingdoms are, at preſent, nearly the ſame they were two hundred years ago: *but what a difference is there in the power and grandeur of thoſe kingdoms?* Which can be aſcribed to nothing but the increaſe of art and induſtry.—When CHARLES VIII. of France invaded Italy, he carried with him about 20,000 men: yet this armament ſo exhauſted the nation, as we learn from Guicciardin, that for ſome years it was not able to make any great effort.—LOUIS XIV. in time of war, kept in pay above 400,000 men †;

† The inſcription on the Place-de-Vendome ſays 440,000.

though

though from Mazarine's death to his own, he was engaged in a courſe of wars that laſted near thirty years.

This induſtry is much promoted by the knowledge inſeparable from ages of art and refinement; as, on the other hand, this knowledge enables the public to make the beſt advantage of the induſtry of its ſubjects.—Laws, order, police, diſcipline; theſe can never be carried to any degree of perfection, before human reaſon has refined itſelf by exerciſe, and by an application to the more vulgar arts, at leaſt, of *commerce* and *manufacture*.—Can we expect, that a government will be well modelled by a people, who know not how to make a ſpinning-wheel, or to employ a loom to advantage? Not to mention, that all ignorant ages are infeſted with ſuperſtition, which throws the government off its bias, and diſturbs men in the purſuit of their intereſt and happineſs.

Knowledge in the arts of government naturally begets mildneſs and moderation, by inſtructing men in the advantages of *humane maxims* above rigour and ſeverity, which drive ſubjects into rebellion, and make the return to ſubmiſſion impracticable, by cutting off all hopes of pardon.—When the tempers of men are ſoftened as well

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as their knowledge improved, *this humanity* appears ſtill more conſpicuous, and is the chief characteriſtic which diſtinguiſhes a civilized age from times of barbarity and ignorance.—*Factions are then leſs inveterate, revolutions leſs tragical, authority leſs ſevere, and ſeditions leſs frequent. —Even foreign wars abate of their cruelty; and after the field of battle, where honour and intereſt ſteel men againſt compaſſion as well as fear, the combatants diveſt themſelves of the brute, and reſume the man.*

Nor need we fear, that men, by loſing their ferocity, will loſe their martial ſpirit, or become leſs undaunted and vigorous in defence of their country or their liberty. —The arts have no ſuch effect in enervating either the mind or body.—On the contrary, induſtry, their inſeparable attendant, adds new force to both.—And if anger, which is ſaid to be the whetſtone of courage, loſes ſomewhat of its aſperity, by politeneſs and refinement; *a ſenſe of honour*, which is a ſtronger, more conſtant, and more governable principle, acquires freſh vigour by that elevation of genius which ariſes from knowledge and a good education.—Add to this, that courage can neither have any duration, nor be of any uſe, when not accompanied with diſcipline and martial ſkill, which are ſeldom found among a barbarous people.—The ancients

remarked, that *Datames* was the only barbarian that ever knew the art of war.—And *Pyrrhus*, ſeeing the ROMANS marſhal their army with ſome art and ſkill, ſaid with ſurpriſe, "*Thoſe barbarians have nothing barbarous in their diſcipline!*"

What has chiefly induced ſevere moraliſts to declaim againſt refinement in the arts, is the example of *ancient Rome*, which, joining to its poverty and ruſticity, virtue and public ſpirit, roſe to ſuch a ſurpriſing height of grandeur and liberty; but having learned from its conquered provinces *the Aſiatic luxury*, fell into every kind of corruption; whence aroſe *ſedition* and *civil wars*, attended at laſt with *the total loſs of liberty*.—All the Latin claſſics, whom we peruſe in our infancy, are full of theſe ſentiments, and univerſally aſcribe the ruin of their ſtate to the arts and riches imported from the eaſt: inſomuch that SALLUST repreſents a taſte for *painting* as a vice, no leſs than *lewdneſs* and *drinking*.—And ſo popular were theſe ſentiments, during the later ages of the republic, that this author abounds in praiſes of the old *rigid Roman virtue*, though himſelf the moſt egregious inſtance of modern luxury and corruption: ſpeaks contemptuouſly of the Grecian eloquence, though the moſt elegant writer in the world; nay, employs prepoſterous digreſ-

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ſions and declamations to this purpoſe, though a model of taſte and correctneſs.

But it would be eaſy to prove, that theſe writers *miſtook* the cauſe of the diſorders in the Roman ſtate, and *aſcribed* to *luxury* and *the arts*, what really proceeded from an *ill-modelled government*, and *the unlimited extent of conqueſts*.—Refinement on the pleaſures and conveniencies of life has no natural tendency to beget venality and corruption.—The value, which all men put upon any particular pleaſure, depends on compariſon and experience; nor is a porter leſs greedy of money, which he ſpends on bacon and brandy, than a courtier who purchaſes champagne and ortolans.—*Riches are valuable at all times, and to all men; becauſe they always purchaſe pleaſures, ſuch as men are accuſtomed to, and deſire: nor can any thing reſtrain or regulate the love of money, but a ſenſe of honour and honeſty; which, if it be not nearly equal at all times, will naturally abound moſt in ages of knowledge and refinement.*

The libertics of ENGLAND, ſo far from decaying ſince the improvements in the arts, have never flouriſhed ſo much as during that period.—*And though corruption may ſeem to increaſe of late years; this is chiefly to be aſcribed to our eſtabliſhed liberty, when our princes have found the impoſſibility*

poſſibility of governing without parliaments, or of terrifying parliaments by the phantom of prerogative.—Not to mention, that this corruption or venality prevails much more among the *electors* than the elected; and therefore cannot juſtly be aſcribed to any refinements in luxury.

If we conſider the matter in a proper light, we ſhall find, that a progreſs in the arts is rather favourable to *liberty*, and has a natural tendency to *preſerve*, if not produce, a FREE GOVERNMENT.—In rude unpoliſhed nations, where the arts are neglected, all labour is beſtowed on the cultivation of the ground; and the whole ſociety is divided into two claſſes, *proprietors of land*, and their *vaſſals* or *tenants*.—The *latter* are neceſſarily dependent, and fitted for ſlavery and ſubjection; eſpecially where they poſſeſs no riches, and are not valued for their knowledge in agriculture; as muſt always be the caſe where the arts are neglected.—The *former* naturally erect themſelves into petty tyrants; and muſt either ſubmit to an abſolute maſter, for the ſake of peace and order; or, if they will preſerve their independency, like the ancient barons, they muſt fall into feuds and conteſts among themſelves, and throw the whole ſociety into ſuch confuſion, as is perhaps worſe than the moſt

deſpotic government.—*But where luxury nouriſhes commerce and induſtry, the peaſants, by a proper cultivation of the land, become rich and independent; while the tradeſmen and merchants acquire a ſhare of the property, and draw authority and conſideration to that middling rank of men, who are the beſt and firmeſt baſis of public liberty.*—These ſubmit not to ſlavery, like the peaſants, from poverty and meanneſs of ſpirit; and, having no hopes of tyrannizing over others, like the barons, they are not tempted, for the ſake of that gratification, to ſubmit to the tyranny of their ſovereign.—They covet *equal laws*, which may ſecure their property, and preſerve them from *monarchical*, as well as *ariſtocratical tyranny* *.

UPON THE WHOLE IT APPEARS THEN, THE LABOURS OF AN INDUSTRIOUS AND INGENIOUS PEOPLE IN CIVILIZED COUNTRIES ARE VARIOUSLY, BUT INCESSANTLY EMPLOYED, IN THE SERVICE OF THE RICH.—IN THEIR DRESS, THEIR TABLE, THEIR HOUSES, AND THEIR FURNITURE, THE FAVOURITES OF FORTUNE UNITE EVERY REFINEMENT OF CONVENIENCY, OF ELEGANCE, AND OF SPLENDOUR; WHATEVER CAN SOOTH THEIR PRIDE, OR GRATIFY THEIR SENSUALITY.—SUCH REFINEMENTS UNDER THE ODI-

* HUME.

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OUS NAME OF LUXURY, HAVE BEEN SEVERELY ARRAIGNED BY THE MORALISTS OF EVERY AGE; BUT IN THE PRESENT IMPERFECT CONDITION OF SOCIETY, LUXURY, THOUGH IT MAY PROCEED FROM VICE OR FOLLY AND OCCASION THEM, SEEMS TO BE THE ONLY LIKELY MEANS TO PROMOTE THE INDUSTRY OF OTHERS, AND CORRECT THE UNEQUAL* DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY.—THE DILIGENT MECHANIC, AND THE SKILFUL ARTIST, WHO HAVE OBTAINED NO SHARE IN THE DIVISION OF THE EARTH, RECEIVE A VOLUNTARY TAX FROM THE POSSESSORS OF GREAT ESTATES; AND THE LATTER ARE PROMPTED, BY A SENSE OF INTEREST, TO IMPROVE THOSE LANDS, WITH WHOSE PRODUCE THEY MAY BE ENABLED TO PURCHASE ADDITIONAL PLEASURES.

SECT.

* It muſt, indeed, be confeſſed, that nature is ſo liberal to mankind, *that were all her preſents equally divided among the ſpecies, and improved by art and induſtry, every individual would enjoy all the neceſſaries, and even moſt of the comforts of life; nor would ever be liable to any ills, but ſuch as might accidentally ariſe from the ſickly frame and conſtitution of his body.*—It muſt be confeſſed, wherever we depart from the EQUALITY, we rob the *poor* of *more ſatisfaction* than we *add* to the *rich*, and that the *ſlight gratification* of a *frivolous vanity*, in ONE individual, frequently coſts more than *bread* to MANY FAMILIES, and EVEN PROVINCES.

But hiſtorians, alas! and even common ſenſe, may inform us, however

SECT. XIII.

ON LIBERTY AS CONNECTED WITH TRADE.

THE *arts* and *manufactures*, *trade* and *commerce*, are inſeparably connected with FREEDOM; *they ariſe* from IT; and *they* tend to *produce* IT.—Let any country *regain* its LIBERTY, and *theſe return*; let a country *loſe* its LIBERTY, and *theſe* gradually *die away*; let *them flouriſh*, and the country cannot eaſily be *ſubdued* by a *foreign power*, nor *enſlaved* by *its own ſovereign*.—*Artiſts*, *manufacturers*, and *merchants*, are the *life* and *ſoul* of LIBER-

ſpecious theſe *levelling ideas*, they are really, at bottom, *impracticable*; and were they not ſo, would be extremely *pernicious* to human ſociety.

Render poſſeſſions ever ſo *equal*, men's different degrees of art, care, and induſtry, will immediately break *that equality*.—Or if you *check theſe virtues*, you reduce ſociety to the extremeſt indigence; and inſtead of preventing *want* and *beggary* in a *few*, render it *unavoidable* to the *whole community*.—The moſt rigorous inquiſition, too, is requiſite to watch every inequality on its firſt appearance; and the moſt ſevere juriſdiction, to puniſh and redreſs it.—But beſides, that *ſo much authority* muſt ſoon degenerate into *tyranny*, and be exerted with *great partialities*; and who can poſſibly be poſſeſſed of it in the *ſavage ſtate* here ſuppoſed? HUME.——(This by the bye, that the meaning of the laſt paragraph may not be miſunderſtood.)

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TY; the metropolis is the chief vital part, where the firſt and the laſt pulſe of LIBERTY will be felt.

Under a deſpotic government, property is precarious, wealth is dangerous; it is not the intereſt of the deſpot to encourage trade, nor is it the intereſt of merchants and manufacturers to truſt a deſpot.

The moſt fertile country, if the government is not free, will not allure them; ſecurity of property, and certainty of enjoyment, being their firſt reſearch, theſe bees often lodge their honey in the barren rock.—The *Tyrians* by commerce acquired ſuch wealth and ſtrength, as enabled them for thirteen years to reſiſt the whole power of NEBUCHADNEZZAR; rather than ſubmit at laſt, they quitted a fertile country, and retired to a little iſland, where they built their city on a rock, and there maintained their freedom.—*Marſeilles* is ſurrounded by a barren country.—The cities of *Holland* are encloſed by marſhes, and *Venice* by the ſea.

At the commencement of the eleventh century, EUROPE began to *awake* as out of a deep ſleep; the eyes of its inhabitants were opened to ſee the *utility* of COMMERCE, with the *value* of LIBERTY, and their *mutual connection*.—They had borne the yoke of *feodal* tyranny for many ages.—That ſyſtem of government was

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very ſimple, but to the laſt degree oppreſſive.—The ſovereign ſometimes exerted deſpotic ſway over the feodal lords; at other times, indeed, his power was circumſcribed, and his authority deſpiſed; but the feodal lords themſelves exerciſed at *all times* the moſt abſolute dominion over their ſlaves and vaſſals.—Cities being ſubject to the juriſdiction and oppreſſion of the lords, and deſerted by merchants and manufacturers, were inhabited only by ſlaves, and the loweſt of the people.—The active and induſtrious artiſts were driven away by the impolitic exactions, and abſurd regulations of the avaricious barons.—In the eleventh century, ſome cities in *Italy* caſt off the yoke, others purchaſed their freedom, and eſtabliſhed an equal government.—The cities of *France*, *Germany*, *Spain*, and *England*, ſoon followed the example.

In the *train* of *returning* LIBERTY, came the *arts*, *manufactures*, *commerce*, *induſtry*, and *wealth*.—Happy had it been for mankind, if luxury could have been left behind.—Even luxury, under the reſtraint of reaſon and religion, is beneficial to ſociety, promotes induſtry, and leads to the perfection of the arts.

At the introduction of commerce, the cities of *Italy* took the lead, and ſoon eſtabliſhed their freedom and independence;

dependence; among theſe was *Florence*, by whoſe government, under the form of a democracy, encouraging and protecting manufactures, this city grew in power, and its citizens in wealth.

Venice is more ancient and honourable than *Florence*. *Venice* is governed by a peculiar kind of ariſtocracy, whoſe intereſt is to encourage commerce, becauſe her nobility engage in it.—*Jealous of her liberty, ſhe employs only foreign mercenaries in her army, while her navy, which is her chief ſtrength, is manned and commanded by her own ſubjects.*—By her traffic ſhe acquired ſuch wealth and power, as enabled her, in the beginning of the ſixteenth century, to reſiſt the united efforts of the *Pope*, the *Emperor* of *Germany*, the *kings* of *France* and *Arragon*, with almoſt *all the princes of Italy*.—It matters not what free form of government is adopted by any country, democracy, or mixed monarchy, provided the artiſts, manufacturers, and merchants, can find a ſpot where they may enjoy peace and quietneſs, protection and ſecurity for their perſons and poſſeſſions.—We have had examples of the two firſt; let us conſider an inſtance of the latter.—The *Seventeen Provinces* of the *Netherlands* were firſt united under *Philip of Burgundy*, in the beginning of the fifteenth century.—They had long en-

joyed the ſweets of a free government, ſimilar to that eſtabliſhed in all the northern nations.—The ſovereignty was hereditary, but the laws were paſſed, and taxes voted, by the three eſtates of the nobility, the clergy, and the commons.—Their cities had peculiar immunities and internal juriſdiction.—This ſecurity and happineſs was not diſturbed by *Philip*.—This prince being *wiſe*, conſidered, that the wealth which flowed into his dominions through the cities of *Bourges*, *Ghent*, and *Antwerp*, would ceaſe to flow, ſhould theſe cities loſe their LIBERTY; being *good*, HE LOVED HIS SUBJECTS, AND REJOICED TO SEE THEM HAPPY.—When therefore by their blood and treaſure he had eſtabliſhed his throne, and ſecured himſelf againſt the power of *France*, HE WAS CONTENTED TO REIGN OVER A FREE PEOPLE; KNOWING THAT THE HAPPINESS OF THE SUBJECT IS THE SUREST FOUNDATION OF THE SOVEREIGN'S GREATNESS.

The emperor *Charles* the Vth, being a native of the *Low Countries*, had a peculiar love for this part of his dominions; which, during his reign, continued to increaſe in wealth.—*Philip* the IId, his ſucceſſor in the *Netherlands* and *Spain*, being a prince of different diſpoſitions, and reſiding in *Spain*, his native country, appointed

pointed *the Ducheſs* of *Parma* regent of the *Low Countries*, with orders to ſet up THE INQUISITION *.—The common

* The *priſons* of the inquiſition are little dark cells, without any furniture but a hard quilt: the *priſoner* is not permitted to ſee any one except his keeper, in this cell, who brings his diet with a lamp that burns half an hour, and departs in ſilence. At the end of three days he is carried to the *inquiſitor*, and takes an oath to return true anſwers to all queſtions which ſhall be put to him, and to confeſs all his hereſies. If he have no hereſies to confeſs, he is carried back to his doleful dungeon for three days more, to recollect himſelf, and to call to mind his hereſies, his teachers, and his accomplices. Being again brought before the inquiſitors, they aſk him where he was born and educated; who were his parents, maſters, confeſſor; when he was laſt at confeſſion, or the maſs? If, in anſwering all theſe queſtions, he cannot be brought to accuſe himſelf, he is ſent back again to his dark and diſmal priſon, and time is given him to pray for repentance. At the end of three days he is carried again to the inquiſitors, who now examine him on the peculiar doctrines of popery, on tranſubſtantiation, on worſhipping the hoſt, images, ſaints, and the Virgin Mary; on the infallibility of the pope, and his power to pardon ſins paſt, preſent, and to come, &c. &c. If he anſwers, *that he believes all this*, he is then taken to the rack, attended by a *notary*, who is to write down his confeſſion. Here he remains in torment for one hour by the glaſs, after which a *ſurgeon* puts his bones in joint, and he is carried back to his cell. And this horrid proceſs is repeated three times, at certain intervals, till the miſerable wretch perhaps confeſſes hereſies he was never guilty of, or acknowledges that he dare not worſhip idols. If, after two days, the priſoner affirms that his confeſſion was extorted from him by the torments he underwent, and therefore refuſes to ſign it; he is again put upon the rack. If he confeſſes that he did ſpeak heretical words, but to ſave his eſtate for his family, affirms that he ſpake them unadviſedly; he is put upon the rack to prove the truth of this aſſertion. The priſoner never knows who are his accuſers, or what particular words or actions are laid to his charge; nor muſt his advocate know theſe things. Witneſſes are compelled to give evidence, under pain of the greater excommunication; and his own advocate is bound by oath to divulge his

common people revolted, but were ſoon reduced.—To puniſh them, to inſure the eſtabliſhment of the inquiſition, and to prevent any future inſurrections, *Philip* ſent a reinforcement to the Ducheſs, conſiſting of ten thouſand veteran ſoldiers, Spaniſh and Italian, under the command of the *Duke* of *Alva*, an experienced general. —This force produced aſtoniſhment, ſubmiſſion, and deſpair, among thoſe who could not fly before it.—"*Upon the firſt report of this expedition, the trading people of the towns and country began in vaſt numbers to retire out of the provinces*; *ſo as the ducheſs wrote to the king, that in a few days above a hundred thouſand men had left the coun-*

client's ſecrets. When the fatal morning is come, the dominicans begin the proceſſion, followed by the penitents clothed in black, barefooted, and with wax candles in their hands; ſome have benitoes, and others who have but juſt eſcaped being burnt, have inverted flames painted on their garments: then come the negative and relapſed, with flames pointed upwards; then the profeſſed, with flames painted on their garments and on their breaſts, carrying their own pictures, with dogs, ſerpents, and devils round them, all with open mouths. The *familiars* and *inquiſitors* cloſe the proceſſion. After prayers and a ſermon, the priſoners are delivered over to the ſecular arm, with earneſt entreaties not to touch their blood, or put their life in danger! They are inſtantly bound with chains, carried to the ſecular priſon for about two hours, then brought out, chained to ſtakes about four yards high, ſeated within half a yard of the top, when the negative and relapſed are ſtrangled, but the honeſt and profeſſed are ſolemnly delivered up to the devil; after which the holy fathers leave them: when, their faces being firſt ſcorched, the furze is kindled round them, and in about half an hour in calm weather, or in about two hours in very windy weather, their excruciating torments end. Dr. GEDDES.

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try, and withdrawn both their money and their goods, and more were following every day: ſo great an antipathy there ever appears between merchants and ſoldiers."—Many of theſe families came to *England*, and ſettled in *Norwich*, *Colcheſter*, *Sandwich*, *Maidſtone*, and *Southampton*, under protection of Queen *Elizabeth*.—In return for their hoſpitable reception, they enriched the kingdom with the manufacture of bays, and other linen and woollen cloths of like kind *.—Some of them ſettled in *Sweden*, and carried the iron and other manufactures into that country †.—*Freſh exactions, cruelties, and oppreſſions, excited in the* NETHERLANDS *freſh inſurrections, which never more ſubſided till after a conteſt, which laſted upwards of forty years, the* SEVEN UNITED PROVINCES *eſtabliſhed their liberty, and were acknowledged a free and independent people.—The arts, manufactures, and commerce, returned with returning liberty, and wealth flowed in upon them from every quarter of the globe.*

If for a moment we can turn away our eyes from this ſcene of induſtry, from theſe rich provinces, where peace and plenty reign, let us enquire what is become of *Athens*, *Tyre*, *Sidon*, *Carthage*, *Colchis*, *Syracuſe*,

* Camden, p. 416.

† Lord Molesworth's Account of Denmark and Sweden.

Agrigentum, *Rhodes*, thoſe free cities, each of which in its day has been the metropolis of the commercial world? They are now no more, their place is hardly to be found.—*They loſt their liberty*, and *with liberty* the *arts*, *manufactures*, and *commerce*, have taken their *everlaſting flight* *.

* Townsend.

SECT.

SECT. XIV.

ON AGRICULTURE.

THE *final view* of all RATIONAL POLITICS is to produce *the greateſt quantity of happineſs* in a given tract of country.—The riches, ſtrength, and glory of nations, the topics which hiſtory celebrates, and which alone almoſt engage the praiſes, and poſſeſs the admiration of mankind, have no value farther than as they contribute to *this end*.—When they interfere with it, they are evils, and not the leſs real for the ſplendour that ſurrounds them.

Secondly, although we ſpeak of communities as of ſentient beings; although we aſcribe to them happineſs and miſery, deſires, intereſts, and paſſions, nothing really exiſts or feels but *individuals*.—*The happineſs of a people* is made up of the happineſs of *ſingle perſons*; and the quantity of happineſs can only be augmented by increaſing the happineſs of individuals.

The fertility of the ground, in temperate regions, is

capable of being improved by *cultivation* to an extent which is unknown: much, however, beyond the ſtate of improvement in any country in EUROPE.—In our own, which holds almoſt the firſt place in the knowledge and encouragement of *agriculture*, let it only be ſuppoſed that every field in ENGLAND of the ſame original quality with thoſe in the neighbourhood of the metropolis, and conſequently capable of the ſame fertility, were by a like management made to yield an equal produce, and it may be aſſerted, I believe, with truth, that the quantity of human proviſion raiſed in the iſland would be increaſed *fivefold*.—The two principles, therefore, upon which population ſeems primarily to depend, *the fecundity of the ſpecies*, and *the capacity of the ſoil*, would in moſt, perhaps in all countries, enable it to proceed much further than it has yet advanced.—The number of marriageable women, who, in each country, remain unmarried, afford a computation how much the agency of nature in the diffuſion of human life is cramped and contracted; and *the quantity of waſte, neglected*, or *miſmanaged ſurface*, together with a compariſon, like the preceding, of the crops raiſed from the ſoil in the neighbourhood of populous cities, and under a perfect ſtate of cultivation, with thoſe, which lands

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of equal or ſuperior quality yield in different ſituations, will ſhew in what proportion the indigenous productions of the earth *are capable of being further augmented.*

In CHINA, where the inhabitants frequent the ſea ſhore, and ſubſiſt in a great meaſure upon *fiſh*, the population is deſcribed to be exceſſive.—This peculiarity ariſes, not probably from any civil advantages, any care or policy, any particular conſtitution or ſuperior wiſdom of government, but ſimply from hence, that the ſpecies of food, to which cuſtom hath reconciled the deſires and inclinations of the inhabitants, is that which, of all others, is procured in the greateſt abundance, with the moſt eaſe, and ſtands in need of the leaſt preparation.

The natives of INDOSTAN, being confined, by the laws of their religion, to the uſe of *vegetable food*, and requiring little except rice, which the country produces in plentiful crops; and food, in warm climates, compoſing the only want of life; theſe countries are populous, under all the injuries of a deſpotic, and the agitations of an unſettled government.—If any revolution, or what would be called perhaps refinement of manners, ſhould generate in theſe people *a taſte for the fleſh of animals*, ſimilar to what prevails amongſt the Arabian hordes;

hordes; ſhould introduce flocks and herds into grounds which are now covered with corn; ſhould teach them to account a certain portion of this ſpecies of food amongſt the neceſſaries of life; the population, from this ſingle change, would ſuffer in a few years a great diminution: and this diminution would follow, in ſpite of every effort of the laws, or even of any improvement that might take place in their civil condition.

The firſt reſource of ſavage life is in the fleſh of WILD ANIMALS; hence the numbers amongſt ſavage nations, compared with the tract of country which they occupy, are univerſally ſmall, becauſe this ſpecies of proviſion is, of all others, ſupplied in the ſlendereſt proportion.—*The next ſtep* was the invention of PASTURAGE, or the rearing of flocks and herds of tame animals.—*This alteration* added to the ſtock of proviſion much: but *the laſt* and *principal improvement* was to follow, namely, TILLAGE, or the artificial production of corn, eſculent plants, and roots.

So far as the ſtate of population is governed and limited by the quantity of proviſion, perhaps there is no ſingle cauſe that affects it ſo powerfully, as the kind and quality of food, which chance or uſage hath introduced into a country.—In ENGLAND, notwithſtanding the produce

produce of the ſoil has been, of late, conſiderably *increaſed*, by the incloſure of waſtes, and the adoption, in many places, of a more ſucceſsful huſbandry, yet we do not obſerve a correſponding addition to the number of inhabitants; the reaſon of which appears to me to be the more general conſumption of *animal food* amongſt us.—Many ranks of people, whoſe ordinary diet was, in the laſt century, prepared almoſt entirely from milk, roots, and vegetables, now require every day a conſiderable portion of the fleſh of animals.—Hence a great part of the richeſt lands of the country are converted to paſturage.—Much alſo of the bread corn, which went directly to the nouriſhment of human bodies, now only contributes to it, by fattening the fleſh of ſheep and oxen.—The maſs and volume of proviſions are hereby *diminiſhed*; and what is gained in the melioration of the ſoil is loſt in the quality of the produce.—This conſideration teaches us, that TILLAGE, as an object of national care and encouragement, is univerſally preferable to *paſturage*; becauſe *the kind of proviſion* which it yields goes *much further* in the ſuſtention of human life.—TILLAGE is alſo recommended by this additional advantage, that it affords *employment* to a much more *numerous peaſantry*.—Indeed *paſturage* ſeems to be the art of a nation,

either imperfectly civilized, as are many of the tribes which cultivate it in the internal parts of ASIA; or of a nation, like SPAIN, declining from its ſummit by luxury and inactivity.

The kind and quality of proviſion, together with the extent and capacity of the ſoil from which it is raiſed, being the ſame; the quantity procured will principally depend upon two circumſtances, the *ability* of the occupier, and *the encouragement* which he receives.—The greateſt misfortune of a country is an indigent tenantry. —Whatever be the native advantages of the ſoil, or even the ſkill and induſtry of the occupier, the want of *a ſufficient capital* confines every plan, as well as cripples and weakens every operation of huſbandry.—This evil is felt where agriculture is accounted a ſervile or mean employment: where farms are *extremely ſubdivided*, and badly furniſhed with habitations; where leaſes are unknown, or are of ſhort or precarious duration.—With reſpect to the *encouragement* of huſbandry; in this, as in every other employment, the true reward of induſtry is in the price and ſale of the produce.—The excluſive right to the produce is the only incitement which acts conſtantly and univerſally; the only ſpring which keeps human labour in motion.—ALL THEREFORE THAT THE LAWS

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CAN DO, IS TO SECURE THIS RIGHT TO THE OCCUPIER OF THE GROUND, THAT IS, TO CONSTITUTE SUCH A SYSTEM OF TENURE, THAT THE FULL AND ENTIRE ADVANTAGE OF EVERY IMPROVEMENT GO TO THE BENEFIT OF THE IMPROVER; THAT EVERY MAN WORK FOR HIMSELF, AND NOT FOR ANOTHER; AND THAT NO MAN SHARE IN THE PROFIT WHO DOES NOT ASSIST IN THE PRODUCTION.

No man can purchaſe without an equivalent, and that equivalent, by the generality of the people, muſt, in every country, be derived from employment. And upon this baſis is founded the public benefit of *trade*, that is to ſay, its ſubſerviency to increaſe the quantity of food, in which its only real utility conſiſts.—Of that induſtry, and of thoſe arts and branches of trade, which are employed in the production, conveyance, and preparation of any principal ſpecies of human food, as of the buſineſs of the huſbandman, the butcher, baker, brewer, corn-merchant, &c. we acknowledge the neceſſity: likewiſe of thoſe manufactures which furniſh us with warm clothing, convenient habitations, domeſtic utenſils, as of the weaver, taylor, ſmith, carpenter, &c. we perceive (in climates, however, like ours, removed at a diſtance from the ſun) the conduciveneſs to happi-

neſs, by their rendering human life more healthy, vigorous, and comfortable.—*But not one half of the occupations which compoſe the trade of Europe fall within either of theſe deſcriptions.*—Perhaps two thirds of the manufacturers of England are employed upon articles of confeſſed luxury, ornament, or ſplendour: in the ſuperfluous embelliſhment of ſome articles which are uſeful in their kind, or upon others which have no conceivable uſe or value, but what is founded in caprice or faſhion.—What can be leſs neceſſary, or leſs connected with the ſuſtention of human life, than the whole produce of the ſilk, lace, and plate manufacture?—yet *what multitudes* labour in the different branches of theſe arts!—What can be imagined more capricious than the fondneſs for tobacco and ſnuff?—yet how many various occupations, and *how many thouſands* in each, are ſet at work in adminiſtering to this frivolous gratification!—Concerning trades of this kind, and this kind comprehends more than half of the trades that are exerciſed, it may fairly be aſked, "*how, ſince they add nothing to the ſtock of proviſion, do they tend to increaſe the number of the people.*"—We are taught to ſay of trade, "*that it maintains multitudes*;" but by what means does it maintain them, when it produces nothing upon which the ſupport of human life depends?

pends?—In like manner with reſpect to foreign commerce; of that merchandiſe which brings the neceſſaries of life into a country, which imports, for example, corn, or cattle, or cloth, or fuel, we allow the tendency to advance happineſs, becauſe it increaſes the ſtock of proviſion by which the people are ſubſiſted.—Here, therefore, as before, we may fairly aſk, by what operation it is, that *foreign commerce*, which brings into the country not many articles of human ſubſiſtence, promotes the pleaſures of human life?

Since the ſoil will maintain many more than it can employ, what muſt be done, ſuppoſing the country to be full with the remainder of the inhabitants? They who, by the rules of partition (and ſome ſuch muſt be eſtabliſhed in every country), are entitled to the land; and they who, by their labour upon the ſoil, acquire a right in its produce, will not part with their property for nothing; or rather, they will no longer raiſe from the ſoil what they can neither uſe themſelves, nor exchange for what they want.—Or, laſtly, if theſe were willing to diſtribute what they could ſpare of the proviſion which the ground yielded, to others who had no ſhare or concern in the property or cultivation of it, yet ſtill the moſt enormous miſchiefs would enſue from great numbers

numbers remaining unemployed.—*The idleneſs of one half of the community would overwhelm the whole with confuſion and diſorder.*—One only way preſents itſelf of removing the difficulty which this queſtion ſtates, and which is ſimply this; that they, whoſe work is not wanted, nor can be employed in the raiſing of proviſion out of the ground, convert their hands and ingenuity to the fabrication of articles which may gratify and requite thoſe who are ſo employed, or who, by the diviſion of lands in the country, are entitled to the excluſive poſſeſſion of certain parts of them.—By *this contrivance* all things proceed well.—The occupier of the ground raiſes from it the utmoſt that he can procure, becauſe he is repaid for what he can ſpare by ſomething elſe, which he wants, or with which he is pleaſed: the artiſt and manufacturer, though he have neither any property in the ſoil, nor any concern in its cultivation, is regularly ſupplied with the produce, becauſe he gives in exchange for what he ſtands in need of ſomething, upon which the receiver places an equal value: and the community is kept quiet, whilſt both ſides are engaged in their reſpective occupations.

It appears then, "THAT THE BUSINESS OF ONE HALF OF MANKIND IS TO SET THE OTHER HALF AT WORK;"

WORK;" that is, to provide articles, which, by tempting the defires, may ſtimulate the induſtry, and call forth the activity of thoſe, upon the exertion of whoſe induſtry, and the application of whoſe faculties, the production of human proviſion depends.—A certain portion only of human labour is, or can be *productive*; the reſt is *inſtrumental*—both *equally neceſſary*, though the one have no other object than to excite the other.

It appears alſo, that it ſignifies nothing as to the main purpoſe of trade, how ſuperfluous the articles which it furniſhes are; whether the want of them be real or imaginary; whether it be founded in nature or in opinion, in faſhion, habit, or emulation: it is enough that they be actually deſired and ſought after.—Flouriſhing cities are raiſed and ſupported by trading in tobacco: popular towns ſubſiſt by the manufactory of ribbons.—A watch may be a very unneceſſary appendage to the dreſs of a peaſant, yet if the peaſant will till the ground in order to obtain a watch, the true deſign of trade is anſwered; and the watch-maker, whilſt he poliſhes the caſe, or files the wheels of his machine, is contributing to the production of corn as effectually, though not ſo directly, as if he handled the ſpade or held the plough.—The uſe of tobacco has been mentioned already, not only as an acknowledged ſuperfluity, but as affording a remarkable

example of the caprice of human appetite: yet, if the fiſherman will ply his nets, or the mariner fetch rice from foreign countries, in order to procure to himſelf this indulgence, the market is ſupplied with two important articles of proviſion, by the inſtrumentality of a merchandiſe which has no other apparent uſe than the gratification of a vitiated palate.

But it may come to paſs that the huſbandman, landowner, or whoever he be, that is entitled to the produce of the ſoil, will no longer exchange it for what the manufacturer has to offer.—He is already ſupplied to the extent of his deſires.—For inſtance, he wants no more cloth; he will no longer therefore give the weaver corn, in return for the produce of his looms; but he would readily give it for *tea*, or for *wine*.—When the weaver finds this to be the caſe, he has nothing to do but to ſend *his cloth* abroad in *exchange* for *tea* or for *wine*, which he may barter for that proviſion which the offer of his cloth will no longer procure.—The *circulation* is thus revived; and the benefit of the diſcovery is, that whereas the number of weavers, who could find ſubſiſtence from their employment, was before limited by the conſumption of cloth in the country, that number is now augmented in proportion to the demand for tea and for wine. —This is the principle of FOREIGN COMMERCE.—In the

the magnitude and complexity of the machine, the principle of motion is ſometimes loſt or unobſerved; but it is always ſimple and the ſame, to whatever extent it may be diverſified and enlarged in its operation.

The effect of trade upon agriculture, the proceſs of which we have been endeavouring to deſcribe, is viſible in the neighbourhood of trading towns, and in thoſe diſtricts which carry on a communication with the markets of trading towns. —The huſbandmen are buſy and ſkilful; the peaſantry laborious; the lands are managed to the beſt advantage, and double the quantity of corn or herbage (articles which are ultimately converted into human proviſion) raiſed from it, of what the ſame ſoil yields in remoter and more neglected parts of the country.—Wherever a thriving manufactory finds means to eſtabliſh itſelf, a new vegetation ſprings up around it.—I believe it is true that agriculture never arrives at any conſiderable, much leſs at its higheſt degree of perfection, where it is not connected with trade; that is, where the demand for the produce is not increaſed by the conſumption of trading cities.

It muſt be here however noticed, that we have all along conſidered the inhabitants of a country as maintained by the produce of the country: and that what we have ſaid is applicable with ſtrictneſs to this ſuppoſition

alone.—The reaſoning, nevertheleſs, may eaſily be adapted to a different caſe; for when proviſion is not produced, but *imported*, what has been affirmed concerning proviſion, will be, in a great meaſure, true of that article, whether it be money, produce, or labour, which is exchanged for proviſion.—Thus, when the *Dutch* raiſe maddor, and exchange it for corn; or when the people of *America* plant tobacco, and ſend it to *Europe* for cloth; the cultivation of madder and tobacco become as neceſſary to the ſubſiſtence of the inhabitants, and, by conſequence, will affect the ſtate of population in theſe countries as ſenſibly as the actual production of food, or the manufactory of raiment.—In like manner, when the ſame inhabitants of *Holland* earn money by the carriage of the produce of one country to another, and with that money purchaſe the proviſion from abroad, which their own land is not extenſive enough to ſupply, the increaſe or decline of this carrying trade will influence the happineſs of the people no leſs than ſimilar changes would do in the cultivation of the ſoil.

From the reaſoning that has been purſued, and the various conſiderations ſuggeſted in this ſection, a judg-

ment may, in ſome ſort, be formed, how far regulations of *Law* are in their nature capable of contributing to the ſupport and advancement of happineſs.—I ſay *how far:* for, as in many ſubjects, ſo eſpecially in thoſe which relate to commerce, to plenty, and to riches, more is wont to be *expected* from laws, *than laws can do.*—*Laws* cannot regulate the wants of mankind, their mode of living, or their deſire of thoſe ſuperfluities which faſhion, more irreſiſtible than laws, has once introduced into general uſage, or, in other words, has erected into neceſſaries of life.—*Laws* cannot induce men to enter into marriages, when the expences of a family muſt deprive them of that ſyſtem of accommodation to which they have habituated their expectations.—*Laws*, by their protection, by aſſuring to the labourer the fruit and profit of his labour, may help to make a people induſtrious; but without induſtry the laws cannot provide either ſubſiſtence or employment: *Laws* cannot make corn grow without toil and care; or trade flouriſh without art and diligence.—*In ſpite of Laws*, the expert, laborious, honeſt workman will be employed, in preference to the lazy, the unſkilful, the fraudulent, and evaſive: and this is not more true of two inhabitants of the ſame village, than it is of the people of two different countries, which

communicate either with each other, or with the reſt of the world.—The natural baſis of trade is rivalſhip of quality and price; or, which is the ſame thing, of ſkill and induſtry.—Every attempt to *force trade* by operation of law, that is, by compelling perſons to buy goods at one market, which they can obtain cheaper and better from another, is ſure to be either eluded by the quick-ſightedneſs and inceſſant activity of private intereſt, or to be fruſtrated by retaliation.—One half of the commercial laws of many ſtates are calculated merely to counteract the reſtrictions which have been impoſed by other ſtates.—Perhaps the only way in which the interpoſition of law is ſalutary in trade, is in the prevention of frauds.

The principal expedient to encourage *agriculture*, is *to adjuſt the laws of property*, as nearly as poſſible, to the following rules:—*Firſt*, TO GIVE TO THE OCCUPIER ALL THE POWER OVER THE SOIL WHICH IS NECESSARY FOR ITS PERFECT CULTIVATION;—*Secondly*, TO ASSIGN THE WHOLE PROFIT OF EVERY IMPROVEMENT TO THE PERSONS BY WHOSE ACTIVITY IT IS CARRIED ON.

What we call property in land, as hath been obſerved above, is power over it.—Now it is indifferent to the public

public in whoſe hands this power reſides, *if it be rightly uſed:* it matters not to whom the land belongs, if it be well cultivated.—When we lament that great eſtates are often united in the ſame hand, or complain that one man poſſeſſes what would be ſufficient for a thouſand, we ſuffer ourſelves to be miſled by words.—The owner of ten thouſand pounds a year *conſumes* little more of the produce of the ſoil than the owner of ten pounds a year. —*If the cultivation be equal, the eſtate in the hands of one great lord affords ſubſiſtence and employment to the ſame number of perſons as it would do if it were divided amongſt a hundred proprietors.*—In like manner, we ought to judge of the effect upon the public intereſt, which may ariſe from lands being holden by the king, or by the ſubject; by private perſons, or by corporations; by laymen, or eccleſiaſtics; in fee, or for life; by virtue of office, or in right of inheritance.—I do not mean that theſe varieties make no difference, but I mean, that all the difference they do make reſpects the cultivation of the lands which are ſo holden.

There exiſt in this country conditions of tenure, which condemn the land itſelf to perpetual ſterility.—Of this kind is *the right of common*, which precludes each proprietor from the improvement, or even the conveni-

ent

ent occupation of his eſtate, without, what ſeldom can be obtained, the conſent of many others.—This tenure is alſo uſually embarraſſed by the interference of *manorial* claims, under which it often happens that the ſurface belongs to one owner and the ſoil to another; ſo that neither owner can ſtir a clod without the concurrence of his partner in the property.—In many manors, the tenant is reſtrained from granting *leaſes* beyond a ſhort term of years; which renders every plan of ſolid improvement impracticable.—In theſe caſes the owner *wants*, what the firſt rule of rational policy requires, "*ſufficient power over the ſoil for its perfect cultivation.*" This power ought to be extended to him by ſome eaſy and general law of enfranchiſement, partition, and incloſure; which, though compulſory upon the lord, or the reſt of the tenants, *whilſt it has in view the melioration of the ſoil*, and tenders an equitable compenſation for every right that it takes away, is neither more arbitrary, nor more dangerous to the ſtability of property, than that which is done in the conſtruction of roads, bridges, embankments, navigable canals, and indeed in almoſt every public work in which private owners of land are obliged to accept that price for their property which an indifferent jury may award.—*It may*

here

here however be proper to obſerve, that although the incloſure of waſtes and paſtures be generally beneficial to population, yet the incloſure of lands in tillage, in order to convert them into paſtures, is as generally hurtful.

But ſecondly, *agriculture* is *diſcouraged* by every conſtitution of landed property, which lets in thoſe who have no concern in the improvement to a participation of the profit.—This objection is applicable to all ſuch cuſtoms of *manors* as ſubject the proprietor, upon the death of the lord or tenant, or the alienation of the eſtate, to a fine apportioned to the improved value of the land.—But of all inſtitutions which are in this way adverſe to cultivation and improvement, none is ſo *noxious* as that of TITHES.—*A claimant here enters into the produce who contributed no aſſiſtance whatever to the production.—When years, perhaps, of care and toil have matured an improvement; when the huſbandman ſees new crops ripening to his ſkill and induſtry, the moment he is ready to put his ſickle to the grain, he finds himſelf compelled to divide his harveſt with a ſtranger.*—TITHES *are a tax not only upon induſtry, but upon that induſtry which feeds mankind; upon that ſpecies of exertion which it is the aim of all wiſe laws to cheriſh and promote; and to uphold and excite which, compoſes, as we have ſeen, the main benefit that*

the

the community receives from the whole ſyſtem of trade, the ſucceſs of commerce.—And, together with the more neral inconveniency that attends the exaction of TIT *there is this additional evil, in the mode at leaſt accordi which they are collected at preſent, that they operate bounty upon paſturage.—The burthen of the tax falls its chief, if not with its whole weight, upon tillage; th to ſay, upon that preciſe mode of cultivation, which, as been ſhewn above, it is the buſineſs of the ſtate to relieve remunerate, in preference to every other *.*

* Archdeacon Paley.

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THE

POLITICIAN's CREED;

OR,

POLITICAL EXTRACTS:

BEING

AN ANSWER TO THESE QUESTIONS,

What is the beſt Form of Government?

AND

What is the beſt Adminiſtration of a Government?

BY A LOVER OF SOCIAL ORDER.

VOL. III.

PHILOSOPHY conſiſts not
In airy ſchemes, or idle ſpeculations:
The rule and conduct of all ſocial life
Is her great province. Not in lonely cells
Obſcure ſhe lurks, but holds her *heav'nly light*
To ſenates and to kings, to guide her councils,
And teach them to reform and bleſs mankind.

THOMSON.

LONDON:

Printed for ROBINSONS, Paternoſter-Row; T. COX, St. Thomas's-ſtreet, Borough; DILLY in the Poultry; MURRAY and HIGHLEY, Fleet-ſtreet; RICHARDSON, Cornhill; WHITE, Fleet-ſtreet; BECKET, and EDWARDS, Pall Mall; HOOKHAM and CARPENTER, Bond-ſtreet; and H. D. SYMONDS, No. 20, Paternoſter-Row.

1799.

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

SECT. XV.

ON THE CULTIVATION OF WASTE LANDS.

THERE are few things in which the lower claſſes of people appear to have miſtaken their intereſt ſo materially as in their uniform oppoſition to the encloſure of waſte lands.—A prejudice has long been entertained by the peaſantry, that the encloſure of waſte lands is to rob them of a right, and unfeelingly to deprive them of a ſupport, which has been claimed as an inheritance by their anceſtors, and immemorially enjoyed by them, without jealouſy or moleſtation; and ſo deeply is this ſentiment ingrafted, that the man who propoſes to apply for an act of parliament to enable him to take in a common, is looked upon by the village with an eye of hatred and ſuſpicion.

It may not be totally unprofitable to conſider the foundation of this prejudice, and attempt to diſcover whether it be truth or fallacy.—I ſhall endeavour to anſwer one or two of the principal objections, and afterwards make ſome general obſervations on the ſubject.

ſtance *population* will always increaſe; the cultivation of waſte lands would operate like the ſettlement of a new colony: and in no country does the increaſe of population bear any proportion to that in a new colony*.—"*The liberal reward of labour always encourages marriage,* "*and joined to the plenty and cheapneſs of land, the la-* "*bourers are ſoon induced to leave their maſters, and to* "*reward with equal liberality other labourers, who ſoon* "*leave them for the ſame reaſon that they left their firſt* "*maſters; the children are well fed and properly taken care* "*of, and when they are grown up, the value of their la-* "*bour greatly overpays their maintenance*†."

This cauſe, namely, the high price of labour, would operate with equal effect in towns and in the country: men would not leave the former for the latter, unleſs they were better paid for it; and they would be better paid for it on account of the ſcarcity of labourers; an immediate competition between the country maſters and the town maſters would enſue; the conſequence of

* It appears that the number of inhabitants in the United States of America has nearly doubled itſelf within theſe twenty years, notwithſtanding the war. From the laſt cenſus, taken by order of Congreſs in the year 1791, it appears that the population amounted to 3,925,253. Vide *Morſe's Am. Geo.*

† *Wealth of Nations.*

which,

which, as has been before obſerved, would be an increaſe of wages—an increaſe of population—with an increaſe of proſperity.—The encloſure of all the waſte lands in this kingdom (or of thoſe which are worth cultivation) might perhaps be a temporary check upon manufactures, but could not poſſibly be of long duration; employments and high wages will always attract and even create labourers.

WE HAVE NOW TO CONGRATULATE OUR COUNTRY ON THE LATE ESTABLISHMENT OF A BOARD OF AGRICULTURE, THE PRESIDENT OF WHICH IS SIR JOHN SINCLAIR, WHOSE PATRIOTIC EXERTIONS ENTITLE HIM TO THE WARMEST PRAISES OF HIS FELLOW CITIZENS, AND OF THE WORLD AT LARGE. — HE HAS BROUGHT A BILL INTO PARLIAMENT FOR A GENERAL ENCLOSURE, THE ADVANTAGES OF WHICH ARE SO OBVIOUS, THAT WE SHOULD BE THUNDER-STRUCK SHOULD PARTY SPIRIT BE ABLE TO REJECT IT!

A POPULOUS NATION IS A GREAT NATION, FROM ITS POWER IN RESISTING CONQUEST, AND FROM ITS ABILITY TO CARRY ON OFFENSIVE WAR.—THE POPULATION, AS WE HAVE SEEN, DEPENDS

UPON THE FOOD RAISED; THEREFORE TO INCREASE THIS LAST SHOULD BE THE OBJECT OF EVERY WISE GOVERNMENT*.

* Whether POPULATION, as it promotes the *grandeur* of a nation, increaſes in an equal ratio its *happineſs*?—will be the object of conſideration in the next chapter. This queſtion was *firſt* ſtarted by the ingenious and learned Mr. TOWNSEND, in his *Diſſertation on the Poor Laws*, and merits the deepeſt attention of the politician.

SECT.

SECT. XVI.

ON POPULATION.

It has been ſaid that the riches of a country conſiſt in the multitude of its inhabitants; in other words, that populouſneſs is the cauſe of happineſs: I am diſpoſed to think that ſometimes the direct inverſe of this propoſition is true.—No doubt rich and flouriſhing countries are in general populous; but this only proves that its inhabitants are ſtrongly impelled to early marriages, from the great probability of being able to maintain a family without difficulty; ſo that the populouſneſs is the *effect*, and not the cauſe, of this proſperity.—The object of the preſent eſſay, is to notice the effects of population when rendered as intenſe as poſſible, to prove that populouſneſs may become exceſſive, and to point out the remedies that muſt be adopted to counteract the exceſs.

We may form ſome idea of the rapidity with which inhabitants increaſe, by adverting to what has lately taken place in a country in which the regeneration of manners and inſtitutions has been far from complete. Between the years 1774 and 1782, notwithſtanding con-

ſiderable emigrations from Connecticut to Vermont, to Suſquehannah, and other places; notwithſtanding the loſs of life occaſioned by a ſeven years bloody war; it was found, from an actual cenſus of the inhabitants, taken at theſe two periods, that the population of New England increaſed from 197,856 to 209,150, and it is to be obſerved that no importation of foreigners took place during this time, in conſequence of the war*. If leſs than two hundred thouſand men, notwithſtanding ſeveral accidental impediments, produced an increaſe of more than 10,000, in ſo ſhort a ſpace of time as ſeven years, we may judge of the increaſe which nine hundred millions, the preſent population of the world, would produce in a ſtate of ſociety exempt from theſe hindrances to marriage.—It muſt be evident that the period might arrive when the populouſneſs would be exceſſive.

If we examine the opinions of ancient writers on political œconomy, if we refer to the inſtitutions and manners of ancient nations, we ſhall find that too great populouſneſs was an evil, of which they not only foreſaw the poſſibility, but againſt which they had already pro-

* Morſe's American Geography, 8vo. edit. p. 144.

vided

vided a remedy.—In *China*, at the remoteſt period to which their hiſtory extends, we learn, that parents either deſtroyed their infant children, or exported from the country their adult daughters *.—In the iſland *Formoſa*, women were forbidden, by the religion of the country, to cohabit with men before the age of thirty-five.—If they proved pregnant before that age, the prieſteſs was ordered by the magiſtrate to procure abortion †.—In the different ſtates of *Greece*, there ſeems to have been an anxiety to keep the populouſneſs at a certain ſtandard; the laws took care that the people ſhould never exceed or fall ſhort of the preciſe number which the produce of the earth would ſupport.—The propagation of the ſpecies was encouraged or diſcouraged by honours, ſhame, and admonition, exactly as circumſtances required ‡.—PLATO, in his republic, expreſsly

* See Dampier's Voyage, tom. ii. p. 41.

† Recueil des Voyages qui ont ſervi a l'etabliſſement de la compagnie des Indes, tom. v. part 1. 182—188.

‡ In the republics of Greece, where the territory was ſmall and proſperity great, as was natural, the number of citizens greatly augmented, and became a burthen to the ſtate; therefore they inceſſantly formed *colonies*; they even hired themſelves out as *warriors*, as the Swiſs do at the preſent day; indeed nothing was neglected to prevent the increaſe of birth. The Gauls, who were in exactly the ſame predicament, did exactly the ſame. MONTESQUIEU, tom. iii. p. 16.

limits the number of marriages .—ARISTOTLE ſays, that, if the laws of the country forbid infanticide, adults muſt be prevented from engendering beyond a certain number.—If they exceed the number defined by the law, he recommends the procuring abortion.

The Papian and Julian laws, made by AUGUSTUS for the expreſs purpoſe of encouraging marriage and puniſhing celibacy †, were repealed or modified by CONSTANTINE ‡.—Theodoſius the younger aboliſhed the decimary laws, which granted certain advantages to parents, in proportion to the number of their children||. The Papian law recommended ſecond marriages; JUSTINIAN rewarded thoſe who did not marry a ſecond time §.

It appears at firſt ſight ſingular, that Switzerland, the government of which is ſo much more perfect than that of the petty German princes, ſhould yet imitate their conduct in letting out ſoldiers for hire.—The reaſon appears to be, that they do it for the purpoſe of ridding

* Lib. V. de Repub.

† See the ſpeech of Auguſtus, at the promulgation of this law, as recorded by Dion. lib. XVI.

‡ Leg. unic. cod. Theod. de infirm. pæn. cælib. & orbit.

|| Leg. II. & III. cod. Theod. de jur. lib.

§ Nov. 127. ch. III. Nov. 118. ch. V.

themſelves

themſelves of the redundancy of people, to the propagation of whom their free and equal laws are ſo favourable.

In the South Seas there is an iſland, which from the firſt diſcoverer is called *Juan Fernandes*.—In this ſequeſtered ſpot, John FERNANDO placed a colony of goats, conſiſting of one male, attended by his female.—This happy couple finding paſture in abundance, could readily obey the firſt commandment, to increaſe and multiply, till in proceſs of time they had repleniſhed their little iſland.—In advancing to this period they were ſtrangers to miſery and want, and ſeemed to glory in their numbers: but from this unhappy moment they began to ſuffer hunger; yet continuing for a time to increaſe their numbers, had they been endued with reaſon, they muſt have apprehended the extremity of famine.—In this ſituation the weakeſt firſt gave way, and plenty was again reſtored.—Thus they fluctuated between happineſs and miſery, and either ſuffered want or rejoiced in abundance, according as their numbers were diminiſhed or increaſed; never at a ſtay, yet nearly balancing at all times their quantity of food.—This degree of æquipoiſe was from time to time deſtroyed, either by

by epidemical diſeaſes, or by the arrival of ſome veſſel in diſtreſs.—On ſuch occaſions their numbers were conſiderably reduced; but to compenſate for this alarm, and to comfort them for the loſs of their companions, the ſurvivors never failed immediately to meet returning plenty.—They were no longer in fear of famine: they ceaſed to regard each other with an evil eye; all had abundance, all were contented, all were happy:—Thus, what might have been conſidered as misfortunes, proved a ſource of comfort; and, to them at leaſt, *partial evil* was *univerſal good*.

When the Spaniards found that the Engliſh privateers reſorted to this iſland for proviſions, they reſolved on the total extirpation of the goats, and for this purpoſe they put on ſhore a greyhound dog and bitch *.—Theſe in their turn increaſed and multiplied, in proportion to the quantity of food they met with; but in conſequence, as the Spaniards had foreſeen, the breed of goats diminiſhed.—Had they been totally deſtroyed, the dogs likewiſe muſt have periſhed.—But as many of the goats retired to the craggy rocks, where the dogs could never follow them, deſcending only for ſhort intervals to feed with fear and circumſpection in the vallies, few of theſe,

* Ulloa, B. ii. C. 4.

beſides

beſides the careleſs and the raſh, became a prey; and none but the moſt watchful, ſtrong, and active of the dogs could get a ſufficiency of food.—Thus a new kind of balance was eſtabliſhed.—The weakeſt of both ſpecies were among the firſt to pay the debt of nature; the moſt active and vigorous preſerved their lives *.

Whenever the period of exceſſive populouſneſs arrives in any particular country, unleſs the inhabitants themſelves correct the evil, it will itſelf produce a remedy; that is to ſay, certain cauſes of deſtruction will neceſſarily ariſe.—Theſe are peſtilence, famine, and internal warfare, or a conteſt between man and man for the mere neceſſaries of life.—The inhabitants themſelves may prevent the neceſſity of the exiſtence of theſe dreadful evils by different methods, but theſe are only temporary and palliative expedients.

I. One of the *temporary expedients* is, THE PERFECT CULTIVATION OF EVERY INCH OF GROUND.—In fine, the inhabitants of an over-populated country muſt

* Vide the Rev. Mr. TOWNSEND's *Diſſertation on the Poor Laws*, page 39; where theſe remarkable circumſtances are recorded, and a train of moſt excellent arguments adduced reſpecting the evils ariſing from over-population. As theſe laws are to undergo *reviſion* in parliament, we ſhall omit in this edition to treat on them.

not loſe a ſingle inch of ground; their ſole ſtudy muſt be to make two ears of corn grow where only one grew before: poſſibly, by having their labour and their ingenuity always directed to this one object, they may increaſe that power which the earth poſſeſſes, of producing nutritive matter to an almoſt incredible extent, and make to grow twenty ears of corn where only one grows at preſent.

However, whether the matter be puſhed to this extreme or not, it is evident that all theſe means of increaſing the production of nutritive matter, and preventing its waſte when produced, are neceſſarily *finite* in their operation, and that, if the original cauſes which produced the over-population continue to exiſt and to operate, the evil will, when all theſe means are exhauſted, ſtill exiſt, and at length remedy itſelf by famine, peſtilence, or war.

II. Another *palliative expedient*, in caſe of over-population, is THE ABSENCE OF EVERY KIND OF LUXURY.—No member of the community muſt be ſuffered to conſume more than is barely neceſſary for his ſubſiſtence.—Some of the inſtitutions of the Chineſe againſt luxury are worthy of notice.—Our anceſtors, ſaid an emperor of the family of TANG, held this maxim, that

if

if a ſingle individual led an idle life, ſome other perſon muſt inevitably feel the conſequences, muſt either ſtarve or go naked *.—The third emperor of the 21ſt dynaſty, being preſented with ſome diamonds, a mine of which had been diſcovered, inſtantly returned them, and ordered the mine to be cloſed, not chooſing to have the labour of his people directed to an object that would neither furniſh them with food nor clothing †.—Our luxury is ſo great, ſaid KIAYVENTO, that many people are employed in ornamenting ſhoes.—If many perſons are employed in making clothes for one man, many men muſt go naked.—If only one man tills the earth, and nine conſume its productions, without labouring at all, it follows that many men muſt ſtarve ‡.—In conſequence of inſtitutions, founded on ſuch principles as theſe, luxury is almoſt annihilated in China: when a man marries, he allows his wife a quantity of rice for food, and ſome raw cotton to be worked into clothing, while two or three mats conſtitute the whole furniture of his houſe.

There is no doubt but that the entire abſence of luxury, as well as the entire cultivation of the earth, would

* Du Halde, t. ii. p. 497. † Idem, t. i.
‡ Idem, t. ii. p. 418.

have a very extenſive operation.—At preſent, men probably eat and drink twice as much as they have real occaſion for.—The productive power of the earth would be directed to the production of that ſpecies of nutriment which grows in the greateſt quantity, and with the leaſt labour; vines and olives muſt be rooted up, even corn muſt not be ſpared, rice and potatoes muſt be the only articles of culture.—There is no doubt that a country which, in the preſent ſtate of things, would not admit of a greater population than ten millions, might be made to ſupply clothing, habitation, and food, for thirty millions, if every inch of ground was cultivated in the beſt poſſible manner, and if no unneceſſary conſumption of its produce took place: but it is equally clear, that if the populouſneſs ſtill goes on to increaſe, the time will come when theſe remedies will be found to be mere palliative expedients.

III. A country in this ſituation muſt imitate the example of the bees, and EMIT A SWARM.—Without dwelling on the enormities and crimes, with which coloniſation has in almoſt every inſtance been attended *.

* Reflect only on the coloniſation of South America by the Spaniards, in the progreſs of which, the natives were hunted down by dogs, as if they were wild beaſts.

it

it will be ſufficient to obſerve that this is alſo an expedient merely palliative.—This muſt be clear when we reflect that the ſame cauſes which over-populated the mother country continuing to operate, repeated emiſſions of coloniſts muſt take place, till the whole world would ſwarm with people, and no one country could get rid of its exuberance by throwing it on another, ſince no other would be able to receive it.—No doubt, the period when coloniſation muſt of neceſſity ceaſe is at a great diſtance, but every one muſt ſee the poſſibility of its arrival.

The populouſneſs of *China* has been already adverted to in the courſe of this Section.—The inhabitants have adopted the two expedients firſt mentioned; they have *cultivated the earth to the utmoſt*, and they have *baniſhed luxury*.—It ſhould ſeem then that when theſe were found to fail, they ought to have had recourſe to the third.—Actuated by an aſtoniſhing ſpirit of nationality, the Chineſe do never *emigrate*: to a limited extent *infanticide* is practiſed, but even this is not ſufficient *; *famine* and *peſtilence*, every ſix or ſeven years, come in

* See Lettres ediſ. 21 Recueil.

to correct an evil which the emiſſion of *ſwarms* would at leaſt have retarded.

Let thoſe who contend that POPULOUSNESS is the greateſt bleſſing a country can enjoy, contemplate its *effects* in China;—in *China*, where it is puſhed to its greateſt extent, which is the moſt populous country in the univerſe, and which, if populouſneſs were a real bleſſing, ought to be the moſt happy;—in *China*, where the putrid carcaſes of dogs, cats, and vermin, are ſought with avidity to ſuſtain the lives of wretches who are born only to be ſtarved;—in *China*, which is continually expoſed to the almoſt inexpreſſible horrors of famine; a ſtate in which ſelfiſhneſs univerſally prevails, in which the parent refuſes part of that nouriſhment he has been ſo fortunate to acquire, to his ſtarving child; in which, the child refuſes to hear the ſupplication of his famiſhed parent; or to peſtilence, during which the unfortunate object, abandoned by his neareſt connections and deareſt friends, after dragging his already putrid carcaſe from door to door, dies, unheeded, in the ſtreet.

I have ſpoken of the three palliative expedients which may be adopted in the caſe of over-populouſneſs: the *entire cultivation of the earth*, the *annihilation of luxury*,

way, and a general ſpread of people over the whole earth, by *coloniſation*, which will for ages prevent populouſneſs from becoming exceſſive.

WHILE THE AFFAIRS OF THIS WORLD ARE MANAGED AS THEY ARE AT PRESENT IN EUROPE, IT IS THE RARITY, RATHER THAN THE INTENSITY, OF POPULATION WHICH WE HAVE TO GUARD AGAINST: WHILE MEN CHOOSE TO PAMPER THEIR BODIES, LESSEN THEIR VIGOUR, AND SHORTEN THEIR LIVES, BY DAILY INTEMPERANCE, BY DAILY INDULGING IN THE DAINTIES OF THE EAST AND WEST, RANSACKING BOTH HEMISPHERES FOR THEIR MOST ORDINARY DIET AND CLOTHING; WHILE THEY COMMUNICATE THEIR OWN DISEASES, AND RECEIVE THOSE OF OTHER COUNTRIES IN BALES OF MERCHANDIZE; WHILE THE IMPERFECT STATE OF MEDICINE PRESENTS SO PIGMY A LANCE, SO WEAK A BUCKLER, AGAINST DISORDERS; WHILE URGED BY COMMERCIAL SPECULATION MEN ARE CONTENT TO PERISH BY HUNDREDS ON UNKNOWN SEAS; AND WHILE SLAVES TO AN IMPERIOUS DESPOTISM THEY ARE WILLING TO HAVE THEIR THROATS CUT BY THOUSANDS

SANDS AT THE BECK OF A FEW INDIVIDUALS; WHILE SERVANTS LOSE THEIR BREAD WHO MARRY; THERE IS NOT MUCH REASON TO APPREHEND THAT POPULOUSNESS WILL BECOME EXCESSIVE *.

WE IN THIS ISLAND HAVE STILL LESS REASON TO FEAR A SUPERABUNDANT POPULATION THAN ANY OTHER PEOPLE OF THE EARTH.—OUR COMMERCE, WHICH EMPLOYS MEN AT SEA, AND KEEPS THEM IN CELIBACY, AND DESTROYS SO MANY BRAVE LIVES; OUR MANUFACTURES, THE BANE OF MORALS AND OF HEALTH; BUT, ABOVE ALL, OUR NUMEROUS COLONIES, PREVENT THE ARRIVAL OF SUCH EVILS, THE POSSIBILITY OF WHICH WAS ALONE EXPATIATED ON.

* The Cabinet.

SECT.

SECT. XVII.

OF CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE.

The proper end of human punishment is, not the satisfaction of justice, but the prevention of crimes.—By the *satisfaction* of *justice*, I mean the *retribution* of *so much pain for so much guilt*; *which is the dispensation we expect at the hand of* God, and which we are accustomed to consider as the order of things that perfect justice dictates and requires.—In what sense, or whether with truth in any sense, justice may be said to demand the punishment of offenders, I do not now inquire; but I assert that this *demand* is not the *motive or occasion of human punishment*.—What would it be to the magistrate that offences went altogether unpunished, if the impunity of the offenders were followed by no danger or prejudice to the commonwealth?—The fear lest the escape of the criminal should encourage him, or others by his example, to repeat the same crime, or to commit different crimes, is the sole consideration which authorizes the infliction of punishment by human laws—Now that, whatever it be, which is the cause and end

of

of the puniſhment, ought undoubtedly to regulate the meaſure of its ſeverity.—But this cauſe appears to be founded, not in the *guilt of the offender*, but *in the neceſſity of preventing the repetition of the offence.*—And from hence reſults the reaſon, that crimes are not by *any government* puniſhed in *proportion* to their guilt, nor in all caſes ought to be ſo, but in proportion to the *difficulty* and the *neceſſity of preventing them.*—Thus the ſtealing of goods privately out of a *ſhop* may not, in its moral quality, be more criminal than the ſtealing of them out of a *houſe*; yet, being equally neceſſary, and more difficult to be prevented, the law, in certain circumſtances, denounces againſt it a ſeverer puniſhment.—*The crime muſt be prevented by ſome means or other*; and conſequently, *whatever means* appear *neceſſary to this end*, whether they be *proportionable* to the *guilt* of the *criminal* or *not*, are adopted *rightly*, becauſe they are *adopted* upon the *principle which alone juſtifies the infliction of puniſhment at all.*—From the ſame conſideration it alſo follows, that puniſhment ought not to be employed, much leſs rendered ſevere, when the crime can be prevented by any other means.—*Puniſhment is an evil to which the magiſtrate reſorts only from its being neceſſary to the prevention of a greater.*—This neceſſity does not exiſt, when the

may be attained; that is, when the public may be
ided from the effects of the crime by any other ex-
nt.—The ſanguinary laws which have been made
ſt counterfeiting or diminiſhing the gold coin of
ingdom might be juſt, until the method of detect-
he fraud, by weighing the money, was introduced
general uſage.—Since that *precaution* was practiſed,
laws have ſlept: and an execution under them at
day would be deemed a meaſure of unjuſtifiable ſe-
y.—The ſame principle accounts for a circumſtance,
h has been often cenſured as an abſurdity in the
l laws of this, and of moſt modern nations, namely,
breaches of truſt are either not puniſhed at all, or
ſhed with leſs rigour than other frauds.—*Wherefore*
ſome have aſked, that a violation of confidence, which
aſes the guilt, ſhould mitigate the penalty?—This le-
, or rather forbearance of the laws, is founded in
moſt *reaſonable diſtinction.*—A due circumſpection
ie choice of the perſons whom they truſt; caution
miting the extent of that truſt; or the requiring of
ient ſecurity for the faithful diſcharge of it, will
monly guard men from injuries of this deſcription:
the *law will not interpoſe its ſanctions, to protect negli-*
and credulity, or to ſupply the place of domeſtic care

and prudence.—To be convinced that the law proceeds entirely upon this conſideration, we have only to obſerve, that, where the *conſidence is unavoidable*, where no practicable vigilance could watch the offender, as in the caſe of theft committed by a ſervant in the ſhop or dwelling-houſe of his maſter, or upon property to which he muſt neceſſarily have acceſs, *the ſentence of the law is not leſs ſevere, and its execution commonly more certain and rigorous*, than if *no truſt* at all had intervened.

It is in purſuance of the *ſame principle*, which pervades indeed the whole ſyſtem of penal juriſprudence, *that the facility with which any ſpecies of crimes is perpetrated, has been generally deemed a reaſon for aggravating the puniſhment.*—Thus, ſheep-ſtealing, horſe-ſtealing, the ſtealing of cloth from tenters, or bleaching grounds, by our laws, ſubject the offenders to ſentence of *death:* not that theſe crimes are in their nature more heinous, than many ſimple felonies which are puniſhed by impriſonment or tranſportation, *but becauſe the property being more expoſed, requires the terror of capital puniſhment to protect it.*—This ſeverity would be abſurd and unjuſt, if the guilt of the offender were the immediate cauſe and meaſure of the puniſhment; but is a conſiſtent and regular conſequence of the ſuppoſition, that the right of

of puniſhment reſults from the neceſſity of *preventing* the crime: for if this be the end propoſed, the ſeverity of the puniſhment muſt be increaſed in proportion to the expediency and the difficulty of attaining this end; that is, in a proportion compounded of the miſchief of the crime, and of the eaſe with which it is executed.—The *difficulty of diſcovery* is a circumſtance to be included in the ſame conſideration.—It conſtitutes indeed, with reſpect to the crime, the facility of which we ſpeak.—*By how much therefore the detection of an offender is more rare and uncertain, by ſo much the more ſevere muſt be the puniſhment, when he is detected.—Thus the writing of incendiary letters, though in itſelf a pernicious and alarming injury, calls for a more condign and exemplary puniſhment, by the very obſcurity with which the crime is committed.*

From the juſtice of God we are taught to look for a *gradation of puniſhment*, exactly proportioned to the guilt of the offender: when therefore, in aſſigning the degrees of human puniſhment, we introduce conſiderations diſtinct from that guilt, and a proportion ſo varied by external circumſtances, that *equal crimes* frequently undergo *unequal puniſhments*, or the *leſs crime* the *greater*; it is natural to demand the reaſon why a different mea-

ſure of puniſhment ſhould be expected from GOD, and obſerved by men; why that rule, which befits the abſolute and perfect juſtice of the DEITY, ſhould not be the rule which ought to be purſued and imitated by human laws.—The ſolution of this difficulty muſt be ſought for in thoſe peculiar attributes of the divine nature, which diſtinguiſh the diſpenſations of ſupreme wiſdom from the proceedings of human judicature.—A BEING WHOSE KNOWLEDGE PENETRATES EVERY CONCEALMENT; FROM THE OPERATION OF WHOSE WILL NO ART OR SLIGHT CAN ESCAPE; AND IN WHOSE HANDS PUNISHMENT IS SURE; SUCH A BEING MAY CONDUCT THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF HIS CREATION, IN THE BEST AND WISEST MANNER, BY PRONOUNCING A LAW THAT EVERY CRIME SHALL FINALLY RECEIVE A PUNISHMENT PROPORTIONED TO THE GUILT WHICH IT CONTAINS, abſtracted from any foreign conſideration whatever: and may teſtify his veracity to the ſpectators of his judgments, by carrying this law into ſtrict execution.—But when the care of the public ſafety is entruſted to *men*, whoſe *authority* over their fellow creatures is *limited* by *defects of power and knowledge*; from whoſe *utmoſt vigilance and ſagacity* the *greateſt offenders often lie hid*;

whoſe *wiſeſt precautions and ſpeedieſt purſuit* may be *eluded by artifice or concealment*; a different neceſſity, a new rule of proceeding reſults from the very *imperfection of their faculties*.—In *their* hands the *uncertainty* of puniſhment muſt be compenſated by the *ſeverity*.—The *eaſe* with which crimes are committed or concealed, muſt be counteracted by *additional penalties* and *increaſed terrors*.—The very *end* for which human government is eſtabliſhed, requires that its regulations be adapted to *the ſuppreſſion of crimes*.—*This end*, whatever it may do in the plans of Infinite Wiſdom, *does not, in the deſignation of temporal penalties, always coincide with the proportionate puniſhment of guilt*.

There are two methods of adminiſtering penal juſtice.

The firſt method aſſigns *capital puniſhments to few offences, and inflicts it invariably*.

The ſecond method aſſigns *capital puniſhments to many kinds of offences, but inflicts it only upon a few examples of each kind*.

The *latter of which two methods* has been long adopted in *this country*, where, of thoſe who receive *ſentence* of *death*, ſcarcely *one* in *ten* is executed.—And the preference of this to the former method ſeems to be found-

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ed in the conſideration, *that the ſelection of proper objects for capital puniſhment principally depends upon circumſtances*, which, however *eaſy to perceive in each particular caſe after the crime is committed, it is impoſſible to enumerate or define beforehand*; or to aſcertain however with that exactneſs, which is requiſite in *legal deſcriptions*.—Hence, although it be neceſſary to fix, by preciſe rules of law, the boundary on one ſide; that is, the limit to which the puniſhment may be extended, and alſo that nothing leſs than the authority of the whole legiſlature be ſuffered to determine that boundary, and aſſign theſe rules; *yet the mitigation of puniſhment, the exerciſe of lenity, may, without danger, be entruſted to the executive magiſtrate, whoſe diſcretion will operate upon thoſe numerous, unforeſeen, mutable, and indefinite circumſtances, both of the crime and the criminal, which conſtitute or qualify the malignity of each offence*.—Without the power of *relaxation* lodged in a *living authority*, either ſome offenders would *eſcape capital puniſhment*, whom the *public ſafety required to ſuffer*; or *ſome would undergo this puniſhment*, where it was neither *deſerved* nor *neceſſary*.—For if judgment of death were reſerved for one or two ſpecies of crimes only, which would probably be the caſe, if that judgment was intended to be executed without exception,

ception, *crimes might occur of the moſt dangerous example, and accompanied with circumſtances of heinous aggravation; which did not fall within any deſcription of offences that the laws had made capital, and which conſequently could not receive the puniſhment their own malignity and the public ſafety required.*—What is worſe, it would be *known beforehand*, that *ſuch crimes* might be *committed without danger to the offender's life.*—On the other hand, if, to reach theſe poſſible caſes, the whole claſs of offences to which they belong be ſubjected to pains of death, and no power of remitting this ſeverity remain any where, the *execution of the laws* will become more *ſanguinary* than the *public compaſſion* would endure, or than is *neceſſary* to the *general ſecurity.*

The LAW OF ENGLAND is conſtructed upon a different and a better policy.—*By the number of ſtatutes creating capital offences, it ſweeps into the net every crime, which under any poſſible circumſtances may merit the puniſhment of death: but when the execution of this ſentence comes to be deliberated upon, a ſmall proportion of each claſs are ſingled out, the general character, or the peculiar aggravations of whoſe crimes, render them fit examples of public juſtice.*—By this expedient *few actually ſuffer death*, whilſt *the dread and danger of it hang over the crimes of many.*

many.—The tenderneſs of the law cannot be taken advantage of.—The life of the ſubject is ſpared, as far as the neceſſity of reſtraint and intimidation permits, *yet no one will adventure upon the commiſſion of any enormous crime, from a knowledge that the laws have not provided for its puniſhment*.—The wiſdom and humanity of this deſign furniſh a *juſt excuſe* for the *multiplicity of capital offences*, which the laws of England are accuſed of creating beyond thoſe of other countries.—The charge of *cruelty* is anſwered by obſerving, that theſe laws were never meant to be carried into *indiſcriminate execution*; that the legiſlature, when it eſtabliſhes its laſt and higheſt ſanctions, truſts to the *benignity of the crown to relax their ſeverity*, as often as circumſtances appear to palliate the offence, *or even as often as thoſe circumſtances of aggravation are wanting*, which render this *rigorous* interpoſition neceſſary.—Upon this plan it is enough to vindicate the lenity of the laws, that ſome inſtances are to be found in each claſs of capital crimes, which require the reſtraint of capital puniſhment; and that this reſtraint could not be applied, without ſubjecting the whole claſs to the ſame condemnation.

There is however one ſpecies of crimes, the making of which *capital* can hardly, I think, be defended, even upon

upon the comprehenſive principle juſt now ſtated; I mean that of *privately ſtealing* from the perſon.—As every degree of force is excluded by the deſcription of the crime, it will be difficult to aſſign an example, where either the amount or circumſtances of the theft place it upon a level with thoſe dangerous attempts, to which the puniſhment of death ſhould be confined.—It will be ſtill more difficult to ſhew, that, without groſs and culpable negligence on the part of the ſufferer, ſuch examples can ever become ſo frequent, as to make it neceſſary to conſtitute a claſs of capital offences, of very wide and large extent.

The prerogative of pardon is properly reſerved to the chief magiſtrate.—The power of ſuſpending the laws is a privilege of too high a nature to be committed to many hands, or to thoſe of any inferior officer in the ſtate.—The *king* alſo can beſt collect the advice by which his reſolutions ſhould be governed; and is at the ſame time removed at the greateſt diſtance from the influence of private motives.—But let this power be depoſited where it will, the exerciſe of it ought to be regarded, not as a favour to be yielded to ſolicitation, granted to friendſhip, or, leaſt of all, to be made ſubſervient to the conciliating or gratifying of political attachments, *but as a ju-*

dicial act; as a deliberation to be conducted with the ſame character of impartiality, with the ſame exact and diligent attention to the proper merits and circumſtances of the caſe, as that which the judge upon the bench was expected to maintain and ſhew in the trial of the priſoner's guilt.—*The queſtions whether the priſoner be guilty, and whether, being guilty, he ought to be executed, are equally queſtions of public juſtice.*—The adjudication of the latter queſtion is as much a function of magiſtracy as the trial of the former.—The public welfare is intereſted in both.—The conviction of an offender ſhould depend upon nothing but the proof of his guilt, nor the execution of the ſentence upon any thing beſide the quality and circumſtances of his crime.—It is neceſſary to the good order of ſociety, and to the reputation and authority of government, that this be known and believed to be the caſe in each part of the proceeding.

Aggravations which ought to guide the magiſtrate in the *ſelection of objects of condign puniſhment* are principally theſe three—*repetition*, *cruelty*, *combination*.—The two firſt, it is manifeſt, add to every reaſon upon which the juſtice or the neceſſity of rigorous meaſures can be founded; and, with reſpect to the laſt circumſtance, it may be obſerved, that when thieves and robbers are

once

once collected into gangs, their violence becomes more formidable, the confederates more deſperate, and the difficulty of defending the public againſt their depredations much greater, than in the caſe of ſolitary adventurers.—Which ſeveral conſiderations compoſe a diſtinction, that is properly adverted to, in deciding upon the fate of convicted malefactors.

In crimes, however, which are perpetrated by a multitude, or by a gang, it is proper to ſeparate, in the puniſhment, the *ring-leader from his followers*, the principal from his accomplices, and *even the perſon who ſtruck the blow, broke the lock, or firſt entered the houſe, from thoſe who joined him in the felony*; not ſo much on account of any diſtinction in the guilt of the offenders, as for the ſake of caſting an obſtacle in the way of ſuch confederacies, by rendering it difficult for the confederates to ſettle who ſhall begin the attack, or to find a man amongſt their number willing to expoſe himſelf to greater danger than his aſſociates.—This is another inſtance in which the puniſhment, which expediency directs, does not purſue the exact proportion of the crime.

Injuries effected by *terror* and *violence*, are thoſe which it is the firſt and chief concern of legal government to

repreſs; becauſe, their extent is unlimited; becauſe, no private precaution can protect the ſubject againſt them; becauſe, they endanger life and ſafety, as well as property; and laſtly, becauſe they render the condition of ſociety wretched, by a ſenſe of perſonal inſecurity.—Theſe reaſons do not apply to frauds, which circumſpection may prevent; which muſt wait for opportunity; which can proceed only to certain limits; and, by the apprehenſion of which, although the buſineſs of life be incommoded, life itſelf is not made miſerable.—The appearance of this diſtinction has led ſome humane writers to expreſs a wiſh, that capital puniſhments might be confined to crimes of violence.

In eſtimating the comparative malignancy of crimes of violence, regard is to be had, not only to the proper and intended miſchief of the crime, but to the fright occaſioned by the attack, to the general alarm excited by it in others, and to the conſequences which may attend future attempts of the ſame kind.—Thus in aſſigning the puniſhment of *burglary*, or of breaking into dwelling-houſes by night, we are to conſider not only the peril to which the moſt valuable property is expoſed by this crime, and which may be called the direct miſchief of it, but the danger alſo of murder in caſe of re-

ſiſtance, or for the ſake of preventing diſcovery, and the univerſal dread with which the *ſilent and defenceleſs hours of reſt and ſleep* muſt be diſturbed, were attempts of this ſort to become frequent; and which *dread* alone, even without the miſchief which is the object of it, is not only a public evil, but almoſt of all evils the moſt inſupportable.—Theſe circumſtances place a difference between the breaking into a dwelling-houſe by day, and by night; which difference obtains in the puniſhment of the offence by the law of Moſes, and is probably to be found in the judicial codes of moſt countries, from the earlieſt ages to the preſent.

Of frauds, or of injuries which are effected *without force*, the moſt noxious kinds are *forgeries*, counterfeiting or diminiſhing of the *coin*, and the *ſtealing of letters* in the courſe of their conveyance; inaſmuch *as theſe practices tend to deprive the public of accommodations*, which not only improve the conveniencies of ſocial life, but are eſſential to the proſperity, and even the exiſtence of commerce.—Of theſe crimes it may be ſaid, that, although they ſeem to affect property alone, the miſchief of their operation does not terminate there.—For let it be ſuppoſed, that the remiſſneſs or lenity of the laws ſhould, in any country, ſuffer offences of this ſort to grow

grow into ſuch a frequency, as to render the uſe of money, the circulation of bills, or the public conveyance of letters no longer ſafe or practicable; what would follow, but that every ſpecies of trade and of activity muſt decline under theſe diſcouragements; the ſources of ſubſiſtence fail, by which the inhabitants of the country are ſupported; the country itſelf, where the intercourſe of civil life was ſo endangered and defective, be deſerted; and that, beſide the diſtreſs and poverty, which the loſs of employment would produce to the induſtrious and valuable part of the exiſting community, a rapid depopulation muſt take place, each generation becoming leſs numerous than the laſt, till ſolitude and barrenneſs overſpread the land; until a deſolation ſimilar to what obtains in many countries of Aſia, which were once the moſt civilized and frequented parts of the world, ſucceeded in the place of crowded cities, of cultivated fields, of happy and well-peopled regions.—When we carry forwards, therefore, our views to the more diſtant, but not leſs certain conſequences of theſe crimes, we perceive that, though no living creature be deſtroyed by them, yet human life is diminiſhed; that an offence, the particular conſequence of which deprives only an individual of a ſmall portion of his property,

and

d which even in its general tendency ſeems to do no-
ing more than to obſtruct the enjoyment of certain
iblic conveniencies, may nevertheleſs, by its ultimate
ſects, conclude in the laying waſte of human exiſtence.
-This obſervation will enable thoſe, who regard the
vine rule of " life for life, and blood for blood," as
e only authoriſed and juſtifiable meaſure of capital
uniſhment, to perceive, with reſpect to the effects and
uality of the actions, a greater reſemblance than they
ppoſe to exiſt, between certain atrocious frauds, and
eſe crimes which attack perſonal ſafety.

In the caſe of *forgeries* there appears a ſubſtantial dif-
rence, between the forging of bills of exchange, or of
curities which are circulated, and of which the circu-
tion and currency are found to ſerve and facilitate va-
able purpoſes of commerce, and the forging of bonds,
aſes, mortgages, or of inſtruments which are not com-
only transferred from one hand to another; becauſe,
n the former caſe credit is neceſſarily given to the ſig-
ature, and, without that credit, the negociation of
ch property could not be carried on, nor the public
tility ſought from it be attained; in the other caſe, all
ſſibility of deceit might be precluded, by a direct com-
munication

munication between the parties, or by due care in the choice of their agents, with little interruption to buſineſs, and without deſtroying, or much incumbering, the uſes for which theſe inſtruments are calculated.—This diſtinction, I apprehend to be not only real, but preciſe enough to afford a line of diviſion between forgeries, which, as the law now ſtands, are almoſt univerſally capital, and puniſhed with undiſtinguiſhing ſeverity.

Perjury is another crime of the ſame claſs and magnitude.—And, when we conſider what reliance is neceſſarily placed upon oaths; that all judicial deciſions proceed upon teſtimony; that conſequently there is not a right, that a man poſſeſſes, of which falſe witneſſes may not deprive him; that reputation, property, and life itſelf lie open to the attempts of perjury; that it may often be committed without a poſſibility of contradiction or diſcovery; that the ſucceſs and prevalency of this vice tend to introduce the moſt grievous and fatal injuſtice into the adminiſtration of human affairs, or ſuch a diſtruſt of teſtimony as muſt create univerſal embarraſſment and confuſion; when we reflect upon theſe miſchiefs, we ſhall be brought, probably, to agree with the opinion of thoſe, who contend that perjury, in its puniſh-

ment,

ment, eſpecially that which is attempted in ſolemn evidence, and in the face of a court of juſtice, ſhould be placed upon a level with the moſt flagitious frauds.

The obtaining of money by *ſecret threats*, whether we regard the difficulty with which the crime is traced out, the odious imputations to which it may lead, or the profligate conſpiracies that are ſometimes formed to carry it into execution, deſerves to be reckoned amongſt the worſt ſpecies of robbery.

The *frequency* of capital executions in this country, owes its neceſſity to *three cauſes—much liberty, great cities*, and the *want* of a *puniſhment*, ſhort of death, poſſeſſing a ſufficient degree of terror.—And if the taking away of the life of malefactors be more rare in other countries than in ours, the reaſon will be found in ſome difference in theſe articles.—The liberties of a free people, and ſtill more the jealouſy with which theſe liberties are watched, and by which they are preſerved, *permit not thoſe precautions and reſtraints, that inſpection, ſcrutiny, and control, which are exerciſed with ſucceſs in arbitrary government.*—For example, neither the ſpirit of the laws, nor of the people, will ſuffer the detention or confinement of *ſuſpected perſons*, without proofs of their guilt, which it is often impoſſible to obtain; nor will

they allow that maſters of families be obliged to record and render up a deſcription of the ſtrangers or inmates whom they entertain; nor that an account be demanded, at the pleaſure of the magiſtrate, of each man's time, employment, and means of ſubſiſtence; nor ſecurities to be required when theſe accounts appear unſatisfactory or dubious; nor men to be apprehended upon the mere ſuggeſtion of idleneſs or vagrancy; nor to be confined to certain diſtricts; nor the inhabitants of each diſtrict to be made reſponſible for one another's behaviour; nor paſſports to be exacted from all perſons entering or leaving the kingdom: leaſt of all will they tolerate the appearance of an armed force, or of military law; or ſuffer the ſtreets and public roads to be guarded and patrolled by ſoldiers; *or, laſtly, entruſt the police with ſuch diſcretionary powers, as may make ſure of the guilty, however they involve the innocent.*—Theſe *expedients*, although *arbitrary* and *rigorous*, are many of them *effectual*; and in proportion as they render the commiſſion or concealment of crimes more difficult, they ſubſtract from the neceſſity of ſevere puniſhment.—*Great cities* multiply crimes by preſenting eaſier opportunities and more incentives to libertiniſm, which in low life is commonly the introductory ſtage to other enormities;

enormities; by collecting thieves and robbers into the ſame neighbourhood, which enables them to form communications and confederacies, that increaſe their art and courage, as well as ſtrength and wickedneſs; but principally by the refuge they afford to villainy, in the means of concealment, and of ſubſiſting in ſecrecy, which crowded towns ſupply to men of every deſcription.—Theſe temptations and facilities can only be counteracted by adding to the number of capital puniſhments.—But a *third cauſe*, which increaſes the frequency of capital executions in England, is a defect of the laws in not being provided with any other puniſhment than that of death, ſufficiently terrible to keep offenders in awe.—*Tranſportation*, which is the ſentence ſecond in the order of ſeverity, appears to me to anſwer the purpoſe of example very imperfectly; not only becauſe exile is in reality a *ſlight puniſhment* to thoſe, who have neither property, nor friends, nor reputation, nor regular means of ſubſiſtence at home; and becauſe their ſituation becomes little worſe by their crime, than it was before they committed it; but becauſe the puniſhment, whatever it be, is unobſerved and unknown.—*A tranſported convict may ſuffer under his ſentence, but his ſufferings are removed from the view of his countrymen: his mi-*

fery is unſeen; his condition ſtrikes no terror into the minds of thoſe, for whoſe warning and admonition it was intended.—This chaſm in the ſcale of puniſhment produces alſo two further imperfections in the adminiſtration of penal juſtice: the firſt is, that the ſame puniſhment is extended to crimes of very different character and malignity; the ſecond, that puniſhments ſeparated by a great interval, are aſſigned to crimes hardly diſtinguiſhable in their guilt and miſchief *.

* PALEY.

SECT.

SECT. XVIII.

THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED, BUT PLACED IN ANOTHER POINT OF VIEW.

It is clear, that the right of puniſhing crimes againſt the law of nature, as murder and the like, is in a ſtate of mere nature, veſted in every individual.—For it muſt be veſted in ſomebody; otherwiſe the laws of nature would be vain and fruitleſs, if none were empowered to put them in execution: and if that power is veſted in any one, it muſt alſo be veſted in all mankind; ſince all are by nature equal; of which the firſt murderer Cain was ſo ſenſible, that we find him expreſſing his apprehenſions, that whoever ſhould find him would ſlay him. —In a ſtate of ſociety this right is transferred from individuals to the ſovereign power; whereby men are prevented from being judges in their own cauſes, which is one of the evils that civil government was intended to remedy.—Whatever power, therefore, individuals had of puniſhing offences againſt the laws of nature, that is

now

it is lawful to deter them at any rate, and by any means; ſince there may be unlawful methods of enforcing obedience even to the juſteſt laws.—Every humane legiſlator will be therefore extremely cautious of eſtabliſhing laws that inflict the penalty of *death*, eſpecially for ſlight offences, or ſuch as are merely poſitive.—He will expect a better reaſon for his ſo doing, than that looſe one which generally is given; that it is found by former experience that no lighter penalty will be effectual.—For is it found upon farther experience, that capital puniſhments are more effectual?—Was the vaſt territory of all the Ruſſias worſe regulated under the late empreſs ELIZABETH, than under her more ſanguinary predeceſſor? —Is it now, under CATHERINE II. leſs civilized, leſs ſocial, leſs ſecure? And yet we are aſſured, that neither of theſe illuſtrious princeſſes have, throughout their whole adminiſtration, inflicted the penalty of *death*: and the latter has, upon full perſuaſion of its being uſeleſs, nay even pernicious, given orders for aboliſhing it entirely throughout her extenſive dominions.

Upon the whole, we may obſerve, that puniſhments of unreaſonable ſeverity, eſpecially when indiſcriminately inflicted, have leſs effect in preventing crimes, and amending the manners of a people, than ſuch as are

more merciful in general, yet properly intermixed with due diſtinctions of ſeverity.—It is the ſentiment of an ingenious writer, who ſeems to have well ſtudied the ſprings of human action, that crimes are more effectually prevented by the certainty than by the ſeverity of puniſhment; for the exceſſive ſeverity of laws (ſays MONTESQUIEU) hinders their execution.—When the puniſhment ſurpaſſes all meaſure, the public will frequently prefer impunity to it.—Thus alſo the ſtatute 1 Mar. ſt. 1. c. 1. recites in its preamble, "that the ſtate of every king conſiſts more aſſuredly in the love of the ſubject towards their prince, than in the dread of laws made with rigorous pains; and that laws made for the preſervation of the commonwealth without great penalties, are more often obeyed and kept, than laws made with extreme puniſhments."—Happy had it been for the nation if the ſubſequent practice of that deluded princeſs in matters of religion, had been correſpondent to theſe ſentiments of herſelf and parliament in matters of ſtate and government! We may further obſerve, that ſanguinary laws are a bad ſymptom of the diſtemper of any ſtate, or at leaſt of its weak conſtitution.—The laws of the Roman kings, and the twelve tables of the *decemviri*, were full of cruel puniſhments: the Porcian law,

which exempted all citizens from ſentence of death, ſilently abrogated them all.—In this period the republic flouriſhed: under the emperors ſevere puniſhments were revived, and then the empire fell.

It is, moreover, abſurd and impolitic to apply the ſame puniſhment to crimes of different malignity.—A multitude of ſanguinary laws (beſides the doubt that may be entertained concerning the right of making them) do likewiſe prove a manifeſt defect either in the wiſdom of the legiſlative, or the ſtrength of the executive, power.—It is a kind of quackery in government, and argues a want of ſolid ſkill, to apply the ſame univerſal remedy, the *ultimum ſupplicium*, to every caſe of difficulty.—It is, it muſt be owned, much eaſier to extirpate than to amend mankind; yet that magiſtrate muſt be eſteemed both a weak and a cruel ſurgeon, who cuts off every limb which through ignorance or indolence he will not attempt to cure.—It has been therefore ingeniouſly propoſed, that in every ſtate a ſcale of crimes ſhould be formed, with a correſponding ſcale of puniſhments, deſcending from the greateſt to the leaſt.—But if that be too romantic an idea, yet at leaſt a wiſe legiſlator will mark the principal diviſions, and not aſſign penalties of the firſt degree to offences of an inferior rank.

rank.—Where men ſee no diſtinction made in the nature and gradations of puniſhment, the generality will be led to conclude there is no diſtinction in the guilt.—Thus in France the puniſhment of robbery, either with or without murder, is the ſame: hence it is, that though perhaps they are therefore ſubject to fewer robberies, yet they ſeldom rob but they alſo murder.—In China murderers are cut to pieces, and robbers not: hence in that country they never murder on the highway, though they often rob.—And in Britain, beſides the additional terrors of a ſpeedy execution, and a ſubſequent expoſure or diſſection, robbers have a hope of tranſportation, which ſeldom is extended to murderers.—This has the ſame effect here as in China, in preventing frequent aſſaſſination and ſlaughter.

But indeed, were capital puniſhments proved by experience to be a ſure and effectual remedy, that would not prove the neceſſity (upon which the juſtice and propriety depend) of inflicting them upon all occaſions when other expedients fail.—It is feared this reaſoning would extend a great deal too far.—For inſtance, the damage done to our public roads by loaded waggons is univerſally allowed, and many laws have been made to prevent it, none of which have hitherto proved effectual.

—But it does not therefore follow, that it would be juſt for the legiſlature to inflict death upon every obſtinate carrier, who defeats or eludes the proviſions of former ſtatutes.—Where the evil to be prevented is not adequate to the violence of the preventive, a ſovereign that thinks ſeriouſly can never juſtify ſuch a law to the dictates of conſcience and humanity.—To ſhed the blood of our fellow-creature is a matter that requires the greateſt deliberation, and the fulleſt conviction of our own authority: for life is the immediate gift of GOD to man; which neither he can reſign, nor can it be taken from him, unleſs by the command or permiſſion of him who gave it, either expreſsly revealed, or collected from the laws of nature or ſociety by clear and indiſputable demonſtration.

Yet though we may glory in the wiſdom of our conſtitution, we ſhall find it difficult to juſtify the frequency of capital puniſhment, inflicted (perhaps inattentively) by a multitude of ſucceſſive independent ſtatutes, upon crimes very different in their natures.—It is a melancholy truth, that among the variety of actions which men are daily liable to commit, no leſs than 160 have been declared by acts of parliament to be felonies without benefit of clergy; or, in other words, to be worthy of inſtant death.—So

dreadful a liſt, inſtead of diminiſhing, increaſes the number of offenders.—The injured, through compaſſion, will often forbear to proſecute; juries, through compaſſion, will ſometimes forget their oaths, and either acquit the guilty or mitigate the nature of the offence; and judges, through compaſſion, will reſpite one half of the convicts, and recommend them to the royal mercy.—Among ſo many chances of eſcaping, the needy and hardened offender overlooks the multitude that ſuffer: he boldly engages in ſome deſperate attempt to relieve his wants or ſupply his vices; and if unexpectedly the hand of juſtice overtakes him, he deems himſelf peculiarly unfortunate in falling at laſt a ſacrifice to thoſe laws which long impunity has taught him to contemn.

The ſeverity of puniſhment is alſo one great reaſon why crimes of an inferior claſs, with reſpect to enormity, are in a more peculiar manner felt as national evils *.

It will ſcarcely be credited by thoſe, whoſe habits of life do not permit them to enter into diſcuſſions of this ſort, that by the laws of England, there are above one hundred and ſixty different offences which ſubject the

* *Vide* an excellent Treatiſe on the Police, by a Magiſtrate.

parties

parties who are found guilty, to the punishment of death without benefit of clergy.

It requires little penetration to be convinced that a criminal code, so sanguinary in its provisions, must in the nature of things defeat those ends, the attainment of which ought to be the object of all law, namely, *the prevention of crimes.*

It is only necessary to examine, with a little attention, the modern history of the *criminal prosecutions, trials, acquittals, and pardons, in this country* *, in order to

* Discharged from Newgate in

1786	575	1791	584
1787	611	1792	804
1788	542	1793	702
1789	614	1794	644
1790	532	1795	578
	2874		3312
			2874
		Total prisoners	6186

Since the first institution of the Hulks in 1776, there have been discharged from Woolwich, Portsmouth, and Langston Harbour, *two thousand five hundred and thirty convicts.*

Viz. 1. By expiration of punishment	-	1610
2. By pardons, - - - - - - -		790
3. By escapes, - - - - - - -		130
Total		2530

1. Discharged

ompletely convinced that one great cauſe of the ſſive increaſe of crimes and criminal delinquents, from the ſingle circumſtance of ſuch a multitude hter offences being liable to the puniſhment of

e Roman empire never flouriſhed ſo much as ; the æra of the Portian law, which abrogated the ıment of death for all offences whatſoever.—When puniſhments and an incorrect police were after- revived, as we before obſerved, the empire fell. s not meant, however, to be inſinuated that this be, altogether, a proper ſyſtem of criminal juriſ- ce to be adopted in modern times.

arged by proclamation and gaol-deliveries; having been com- d in conſequence of being charged with various offences, for h bills were not found by the grand jury, or where the proſe- s did not appear to maintain and ſupport the charges, - - 5592

arged by acquittals, in the different courts; (frequently from g availed themſelves of the defects of the law,—from frauds eeping back evidence, and other devices), - - - - - - 2962

ifts diſcharged from the different gaols, after ſuffering the ſhment of impriſonment, &c. inflicted on them for their ſeve- ffences, - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2484

ifts diſcharged and eſcaped from the Hulks at Woolwich, ſmouth, and Langſton, - - - - - - - - - - 896

Total 11,934

In

In the preſent ſtate of ſociety it may be thought indiſpenſably neceſſary, that offences, which in their nature are highly injurious to the public, and where no mode of prevention can be eſtabliſhed, ſhould be puniſhed by the forfeiture of life; but theſe dreadful examples ſhould be exhibited as ſeldom as poſſible; for while on the one hand, ſuch puniſhments often defeat the ends of juſtice, by their not being carried into execution: ſo on the other, by being often repeated, they loſe their effect upon the minds of the people.

If it were poſſible to form a ſcale of offences with a correſponding puniſhment applicable to each, aſcending from the ſlighteſt miſdemeanor, in progreſſive gradation to the higheſt crimes of forgery, arſon, murder, and treaſon, the guilty would not ſo frequently eſcape the puniſhment of the law; and the numerous hordes of thieves and cheats who are daily committed for ſlighter offences, would not, as at preſent, be ſet at liberty either by goal-deliveries or by acquittals.

This idea has been already ſuggeſted by an author of the higheſt reputation *, and certainly merits attention; as it is hoped thoſe ſuggeſtions do which will be ſubmitted to the conſideration of the public, for the improve-

* Baccaria, cap. 6.

ment

ment of the police of the metropolis, and of the country at large, in the next ſection.—For certain it is, that however much we glory (and we ought to glory) in the excellence of our conſtitution, yet there is no truth more clear and obvious than this;—"That our code "exhibits too much the appearance of a heterogeneous "maſs, concocted too often on the ſpur of the occaſion "(as Lord BACON expreſſes it),—And frequently with- "out that degree of accuracy which is the reſult of "able and minute diſcuſſion, or a due attention to the "reviſion of the exiſting laws, or how far their pro- "viſions bear upon new and accumulated ſtatutes in- "troduced into parliament, often without either con- "ſideration or knowledge; and without thoſe precau- "tions which are always neceſſary, when laws are to "be made which may affect the property, the liberty, "and perhaps even the lives of thouſands."

Were the exiſting laws, which form our preſent criminal code (according to the ſuggeſtions of Lord BACON, and an eminent crown lawyer of our own times), to be referred to able and intelligent men to reviſe, conſolidate, and adjuſt the whole, in a manner beſt ſuited to the preſent ſtate of ſociety and manners, the inveſtigation would unqueſtionably excite wonder and aſtoniſh-

ment; and thoſe concerned in it could not fail to lament that ſo many laws, inflicting ſevere penalties and puniſhments for ſlight offences, at preſent fill the ſtatute-book; while ſeveral crimes, highly injurious to ſociety, are not liable to any puniſhment whatever.

Penal laws, which are either obſolete or abſurd, or which have ariſen from an adherence to rules of common law, when the reaſons have ceaſed upon which theſe rules are founded; and in ſhort, all laws which appear not to be founded on the dictates of truth and juſtice, the feelings of humanity, and the indelible rights of mankind, ſhould be abrogated and repealed *.

The method of inflicting puniſhment ought always to be proportioned to the end it is meant to ſerve.—That boundary ſhould never be exceeded, and where death does not attach to the crime, the *reformation*, and *future uſefulneſs* of the culprit to the ſtate, ſhould conſtantly form a leading feature in all criminal juriſprudence.

By compelling perſons convicted of offences to be uſeful and induſtrious, a repetition of crimes would be prevented; and inſtead of being injured by reiterated depredations, as is the caſe at preſent, ſociety would enjoy, not only the benefits ariſing from the protection of

* Blackstone.

life

life and property, but alſo from productive labour, increaſing and enlarging the reſources of the ſtate through the medium of its worſt members.

Prevention of crimes and miſdemeanors, it cannot be too often repeated, is the true eſſence of police;—and this is only to be attained by a ſyſtem of energy directed by ſuch wiſe and legiſlative arrangements, as ſhall enable the civil magiſtrate to throw every poſſible difficulty in the way of offenders.

This indeed is very different from what is ſaid to have prevailed in the capital, when criminals were generally permitted to ripen from the firſt ſtage of depravity until they were worth forty pounds.—This is not the ſyſtem which ſubjected the public to the intermediate depredations of every villain from his firſt ſtarting, till he could be clearly convicted of a capital offence.—Neither is it the ſyſtem which encouraged public houſes of rendezvous for thieves, for the purpoſe of knowing where to apprehend them, when they became ripe for the puniſhment of death.

The ſyſtem now ſuggeſted, is calculated to prevent, if poſſible, the ſeeds of villainy from being ſown;—or if ſown, to check their growth in the bud, and never permit them to ripen at all.

Humanity ſhudders at the contemplation of this intereſting part of the diſcuſſion, when it is conſidered, who theſe our miſerable fellow-mortals are! and what is to be expected from the extreme depravity which attaches to the chief part of them!

And here a prominent feature of the imperfect ſtate of the police of the metropolis and the country is too evident to eſcape notice.

Without friends, without character, and without the means of ſubſiſtence, what are theſe unhappy mortals to do?—They are no ſooner known or ſuſpected, than they are avoided.—No perſon will employ them, even if they were diſpoſed to return to the paths of honeſty; unleſs they make uſe of fraud and deception, by concealing that they have been the inhabitants of a *priſon*, or of the *hulks*.

At large upon the world, without food or raiment, and with the conſtant calls of nature upon them for both, without a home or an aſylum to ſhelter them from the inclemency of the weather, *what is to become of them?*

The police of the country has provided no place of induſtry, in which thoſe who were diſpoſed to reform might find ſubſiſtence in return for labour; which, in their preſent ſituation, becomes uſeleſs to them, becauſe

no

no perſon will purchaſe it by employing them.—Under all theſe circumſtances it is to be feared, indeed it is known, that many convicts, from dire neceſſity, return to their old courſes.—And thus, through the medium of theſe miſerable outcaſts of ſociety, crimes are increaſed and become a regular trade, becauſe many of them can make no other election.

THOSE MEN WILL DESERVE A STATUE TO THEIR MEMORY WHO SHALL MODERATE THE NEEDLESS SEVERITY OF OUR LAWS, AND DEVISE AND CARRY INTO EFFECT A PLAN FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF DISCHARGED CONVICTS, WHO MAY BE DESIROUS OF LABOURING FOR THEIR SUBSISTENCE IN AN HONEST WAY.—IT IS ONLY NECESSARY FOR PERSONS OF WEIGHT AND INFLUENCE TO MAKE THE ATTEMPT, IN ORDER TO ENSURE THE ASSISTANCE OF THE OPULENT AND HUMANE IN SO GOOD AND NECESSARY A WORK.

SECT. XIX.

THE SAME SUBJECT CONSIDERED PRACTICALLY.

HOWARD, the beneficent HOWARD, whoſe generous efforts have been too often treated as the ſchemes of a philanthropic viſionary, even by thoſe who were unable to refuſe him their tribute of admiration and reſpect, HOWARD, thanks to the wiſdom of the ſtate of *Pennſylvania*, will be henceforth acknowledged to be a philoſopher as acute in his obſervations, and as enlightened in his views, as in his diſpoſition virtuous, and friendly to the human race.—His doctrines have been attended to, and his ſyſtem put in practice in *Philadelphia*, for ſeveral years paſt, and ſucceſs has crowned them: that ſucceſs which had been predicted by the benefactor of mankind.

As the criminal juriſprudence of the ſtate of *Pennſylvania* is the baſis on which the new ſyſtem of priſon-adminiſtration reſts, it may be uſeful to give ſome account of it in a ſuccinct hiſtory.

William

/illiam PENN, when he eſtabliſhed this colony in , brought with him a charter from CHARLES the nd, which required the eſtabliſhment of the laws of land in the infant ſettlement.—But how could N, a philoſophic legiſlator, whoſe firſt act of go- ment was to grant equal protection (without pre- ice or partiality to any religion) to every ſect, liſh without reluctance a ſyſtem of criminal juriſ- ence, which awarded to almoſt every kind of crime puniſhment of *death*?—PENN was the friend of rea- nd humanity.—He wiſhed to extend their empire, o enſure their bleſſings to his riſing colony.—Nor l a cold indifference to the effuſion of blood, accord the principles of that ſect, which refuſes to ac- vledge the lawfulneſs even of defenſive war.—He oiled, as ſoon as he could, a milder code of criminal rudence, in which the puniſhment of death was ded to premeditated murder only.—This code was pproved of in England, and, after a long diſpute een the king and the governor of *Pennſylvania*, the liſh criminal law was eſtabliſhed in its full extent rigour.—This order ſubſiſted as long as the kings of land remained ſovereigns of America.

he inhabitants of *Pennſylvania*, awakened to liberty,

had

had their attention immediately recalled to the mildneſs of their original penal code.—The new conſtitution of the ſtate, formed in the year 1776, enjoined the legiſlature to proceed to the reformation of the penal laws, and to invent puniſhments leſs cruel, and better proportioned to the various degrees of criminality.—The war prevented the execution of theſe views till 1776.—At that time the puniſhment of death, which had been inflicted upon almoſt every ſpecies of theft, &c. was reſerved for murder, rape, wilful incendiaries, and treaſon; and whipping, impriſonment, and public labour, ſubſtituted in its ſtead.

The experience of a few years has at length demonſtrated the numberleſs inconveniences of *public labour*. —Criminals loaded with irons, and ſcattered through the ſtreets and along the roads, preſented to the public the ſpectacle of vice rather than of ſhame and miſery; and the impoſſibility of watching them properly, facilitated the means of exceſs, of drunkenneſs, of pillage, and of eſcape —All the priſoners, whatever might have been their crimes or their characters, were confounded in one maſs.—By this mixture, the bad were not ameliorated, but the leſs criminal often became worſe.—They ſpread terror over town and country; and far

from being put in the way of amendment, became initiated in new ſcenes of wickedneſs, till the priſons were found incompetent to contain the increaſing number of the convicted.

At this period, ſome of the moſt reſpectable citizens of *Philadelphia* formed themſelves into a ſociety, with the view of alleviating the miſeries of the priſons, of aſcertaining their defects, and of pointing out to the government the prevailing abuſes.—This ſociety was the occaſion of an additional mitigation of the penal code.—In 1790, the legiſlature, compoſed at that time of a ſingle chamber, aboliſhed the puniſhments of public labour, of mutilation, and of whipping; and ſubſtituted in their ſtead impriſonment, fine, and reparation for the crime committed. — The ſame law requires ſtronger evidence for the conviction of certain criminals; and, after ſettling ſeveral important articles relative to the general adminiſtration of priſons, gives in charge to a board of inſpectors to make, with the approbation of the mayor and two aldermen of *Philadelphia*, two judges of the ſupreme court, and two judges of the court of common pleas of *Pennſylvania*, ſuch alterations as may be neceſſary for the internal management of ſuch buildings. Confidence in the good intentions of this beneficent ſo-

ciety, and in the patriotiſm and ſagacity of the inſpectors, forced, as it were, this act from the legiſlature, who were far from expecting that the avoiding of ill treatment, and the adoption of a mild conduct, would have more effect upon the priſoners, and prove a better means of correction, than fetters, harſhneſs, and ſeverity.

The judges conſulted on this occaſion, oppoſed the change, not becauſe they were hardened by prejudice, they were, on the contrary, enlightened and humane; but a too intimate acquaintance with crimes and criminals, the conſequence of their profeſſion, blinded them to the hopes of ſucceſs pointed out in the new ſyſtem.—The new mode of diſcipline was, however, the only plea for the alteration of the penal code, which, for this reaſon, was made temporary, and its duration limited to five years.—It was left to after-experience, to determine whether it ſhould be continued or abandoned.

The Quakers were the chief promoters of this ſoftened ſyſtem.

It was Lownes who propoſed and effected the change of diſcipline; who propoſed to ſubſtitute a mild and rational, but firm, treatment, in the room of irons and ſtripes:

ſtripes: and who, without relaxing in his efforts, patiently bore to be treated as a viſionary, in full confidence of the good to be obtained by perſeverance.—His indefatigable zeal, by intereſting in his favour every perſon capable of contributing to his ſucceſs, obtained, from the good will of the legiſlature, the already noticed laws: laws dictated not only by benevolence, but alſo by juſtice and true policy.—He, in fine, by conſenting to be re-elected on every nomination, became the principal agent in this reſpectable work of reaſon and humanity.

I have already obſerved, that the opinion of the judges was decidedly againſt this eſtabliſhment: one, younger than the reſt, and leſs inclined to deſpair of the melioration of the human character, embraced with ardour the new ſyſtem, aſſociated himſelf with Caleb Lowns, aſſiſted him with that advice which could be given only by a man well verſed in the ſcience of juriſprudence; and ſhared with him his hopes, his labours, and his deſervings.—This man was William Bradford, at that time judge of the ſtate of Pennſylvania, ſince attorney-general of the United States, and recently deceaſed, honoured by the regret and univerſal eſteem of his fellow citizens. — He deſerves, indeed, particular reſpect;

which I pay him with the greater readineſs, as it implies no cenſure on his brethren, who, in refuſing their ſanction to the new ſyſtem, were actuated only by the fear of ſucceſs, a fear founded upon paſt experience.

They were ſeconded by the influence of ſeveral other citizens, of importance by their fortunes, and by their great credit and reſpectability, who were ſufficiently enlightened to calculate the poſſibility of its ſucceſs, and the advantages it promiſed.—Their patriotiſm rendered them ardent to contribute to its advancement.—In conſequence, the regulations were ſpeedily concerted, and the neceſſary alterations in the buildings being made, the new diſcipline commenced.—The trials already made, have ſo fully anſwered every expectation, that during the laſt year, the ſtate legiſlature has proceeded to a further mitigation of its penal code, and has confined the puniſhment of death to murder committed with malice and premeditated intention; puniſhing every other ſpecies of the ſame crime with impriſonment of greater or leſs continuance and ſeverity, leaving to the governor, at the ſame time, the power of abridging its duration.—To theſe enlightened legiſlators it appeared, that if, on the one hand, the certainty of puniſhment

operated as a powerful check on crimes, the hope of obtaining pardon, in conſequence of good behaviour, was, on the other, a means no leſs powerful in determining the convict to real and poſitive amendment.

The end propoſed in puniſhment, ought to be the correction of the guilty, and ſhould include the means of amendment.—This axiom of morality is the baſis of the government of the priſon.—The managers have connected with it a great political truth; that the confinement of a convict being a reparation made to the community, the ſociety ought to be burdened as little as poſſible with the expence attending ſuch detention: whence it follows, that a chief object of the regimen of theſe priſons ought to be, firſt, to break off the old habits to which the convicts have been accuſtomed, and induce them to ſelf-reflection, and conſequent amelioration; ſecondly, to proſcribe all arbitrary ill-treatment of the priſoners; and thirdly, to keep them conſtantly employed in ſome ſpecies of productive labour, with a view to make them contribute to the expences of the priſon, preſerve them from idleneſs and inaction, and enable them to lay up ſome kind of fund againſt the termination of their captivity.

The convicts, condemned to impriſonment under the

new

new act, may be divided into two claſſes. 1ſt. Thoſe condemned for crimes, heretofore puniſhable with death, whoſe ſentence always includes the article of ſolitary confinement during a part of their detention.—2d. Such as have been convicted of crimes of leſs importance, and whoſe ſentence does not include the above article of ſolitary confinement.

The perſon ſentenced to ſolitary confinement is ſhut up in a kind of cell, whoſe floor is eight feet by ſix, and its height nine feet.—This room is on the firſt or ſecond ſtory of an inſulated building raiſed on arches.—It is warmed by means of a ſtove, placed in the paſſage leading to the cells.—The priſoner, confined within two iron gratings, receives the heat, without the power of making an improper uſe of the fire, which he cannot handle.—His chamber, which is partly lighted by the window of the paſſage, is more directly illuminated by a ſmall window which opens into the cell itſelf.—Each apartment contains a neceſſary, cleanſable at will by a ſtream of water.—Every precaution is taken to preſerve health.—The cell, as well as the reſt of the houſe, is whitewaſhed twice a year, or more frequently, if neceſſity requires—The priſoner ſleeps upon a mattrafs, and is allowed a ſufficient quantity of cloathing.—In this

this ſituation, ſeparated from every other individual, given up to ſolitude, to ſelf-reflection, and to remorſe, he can communicate only with himſelf.—He ſees the turnkey but once a day, to receive a ſmall pudding made of Indian corn, together with ſome melaſſes; nor is it till after a given time, that he obtains, upon his petition, the leave to read.

The convicts whoſe ſentence does not include ſolitary confinement, are on their arrival placed among the reſt; their clothes are taken away, and, if neceſſary, expoſed to heat in an oven, and the common dreſs of the priſoners put upon them.—They are made acquainted with the regulations of the houſe, and interrogated with reſpect to the labour they are able or willing to perform.—The officer who brings them, delivers to the inſpectors a ſhort account of their crime, of its aggravating or extenuating circumſtances, of their trial, of the faults they have been guilty of, and, in ſhort, of the general character of the individual previous to his condemnation.—This account, afforded by the court which pronounced ſentence, enables the inſpectors to form ſome judgment of the new priſoner, and of the greater or leſs attention which it will be neceſſary to pay to his behaviour.

The

The work aſſigned them is adapted to their ſtrength and capacity.—There are in the houſe, looms for weavers, work-ſhops and tools for joiners, carpenters, turners, ſhoe-makers, and taylors; the convicts who poſſeſs ſuch trades, are allowed to practiſe them; the remainder are employed in ſawing and poliſhing marble, in cutting logwood, in pounding and grinding plaiſter of Paris, in carding wool, or in beating hemp.—The weaker and leſs ſkilful are buſied in picking wool, hair, or oakum.—The inſpectors have lately added to theſe eſtabliſhments, a manufacture of nails, capable of affording employment to a great number of priſoners, and bringing conſiderable profit to the houſe.—Every one is paid in proportion to his labour.—The bargain for each ſpecies of work is made, in the preſence of the convict, between the gaoler and the employer.—Out of his profits, the priſoner is obliged to pay his board, and the price of, or in ſome caſes a certain rent or hire for the inſtruments he uſes.—Theſe payments, which are neceſſarily determined by the current price of commodities, are fixed by the inſpectors four times in every year.

Beſides his board and cloathing, which are paid out of the profits of his labour, the original ſentence of the law

law obliges the convict to pay the expences of profecution, together with a fine, which never fails to be impoſed.—That part of the fine which is appropriated to the commonwealth, is commonly remitted; but he is bound to diſcharge, without failure, that which is intended as a reparation of his crime, and to defray the expences of proſecution.—The county advances the ſums required on this laſt ſcore, and is reimburſed by the produce of the convict's labour, unleſs repaid by the family or friends.

The women are employed in ſpinning, ſewing, preparing flax and hemp, and in waſhing and mending for the houſe.—Their labour is not ſo productive as that of the men, but it is ſufficient to pay the ſeven-pence a day required for their maintenance; or amounts to ſomething more, if they labour throughout the day.—As their work demands leſs ſtrength than that of the men, their nouriſhment is likewiſe leſs conſiderable.

The gaoler is not here, as is too often the caſe in Europe, an extortioner, who lays under contribution the weakneſs, the captivity, and the miſery of the confined.—No garniſh, no purchaſe of favours or privileges, no diſmiſſion fees diſgrace theſe priſons.—In Europe, the ſmall ſalary annexed to many places ſeem to

they are allowed a few billets.—As the building is arched, they cannot ſet fire to it; and were they to attempt to burn their beds, they would not only be expoſed to ſuffocation, but the ſurvivors would be obliged to pay the damages committed by their companions.

Before they begin their labour, they are obliged to waſh their face and hands.—In ſummer they bathe twice a week, in a baſon deſtined to that purpoſe in the middle of the court.—They are ſhaved regularly twice a week, and the wages of the barber, who is a convict, form another part of the general ſum deducted from their daily earnings. They change their linen twice a week.

The ruder kinds of labour are performed in the court-yard; thoſe which are more delicate are carried on in various apartments of the ſame ſtory with thoſe in which they ſleep, but in another part of the building.—The workmen are not locked in the rooms: they work under the mutual inſpection of each other, and there are ſeldom more than five or ſix in one work-ſhop.—The turnkeys, who are four in number for the whole houſe, are conſtantly parading in the paſſages, in the courts, and among the priſoners.—Long converſations are for-

 bidden;

bidden; they are allowed to aſk aſſiſtance of each other, and to ſpeak on the ſubject of their mutual wants; but not otherwiſe.—They are forbidden to bawl after one another, or to converſe on the cauſes of their detention, or to reproach each other, on any account; at table the ſame ſilence is preſcribed.

Their breakfaſt and ſupper is a pudding of Indian corn, ſweetened with melaſſes.—At dinner they are allowed half a pound of meat.—They are never, on any account, permitted the uſe of fermented liquors, not even of ſmall-beer.—The prohibition of fermented drink is a ſtanding order, and moſt religiouſly obſerved.—The livelineſs and animation which ſuch liquors might induce in the workmen, is only an artificial and momentary vigour; a cauſe of irritation, heating the blood, and deſtroying the effect of that temperate regimen, which is intended to alter the habit and conſtitution.—The convict, on the contrary, derives ſtrength from ſubſtantial nouriſhment, limited to what is neceſſary.

If the convict diſobeys any order of the houſe, he is warned of his firſt offence by the inſpectors, the gaoler, or the turnkey.—If he offends again, he is put into ſolitary confinement.—This ſolitary confinement is a puniſhment allowed to be inflicted by the gaolar, who is bound,

bound, as ſoon as poſſible, to report what he has done to the inſpectors.—The idler, who refuſes to work, is likewiſe ſent into ſolitary confinement; and for him this puniſhment, beſides its own extreme ſeverity, occaſions his loſing a portion of time and labour, which he muſt make up by his future exertions, ſince the expences of his board continue all the while to be charged to his account.

The four turnkeys are, in their turns, on the watch all night.—Two remain in the inſpectors room, while the others parade in the paſſages of the convicts ſide of the gaol.—Their orders are to awaken the gaoler on the leaſt noiſe, and collect into one body.—The gaoler is to enter the room whence the noiſe proceeds, and conduct the offender into the dreadful ſolitude.—Such caſes have ſeldom occurred.

Solitary confinement is the only puniſhment known in the gaol.—The gaoler and turnkeys are without arms, without dogs; they are even forbidden to carry ſticks, leſt, in a moment of paſſion, they ſhould ſtrike a priſoner, and break in upon that ſyſtem of tranquillity and impartial juſtice, from which is expected ſo much benefit.

The treatment of the women is the ſame with that

of

of the men.—They are confined in a ſeparate wing of the building, and joined to thoſe whom the police has ſentenced for other cauſes.—The only work done in their court-yard is waſhing: they have, however, the free uſe of it.—The number of female convicts is generally about five or ſix.—Silence is leſs rigidly required of them, nor are they ſo exactly ſuperintended as the men; they are leſs numerous; their apartments are kept conſtantly locked; one of them cooks for the reſt; they nurſe each other mutually in diſeaſes, but theſe are few.—The new regimen has, in this reſpect, produced a change, which is remarkably evident, even in the druggiſt's bill, which formerly amounted to two hundred, or three hundred and twenty dollars per quarter, but at preſent ſeldom riſes above forty.—This enormous difference is entirely attributable to the total change of diſcipline which has taken place.—During the former ſyſtem, the irregular government of the priſon was attended with filth and drunkenneſs; and frequent broils produced diſeaſes, wounds, and bruiſes of every kind.—Under the new order, theſe cauſes of evil having ceaſed, the diſorders are confined to colds, or ſuch accidents as are common every where.—Only two priſoners have deceaſed within four years, and thoſe of the ſmall-pox.

Except

Except in caſes of contagious maladies, the ſick priſoners remain in their room; in ſuch caſes, however, they are removed to a ſeparate apartment.

On Sunday the priſoners attend a ſermon, and a lecture delivered by a clergyman, whoſe zeal leads him to undertake the taſk.—As chriſtianity is profeſſed by almoſt every inhabitant of the ſtate, the reading is from the Bible.—The ſermons turn rather upon points of morality than upon articles of faith, and are adapted, as much as poſſible, to the faith and nature of the audience. —All the priſoners, of whatever claſs or ſex, are obliged to attend, thoſe alone excepted who are in ſolitary confinement: but none of the claſſes are intermingled.—In the evening another ſermon is preached, and books are given to thoſe who requeſt them, of a nature fitted to recal them to their duty.

The convicts, on leaving the priſon, receive the overplus of their gains either in money, if the inſpectors conſider that they will not make an improper uſe of it; or in cloathing, in caſe of want of confidence in the diſcretion of the liberated.—There are ſome who diſpoſe of their profits, even during the time of their impriſonment, for the maintenance of their families; and ſuch have been the admirable fruits of the new diſcipline, that

out

out of thoſe who leave the gaol, whether in conſequence of a pardon, or on the expiration of their ſentence, not above two in a hundred ever return to it; while, under the *old ſyſtem*, the priſons were filled with incorrigible and confirmed criminals, who, like thoſe of Europe, carried out more vices than they brought in, abuſed their liberty in the commiſſion of freſh crimes, and were continually returning to their fetters, till they terminated their exiſtence on the ſcaffold.

The ſubjoined table *, and the note which follows it,

* CRIMES.	From Jan. 1787, to June 1791, under the Old Syſtem.	From June 1791 to March 1795, under the Preſent Syſtem.
Murder	9	
Manſlaughter		5
Robbery	39	3
Burglary,	77	16
Larceny	374	163
Forgery	5	10
Counterfeiting	6	4
Miſdemeanor, 1ſt degree	4	3
Do. 2d degree	13	1
Receiving ſtolen goods, 1ſt degree	26	1
Do. 2d degree	6	5
Horſe-ſtealing	10	27
Defrauding	3	3
Bigamy	1	
Violent aſſault to kill	6	
Harbouring convicts	5	
Diſorderly houſes	10	2
Total	394	243

* During the four firſt of theſe eight years, the priſons were peopled from the city and county of Philadelphia only. During the four laſt years, the whole ſtate of Pennſylvania has ſent its convicts in addition.

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ment proportioned to the crime, and are convinced of the utility of the ſcheme, will be leſs averſe to inveſtigate and admit the proofs of guilt.—The executive power alſo has no ſufficient motive to pardon a convict previous to the execution of his ſentence, ſince at any time he has the power of doing it, after the criminal has demonſtrated that he is worthy of the indulgence.

The reſult of this experiment, which already includes four years of trial, is:

1ſt. That many perſons formerly loſt to ſociety are reſtored to it, and become uſeful members of the community, and bring back into it thoſe habits of labour and induſtry, which in every quarter of the globe are the moſt certain and powerful preſervatives againſt wickedneſs and crimes.

2dly. That the expence of their detention does not fall upon the public.—Since the ſtate, which had formerly to ſupport only the expences of repairs, and of ſervants' wages (even before the eſtabliſhment of the nail manufactories *), is at this time burdened with no

* The whole ſum levied upon the county, for the wages of the gaoler and turnkeys, for repairs, &c. amounted only to one thouſand dollars.—It may be proper to add, that during the period in which fetters were made uſe of in the priſon, the blackſmith's bill alone amounted, on an average, to eight hundred dollars; but that at preſent, and for four years paſt, it has not riſen to forty.

part of the expenſe; but has, on the contrary, an exceſs of income ariſing from this fund, which is thrown into the public treaſury, to be employed in other public works *.

The ſucceſs of the *new ſyſtem* is on the point, therefore, of being more complete than HOWARD himſelf had ventured to contemplate: for he conſidered the hope, that the labour of priſoners would defray the expences of their detention as an illuſion †; and yet, thoſe in the gaol of Philadelphia, on their diſmiſſion, beſides paying their expences of every kind, take with them an overplus of profit.—His opinion was, likewiſe, that fetters, and even whipping, were indiſpenſable in the management of priſons ‡; and yet all corporeal correction, as well as irons, are forbidden in this gaol.—And laſtly, the puniſhment of death, which, according to HOWARD,

* As the nail manufacture is continually increaſing, and its profits depend on the number of hands employed in it, a general idea only is given of the profits it affords the houſe, which are poſitive, and already conſiderable.—It is to be wiſhed that a particular ſtatement of the whole expence of the eſtabliſhment, and the produce of each branch of labour, were given to the public, by the inſpectors.—This information, and thoſe details are of great importance, but cannot be brought forward with any confidence by a traveller, deſirous to publiſh nothing but truth.

† Howard on Priſons, Vol. II. p. 41.

‡ Ibid. Vol. II. p. 227. On Priſon Regulations.

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the law ought ſtill to inflict on houſe-breakers, incendiaries, and murderers in general, is confined here to murderers of the firſt degree.—This puniſhment, ſo often enacted by legiſlators, merely becauſe they were embarraſſed how to diſpoſe of the criminals to whom they granted life, ought then only, according to every principle of morality and ſound policy, to be pronounced, when no other means exiſt of preſerving the community from ſome great peril.—In every other caſe, it becomes a cruelty detrimental to its true intereſts; which, after all, puniſhes the criminal leſs ſeverely *than a rigid and long detention, than that exact and cloſe confinement in ſeparate cells, which leaves the inſulated criminal to the heart-rending recollection of his crimes; condemns him to drag on, in ſad inquietude, long days of liſtleſs uneaſineſs; and makes him feel that he is a ſtranger, and as it were alone in the univerſe**.

MAY THE NEW CONTINENT, ACCUSTOMED TO RECEIVE FROM EUROPE, THAT ILLUMINATION, WHICH HER YOUTH AND INEXPERIENCE REQUIRE, SERVE, IN HER TURN, AS A MODEL, TO REFORM THE CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE, AND ESTABLISH A NEW SYSTEM OF IMPRISONMENT, IN THE OLD WORLD; SEVERE AND TERRIBLE, YET HUMANE

* Duke de Liancourt.

AND

AND JUST.—TO AMERICA, IT MUST BE CONFESSED, WE ARE INDEBTED FOR THE FIRST EXAMPLE.—THE OPINIONS THAT GAVE IT BIRTH, ARE DOUBTLESS OF EUROPEAN ORIGIN.—IN THAT COUNTRY, THE CAUSE OF HUMANITY HAS FOUND ABLE AND ZEALOUS ADVOCATES.—BUT THE ATTEMPT AT AN ALMOST ENTIRE ABOLITION OF THE PUNISHMENT OF DEATH, AND THE SUBSTITUTION OF A SYSTEM OF REASON AND JUSTICE, TO THAT OF BONDS, ILL-TREATMENT, AND ARBITRARY PUNISHMENT, WAS NEVER MADE BUT IN AMERICA.—THE OBSTACLES, TO SUCH AN ATTEMPT, IT MUST BE ACKNOWLEDGED, ARE, IN EUROPE, ALMOST UNSURMOUNTABLE.—BUT THEY WERE NOT SMALL, EVEN IN AMERICA: THEY WERE BELIEVED TO BE GREAT; AND THEY WERE MUCH MULTIPLIED.—THE PREJUDICES OF MOST MEN WERE OPPOSED TO THE INNOVATION; AND, NOTWITHSTANDING THIS, THE COURAGE AND PERSEVERANCE OF A FEW CITIZENS, TERMINATED IN THE HONOURABLE TRIUMPH.

Number

Number of Priſoners puniſhed and diſpoſed of in one Year, in London and its Environs, ending in October 1795.

Died	2
Capitally convicted	6
Sentenced to Tranſportation	17
Impriſoned in Newgate	8
Impriſoned in Bridewell Hoſpital	58
——— in the Houſe of Correction of Middleſex	5
——— in Tothill-Fields Bridewell	3
——— in Surry Gaols	3
Sent to the Philanthropic and Marine Societies	1
Sent to ſerve His Majeſty in the Navy and Army	21
Paſſed to Pariſhes	128
Sent to Hoſpitals	11
Total	267

Number Diſcharged.

Diſcharged by Magiſtrates for want of proof	167
——— by Proclamation and Gaol Delivery	89
——— by Acquittals	41
——— after being whipt	2
——— after being fined	5
——— after ſuffering impriſonment	65
Apprentices diſcharged	14
Offenders bailed out of Priſon	41
Diſcharged by Pardon	12
Total diſcharged	446

SECT. XX.

PENITENTIARY, OR BETTERING HOUSES.

PENITENTIARY-HOUSES for the confinement of perſons who have not been guilty of great crimes, have, for the laſt twenty years, been conſidered as a very popular mode of puniſhment even in this country; and it cannot be ſufficiently lamented that the excellent laws for giving energy and effect to this ſyſtem have been ſo imperfectly carried into execution.—For, in ſpite of all the diſappointments which have been experienced as to expected utility, wherever ſuch houſes have been erected; the error, upon a minute examination, will be found to have originated in the executive management of them: for this requires an aſſemblage of qualities, diſpoſitions, and endowments, which ſeem rarely to meet in any one man—namely, *an active and diſcriminating mind, joined to a philanthropic diſpoſition—the pureſt morals—no naturally bad propenſity;—and theſe muſt all unite in a perſon to whom ſuch a ſituation ſhould be entruſted.*

That ſuch men are to be found (although ſeldom) is unqueſtionably true.—It is reaſonable to preſume that public advertiſements, offering adequate encouragements, would bring men of great merit and diſcretion forward, whenever it ſhall become the ſyſtem to have recourſe to ſuch a *mode* of application.—Under ſuch ſuperintendance there would be little danger, with the reſources which the metropolis affords, of finding good and productive labour ſuited to the ſituation and former purſuits of the convicts; while proper attention would be beſtowed on the means of working their reformation, and of reſtoring the leſs criminal to ſociety, after a certain period; with a proſpect of becoming uſeful and peaceable members of the community.—It is earneſtly to be hoped, therefore, that the good intentions of the legiſlature will not be defeated, and that the ſalutary meaſure of building and improving penitentiary houſes * in the different counties will be carried into effectual execution, purſuant to the act of the 16th of his preſent Majeſty already mentioned.—And if, in addition to this, the national penitentionary houſes for male and female con-

* Two or three have been erected, and it is much to be lamented that the plan has not been generally purſued. In Cold-Bath Fields a priſon for ſolitary confinement has been built, which, if we *except* the proviſions being too ſcanty, and that the rooms are not warmed by flues in winter, demand public approbation.

victs, propoſed to be built in the vicinity of the metropolis, by the Act of the 19th of GEORGE III. cap. 74. (very recently enlarged by the 34th GEORGE III. cap. 84), a moſt uſeful reſource will be afforded for thoſe who are convicted of larcenies and miſdemeanors, and whoſe puniſhment does not extend to tranſportation.

The number of perſons liberated from the *common priſons* are extremely numerous, as has been already ſhewn *; of whom many hundreds, after a ſhort confinement, are thrown back every day upon ſociety, *without reformation,—without character,—without friends, and without the means of ſubſiſtence.*—The reſult is painful to reflect upon.—They generally reſort to new crimes, to which they are ſeldom ill-diſpoſed, from the education they have received in theſe *ſchools* of profligacy, which they have recently left; and by this kind of gradation the ſlight offender becomes a complete villain.

LET AN APPEAL BE MADE TO THE FEELINGS OF HUMANITY IN BEHALF OF THESE EARLY VICTIMS TO VICE AND CRIMINALITY, AND LET THEIR UNHAPPY SITUATION PLEAD FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE LOCAL AND NATIONAL PENITENTIARY HOUSES WHICH THE LEGISLATURE HAS AU-

* Vide general view of priſoners puniſhed and diſcharged in one year, p. 296.

CORDS EITHER WITH WHAT HAS BEEN ALREADY SUGGESTED, IN SUBSTANCE AND EFFECT, BY THE LEGISLATURE; OR WHAT HAS BEEN CONCEIVED TO BE PRACTICABLE, UNDER THE CONTROUL OF AN ABLE AND ACTIVE SUPERINTENDANCE.—IF IMPERFECTIONS IN THE PROGRESS OF THE EXECUTION OF THE DESIGN SHALL BE DISCOVERED, REMEDIES WILL OCCUR.—AND IN A MATTER OF SO MUCH IMPORTANCE TO SOCIETY, AS WELL AS TO THE CAUSE OF HUMANITY, NO GOOD MAN WILL WITHHOLD HIS ADVICE OR A SISTANCE, WHENEVER IT MAY BE REQUIRED, IN PERFECTING A PLAN, THE OBJECT OF WHICH IS TO RESCUE THOUSANDS YET UNBORN FROM MISERY AND DESTRUCTION.

THORISED.—BY THIS MEANS, WHILE THE LINK OF CONNECTION WITH THEIR ASSOCIATES IN MISCHIEF IS DESTROYED, YOUTHFUL CRIMINALS WILL BE ARRESTED IN THEIR CAREER OF VILLAINY; AND AFTER A COURSE OF LABOUR, SOBRIETY, AND RELIGIOUS AND MORAL INSTRUCTION, JOINED TO GOOD AND JUDICIOUS DISCIPLINE, ACCURATELY CARRIED INTO EXECUTION, THEY MAY BE ALSO RESTORED TO SOCIETY, WITH MINDS FREED FROM DEPRAVITY, AND WITH SUCH HABITS OF INDUSTRY AND SUCH A DISPOSITION TO LEAD A NEW LIFE AS MAY ENTITLE THEM TO EXPECT EMPLOYMENT: THIS BENEFIT MAY BE SECURED TO THEM BY A CERTIFICATE OF GOOD BEHAVIOUR FROM THE GAOLER, AND INSPECTORS; WHICH MAY REMOVE THEIR FORMER STIGMA, RESCUE THEM FROM THE DREADFUL STATE OF BEING OUTCASTS OF SOCIETY, AND AFFORD THEM AN OPPORTUNITY OF SUPPORTING THEMSELVES BY HONEST LABOUR WHEN THEY ARE ONCE MORE UPON THE WORLD.

THESE PROPOSITIONS ARE NOT THE REFINEMENTS OF SPECULATION DOUBTFUL AND UNCERTAIN IN THEIR ISSUE *.—THE WHOLE SYSTEM AC-

* This was proved in Sect. XIX.

CORDS

CORDS EITHER WITH WHAT HAS BEEN ALREADY SUGGESTED, IN SUBSTANCE AND EFFECT, BY THE LEGISLATURE; OR WHAT HAS BEEN CONCEIVED TO BE PRACTICABLE, UNDER THE CONTROUL OF AN ABLE AND ACTIVE SUPERINTENDANCE.—IF IMPERFECTIONS IN THE PROGRESS OF THE EXECUTION OF THE DESIGN SHALL BE DISCOVERED, REMEDIES WILL OCCUR.—AND IN A MATTER OF SO MUCH IMPORTANCE TO SOCIETY, AS WELL AS TO THE CAUSE OF HUMANITY, NO GOOD MAN WILL WITHHOLD HIS ADVICE OR A SISTANCE, WHENEVER IT MAY BE REQUIRED, IN PERFECTING A PLAN, THE OBJECT OF WHICH IS TO RESCUE THOUSANDS YET UNBORN FROM MISERY AND DESTRUCTION.

SECT. XXI.

EMPLOYMENT OF CONVICTS.

THE Syſtem of the Hulks commenced on the 12th day of July, in the year 1776; and from that time until the 12th of December 1795, comprehending a period of nineteen years, 7999 convicts have been ordered to be puniſhed by hard labour on the river Thames, and Langſton and Portſmouth harbours *.

The Contractors for theſe places (as appears from documents laid before the Houſe of Commons) entered into an agreement with the Lords of the Treaſury, obliging themſelves, for *the conſideration of* 1*s.* 3*d. per day* (being 22*l.* 16*s.* 3*d.* a year *for each convict*), to provide, at their own coſt or charges, *one* or more *hulks*, to keep the ſame in proper repair, to provide proper ſhips' Companies for the ſafe cuſtody of ſuch convicts;

* In a financial view, the ſyſtem of the hulks is entitled to very ſerious attention; from the year 1776 to 1789, £220,873 was expended in maintaining the convicts on the Thames.

Sir John SINCLAIR's *Hiſt. Revenue.*

and

and ſufficient *meat, drink, clothing,* and *medical aſſiſtance,* for the convicts; as alſo to ſuſtain all other charges: obeying, at the ſame time, all the orders of his Majeſty's principal Secretary of State for the Home Department, reſpecting the convicts.

The terms of theſe laſt contracts appear to be as favourable for Government as could reaſonably be expected, under all circumſtances; and the advantages to the public are the more prominent, as it appears from the ſame documents laid before the Houſe of Commons, that the labour performed by the Convicts is productive in a certain degree,—*as the following ſtatement will ſhew*

From the 1ſt January 1789 to the 1ſt January 1792, it appears that 653,432 days work had been performed at Langſton Harbour, Portſmouth, and Woolwich Warren; which being eſtimated at 9d. a day, is - -	£24,503 14
and	
From the 1ſt January 1789 to the 1ſt January 1792, it alſo appears that 260,440 days work had been performed at the Dock-yard at Woolwich; which being partly performed by artificers in a more productive ſpecies of labour, is eſtimated at 1s. a day	13,022 0
Total value of Convicts' labour in 3 years*	37,525 14

* 500 convicts were employed at Woolwich, and 510 at Langſton and Portſmouth, at the time theſe accounts were made up; making in all 1010 perſons.

From

From theſe ſtatements it appears, that the eſtimated labour of the convicts on board the hulks, amounts to about 3-5th parts of the actual expence incurred by their maintenance.—While it is allowed that conſiderable improvements have been made with regard to the reduction of the expence; that proviſion has alſo been made for religious and moral inſtruction, by eſtabliſhed ſalaries to chaplains;—and that the contractors have honourably performed their part of the undertaking; it is much to be lamented that this experiment has not been attended with more beneficial conſequences to the public; not only in rendering the labour of the convicts productive in a *greater degree*, ſo as at leaſt to be equal to the expence, but alſo in amending the *morals* of theſe our miſerable fellow-mortals; ſo that on their return to ſociety, they might, in ſome reſpect, atone for the errors of their former lives, by a courſe of honeſt induſtry, uſeful to themſelves and to their country.—ON THE CONTRARY, *experience has ſhewn that many of them, inſtead of profiting by the puniſhment they have ſuffered (forgetting they were under ſentence of death, and undiſmayed by the dangers they have eſcaped), immediately ruſh into the ſame courſe of depredation and warfare upon the public:* nay, ſo hardened and determined in this reſpect have ſome of them

them been, as even to make propoſals to their old friends, the receivers, previous to the period of their diſcharge, to purchaſe their newly-acquired plunder.—It has already been ſhewn, that thoſe few alſo who are leſs depraved, and perhaps diſpoſed to amend their conduct, can find no reſource for labour; and are thus, too frequently, compelled, by dire neceſſity, to herd with their former aſſociates in iniquity.

Reflecting on this ſyſtem of puniſhment taken in connection with the various facts already detailed, it ſeems not impracticable, by ſome improved arrangements, even to render the hulks an uſeful eſtabliſhment, without the hazard of thoſe injuries to the public, which are at preſent experienced.

To effect this purpoſe, it muſt be laid down as an invariable principle, *that the labour muſt be ſuch as to cover every expence whatſoever*; and *that no convict*, guilty of death, ſhall be permitted to return *upon ſociety*, without the fulleſt atteſtations of good behaviour.

By ſelecting thoſe atrocious offenders, who have forfeited their lives without any claim to mercy, and by adjudging them to ſerve in a courſe of hard labour during the whole of their lives, a more *dreadful example* would be held out to their aſſociates in iniquity, than even

the puniſhment of *death* itſelf: and little doubt can be entertained, that while theſe forlorn outcaſts might be rendered in ſome degree uſeful, their condition, and the dread of a ſimilar doom, would deter many others from the commiſſion of crimes *.

In every part of Great Britain, the labour of man has become extremely valuable.—While the extenſive manufactures of the country occupy the more ingenious handicrafts, men are often, nay always, wanting for the more laborious occupations of *digging in collieries—quarrying ſtones* of different kinds, for *building* and *pavements*; working on the highways—in *raiſing ore* from the numerous *mines* in different parts of the country, where there is an inexhauſtible reſource for human labour.

While the labour of man is ſo valuable; while ſo many public and private undertakings are going on in this country, requiring this labour, it is worthy the moſt ſerious attention that, *in many inſtances*, the ſervice of convicts would be far ſuperior to that of the general run of labourers; from the certainty of having the la-

* Perhaps it would be right for the marriage to be diſſolved, and the children of convicts, unleſs the beſt atteſtation can be given by the clergyman and ſome reſpectable pariſhioners, concerning the wife, that they be placed in ſome public ſeminary. The good effects of the *Philanthropic Scheme* is too well known to inſiſt farther upon this plan.

bou

bour performed in a given time, ariſing from the legal diſcipline and ſubordination, which muſt enter into the ſyſtem of controul and ſafe cuſtody; where neither the *alehouſe*, nor the *holiday rambles*, will diſappoint the employers: as is at preſent too frequently the caſe on ſudden or important emergencies.

Upon a ſubject of this kind, of all others the moſt important to ſociety, it is not neceſſary to *hazard* vague or *uncertain ſpeculations*.—To men of buſineſs, and men of the world, the reſource now ſuggeſted for the uſeful employment of convicts is *obvious* and *practicable* at firſt view.—The labour of man carried to its fulleſt extent, where a body of people are collected together, may be eſtimated, at the preſent period, on an average, at 1 *s.* 8 *d.* a day, even in the coarſeſt and moſt ſervile employment:—But if authority could be exerciſed, and unneceſſary interruptions of labour prevented, the average would be equal to *two ſhillings* at leaſt: and hence it may be fairly concluded, that to any contractor, who had the means of employing *ablebodied convicts*, their ſervices, while in health, would be worth about 30 *l.* a year.

This will be more obvious, when it is taken into the calculation, that many of theſe unhappy people have

been bred to uſeful mechanical employments, wh might render their labour extremely productive; wh others, by conſtant practice, in even the coarſeſt wo ſoon acquire a ſleight or facility in the execution, wh enables them to double, and ſometimes to treble, t earnings in the courſe of a year.—This has been ma feſted, in innumerable inſtances, in removing earth, making embankments for canals and inland navigatio A ſtranger to this ſpecies of labour, of the greateſt bo ſtrength, cannot, at the outſet, earn near ſo mu money as a perſon of not half the athletic powers, w has been accuſtomed to ſuch work.

The ſame reaſoning applies to every kind of labo and therefore if convicts, deſtined to ſervile emplo ments for life, are not at firſt able to earn the uſ wages, conſtant practice, aided by their own natu genius, will ſoon enable them to reach the *né plus ul of human exertion*; they would thus be rendered valuab acquiſitions to many enterpriſing and uſeful aſſociatio in this kingdom; who would not only be able to gi ample ſecurity for their ſafe cuſtody, but alſo for t due performance of every other covenant which mig relate to the *preſervation of health*, and to the *fo cloathing*, *hours of labour*, and *religious and moral inſtru tio*

tion, of ſuch convicts; as well as for the allowance in money to be made to each out of their earnings.

Let the experiment only be tried at firſt on a ſmall ſcale; and, if the author of theſe pages is not much miſtaken, applications would be made by perſons of great reſpectability, and even premiums offered for an aſſignment of the ſervices of convicts under ſuch circumſtances: thus relieving the public from a very heavy annual expence, and rendering uſeful and productive to the country the labour of the moſt miſchievous part of the community; whoſe atonement in this manner for the injuries they have done to ſociety, by being more immediately under the eye of the public, would probably go further in *preventing crimes* (as has been already repeatedly urged) than even *death* itſelf, or any other mode of puniſhment that could be deviſed.

But though it ſhould not accord with the wiſdom of the legiſlature to permit the labour of convicts to be let out, on contract, to any perſon who can give proper ſecurity for performing the covenants which may be required, there are other methods of rendering their exertions uſeful; by dividing them near the different dock-yards, aſſigning a particular place where they ſhall work by themſelves, in *moving* and *ſawing large timber*, *forging*

ing anchors, or *making cordag*
der proper management, th
ſhort time, yield at leaſt d
maintain them; and afford
pecuniary encouragements,
to their lot, and induce them
rendering their labour produ

The great error hitherto,
ed, has been in permitting c
ſociety; after herding tog
where the certainty of liber
excited no other wiſh than
crimes; encouraged and fort
tional ſources of ill-gained l
tection and evading the law.

When an atrocious offen
the laws of his country, an
grave, with the dread befor
before a higher judgment-ſe
his head:—where is the ha
tion to accept of *perpetual lab*

A moment's reflection,
of this ſpecies of puniſhment
of manual labour, the ha

more than every honeſt artiſan, who works induſtriouſly for his family, muſt, *during the whole courſe of his life*, impoſe upon himſelf.—The conditions of a convict would even in ſome reſpects be ſuperior; inaſmuch as he would have medical aſſiſtance, and other advantages tending to the preſervation of health, which do not attach to the lower claſſes of the people; whoſe irregularities, not being reſtrained, and whoſe purſuits and labours, not being directed by good judgment and intelligence, often produce bad health, and extreme poverty and diſtreſs.

But although it is ſuggeſted as a general rule, for the purpoſe of preventing crimes, that no offender who has been condemned to death ſhould ever be at large upon ſociety again, it is by no means meant to inſinuate that the *Royal Mercy* ſhould be entirely ſhut againſt all theſe unhappy outcaſts;—God forbid!—It may happen that ſome of them may well deſerve mercy, after certain probation, and the hope of obtaining it ſhould be kept alive; but in this, *as well as in every other caſe*, it ſurely would be greatly for the intereſt of the public, that free pardons ſhould only be obtained after a long trial of the good behaviour of the convict, for the term of five years

at leaſt; and this ſhould be previouſly underſtood by a perſons applying for pardons.—Quarterly inſpectio ought therefore to be appointed, being perſons of gre reſpectability in life.

This is ſurely a moderate requeſt: for as every con vict, thus reſtored to ſociety, may be reaſonably ſuppoſe to increaſe the riſk of public injury; a right attaches t the community to expect ſome ſecurity againſt ſuch a ditional hazard.—And this would probably be grante with the leſs reluctance, as thoſe who generally intere themſelves in procuring pardons, do it, either from belief of the convict's innocence, or from a ſtrong im preſſion that he never will again offend againſt the law of his country.

THUS MIGHT OUR MURDEROUS CODE OF LAW BE USEFULLY ABOLISHED; WHICH EXPERIENCE TEACHES US DOES NOT PREVENT CRIMES: FOR THE HARDENED VILLAIN LOOKS UPON DEATH A A MOMENTARY EVIL, LESS THAN HIS DISTRESSES AND WHAT HE IS ALREADY DOOMED TO EXPEC FROM THE LAW OF NATURE.—OF THE HUNDRED AND SIXTY CRIMES, WHICH INCUR AT PRESEN THE PENALTY OF DEATH IN OUR LAW, PERHAP MURDER

MURDER, RAPE, TREASON, AND ONE OR TWO OTHER CRIMES, ALONE DESERVE THAT SEVERE PUNISHMENT, AS THE REFORM OF MAN IS, IN GENERAL, THE DUTY OF THE LEGISLATURE, AND NOT HIS DESTRUCTION.

SECT. XXII.

TRANSPORTATION.

HAVING thus ſuggeſted ſuch expedients as have oc curred for improving the ſyſtem of the hulks, or pu niſhment by labour in this country; it now remains t examine the facts regarding the preſent mode of *tran portation* of convicts to NEW SOUTH WALES; with view to conſider how far any practicable improvemen can be introduced alſo into this Syſtem.

The moſt prominent objection is not to the ſpeci of puniſhment: but to the enormous expence attend ing it *; which could not poſſibly have been foreſee

* Sir JOHN SINCLAIR (whoſe indefatigable, diſintereſted, uſeful, a patriotic exertions can never be forgotten while there is any gratitude in t nation), in his Hiſtory of the Public Revenue, publiſhed in 1790, Vol. page 89, makes the following obſervation.

" About £100,000 has already been laid out in attempting to eſtabliſ " very unpromiſing colony in New South Wales.—At the moſt moder " calculation, the puniſhment of petty felons, if the ſame meaſures are pu " ſued, will coſt above £50,000 *per annum:* an article which has not as " been ſtated in any eſtimate of the permanent expences of this country."

at the time, otherwiſe it would probably have never been adopted*.

The

* From the accounts and papers which were laid before the Houſe of Commons relative to the convicts tranſported to New South Wales, and ordered to be printed, the 8th of April, 1791, and the 10th and 26th of March, 1792: the following expences appear to have been incurred in the courſe of about four years.

1. Expence of the Civil Eſtabliſhment of New South Wales, from the year 1787, to the 10th of October 1790 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	£ 13,190 17 1
2. Expence of the Military Eſtabliſhment from the year 1787, to the 1ſt of January 1791 - - - - -	29,669 16 2
3. Expence of Tranſporting Convicts to New South Wales, as far as the ſame could be made up on the 9th of February 1791 - - - - - - - - - - -	161,075 17 2
4. Coſt of Proviſions and Stores which have been ſent to New South Wales for the maintenance and ſupport of the Settlements there; as far as the ſame could be made up on the 9th of February 1791 - - - -	84,553 4 8¾
5. Expences of His Majeſty's ſhips *Syrius*, *Supply*, *Guardian*, and *Gorgon*, ſent on ſervice to New South Wales - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	95,601 0 0
Total (according to the Statement, printed by order of the Houſe of Commons, 8th of April 1791) - -	384,090 15 8¾
1. Expence of proviſions and ſundry articles ſent to New South Wales, including bills drawn on account of convicts ſent thither; per account, made up to 7th of Feb. 1792 - £ 22,179 12 6	
Carried over - - - £ 22,179 12 6	£ 384,090 15 8¾

The firſt embarkation to NEW SOUTH WALES commenced in 1787, and in the month of May in the following

Brought over -	£22,179 12 6	£384,090 15 8¼
2. Expence of proviſions and ſtores ſent to New South Wales, for the ſupport of the convicts, including bills drawn; per account, made up to 23d of Feb. 1792 - - - - - - - - -	53,551 17 0½	
3. Expence of clothing, tools, and implements of huſbandry, ſhipped in the Pitt Tranſport; reported 16th of Feb. 1792 - - - - - - - - - -	7,937 5 4	
4. Expence of clothing and neceſſaries, ſhipped in the Kitty Tranſport; reported 16th of Feb. 1792 - - - - -	195 0 0	
5. Specie ſhipped to New South Wales in the Kitty Tranſport; reported 16th of Feb. 1792 - - - - - - - -	1,001 0 0	
6. Cloathing, and other articles, ordered to be provided by an order of Treaſury, dated 5th of Jan. 1792; eſtimated by report 16th of Feb. 1792 at	12,000 0 0	
Total; according to the Statement, printed by an order of the Houſe of Commons, 10th and 26th of March 1792 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -		96,864 14 10½
	Aggregate Total	£480,955 10 7½
*** By the abovementioned Document, the future Civil Eſtabliſhment is fixed annually at - - - - - - - -	£3,856 0 0	
Future annual charge of the Military Eſtabliſhment - - - - - - - -	6,134 7 3	
Total, from 1791 to 1792 -		9,990 7 3
Total Expence, as far as it could be made up till Feb. 1792		£490,945 17 10½

lowing

lowing year 1030 male and female convicts were landed on the new colony. In twenty-one months after, there were 77 deaths, and 87 births, in the whole ſettlement; which was divided, by placing a part of the convicts in Norfolk Iſland, a ſmall fertile ſpot, containing only about 14,000 acres of land; and ſituated about 1200 miles diſtant from Sydney Cove, in NEW SOUTH WALES; where the ſeat of government is fixed.—In this project conſiderably above half a million of money has been already expended.—A circumſtance which certainly ſhews the great anxiety of government to deviſe means of puniſhment calculated to rid ſociety of theſe irreclaimable outcaſts, whoſe daily accumulation called for the adoption of ſome expedient to prevent their return upon the public.

Like all new colonial ſettlements, great ſtruggles, ſevere hardſhips, and difficulties, were experienced at the outſet, and for ſome years after were heightened in a very conſiderable degree, by the immenſe diſtance from the mother country, the vaſt length of the voyage, and the difficulty and uncertainty of ſending regular ſupplies; theſe were often felt (notwithſtanding the attention of government) as ſerious evils, ſince the principal ſupport of the colony, for the firſt three years, depended

chiefly on the proviſions, ſt
were ſent from England.—
to *mere ſubſiſtence*, there is n
becoming independent of f
yet, with reſpect to cloathir
wants will experience no din
quires that they ſhould be at

As the expectation formed
new inhabitants, at leaſt to
ſeems in a great meaſure diſa
duce the national expence ar
it within ſome moderate bou
limiting the tranſportation of
by inflicting this puniſhment
cious offenders, who are no
youth and health, ſo as to
own labour; but who alſo
which renders it dangerous
convicts unacquainted with
or others, who might, accord
geſted, be rendered uſeful in
thing can be more abſurd th
ſending to ſuch a diſtance
firm.

THUS, BY MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION, WE WOULD SEPARATE FROM THE MASS OF CONDEMNED CRIMINALS, WHO BY ABUSING HAVE FORFEITED THEIR LIBERTY, THE MOST HARDENED AND REPROBATE WRETCHES, WHO MIGHT, BY THEIR CONVERSATION, CONTAMINATE THEIR FELLOW SUFFERERS;—AND THE AGED, LAME, AND DISEASED, SHOULD BE IN A SEPARATE CONFINEMENT, THAT THE EXAMPLE OF INDULGENCE NECESSARY TO BE SHEWN THEM SHOULD NOT OPERATE AS ANY CHECK TO THE EXERTIONS OF THE OTHERS.—IF A MAN WAS WILFULLY IDLE, WE WOULD PURSUE THE MODE FOLLOWED IN HOLLAND. HE SHOULD BE PUT INTO A ROOM, WHERE THERE WERE FOUR OPEN COCKS, AND A LARGE PUMP, AND IN CASE HE WOULD NOT WORK HE MUST BE DROWNED, AND HIS INDUSTRY, BY SUCH A PUNISHMENT, WOULD BE BETTER EXCITED THAN BY CHASTISEMENT, OR PERHAPS EVEN THE DREAD OF SOLITARY CONFINEMENT.

SECT. XXIII.

PREVENTION OF CRIMES.

WHILE travelling over ſo extenſive a field, in whic
we have ſet forth the crimes which infeſt ſociety, an
called down upon the offenders *juſtice tempered wit*
mercy, it may be natural to ſuppoſe, that our voic
may meet the ear of ſome who entertain notion
very unfavourable to the human race. — Such im
preſſions, however, ſhould be cheriſhed with cau
tion.—It muſt be recollected, that extenſive as th
injuries appear to be, in the light in which they a
placed, in order to appreciate their true amount, the
muſt be meaſured by the temptation.—The depredatio
committed will ceaſe to be a matter of aſtoniſhmen
when compared with the vaſt property that is conſtant
afloat; and, on the whole, the evils are, perhaps, n
to be imputed ſo much to the *increaſed* or *general d*
pravity of the *human character*, as to the *deficiency* of th
laws, in not advancing progreſſively in the means
PREVENTION, in proportion to the introduction of lu
ur

ury, and the additional temptations which the influx of wealth, and the intercourſe of commerce, occaſion in every country.—Mankind have ever been the ſame in all ages.—It ought never to be forgotten, that thoſe who have been exhibited in this work as the moſt deformed part of the human race, *were once innocent*; and, many of them at leaſt, became victims to the deficiency which will be ſhewn to pervade the ſyſtem, with reſpect to the PREVENTION OF CRIMES:—charity, then, claims a tear of pity for their forlorn condition; and the ſame principle of benevolence muſt create a deſire, wherever the remedies ſuggeſted here ſtrike the mind as being practicable and proper, to promote their early adoption; that while thoſe who are innocent, but ready to ruſh into the ſame gulph of miſery and crimes, are arreſted in their progreſs, and ſaved to the community; the more depraved, who are already completely abandoned to criminality, may be diſpoſed of in ſuch a manner, as to guard the public againſt their reiterated acts of fraud, violence, and depredation.

LET EVERY GOVERNMENT, THEN, BE PATERNAL.—LET CRIMES BE PREVENTED NOT ONLY BY THE TERROR OF LAW, BUT BY STOPPING THE FOUNTAINS OF INIQUITY, AND LET US SEE, WHE-

THER BY STRIKING THE AXE AT THE ROOT OF THE TREE, SOCIAL LIFE MAY NOT BE WELL ESTABLISHED, SO AS NEARLY TO PRECLUDE THE HORRID AND BARBAROUS PRACTICE OF HOLDING BEFORE THE EYES OF FELLOW-MEN A POOR CREATURE STRUGGLING IN THE AGONIES OF A PREMATURE DEATH.—THE PREVENTION OF CRIMES, BY ATTENDING TO THE MORALS OF THE PEOPLE, AND RENDERING THEIR PERPETRATION MORE DANGEROUS AND UNPROFITABLE, WILL BE THE OBJECT OF THE ENSUING SECTIONS.

SECT

SECT. XXIV.

POLICE.

At the commencement of the troubles in France, it is a curious fact, that the Lieutenant-General of the National Police, as well as that of the Metropolis, had upon his regiſters the names of not leſs than twenty thouſand ſuſpected and depraved characters, whoſe purſuits were known to be of a criminal nature: yet, by making this part of police the immediate object of the cloſe and uniform attention of one branch of the executive government, crimes were much leſs frequent than in England; and the ſecurity extended to the public, with regard to the protection of life and property againſt lawleſs depredation, was infinitely greater. To elucidate this aſſertion, and to ſhew to what a wonderful height the ſyſtem had advanced, the reader is referred to the following anecdotes; which were mentioned to the author by a foreign miniſter of great intel-

ligence and information, who reſided ſome years at the court of France.

" A merchant of high reſpectability in BOURDEAUX had occaſion to viſit the metropolis upon commercial buſineſs, carrying with him bills and money to a very large amount.

" On his arrival at the gates of PARIS, a genteel looking man opened the door of his carriage, and addreſſed him to this effect :—*Sir, I have been waiting for you ſome time ; according to my notes, your were to arrive at this hour ; and your perſon, your carriage, and your portmanteau, exactly anſwering the deſcription I hold in my hand, you will permit me to have the honour of conducting you to Monſieur De* SARTINE.

" The gentleman, aſtoniſhed and alarmed at this interruption, and ſtill more ſo at hearing the name of the lieutenant of the police mentioned, demanded to know what Monſieur de SARTINE wanted with him ; adding, at the ſame time, that he never had committed any offence againſt the laws, and that he could have no right to interrupt or detain him.

" The meſſenger declared himſelf perfectly ignorant of the cauſe of the detention ; ſtating, at the ſame time, that when he had conducted him to Monſieur de SARTINE,

TINE, he ſhould have executed his orders, which were merely miniſterial.

" After ſome further explanations, the gentleman permitted the officer to conduct him accordingly.—Monſieur de SARTINE received him with great politeneſs; and, after requeſting him to be ſeated, to his great aſtoniſhment, he deſcribed his portmanteau; and told him the exact ſum in bills and ſpecie which he had brought with him to PARIS, and where he was to lodge, his uſual time of going to bed, and a number of other circumſtances, which the gentleman had conceived could only be known to himſelf.—Monſieur de SARTINE having thus excited attention, put this extraordinary queſtion to him—*Sir, are you a man of courage?*—The gentleman, ſtill more aſtoniſhed at the ſingularity of ſuch an interrogatory, demanded the reaſon why he put ſuch a ſtrange queſtion, adding, at the ſame time, that no man ever doubted his courage.—Monſieur de SARTINE replied,—*Sir, you are to be robbed and murdered this night!—If you are a man of courage, you muſt go to your hotel, and retire to reſt at the uſual hour: but be careful that you do not fall aſleep; neither will it be proper for you to look under the bed, or into any of the cloſets which are in your bed-chamber* (which he accurately deſcribed);

—you muſt place your portman
your bed, and diſcover no fi
to me.—If, however, you do
to bear you out, I will procur
you, and go to bed in your fle

" After ſome further ex
the gentleman that Monſieu
was accurate in every parti
ſonated, and formed an imm
follow the directions he hac
went to bed at his uſual hou
—At half paſt twelve (the t
de SARTINE) the door of th
and three men entered with
piſtols.—The gentleman, v
perceived one of them to l
rifled his portmanteau undiſt
of putting him to death.—
this, and not knowing by w
cued, it may naturally be
perturbation of mind during
ſuſpenſe; when, at the mo
paring to commit the horri
acting under Monſieur de S

concealed under the bed, and in the cloſet, ruſhed out and ſeized the offenders with the property in their poſſeſſion, and in the act of preparing to commit the murder.

" The conſequence was, that the perpetration of the atrocious deed was prevented, and ſufficient evidence obtained to convict the offenders.—Monſieur de SARTINE's intelligence enabled him to *prevent* this horrid offence of robbery and murder; which, but for the accuracy of the ſyſtem, would probably have been carried into execution."

Another anecdote was mentioned to the author by the ſame miniſter, relative to the Emperor JOSEPH II. That monarch having, in the year 1787, formed and promulgated a new code of laws relative to criminal and civil offences; and having alſo eſtabliſhed what he conceived to be the beſt ſyſtem of police in Europe, he could ſcarcely ever forgive the French nation, in conſequence of the accuracy and intelligence of Monſieur de SARTINE having been found ſo much ſuperior to his own, notwithſtanding the immenſe pains he had beſtowed upon that department of his government.

" A very notorious offender, who was a ſubject of the emperor, and who committed many atrocious acts of

of violence and depredation
Paris by the police eſtabliſ
ordered his ambaſſador at the
that this delinquent ſhould
juſtice.—

" Monſieur de SARTINE
perial Ambaſſador, that the
had been in *Paris*;—that, if
tion, he could inform him
the different gaming-tables, a
reſort, which he frequented
was now gone.——

" The ambaſſador, after
correct mode by which the
ducted, inſiſted that this offer
otherwiſe the Emperor would
to make ſuch an application.

" Monſieur de SARTINE
the Imperial miniſter, and ma
effect:——

" *Do me the honour, Sir,*
maſter, that the perſon he look
day of the laſt month; and is
looking into a garden in the thi

93, *in* ——— *ſtreet, in his own capital of Vienna*; *where his Majeſty will, by ſending to the ſpot, be ſure to find him.*——

" It was literally as the French miniſter of police had ſtated.—The Emperor, to his aſtoniſhment, found the delinquent in the houſe and apartment deſcribed; but he was greatly mortified at this proof of the accuracy of the French police; which, in this inſtance, in point of intelligence *even in Vienna*, was diſcovered to be ſo much ſuperior to his own."——

The fact is, that the French ſyſtem had arrived at the greateſt degree of perfection: and though not neceſſary, nor even proper, to be copied as a *pattern*, might, nevertheleſs, furniſh many uſeful hints, calculated to improve the police of this metropolis, conſiſtent with the exiſting laws; and even to extend and increaſe the liberty of the ſubject without taking one juſt right away; or interfering in the purſuits of any one claſs of individuals; except thoſe employed in purpoſes of *miſchief*, *fraud*, and *criminality*.

In vain do we boaſt of thoſe liberties which are our birthright, if the vileſt and moſt depraved part of the community are ſuffered to deprive us of the privilege of travelling upon the highways, or of approaching the

capital in any direction, af
being aſſaulted and robbed
murdered.

In vain may we boaſt of
cellent laws afford us, if w
our habitations, without th
committed, our property i
poſed to imminent danger
morning.

If, in addition to this, t
every ſpecious pretence, be
clamours or turbulent effu
regulated paſſions of vulgar
intereſting inquiry, worthy
ligent member of the comm
ſpring thoſe numerous inconve
remedy to be found for ſo man

Prevention of crimes and m
often repeated, is the true
is only to be attained by a ſ
ſuch wiſe and legiſlative ar
the civil magiſtrate to throw
the way of offenders.

This indeed is very differe

once prevailed in the capital, when criminals were permitted to ripen from the firſt ſtage of depravity until they were worth forty pounds.—This is not the ſyſtem which ſubjects the public to the intermediate depredations of every villain from his firſt ſtarting, till he could be clearly convicted of a capital offence.—Neither is it the ſyſtem which encourages public houſes of rendezvous for thieves, for the purpoſe of knowing where to apprehend them, when they became ripe for the puniſhment of death.

The ſyſtem which we now ſuggeſt, is calculated to *prevent*, if poſſible, the ſeeds of villainy from being ſown; —or, if ſown, to check their growth in the bud, and never permit them to ripen at all.

Next to the bleſſings which a nation derives from excellent laws, ably adminiſtered, are thoſe advantages which reſult from a well-regulated and energetic police, conducted with purity, activity, vigilance, and diſcretion.

Upon this depends, in ſo great a degree, the comfort, the happineſs, and the ſecurity of the people, that too much labour and attention cannot poſſibly be beſtowed in rendering the ſyſtem complete.

That much remains to be done in this reſpect no per-

ſon will deny; all ranks mu
ſecurity in which both life a
placed, by the number of
various cauſes (which it is
theſe pages to devellop), are
repeat acts of licentiouſneſs a
depredations upon the proper

At preſent, the watchmen
and properties of the inhabi
thouſand ſtreets, lanes, cou
162,000 houſes, compoſing
and its environs, are under
above ſeventy different tru
double the number of local
in many particulars from
the *directors*, *guardians*, *gov*
according to the title they a
—each attending only to t
Pariſh, *Hamlet*, *Liberty*, o
payment according to local
lence of the particular diſt
each night.

The encouragement beir
ſmall, few candidates appe

are really, in point of character and age, fit for the ſituation; the managers have therefore no alternative but to accept of ſuch aged, and often ſuperannuated, men, living in their reſpective diſtricts, as may offer their ſervices: this they are frequently induced to do from motives of humanity, to aſſiſt old inhabitants who are unable to labour at any mechanical employment, or perhaps with a view to keep them out of the work-houſe.

Thus circumſtanced, and thus encouraged, what can be expected from ſuch watchmen?

Aged in general;—often feeble:—and almoſt, on every occaſion, half ſtarved, from the limited allowance they receive; without any claim upon the public, or the leaſt hope of reward held out, even if they performed any meritorious ſervice, by the *detection of thieves and receivers of ſtolen goods*, or idle and diſorderly perſons: and above all, *making ſo many ſeparate parts of an immenſe ſyſtem, without any general ſuperintendance, diſjointed from the nature of its organization*, it is only a matter of wonder that the protection afforded is what *it really is*.—Not only is there ſmall encouragement offered for the purpoſe of inſuring fidelity, but innumerable temptations are held out to diſhoneſty, by receivers of ſtolen goods,

to

THUS WOULD WE WISH TO SEE ESTABLIS
ENERGETIC POLICE ALL OVER THE METROPOL
AT A SMALL EXPENCE, CONSIDERING THE SE
WHICH WOULD ARISE, AND THE GENEROUS
LOOK ALSO AT THE MERCY OF SUCH A S
FOR TOO OFTEN OPPORTUNITY MAKES THE
—THE GUARDIANS OF THE PUBLIC PEACE
BE DIVIDED INTO SEVERAL WATCHES *.—C
COOK'S GREAT IMPROVEMENT, WHICH HA
FOLLOWED THROUGHOUT THE NAVY, SHOU
COPIED HERE.—HE FORMED HIS SHIP'S CC
INTO THREE WATCHES INSTEAD OF TWO
THIS MEANS HE PRESERVED HIS MEN IN H
LESSENED THEIR FATIGUE, AND INCREASED
VIGILANCE.

* They ſhould be divided into watches; that is, no one ſh
above three or four hours, nor ſhould any man know his appointr
hand.

SECT. XXV.

PUBLIC HOUSES.

INNUMERABLE temptations occur in a great capital to excite, and afterwards criminally to ſupply, imaginary wants and improper gratifications, not known in ſmaller ſocieties: and againſt which the laws have provided few remedies, applicable in the way of *prevention.*

Accuſtomed from their earlieſt infancy to indulge themſelves in eating and drinking; and poſſeſſing little or no knowledge of that kind of frugality and care which enables well-regulated families to make every thing go as far as poſſible, by good management:—aſſailed alſo by the numerous temptations held out by fraudulent lotteries, and places of public reſort and amuſement; and above all, by the habit of ſpending a great deal of valuable time as well as money unneceſſarily in *public-houſes*; where they are often allured, by low gaming, to ſquander more than they can afford;

ſcarcely an inſtance can be found of accommodating expenditure to the income, even in the beſt of tin with a conſiderable body of the loweſt and more praved orders of the people inhabiting the capital: hence a melancholy concluſion is drawn, warranted an eſtimate generally aſſumed to be correct, that cluding gamblers, ſwindlers, and all claſſes of crim and depraved perſons, " above twenty thouſand i " viduals riſe, every morning, without knowing h " or by what means, they are to be ſupported thro " the paſſing day; and in many inſtances even wh " they are to lodge on the ſucceeding night."

Allured and deceived by the opportunities which pawnbrokers and the old iron ſhops afford, to enable bouring people, when they marry, and firſt enter u life, to raiſe money upon whatever can be offered a pledge, or for ſale; the firſt ſtep with too many is nerally to diſpoſe of wearing apparel and houſeh goods; and this is frequently done on the ſlighteſt caſion, rather than forego the uſual gratification liquor.—Embarraſſments are the ſpeedy conſequence this line of conduct, which is often followed up by i neſs and inactivity.—The alehouſe is now again reſo to as a deſperate remedy, where the lazy and diſſol

will always find aſſociates, who being unwilling to labour, reſort to crimes for the purpoſe of ſupplying an unneceſſary extravagance.

It is truly pitiable to behold the abject condition of the numerous claſſes of profligate parents, who, with their children, are, from invincible and growing habit, conſtantly to be found in the tap-rooms of public-houſes; ſpending, in two days, as much of their earnings as would ſupport them a week comfortably in their own dwellings; deſtroying their health; waſting their time; and rearing up their children to be proſtitutes and thieves, before they can diſtinguiſh between right and wrong.

In the city of London, and within the bills of mortality, there are at preſent 5204 licenſed public-houſes, and it is calculated that the money expended in beer and ſpirits in theſe receptacles of idleneſs and profligacy, by the *labouring people only*, is upwards of *three millions ſterling a year* *.

A moment's

* If a concluſion may be drawn from the greater degree of ſobriety, which ſeems manifeſted at preſent by the labouring people, evinced by a decreaſe in the number of quarrels and aſſaults, and by the difficulty in obtaining the neceſſaries of life being apparently leſs than in the ſpring of 1795, *notwithſtanding no charities have been diſtributed*, and *bread is conſiderably higher*:—it

 would

A moment's reflection will ſhew how much theſe u
fortunate habits tend to deſtroy the moral principle, a
to engender crimes.

The period is not too remote to be recollected, wh
it was thought a diſgrace for a woman (excepting
holiday occaſions) to be ſeen in the tap-room of a publ
houſe: but of late years the obloquy has loſt its effe
and the public tap-rooms of many alehouſes are fil
with men, women, and children, on all occaſion
where the wages of labour are too often exchanged
indulgencies ruinous to health; and where leſſons
vice and profligacy are imbibed, totally deſtructive
the morals of adults, as well as of the riſing gene
tion.

In tracing the cauſes of the increaſe of public
predation by means of robberies, pilferings, and frau

would ſeem reaſonable to attribute this favourable change to the high pri
gin. This baneful liquor being now in a great meaſure *inacceſſible,* the l
ranks have it in their power to apply the money, formerly ſpent in this wa
the purchaſe of proviſions—perhaps to the extent of an *hundred thouſand p*
a year in the metropolis alone! If this fact is aſſumed, it is impoſſible to
flect without great ſatisfaction on the actual gain, which reſults to the na
from the preſervation of the health of perſons whoſe lives are ſhortened by
immoderate uſe of ardent ſpirits.—In the labour of adults, the benefit to
nation, ariſing from ſobriety in the maſs of the people, is at leaſt one hund
fold in length of life, and productive induſtry.

much muſt be attributed to ill-conducted public-houſes.

The proper regulation of thoſe haunts of idleneſs and vice becomes then the *ground-work of any rational plan of reform.*—Infinite attention ought to be beſtowed in the ſelection of perſons fit to be entruſted with licences; as on this depends the preſervation of the morals of the people, in a greater degree than on any one meaſure propoſed in the courſe of this work.

Inſtead of being men of ſober manners and of good moral character, a little inquiry will ſhew that a conſiderable proportion of the preſent alehouſe keepers in the metropolis are men of no reſpectability; diſpoſed to promote drunkenneſs, low games, and every ſpecies of vice that can be the means of increaſing their trade; while not a few of them are connected with highwaymen, common thieves, and coiners, venders and utterers of baſe money.

An ill-regulated public-houſe is one of the greateſt nuiſances which can exiſt in civil ſociety.—Through this medium crimes are increaſed in an eminent degree.—Its poiſon ſpreads far and wide.—It may be truly ſaid to be a ſeminary for rearing up rogues and vagabonds.

It

It is in ſuch houſes that thieves and fraudulent pe
find an aſylum, and conſult how and where they a
commit depredations on the public.—It is here that
prentices, and boys and girls of tender years, are t
found, engaged in ſcenes of lewdneſs and debauche
and, in fine, it is in ſuch places that almoſt every
which diſturbs or interrupts the peace and good ord
ſociety, has its origin.

The firſt cauſe of this extenſive evil originates i
number of ſuperfluous houſes which have been i
vertently licenſed.

Of theſe there are ſeldom leſs than *one thouſand* w
change maſters every year, in the metropolis alone;
many of them three or four times over.

The reſult is, that while ſo many public-houſ
conſtantly at market, perſons of worthleſs, profli
and criminal characters, become the purchaſers;
this will ever be the caſe, while no limits are ſet t
number in each diſtrict; and while the preſent *m*
of ſecurity is in practice, by permitting one public
be bound for another, in the ſmall penalty of *ten pou*

* At preſent the legal recognizance is only for 10 *l.*—It has contin
for upwards of 230 years, ſince the reign of Edward VI. when the ſu
fixed on was, according to the preſent decreaſe of the value of money,
more than the 50 *l.* now propoſed.

for the performance of duties, the moſt important and ſacred which are known to exiſt in civil ſociety; ſince a breach of them ſaps the foundation of all morals.

OF HOW MUCH IMPORTANCE THEREFORE IS IT FOR MAGISTRATES TO ESTABLISH CORRECT SYSTEMS FOR WATCHING OVER THE CONDUCT OF PUBLICANS, AND FOR REGULATING PUBLIC-HOUSES? —EVERY THING THAT TENDS TO THE PREVENTION OF CRIMES; TO THE COMFORT AND HAPPINESS OF THE LABOURING POOR; AND TO THE ESSENTIAL INTERESTS OF THE STATE, AS REGARDS THE MORALS AND HEALTH OF THE LOWER RANKS, IN CHECKING THEIR PREVAILING PROPENSITY TO DRUNKENNESS, GAMING, AND IDLENESS; DEPENDS, IN A GREAT MEASURE, ON THE VIGILANCE AND ATTENTION OF THE CIVIL MAGISTRATES: WHOSE POWERS TO DO GOOD IN THIS RESPECT SHOULD BE EXTREMELY AMPLE, AND THESE ONLY REQUIRE TO BE EXERTED WITH ATTENTION, MILDNESS, AND PRUDENCE, JOINED TO FIRMNESS AND GOOD JUDGMENT, IN ORDER TO PRODUCE THE HIGHEST GOOD.

LET THEN THE NUMBER OF PUBLIC-HOUSES ASSIGNED TO EACH LICENSING DIVISION BE LIMITED

MITED BY LAW; AND
CENSED, UNLESS THERE
OF INHABITANTS (BY MI
BUILDINGS OR MANUFA
BOURHOOD) EQUAL TO I
ING THOSE EMPLOYED I

NEXT, LET NO PERSO
CAN PRODUCE A RESPONS
IS NOT A PUBLICAN, T
NIZANCE ALONG WITH H
VIOUR, IN THE SUM O
SHALL BE FORFEITED
DRUNKENNESS, OR ANY
TO BE SPECIFIED IN T
FORM AND OBLIGATION
DERNIZED, ALTERED,
GREAT BENEFIT OF THE

SECT. XXVI.

LICENSES.

ATTACHED to the laws and government of his country, even to a degree of enthuſiaſm, the author of this work will not be too prone to ſeek for greater perfection in other nations; or to quote them as examples to be imitated in the center of the Britiſh empire; and ſtill leſs if ſuch examples ſhould tend, in the ſlighteſt degree, to abridge that freedom which is the birth-right of every Briton.—But as all *true* liberty depends on thoſe fences which are eſtabliſhed in every country, for the protection of the perſons and property of the people, againſt every attack whatſoever: and as *prejudices* ought to be baniſhed from the mind, in all diſcuſſions tending to promote the general weal, we ought not to be aſhamed of borrowing good ſyſtems from other nations; wherever ſuch can be adopted, conſiſtent with the conſtitution of the country, and the liberty of the ſubject.

The author is not ſo preſumptuous as to expect in a matter of ſo much importance, thoſe ſugge which he has offered to the conſideration of the p are either to be immediately approved of, or ſuc adopted.—Some are obvious at firſt view, as pr tory ſteps, in their nature unobjectionable; others require to be well conſidered and accurate amined.

The neceſſity of licenſing *publicans* has been ad and its utility allowed.—What we propoſe here, the dealers hereafter to be mentioned ſhall alſo l giſtered, and ſecurities given; and it would be w they were obliged to give in inventories of their pr from time to time, to prevent their receiving goods: for if there were no receivers, there wou few or no thieves.—The perſons who ſhould hav cenſe, with proper ſecurities, are

1. Publicans licenſed to ſell ale or other liquors.
2. Pawn-brokers.
3. Watch-makers.
4. Buyers of gold and ſilver.
5. Refiners of gold and ſilver.
6. Working and other ſilverſmiths.

7. De

7. Dealers in old and ſecond-hand furniture.

8. Brokers in ſecond-hand goods.

9. Dealers in old building materials.

10. Stable-keepers, and perſons letting horſes for hire.

11. Boilers of horſe-fleſh and other animals for profit.

12. Dealers in old and ſecond-hand naval ſtores, junk, and hand-ſtuff.

13. Dealers in rags and hand-ſtuff.

14. Dealers in ſecond-hand wearing apparel, bed, and table linen.

15. Itinerant dealers in wearing apparel and other articles.

16. Dealers in old iron, braſs, copper, pewter, lead, and other metals.

17. Purchaſers of old iron, braſs, copper, pewter, lead, and other metals for manufacturing.

18. Founders and others keeping crucibles, or other veſſels for melting old metals.

19. Perſons being dealers in any of the above articles, keeping draught or truck carts.

THE SYSTEM OF INSPECTION, THUS STRONGLY AND REPEATEDLY RECOMMENDED, WHILE IT REMEDIED THESE CORRUPT PRACTICES, BY PREVENTING THE EXISTENCE OF THE EVIL, COULD ONLY BE DISAGREEABLE TO FRAUDULENT DEALERS. —THE HONEST AND FAIR TRADESMEN, ENTERING INTO COMPETITION WITH MEN WHO CARRY ON BUSINESS BY FRAUDELENT DEVICES, ARE NOT UPON AN EQUAL FOOTING.—SUCH FAIR TRADERS WHO HAVE NOTHING TO DREAD, WOULD THEREFORE REJOICE AT THE SYSTEM OF INSPECTION WHICH IS PROPOSED, AND WOULD SUBMIT TO IT CHEERFULLY; AS HAVING AN IMMEDIATE TENDENCY TO SHIELD THEM FROM FRAUDULENT COMPETITION, AND TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC AGAINST KNAVERY AND DISHONESTY.

SECT. XXVII.

RECEIVERS.

In contemplating the ſhocking catalogue of human depravity, before the mind ſhall imbibe unfavourable impreſſions, it may be neceſſary to remind the reader, that in order juſtly to appreciate the moral turpitude which attaches to ſuch a hoſt of individuals, in many reſpects deluded and miſled by the numerous temptations which aſſail them, it muſt be meaſured by a ſcale proportioned to the unparalleled extent and opulence of the metropolis, and to the vaſt amount of moving property there.—London is not only the grand magazine of the Britiſh empire, but alſo the general receptacle for the idle and depraved of almoſt every country, and certainly from every quarter of the dominions of the crown; where the temptations and reſources for criminal pleaſures, gambling, fraud, and depredation, as well as for purſuits of honeſt induſtry, almoſt exceed imagination; ſince, beſides being the ſeat of government, and the

centre of faſhion, amuſements, diſſipation, extravagance and folly, it is not only the greateſt commercial city in the univerſe, but perhaps one of the firſt manufacturing towns that is known to exiſt *.

Under theſe circumſtances, while immorality, licentiouſneſs, and crimes, are known to advance in proportion to riches, it is much to be lamented that in the rapid and progreſſive increaſe of the latter, ſufficient attention has not been beſtowed on the means of checking the enormous ſtrides made by the former.

This is to be attributed principally to thoſe deficiencies and imperfections in the ſyſtem of police, which have been explained and pointed out.

It opens a wide field for doing good, to men of opulence

* The enſuing abſtract of the imports into, and the exports from, the port of London is made up from the public accounts for one year, ending the 5th day of January, 1795: but differs with regard to the value from theſe accounts; in which the price is eſtimated on data eſtabliſhed many years ago when the articles of commerce imported and exported were not rated at above half the ſum they now fetch, *excluſive* of duty.

It is therefore to be underſtood, that the following eſtimate is made upon the data of the *preſent value* as nearly as it can be aſcertained. It exhibits a very aſtoniſhing picture of the immenſe opulence and extent of the commerce of the metropolis; and accounts, in a very ſatisfactory manner, for the vaſt reſources of the country, which have been manifeſted in ſo eminent a degree in the courſe of the preſent and former wars.

Nam

:e, talents, and virtue; to *patriots* and *philanthropiſts* › love their country and glory in its proſperity.

Such

es of the ountries.	Value of Imports into London.	Value of Exports from the Port of London to Foreign Parts.	
		Brit. Manufactures.	Foreign Merchandiſe
- - - -	2,209,501 3 4	168,687 18 3	914,352 4 4
W. Indies	6,072,117 5 0	2,249,043 13 11	579,453 6 0
ered Iſlands	1,226,064 13 8	260,976 0 11	110,817 18 0
ner. Colonies	307,412 13 0	654,842 19 4	251,551 6 2
ey & Jerſey	91,936 1 2	12,001 13 10	21,616 16 8
tar - - -	17,947 16 8	83,473 14 11	69,315 2 8
ıas Bay - -	14,696 4 2	2,029 18 11	2,550 16 2
Fiſhery - -	197,680 8 6	21 6 8	
nclud. E. Ind.	8,916,950 2 10	3,398,680 1 4	185,190 16 0
- - -	66,013 8 4	90,593 12 9	188,743 16 6
y - - -	641,860 19 2	32,065 12 0	123,776 7 2
ts - - -	8,389 14 0		
- - - -	82,107 16 0	6,203 17 11	16,305 7 2
- - - -	1,215,012 15 0	80,980 18 9	340,786 0 8
- - - -	1,070,697 18 0	205,096 4 4	265,169 3 4
;al - - -	644,610 3 8	182,780 6 2	119,813 12 6
ra - - -	7,479 16 8	27,998 6 10	6,886 18 2
es - - -	6,763 19 10	20,116 18 4	377 5 2
- - - -	130 6 8	3,216 5 3	63,625 10 6
an Flanders	137,249 5 0	129,413 9 7	887,642 18 10
d - - -	1,203,515 3 6	114,458 3 7	1,968,687 3 4
ny - - -	1,089,307 19 4	1,044,634 18 0	6,176,100 14 8
- - - -	196,657 3 2	54,380 14 0	272,719 17 4
- - - -	104,978 10 4	7,022 11 10	57,067 2 4
a - - -	262,727 3 4	35,845 5 6	111,457 14 4
- - - -	1,269,688 9 6	95,519 8 8	491,244 9 2
ark & Norway	166,366 1 0	147,340 5 11	545,509 19 8
land - -	26,753 11 2		
tes of America	811,511 18 8	2,201,280 12 1	429,248 7 8
a - - - -	16,239 16 0	38,067 0 3	8,855 0 0
n Weſt Indies	56,240 2 0	1,767 13 10	60 0 0
Goods - -	1,572,868 8 8		included in the ac. of each country.
£	29,706,476 : 17 : 4	11,396,539 : 13 : 8	14,208,915 : 14 : 6

RECA-

Such men will ſpeedily diſcover through this mediu
that, like the Roman government when enveloped
ricl

RECAPITULATION.

The aggregate value of goods imported into London in one year - - - - - - - -			£29,706,476 17
Britiſh merchandiſe exported -	£11,396,539 13 8		
Foreign merchandiſe, ditto -	14,208,915 14 6		
			25,605,455 8
Value of goods imported in upwards of 9000 coaſting veſſels, averaged at £500 each	£4,500,000 0 0		
Value of goods exported coaſtways in about 7000 veſſels, at £1000 each - -	7,000,000 0 0		
			11,500,000 0
Total amount of property ſhipt and unſhipt in the River Thames in the courſe of a year, eſtimated at -			£66,811,932 : 5

Beſides the numerous ſmall inland cargoes of coals, merchandiſe, gr malt, flour, and other articles, laden and diſcharged in the Thames, and River Lee; and alſo the tackling, apparel, proviſions, and ſtores, of ab 13,500 ſhips and veſſels (including their repeated voyages), which lade unlade in the courſe of a year, eſtimated (in what may be called *moving p perty*, liable to depredation and plunder) at *four millions* ſterling more!

London, from being a great *depot* for all the manufactures of the co try, and alſo the goods of foreign nations as well as colonial produce, is only the firſt commercial city that is known at preſent to exiſt, but is alſo of the greateſt and moſt extenſive manufacturing towns perhaps in the wor combining in one ſpot every attribute that can occaſion an aſſemblage moving property, unparalleled in point of extent, magnitude, and value, the whole globe. From inquiry, it appears that above 13,500 veſſels, cluding their repeated voyages, arrive at, and depart from, the port of Lo don, with merchandiſe, in the courſe of a year; beſides a vaſt numbe

ri

riches and luxury, the national proſperity may be of ſhort duration; that the ſame calamities are to be dreaded wherever public morals are neglected, and no effectual meaſures adopted for the purpoſe either of checking the alarming growth of depravity and crimes, or of guarding the riſing generation againſt evil examples;

river craft, employed in the trade of the interior country, bringing and carrying away property, eſtimated at *ſeventy millions ſterling*.—

In addition to this, it is calculated, that above 40,000 waggons and other carriages, including their repeated journies, arrive and depart laden, in both inſtances, with articles of domeſtic, colonial, and foreign merchandiſe; occaſioning a tranſit of perhaps (when cattle and proviſions, ſent for the conſumption of the inhabitants, are included) *fifty millions more*. If we take into the account the immenſe quantity of merchandiſe and moveable property of every ſpecies and denomination, depoſited in the various *maritime magazines, timber-yards, piece-goods' warehouſes, ſhops, manufactories, ſtore houſes, public markets, dwelling-houſes, inns, new buildings*, and *other repoſitories*, and which paſs from one place to another, it will eaſt bliſh a foundation for ſuppoſing that, in this way, property to the amount of *fifty millions* more at leaſt, is annually expoſed to depredation; making a ſum of *one hundred and ſeventy millions*, independent of the moving articles in ſhips of war and tranſports, and in the different arſenals, dock-yards, and repoſitories in the Tower of London, and at Deptford, Woolwich, Sheerneſs, and various ſmaller magazines, in the daily courſe of being received and ſent away, ſuppoſed to amount to *fifty millions* more; making in the whole an aggregate ſum of *two hundred and twenty millions*. Thus an immenſe property becomes exceedingly expoſed, in all the various ways; and the *eſtimated* amount of the *annual depredations* (large as it is) will ceaſe to be a matter of ſurpriſe, if meaſured by the enormous ſcale of property above particularized: although it amounts to *two millions one hundred thouſand pounds* ſterling, it ſinks to a trifle, in contemplating the magnitude of the capital, *ſcarcely reaching one per cent. on the value of property paſſing in tranſit in the courſe of a year.*

which are exhibited in t
greater degree than was ev
cularly among the lower r

It is therefore earneſtly
of this work may excite
deſire for the adoption of ſ
the improvement of the m
to remove the danger and
exiſt; and which unqueſt
mented at the concluſion c
multitude of delinquents to

The ſole intention of
theſe accumulated wrongs,
this country againſt the
dreaded from the exiſtence
minal confederacy.—That
effected, in all inſtances v
exiſt, *remedies* are uniform
ſuch as have forced them
from practical obſervation,
lative theories.—They are
that they perfectly accord
and that their adoption will
turbing the conſtitution which

One of the chief nurſeries of crimes is to be traced to the *receivers* of ſtolen property.

If theſe miſchievous and criminal aſſiſtants were not ſuffered to exiſt, there would be fewer encouragements to criminal depredations upon the public.

Without that eaſy encouragement which receivers hold out, by adminiſtering immediately to the wants of criminals, and concealing what they purloin, a thief, a robber, or a burglar, could not carry on his trade.

And yet, concluſive and obvious as this remark muſt be, it is a ſorrowful truth, that in the metropolis alone there are at preſent ſuppoſed to be upwards of *three thouſand receivers* of various kinds of ſtolen goods; and an equal proportion all over the country, who keep open ſhop for the purpoſe of purchaſing at an under-price—often for a mere trifle,—every kind of property brought to them; from a nail, or a glaſs-bottle, up to the moſt valuable article either new or old; and this without aſking a ſingle queſtion.

It is ſuppoſed that the property, which is purloined and pilfered, in a little way, from almoſt every *family*, and from every *houſe*, *ſtable*, *ſhop*, *warehouſe*, *workſhop*, *foundery*, *and other repoſitory*, in and about the metropolis, cannot amount to leſs than £710,000 a year,

excluſive of what is pilfered from ſhips in the Riv
Thames; which, it is calculated, according to eſtima
which have been made, amounts to about half a milli
ſterling more, including the ſtores and materials!
When to this is alſo added the pillage of his majeſt
ſtores, in ſhips of war, dock-yards, and other public
poſitories, the aggregate will be found, in point of e
tent, almoſt to exceed credibility!

It is a melancholy reflection to conſider how ma
individuals, young and old, who are not of the claſs
deſcription of common or even reputed thieves, are i
plicated in this ſyſtem of depredation; who would p
bably have remained honeſt and induſtrious, had it
been for the eaſy and ſafe mode of raiſing money, whi
theſe numerous *receivers* of ſtolen goods hold out,
every bye-ſtreet and lane in the metropolis: in th
houſes, although a beggarly appearance of old iron,
rags, or ſecond-hand clothes, is only exhibited, t
back apartments are often filled with the moſt valua
articles of ſhip ſtores, copper bolts and nails, braſs a
other valuable metals, Weſt-India produce, houſeh
goods and wearing apparel; purchaſed from artific
labourers in the docks, lumpers, glutmen, menial ſ
vants, apprentices, journeymen, porters, chimn
ſweepe

ſweepers, itinerant Jews, and others; who, thus encouraged and protected, go on with impunity, and without the leaſt dread of detection, in ſupplying the numerous imaginary wants which are created in a large capital, by plundering every article not likely to be miſſed, in the houſes or ſtables of men of property; or in the ſhops, warehouſes, founderies, or work-ſhops of manufacturers; or from new buildings, from ſhips in the river, and alſo from his Majeſty's ſtores, and other repoſitories; ſo that in ſome inſtances, the ſame articles are ſaid to be ſold to the public boards three or four times over.

Thus the moral principle is totally deſtroyed among a vaſt body of the lower ranks of the people; for wherever prodigality, diſſipation, or gaming, whether in the lottery or otherwiſe, occaſions a want of money, they avail themſelves of every opportunity to purloin public or private property; recourſe is then had to all thoſe tricks and devices, by which even children are enticed to ſteal before they know that it is a crime; and to raiſe money at the pawnbrokers, or the old iron or rag ſhops, to ſupply the unlawful deſires of profligate parents.

Hence alſo, ſervants, apprentices, journeymen, and in

in ſhort, all thoſe claſſes of labouring people who ha
opportunities of purloining the property of their maſte
their employers, or the public, are led aſtray by t
temptations to ſpend money, which occur in this n
tropolis, and by the facility afforded through theſe n
merous *receivers* of ſtolen goods; who adminiſter
their pecuniary wants, on every occaſion, when th
can furniſh them with any article of their ill-gott
plunder.

The deficiency of our criminal laws, in not exte
ing ſome regulations to this numerous claſs of dealers
old metal, ſtores, and wearing apparel, is too obvi
to require illuſtration; and their ſucceſs in encourag
depredations, as well as the progreſſive accumulation
theſe peſts of ſociety is proved, by their having increaſ
from about 300 to 3000 in the courſe of the laſt twe
years, in the metropolis alone!

The like deficiency extends alſo to the more lat
receivers, who do not keep open ſhop; but ſecre
ſupport the profeſſed robbers and burglars, by p
chaſing their plunder the moment it is acquired;
which latter claſs there are ſome who are ſaid to be
tremely opulent.

Many regulations of police, as well as ſalutary la
mi

might be uſefully eſtabliſhed, for the purpoſe of checking and embarraſſing theſe criminal people, ſo as to render it extremely difficult, if not impracticable for them in many inſtances, to carry on their buſineſs without the greateſt hazard of detection.

But ſuch laws muſt not be placed upon the ſtatute-book as a kind of dead letter, only to be brought into action when accident may lead to the detection, perhaps of one in a thouſand.

If the evil is to be cured at all, it muſt be by ſuch plans as will eſtabliſh an active principle, under proper ſuperintendance, calculated to prevent every claſs of dealers, who are known to live partly or wholly by fraud, from purſuing thoſe illegal practices; which nothing but a watchful police, aided by a correct ſyſtem of reſtraints, can poſſibly effect.

Such reſtraints, while they will aſſiſt the honeſt and fair dealer, will alſo protect the public, as well as merchants, and all ranks of the community, who have any property to loſe, from the numerous depredations and thefts which are now committed; and the moral principle will be alſo, in ſome degree, preſerved, by reaſon of the difficulties which will occur in the diſpoſal of ſtolen property.

Nor

Nor ought it to be argued, that the reſtraints which may hereafter be propoſed, will affect the liberty of the ſubject; ſince it is perfectly conſiſtent with the ſpirit of our ancient laws, to reſtrain perſons from doing evil, who are likely to commit offences; the reſtrictions can affect only a very few, comparatively ſpeaking; and thoſe too ſuch whoſe criminal conduct has been the principal, if not the ſole cauſe, of abridging the general liberty; while it ſubjected to riſk, and to danger of life and property, the great maſs of the people.

Whenever dealers, of any deſcription, are known to encourage or to ſupport crimes, or criminal or fraudulent perſons, it becomes the indiſpenſable intereſt of the ſtate, that they ſhould be reſtrained from purſuing at leaſt the miſchievous part of their trade; and that proviſions ſhould be made for carrying the laws ſtrictly and regularly into execution.

Reſtraints of a much ſeverer nature attach to all trades upon which a revenue is collected; can it then be conſidered as any infringement of freedom, to extend a milder ſyſtem, to thoſe who not only deſtroy liberty but invade property?

The preſent ſtate of ſociety and manners calls aloud for the adoption of this principle of regulation, as the only

only practicable means of preſerving the morals of a vaſt body of the community; and of preventing thoſe numerous and increaſing crimes and miſdemeanors, which are ultimately attended with as much evil to the perpetrators as to the ſufferers.

If ſuch a principle were once eſtabliſhed, under circumſtances which would inſure a correct and regular execution; and if, added to this, certain other practicable arrangements ſhould take place (which will be diſcuſſed in their regular order in theſe pages) we might ſoon congratulate ourſelves on the immediate and obvious reduction of the number of thieves, robbers, burglars, and other criminal and fraudulent perſons in this metropolis.—Not being able to exiſt, or to eſcape detection, without the aid, the concealment, and the opportunities, afforded at preſent by the multitude of receivers ſpread all over the capital, they would be compelled to abandon their evil purſuits, as no leſs unprofitable and hazardous, than they are deſtructive.

Let the ſtrong arm of the law, and the vigour and energy of the police, be directed in a particular manner againſt *receivers*; and the chief part of thoſe robberies and burglaries, which are ſo much dreaded, on account of the acts of violence which attend them, *would abſo-*

lutely ceaſe to exiſt:—and the reſource for plunder bei
thus narrowed in ſo great a degree, robberies on
highway would *alone* ſeldom anſwer the purpoſe of
adventurer; where the riſk would be ſo exceedin
multiplied, while the advantages were in the ſame p
portion diminiſhed;—the reſult therefore would be, t
in *the ſuppreſſion of the receivers*, the encouragement
become thieves and robbers would be taken away:
the preſent depredators upon the public muſt either
turn to honeſt labour as uſeful members of the ſtate,
ſubmit to ſtarve.

It rarely happens that thieves go upon the highw
or commit burglaries, until the money they have p
viouſly acquired is exhauſted.—Having laid their pl
for new depredations, a negociation is frequently ent
ed upon with the moſt favourite receiver, who (to
their own language) is likely to be *ſtaunch*, and
keep their ſecrets.—The plan is explained.—Some
quor is drank to the good of the enterprize, and t
hour fixed when they are to return with the booty:
plate is expected, the crucible is ready in a ſmall furna
built for the purpoſe, inſtantly to melt it, and arran
ments are made for the immediate concealment of t
other articles.

The

There are, however, exceptions to this rule, where the receivers are not truſted, till the booty is acquired; and where it is in the firſt inſtance removed to the houſes of the thieves, or to ſome of their friends; but it ſeldom remains longer than may be neceſſary to obliterate the marks: for money muſt be procured.—All thieves are improvident;—their wants are therefore preſſing—they *muſt* ſell—the receiver knows this, and makes his own terms;—and he of courſe enjoys by far the largeſt ſhare of the profit.

The plunder thus purchaſed, finds a ready vent, through the extenſive connections of the Jew dealers, both in this country and upon the continent: and from the facts already ſtated in the courſe of this work, it may be eaſily conceived that the trade is not only extenſive, but that the profit is immenſe, ſince it rarely happens (except in the article of plate) that thieves receive to the amount of above one third or one fourth of the value of what is ſtolen.

In contemplating the beſt means of preventing depredations upon the public, the ſimpleſt, and perhaps the moſt effectual, mode would be to *make a ſtand at this particular point*; by bending the attention *wholly* to the

means of deſtroying effectually *the trade of receivi ſtolen goods*; under the fulleſt conviction that by a compliſhing ſo valuable a purpoſe, thieving and ſwi ling in all its branches would alſo in a great meaſure deſtroyed.

It is believed, that this object (difficult as it may a pear) is attainable, by well-digeſted applicable laws, c taining and enforcing ſuch regulations as would enſu full and energetic execution.

The importance of a meaſure of this kind is ſo i menſe, that if even a conſiderable part of one ſeſſion parliament were employed in deviſing and legalizin proper ſyſtem, it would be time well and uſefully ſp for the benefit of the country.

The obvious means of remedy ſeem to lie within narrow compaſs; and may be ſummed up under the f lowing heads:—

I. To conſolidate and improve the laws now in beir relative to *receivers of ſtolen goods*; by an arran ment which ſhall render the whole *clear* and *expli* and applicable to all the evils which have been felt exiſt.

II.

II. To make the following additions, namely—

1. To make the receiving ſtolen goods an *original offence*; puniſhable in the ſame manner, in all caſes, as the principal felons are puniſhable by law.

2. The offence of receiving *money*, *bank-notes*, *horſes*, *cattle*, *poultry*, or *any matter* or *thing whatſoever*, to be the ſame as receiving *goods* and *chattels*.

3. The perſons committing any felony or larceny to be competent to give evidence againſt the receiver, and *vice verſa*; provided that the teſtimony and evidence of ſuch principal felon againſt the receiver, or the evidence of the receiver againſt the principal felon, ſhall not be of itſelf ſufficient to convict, without other concurrent evidence: and that the offenders ſo giving evidence ſhall be entitled to his Majeſty's pardon, and alſo to a reward from 10*l.* to 50*l.* unleſs they ſhall be found guilty of wilful and corrupt perjury. — *By this means the thief will be ſet againſt the receiver, and the receiver againſt the thief.*

4. That rewards be paid for the detection and apprehenſion of receivers as well as thieves, in all caſes whatſoever, according to the diſcretion of the judge; *whether*

SECT. XXVIII.

INSURANCES, ETC.

It has been often obſerved in this work, *that gover ment was deſigned for the benefit of the governed*, a therefore ought to be *paternal*.—The principle is t often forgot, and the bread of the people for the ſal of revenue is converted into poiſon, and the ſeeds of t worſe vices are implanted from the ſame indefenſib motive.—Lotteries are eſtabliſhed, and men becon rich without induſtry, and the worſe crimes are e gendered, and the only excuſe given is, " money mu " be got."

Previous to the years 1777 and 1778, *gaming*, a though at all times an object (as appears from the ſtatu books) highly deſerving attention, and calling for t exertions of magiſtrates, never appeared either to ha aſſumed ſo alarming an aſpect, or to have been co ducted upon the methodized ſyſtem of partnerſhip-co

cerns, wherein pecuniary capitals are embarked, till after that period, when the vaſt licenſe which was given to thoſe abominable engines of fraud, E O tables, and the great length of time which elapſed before a check was given to them by the police, afforded a number of diſſolute and abandoned characters, who reſorted to theſe baneful ſubterfuges for ſupport, an opportunity of acquiring property: this was afterwards increaſed in low gaming-houſes, and by following up the ſame ſyſtem at Newmarket and other places of faſhionable reſort, and in the lottery: until at length, without any property at the outſet, or any viſible means of lawful ſupport, a ſum of money, little ſhort of *one million ſterling*, is ſaid to have been acquired by a claſs of individuals originally (with ſome few exceptions) of the loweſt and moſt depraved order of ſociety.—This enormous maſs of wealth (acquired, no doubt, by entailing miſery on many worthy and reſpectable families, and of driving the unhappy victims to acts of deſperation and ſuicide), is now ſaid to be engaged as a great and efficient capital for carrying on various illegal eſtabliſhments; particularly gaming-houſes, and ſhops for fraudulent inſurances in the lottery; together with ſuch objects of diſſipation as the races at Newmarket, and other places of *faſhionable* re-

ſort, hold out: all which are employed as the means
increaſing and improving the ill-gotten wealth of t
parties engaged in theſe nefarious purſuits.

A ſyſtem, grown to ſuch an enormous height, h
of courſe, its riſe by progreſſive advances —Several
thoſe who now roll in their gaudy carriages, and aſ
ciate with ſome men of high rank and faſhion, may
found upon the regiſters of the Old Bailey; or traced
the vagrant purſuit of turning, with their own han
E O tables, in the open ſtreets: theſe miſchievous me
bers of ſociety, through the wealth obtained by a cou
of procedure diametrically oppoſite to law; are, by
ſtrange perverſion, ſheltered from the operation of t
juſtice, which every act of their lives has offended: th
baſk in the ſunſhine of proſperity; while thouſan
who owe their diſtreſs and ruin to the horrid deſigns th
executed, *invigorated*, and *extended*, are pining in miſe
and want.

Certain it is, that the miſchiefs ariſing from the rap
increaſe, and from the vaſt extent, of capital now en
ployed in theſe ſyſtems of ruin and depravity, have b
come great and alarming beyond calculation; as will
evinced by developing the nature of the very dangero
confederacy which ſyſtematically moves and directs th

va

vaſt machine of deſtruction—compoſed in general of men who have been reared and educated under the influence of every ſpecies of depravity which can debaſe the human character.

Wherever intereſt or reſentment ſuggeſt to their minds a line of conduct calculated to gratify any baſe or illegal propenſity, it is immediately indulged.—Some are taken into this iniquitous partnerſhip for their dexterity in ſecuring the dice; or in dealing cards at pharo.—Informers are apprehended and impriſoned upon writs, obtained by perjury, to deter others from ſimilar attacks.—Witneſſes are ſuborned—officers of juſtice are bribed, wherever it can be done, by large ſums of money—ruffians and bludgeon-men are employed to reſiſt the civil power, where pecuniary gratuities fail—and houſes are barricadoed and guarded by armed men: thereby offering defiance to the common exertions of the laws, and oppoſing the regular authority of magiſtrates.

It is impoſſible to contemplate a confederacy thus circumſtanced, ſo powerful from its immenſe pecuniary reſources, and ſo miſchievous and oppreſſive from the depravity which directs theſe reſources, without feeling an anxiety to ſee the ſtrong arm of the law exerted for the purpoſe of effectually deſtroying it.

Whilſt one part of the immenſe property by this confederacy is ſo ſtrongly fortified is employed eſtabliſhment of *gaming-houſes*, holding out th faſcinating allurements to giddy young *men* of f and others, having acceſs to money, by m ſplendid entertainments*, and regular ſuppers abundance of the choiceſt wines, ſo as to form a lounge for the diſſipated and unwary; another the capital is ſaid to form the ſtock which comp various pharo-banks which are to be found at the of *ladies of faſhion:* thus drawing into this vortex quity and ruin, not only the *males*, but alſo the of the giddy and opulent part of ſociety; who to become a prey to that thoughtleſs vanity which fr ly overpowers reaſon and reflection; nor is the d terminated till it is often too late.

Evil example, when thus ſanctioned by appar ſpectability, and by the dazzling blandiſhments o and faſhion, is ſo intoxicating to thoſe who hav ſuddenly acquired riches, or who are young and perienced, that it almoſt ceaſes to be a matter of

* The expence of entertainments at a gaming-houſe of the hig during the eight months of the laſt ſeaſon, has been ſaid to exceed *fi guineas!* What muſt the profits be to afford ſuch a profuſion?

that the fatal propenſity to gaming has become ſo univerſal; extending itſelf over all ranks in ſociety in a degree ſcarcely to be credited, but by thoſe who will attentively inveſtigate the ſubject.

At the commencement of the troubles in France, and before this country was viſited by the hordes of emigrants of all deſcriptions, who fixed a temporary or permanent reſidence in this metropolis, the number of gaming-houſes (excluſive of thoſe that are ſelect, and have long been eſtabliſhed by ſubſcription) did not exceed above *four* or *five:* at the preſent moment, above *thirty* are ſaid to be actually open; where, beſides *pharo* and *hazard*, the foreign games of *roulet*, and *rouge et noir*, have been partly introduced; and where there exiſts a regular gradation of eſtabliſhment, accommodating to all ranks; from the man of faſhion, down to the thief, the burglar, and the pick-pocket—where immenſe ſums of money are played for every evening, for eight months in the year, and from whence incalculable miſchiefs ariſe.

In a commercial country, and in a great metropolis, where, from the vaſt extent of its trade and manufactures, and from the periodical iſſue of above twenty millions annually, ariſing from dividends on funded ſecurity,

curity, there muſt be an immenſe circulation c
perty, the danger is not to be conceived, from
lurements which are thus held out to young
buſineſs, having the command of money, as we
the clerks of merchants, bankers, and others cor
in different branches of trade: in fact, it is well k
that too many of this claſs reſort at preſent to th
ſtructive ſcenes of vice, idleneſs, and misfortune.

The mind ſhrinks with horror at the exiſten
ſyſtem in the metropolis, unknown to our an
even in the worſt periods of their diſſipation; v
Ward, a *Waters*, and a *Chartres*, inſulted public
by their vices and their crimes: for then no
eſtabliſhments—no ſyſtematic concerns for carry
this nefarious trade, were known.—Partnerſ
gaming-houſes, conducted on the principles of co
cial eſtabliſhments, is a new idea in this country
until the laſt ſeven or eight years, had very little
in the metropolis.

But theſe partnerſhips are not confined to g
houſes alone.—A conſiderable proportion of th
menſe capital which the conductors of the ſyſtem
is employed periodically in the *two lotteries*, in *fra*
inſurances, where, like the pharo bank, the chan

ſo calculated as to yield about 30 *per cent.* profit to the gambling proprietors; and, from the extent to which theſe tranſactions are carried, no doubt can be entertained that the annual gains muſt be immenſe.—It has, indeed, been ſtated, with an appearance of truth, that one individual acquired no leſs than 60,000*l.* by the laſt Engliſh lottery!

Although it is impoſſible to be perfectly accurate in any eſtimate which can be formed; for in this, as in all other caſes where calculations are introduced in this work, accuracy to a point is not to be expected; yet when all circumſtances are conſidered, there appear juſt grounds to ſuppoſe that the following ſtatement, placing the whole in one connected point of view, may convey to the reader no very imperfect idea of the vaſt and unparalleled extent of this horrid miſchief.

GAMING.

	Perſons attached.	*Money played for nightly.*	*Yearly aggregate loſt and won.*
		£.	£.
1. Seven ſubſcription houſes open one-third of the year, or 100 nights, ſuppoſe -	1000	— 2000 —	1,400,000
2. Fifteen houſes of a ſuperior claſs one-third of the year, or 100 nights - - - - -	3000	— 2000 —	3,000,000
3. Fifteen houſes of an inferior claſs one-half of the year, or 150 nights - - - - -	3000	— 1000 —	2,225,000
4. Six ladies gaming-houſes, 50 nights -	1000	— 2000 —	500,000
			7,225,000

Fraudulent

Brought forward, - - - - - - - - - - - - - £7,225,000

Fraudulent Insurances in the Lottery.

450 Insurance offices at 100*l.* a day average during the 33 days of the Irish lottery - - -	£1,155,000	
400 Insurance offices at 150*l.* a day average during the 33 days * of the English lottery - -	1,980,000	
		3,135,000
Total - -		10,460,000

This aggregate is only to be considered as shewing the mere interchange of property from one hand to another yet when it is recollected that the operation must progressively produce a certain loss, with not many exceptions, to all the innocent and unsuspecting adventurers either at pharo or the lottery, with an almost uniform gain to the proprietors; the result is shocking to reflect upon.—To individual families in easy circumstances where this unfortunate mania prevails, as well as to the mass of the people who are fascinated by the delusion of the lottery insurances, it is the worst of all misfortunes. —By seizing every opportunity to take advantage of this unhappy bias, it is no uncommon thing to see the pennyless miscreant of to-day become the opulent gam-

* The longer the lottery continues, the greater the evil. A lottery of 60,000 tickets is therefore a much greater evil than one of 50,000: and that in a ratio more than proportionate to the numbers in each.

er

bler of to-morrow: leaving the unhappy ſufferers often no alternative but exiled beggary, or a priſon; or perhaps rendered deſperate by reflecting on the folly of their conduct, to end their days by ſuicide*, while wives, children, and dependants, are ſuddenly reduced from affluence to the loweſt abyſs of miſery.

In contemplating theſe vaſt eſtabliſhments of regular and ſyſtematic fraud and depredation upon the public, in all the hideous forms which they aſſume, nothing is ſo much to be lamented as the unconquerable ſpirit which draws ſuch a multitude of the lower ranks of ſociety into the vortex of the lottery.

The agents in this iniquitous ſyſtem, availing themſelves of the exiſtence of the deluſion, ſpare no pains to keep it alive; ſo that the evil extends far and wide, and the miſchiefs, diſtreſſes, and calamities reſulting from it, were it poſſible to detail them, would form a catalogue of ſufferings of which the opulent and luxurious have no conception.

With a very few exceptions, all the proprietors of the gambling-houſes are alſo concerned in the fraudulent inſurance offices; and have a number of clerks employed

* The gambling and lottery tranſactions of one individual in this great metropolis, are ſaid to be productive of from ten to fifteen ſuicides annually.

during the drawing of the
the buſineſs without riſk, i
inſurances are taken; but
not only from all the diffi
the town, but alſo from
from door to door taking
poor and the middle ranks t

In calculating the chance
the wheels, and the prem
generally about 33½ *per ce*
inſurers; but when it is co
from not being able to re
numbers, always fix on lo
of the inſurer is greatly inc
are plundered, to an extent
culation.

Of how much importanc
at large, to ſee theſe evils f
novel ſyſtem annihilated, t
ments are formed upon con
dical arrangements, with
moſt infamous and diaboli

Let thoſe who have acqu
ſatisfied with what they hav

their gains have occaſioned to ruined thouſands: let them abſtain from employing it in channels calculated to extend theſe evils.—The law is generally ſlow in its operations: but it ſeldom fails to overtake the guilty at laſt.

To this confederacy, powerful in wealth, and unreſtrained by thoſe conſiderations of moral rectitude, which govern the conduct of other men engaged in the common purſuits of life, is to be attributed thoſe vaſt additional hazards to which the young and inexperienced are at preſent ſubjected; hazards which not only did not exiſt before theſe eſtabliſhments were matured and moulded into ſyſtem, but which are now conſiderably increaſed, from its becoming a part of the general arrangements to employ men of genteel exterior (and it is to be feared too, in many inſtances of good connections), who, having been ruined by the deluſion, deſcend, as a means of ſubſiſtence, to accept the degrading office of ſeeking out thoſe cuſtomers, whoſe acceſs to money render them proper objects to be enſnared.—For ſuch is the nature of this new ſyſtem of deſtruction, that while a young man entering upon life, conceives himſelf honoured by the friendſhip and acquaintance of thoſe who are conſidered to be men of faſhion, and of good con-

nections, he is deluded by ſplendid entertainment
the ſnare, which afterwards robs him of his property
peace of mind.

At no period, therefore, has it been more nece
to exerciſe caution and prudence than under the
cumſtances already explained.—Since men, likel
ſport away property, are now *ſought for:* form
they were permitted to *ſeek out* the road to ruin; bu
ſyſtem adopted in the preſent ſituation of things
furniſh a guide.

Such are the arrangements of this alarming and
chievous confederacy, for the purpoſe of plundering
thoughtleſs and unwary.—The evidence given in
Court of King's Bench, in an action, tried for gam
on the 29th November, 1796, fully develops the ſh
ing ſyſtem of fraud which is purſued, after the ine
rienced and unwary are entrapped into theſe recept
of ruin and deſtruction *.—It ought not only to ſer
a be

* The following is the ſubſtance of the moſt ſtriking parts of the ev
of John Shepherd, in an action for gaming, tried in the King's-Bench,
of November, 1796.

" The witneſs ſaw hazard played at the gaming-houſe of the defe
in Leiceſter-ſtreet.—Every perſon who was three times ſucceſsful, paid t
fendant a ſilver medal, which he purchaſed from him on entering the

a beacon to every young man of property carefully to avoid ſuch ſnares; but alſo as an inducement to great

at eight for a guinea, and he received ſix or ſeven of theſe in the courſe of an hour for the box hands, as it was called. The people who frequented this houſe always played for a conſiderable ſum. Sometimes 20*l.* or 30*l.* depended on a ſingle throw of the dice. The witneſs remembered being once at the defendant's gaming-houſe about three or four o'clock in the morning, when a gentleman came in very much in liquor.—He ſeemed to have a great deal of money about him.—The defendant ſaid he had not intended to play, but now he would ſet to with this fellow.—He then ſcraped a little wax with his finger off one of the candles and put the dice together, ſo that they came ſeven every way. After doing this, he dropped them into the box and threw them out, and afterwards drew all the money away, ſaying he had won it.—*Seven* was the main, and he could not throw any thing but *ſeven*. The young gentleman ſaid he had not given him time to *bar*.—A diſpute aroſe between the defendant and him.—It was referred to two or three perſons who were round the table, and they gave it in favour of the defendant.—The gentleman ſaid he had loſt upwards of 70*l.*—The defendant ſaid, *we have cleared him.*—The witneſs has ſeen a man pawn his watch and ring in ſeveral inſtances; and once he ſaw a man pawn his coat and go away without it.

"After the gaming-table was broken by the Bow-ſtreet officers, the defendant ſaid it was too good a thing to be given up, and inſtantly got another table, large enough for twenty or thirty people.—The frequenters of this houſe uſed to play till daylight; and on one or two occaſions, they played all the next day. This is what the defendant called, *ſticking to it rarely*. The gueſts were furniſhed with wine and ſuppers gratis, from the funds of the partnerſhip, in abundance. Sunday was a grand day. The witneſs has ſeen more than forty people there at a time. The table not being ſufficient for the whole, half a crown uſed on ſuch occaſions to be given for a ſeat, and thoſe behind looked over the back of the others and betted."

The perſon above-mentioned (whoſe name was Smith) who pawned his coat, corroborated the above evidence; and added, that he had ſeen a perſon, after he had loſt all his money, throw off his coat and go away, loſing it alſo.

public

public bodies, who employ a number of clerks, as to bankers, merchants, warehouſemen, and to warn and admoniſh the perſons entruſted with in their employment, of the imminent danger evitable ruin which an attachment to gaming or tery muſt produce; thereby putting them up guard againſt the frauds which may be practiſ duce them into this fatal vice.

It will alſo occur to parents and guardians to lant in marking the conduct of young men un charge, and to warn them of the infamous pla are laid to work their ruin and deſtruction.

Nor ought leſs attention to be beſtowed in menial ſervants, and the labouring people in from the deluſion of the lottery.—An attentio object would be an act of great charity and hu and in its conſequences might produce infinite benefit than any ſum of money, however extenſ could be raiſed for a charitable purpoſe: for it w general prevent the neceſſity of thoſe liberal do which become neceſſary more from the thoughtl digality, and the ill-regulated œconomy of th ariſing in too many inſtances from the numerous

tions which a great metropolis affords, than from any actual neceſſity.

The keepers of unlicenſed inſurance offices during the drawing of the Engliſh and Iriſh lotteries, during the intervals of ſuch lotteries, have recently invented and ſet up private lotteries, or wheels, called by the nick-name of *Little Go's*, containing blanks and prizes, which are drawn for the purpoſe of eſtabliſhing *a ground for inſurance*; the fever in the minds of the lower order of the people is thus kept up, in ſome meaſure, all the year round, and produces incalculable miſchiefs; the rage and ſpirit of gambling becoming ſo rooted from habit, that no domeſtic diſtreſs, no conſideration, connected either with the frauds that are practiſed, or the number of chances that are againſt them, will operate as a check upon their minds.

In ſpite of the high price of proviſions, and of the care and attention of the legiſlature in eſtabliſhing ſevere checks and puniſhments for the purpoſe of preventing the evil of lottery inſurances, theſe criminal agents feel no want of cuſtomers; their houſes and offices are not only extremely numerous all over the metropolis, but in general *high-rented*; exhibiting the appearance of conſiderable expence, and barricadoed in ſuch a manner, with

with iron doors and other contrivances, as in many ſtances to defy the arm of the law to reach them.

In tracing all the circumſtances of this intereſting ſineſs, with a view to the diſcovery of the cauſe of great encouragement which theſe lottery inſurer ceive, it appears that a conſiderable proportion of emolument is derived from *menial ſervants* in ge all over the metropolis; but particularly from the pered male and female domeſtics in the houſes of n faſhion and fortune; who are ſaid, almoſt with ſingle exception, to be in the conſtant habit of inſ in the Engliſh and Iriſh lotteries.

This claſs of *menials* being in many inſtances cl as well as fed by their maſters, have not the ſame upon them as labourers and mechanics, who muſ propriate at leaſt a part of their earnings to the pu of obtaining both food and raiment.

With a ſpirit of gambling, rendered more ardent prevails in vulgar life, from the example of their riors, and from their idle and diſſipated habits, ſervants enter keenly into the lottery buſineſs; and ill luck attends them, it is but too well known many are led, ſtep by ſtep, to that point where loſe ſight of all moral principle; impelled by a

to recover what they have loſt, they are induced to raiſe money for that purpoſe, by ſelling or pawning the property of their maſters, wherever it can be pilfered in a little way, without detection; till at length this ſpecies of peculation, by being rendered familiar to their minds, generally terminates in more atrocious crimes.

Upon a ſuppoſition that one hundred thouſand families * in the metropolis keep two ſervants upon an average, and that one ſervant with another inſures only to the extent of twenty-five ſhillings each, in the Engliſh, and the ſame in the Iriſh lottery, the aggregate of the whole will amount to HALF A MILLION STERLING.

Aſtoniſhing as this may appear at firſt view, it is believed that thoſe who will minutely examine into the lottery tranſactions of their ſervants, will find the calculation by no means exaggerated; and when to this are added the ſums drawn from perſons in the middle ranks of life, as well as from the numerous claſs of labourers and artiſans who have caught the mania; it ceaſes to be a matter of wonder, that ſo many ſharpers, ſwindlers,

* It is eſtimated that in the preſent extended and improved ſtate of the metropolis, there are 162,000 inhabited houſes, ſuppoſed to contain about 240,000 families, including lodgers of every deſcription, reſiding in nearly 8,000 ſtreets, lanes, alleys, courts, and ſquares.

and cheats find encouragement in this particular de
ment.

If ſervants in general, who are under the contr
maſters, were prevented from following this abomi
ſpecies of gambling; and if other expedients were ad
which will be hereafter detailed, a large proporti
the preſent race of rogues and vagabonds who follo
infamous trade, would be compelled to become h
and the poor would be ſhielded from the deluſion
impels them to reſort to this deceitful and fraudule
pedient; at the expence ſometimes of pledging eve
ticle of houſehold goods, as well as the laſt rag of
own and their children's wearing apparel, not l
even a ſingle change of raiment!

But when our views are extended to the deſtruc
morals, and to the ſhocking waſte of time, as w
the waſte of property, which attaches to theſe pu
there is no branch of political œconomy ſo importa
ſo truly worthy the ſyſtematic attention of men o
tune and virtue, as the means of checking, by
palliatives, the deſtructive vices of the labouring p
—To render them happy they ſhould be taught
lity and virtue.—To abandon them to their ill-regu
paſſions and propenſities, which often ariſe more

igno

ignorance than bad intentions, is an act of cruelty to them, and injuſtice to the community.

THUS IT IS THAT THOSE MULTIFARIOUS CRIMES ARE ENGENDERED, WHICH IT HAS BEEN THE OBJECT OF THE AUTHOR TO DEVELOPE IN THE COURSE OF THIS WORK.—

WHILE, THEREFORE, WE DEPLORE THE MISERABLE CONDITION OF THOSE NUMEROUS CLASSES OF DELINQUENTS WHO HAVE UNFORTUNATELY MULTIPLIED, WITH THE SAME RAPIDITY THAT THE GREAT WEALTH OF THE METROPOLIS HAS INCREASED, WHILE THEIR ERRORS AND CRIMES ARE EXPOSED ONLY FOR THE PURPOSE OF AMENDMENT, A PROSPECT HAPPILY OPENS FOR THE ADOPTION OF THOSE REMEDIES WHICH MAY PROVE THE MEANS OF GIVING A SEASONABLE CHECK TO IMMORALITY AND CRIMES; SO AS, IN THEIR PREVENTION, NOT ONLY TO PROTECT THE PRIVILEGES OF INNOCENCE, BUT ALSO TO RENDER PUNISHMENTS VERY SELDOM NECESSARY.

TO WITNESS THE COMPLETION OF LEGISLATIVE ARRANGEMENTS, OPERATING SO FAVOURABLY TO THE IMMEDIATE ADVANTAGE AND SECURITY OF THE METROPOLIS, AND EXTENDING BY THAT

MEANS THE SAME BENEFITS TO THE COUNTI
LARGE, WOULD PROVE TO THE AUTHOR OF
WORK A VERY GREAT AND GENUINE SOUR
HAPPINESS.—To THE PUBLIC THEREFORE, I
NERAL, AND TO THE LEGISLATURE IN PAI
LAR, DOES HE LOOK FORWARD WITH CONFI
FOR THAT SINGULAR GRATIFICATION, WHI
GIVING EFFECT TO HIS WELL-MEANT ENDEA
FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRIMES, WILL
AMPLY REWARD THE EXERTIONS HE HAS U
THE COURSE OF A VERY INTRICATE AND LAB
INVESTIGATION; IN WHICH HIS ONLY OBJEC
BEEN THE GOOD OF HIS COUNTRY.

GAMING, THEREFORE, CONSIDERING THE
MISCHIEFS IT PRODUCES, OUGHT TO BE MOR
VERELY PUNISHED BY LAW, AND THE PUNISH
SHOULD BE SOLITARY IMPRISONMENT; REW
SHOULD BE OFFERED FOR THE CONVICTI
GAMESTERS; AND TRANSPORTATION FOR
SHOULD BE THE LOT OF THOSE WHO PERMIT
BANE OF ALL VIRTUE TO BE ACCOMPLISHE
HOUSES OF PUBLIC RESORT.—THIS MAY AP
SEVERE, BUT SEVERITY CERTAINLY HERE IS
HIGHEST MERCY TO OTHERS.

SECT. XXIX.

COINING.

THE vaſt increaſe, and the extenſive circulation of *counterfeit money*, particularly of late years, is too obvious not to have attracted the notice of all ranks. It has become an enormous evil in the melancholy catalogue of crimes which the laws of the country are called upon to aſſiſt the police in ſuppreſſing.—Its extent almoſt exceeds credibility; and the dexterity and ingenuity of theſe counterfeiters have (after conſiderable practice) enabled them to finiſh the different kinds of baſe money in ſo maſterly a manner, that it has become extremely difficult for the common obſerver to diſtinguiſh their ſpurious manufacture from the worn-out ſilver from the Mint.—So ſyſtematic, indeed, has this nefarious traffic become of late, that the great dealers, who in moſt inſtances, are the employers of the coiners, execute orders for the town and country with the ſame regularity, as manufacturers in fair branches of trade.

Scarce

Scarce a waggon or coach departs from the m
polis, which does not carry boxes and parcels of
coin to the camps, ſea-ports, and manufacturing to
inſomuch, that the country is deluged with count
money.

In London, regular markets, in various public
private houſes, are held by the principal dealers; w
hawkers, pedlars, fraudulent horſe-dealers, unlicenſe
tery-office keepers, gamblers at fairs, itinerant Je
labourers, ſervants of toll-gatherers, and hackney-
owners, fraudulent publicans, market-women, rabbi
lers, fiſh-criers, barrow-women, and many who w
not be ſuſpected, are regularly ſupplied with cou
feit copper and ſilver, with the advantage of nearly
per cent. in their favour; and thus it happens,
through theſe various channels, immenſe quantiti
baſe money get into circulation, while an evident d
nution of the Mint coinage * is apparent to every c
mon obſerver.

It is impoſſible to reflect on the neceſſity to whic
perſons are thus reduced, of receiving and again u

* The current coin is collected in, adulterated, and formed int
ſilver, which is the worſe ſpecies of coining. To render it *ſcarce*, it is all
ried out of the country.

ing, money which is known to be falſe and counterfeit, without lamenting, that by thus familiarizing the mind to fraud and deception, the *moral principle* is conſiderably weakened, if not deſtroyed.

In the nature of things at preſent, every one muſt receive baſe money, and being thus cheated, the parties injured muſt, knowingly and wilfully, *cheat* in their turn: and it is much to be feared, that when this ſpecies of fraud becomes familiar to young minds, it may extend to other tranſactions of life:—the barrier being broken down in one part, the principle of common honeſty is infringed upon, and infinite miſchief to the very beſt intereſts of ſociety, is the reſult, in caſes at firſt unthought of.

To permit, therefore, the exiſtence of a ſilver and copper coinage, ſuch as is now in circulation, is, in fact, to tolerate general fraud and deception, to the ultimate loſs of many individuals; for the evil muſt terminate at ſome period, and then thouſands muſt ſuffer; with this aggravation, that the longer it continues, the greater will be the loſs of property.

But the miſchief is not confined to the counterfeiting of coin, ſimilar to that of the realm.—The avarice and ingenuity of man is conſtantly finding out new ſources

of

of fraud; inſomuch, that in London, and in Birmin ham, and its neighbourhood, louis d'ors, half johann French half crowns and ſhillings, as well as ſeve coins of Flanders and Germany, are counterfeited; parently without ſuſpicion, that under the act of 14th of Elizabeth (cap. 3), the offenders are guilty miſpriſion of high treaſon.

Nor does the evil end here:—not content with cou terfeiting the foreign coins of Europe, the ingenic miſcreants extend their manufacture to thoſe of Ind and a coinage of the *ſtar pagoda* of Arcot has been eſ bliſhed in London for ſome years by one perſon.—Th counterfeits, being made wholly of blanched copp tempered in ſuch a manner as to exhibit, when ſtamp the cracks in the edges, which are always to be fou on the real pagoda, coſt the maker only three h pence each, after being double gilt.—When finiſh they are generally ſold to Jews at five ſhillings a doz who diſpoſe of them afterwards at two ſhillings, th ſhillings, or even five ſhillings each; and through t medium, they are introduced by a variety of chann into India, where they are probably mixed with the r pagodas of the country, and paſs at their full denom nated value of eight ſhillings ſterling.

T

The *ſequins* of Turkey, another gold coin, worth about five or ſix ſhillings, have in like manner been recently counterfeited in London:—thus the national character is wounded, and the diſgrace of the Britiſh name proclaimed in Aſia, and even in the moſt diſtant regions of India.—Nor can it be ſufficiently lamented, that perſons who conſider themſelves as ranking in ſuperior ſtations in life, with ſome pretenſions to honour and integrity, have ſuffered their avarice ſo far to get the better of their honeſty, as to be concerned in this iniquitous traffic.

It has been recently diſcovered that there are at leaſt 120 perſons in the metropolis and the country, employed principally in coining and ſelling baſe money; and this, independent of the numerous horde of utterers, who chiefly ſupport themſelves by paſſing it at its full value.

It will ſcarcely be credited, that of criminals of this latter claſs, who have either been detected, proſecuted, or convicted, within the laſt ſeven years, there ſtand upon the regiſter of the ſolicitor to the Mint, no leſs than 608 names!—And yet the miſchief increaſes rapidly.—When the reader is informed, that two perſons

can finiſh from 200*l.* to 300*l.* (nominal value) in ſilver in *ſix days*; and that three people, within ſame period will ſtamp the like amount in copper; takes into the calculation the number of known co the aggregate amount in the courſe of a year w found to be immenſe.

The cauſes of this enormous evil are, however, developed.—The principal laws relative to count coin having been made a century ago, the trick devices of modern times are not ſufficiently pro againſt: when it is conſidered alſo, that the offen dealing in baſe money (which is the main ſpring o evil) is only puniſhable by a ſlight impriſonment; ſeveral offences of a ſimilar nature are not puniſhal all, by any exiſting ſtatute; and that the detecti actual coiners, ſo as to obtain the proof neceſſar conviction, required by law, is, in many inſtances, practicable; it is not to be wondered at, where profit is ſo immenſe, with ſo many chances of eſc puniſhment, that the coinage of, and traffic in, c terfeit money has attracted the attention of ſo many principled and avaricious perſons.

This enormity, however, may, like others alread

luded to, be cured by wiſe legiſlative regulations, aided by proper proviſions for their due execution, under a vigorous and energetic police.

So dexterous and ſkilful have coiners now become, that by mixing a certain proportion of pure gold with a compound of baſe metal, they can fabricate guineas that ſhall be full weight, and of ſuch perfect workmanſhip as to elude a diſcovery, except by perſons of ſkill; while the intrinſic value does not exceed thirteen or fourteen ſhillings, and in ſome inſtances not above eight or nine.—Of this coinage conſiderable quantities were circulated ſome years ſince, bearing the impreſſion of George the ſecond: and another coinage of counterfeit guineas of the year 1793, bearing the impreſſion of his preſent majeſty, is now actually in circulation, finiſhed in a maſterly manner, and nearly full weight, although the intrinſic value is not above eight ſhillings; half guineas are alſo in circulation of the ſame coinage.—But as the fabrication of ſuch coin requires a greater degree of ſkill and ingenuity than generally prevails, and alſo a greater capital than moſt coiners are able to command, it is to be hoped it has gone to no great extent*; for

* Pauſe here kind reader. The ingenious Mr. Bolton propoſed to government to have *ſuch a die* as could not be well counterfeited, ſtruck by a ſteam

 engine,

amidſt all the abuſes which
it is unqueſtionably true t
neas which have been cou
detection, have borne no p
to the coinage of baſe *ſilv*
five different kinds at preſe
we ſhall proceed to enume

The firſt of theſe are deno
cumſtance of this ſpecies
flatted plates, compoſed
blanched copper.—The pr
one fourth to one third, ar
half: the metals are mixe
and afterwards rolled by fi
neſs of *ſhillings*, *half-crown*
deſire of the parties who
which laſt is generally ſtol
preſent one rolling-mill i
ſituation, where all the deal
of baſe money reſort, for
plates prepared; from whi

engine for *all coins* current in this kin
we wiſh him every ſucceſs. Mr. Til
graving, and made his propoſal to
notes. Both gentlemen will deſerve

round pieces are cut out, of the ſize of the money meant to be counterfeited.

The artiſans who ſtamp or coin theſe blanks into baſe money are ſeldom intereſted themſelves.—They generally work as mechanics for the large dealers who employ a capital in the trade;—and who furniſh the plates, and pay about eight *per cent.* for the coinage, being at the rate of one penny for each ſhilling, and twopence half-penny for each half-crown.

This operation conſiſts firſt in turning the blanks in a lathe;—then ſtamping them, by means of a preſs, with dies with the exact impreſſion of the coin intended to be imitated:—they are afterwards rubbed with ſand-paper and cork; then put into aquafortis to bring the ſilver to the ſurface; then rubbed with common ſalt; then with cream of tartar; then warmed in a ſhovel, or ſimilar machine, before the fire: and laſt of all rubbed with *blacking*, to give the money the appearance of having been in circulation.

All theſe operations are ſo quickly performed, that two perſons (a man and his wife for inſtance) can completely finiſh to the nominal amount of fifty pounds in ſhillings and half-crowns in two days, by which they will earn each two guineas a day.

A ſhilling

A ſhilling of this ſpecies, which exhibits nearly appearance of what has been uſually called a Birmi ham ſhilling, is intrinſically worth from *twopenc fourpence*; and crowns and half-crowns are in the ſ proportion.—The quantity made of this ſort of coun feit coinage is very conſiderable: it requires leſs i nuity than any other methods of coining, though at ſame time it is the moſt expenſive mode, and of co the leaſt profitable to the dealer; who for the moſt diſpoſes of it to the utterers, vulgarly called *ſmaſhers* from 28 to 40 for a guinea, according to the lity; while theſe *ſmaſhers* generally manage to utt again at the full import value.

The ſecond ſpecies of counterfeit money paſſes among *dealers by the denomination of* PLATED GOODS; from circumſtance of the ſhillings and half-crowns being n of copper of a reduced ſize, and afterwards plated ſilver, ſo extended as to form a rim round the edg This coin is afterwards ſtamped with dies ſo as to ſemble the real coin; and, from the circumſtance of ſurface being pure ſilver, is not eaſily diſcovered, ex by ringing the money on a table; but as this ſpecie baſe money requires a knowledge of *plating*, as wel a great deal of ingenuity, it is of courſe confined to

ha

hands.—It is however extremely profitable to thoſe who carry it on, as it can generally be uttered, without detection, at its full import value.

The third ſpecies of baſe ſilver-money is called PLAIN GOODS, and is totally confined to ſhillings.—Theſe are made of copper blanks turned in a lathe, of the exact ſize of a Birmingham ſhilling, afterwards ſilvered over by a particular operation uſed in colouring metal buttons; they are then rubbed over with cream of tartar and blacking, after which they are fit for circulation.

Theſe ſhillings do not coſt the makers above one halfpenny each: they are ſold very low to the *ſmaſhers* or *utterers*, who paſs them where they can, at the full nominal value; and when the ſilver wears off, which is very ſoon the caſe, they are ſold to the Jews as bad ſhillings, who generally reſell them at a ſmall profit to cuſtomers, by whom they are recoloured, and thus ſoon brought again into circulation.—The profit is immenſe, owing to the trifling value of the materials; but the circulation, on account of the danger of diſcovery, is not yet very extenſive.—It is however to be remarked, that it is a ſpecies of coinage recently introduced.

The fourth claſs of counterfeit ſilver-money is known by the name of CASTINGS, or CAST GOODS.—This

ſpecies of work requires great ſkill and ingenuity, is therefore confined to few hands; for none but ex lent artiſts can attempt it, with any proſpect of ſ ſucceſs.

The proceſs is to melt blanched copper, and to c in moulds, having the impreſſion, and being of the of a *crown*, a *half-crown*, a *ſhilling*, or a *ſixpenc* the caſe may be; after being removed from the mo the money thus formed is cleaned off, and afterw neatly ſilvered over by an operation ſimilar to that w takes place in the manufacture of buttons.

The counterfeit money made in imitation of ſhill by this proceſs, is generally caſt ſo as to have a *cr appearance*; and the deception is ſo admirable, tha though intrinſically not worth *one halfpenny*, by e biting the appearance of a *thick crooked ſhilling*, enter into circulation without ſuſpicion, and are ſel refuſed while the ſurface exhibits no part of the co and even after this the itinerant Jews will purchaſe t at threepence each, though ſix times their intrinſi lue, well knowing that they can again be recolour the expence of half a farthing, ſo as to paſs without ficulty for their nominal value of twelve pence.

The profit therefore in every view, whether t

original maker, or to the ſubſequent purchaſers, after having loſt their colour, is *immenſe*.

In fabricating this ſpecies of baſe money, the workmen are always more ſecure than where preſſes and dies are uſed; becauſe, upon the leaſt alarm, and before any officer of juſtice can have any admiſſion, the counterfeits are thrown into the crucible; the moulds are deſtroyed; and nothing is to be found that can convict, or even criminate, the offender: on this account the preſent makers of caſt money have reigned long, and were they careful and frugal, they might have become extremely rich; but prudence rarely falls to the lot of men who live by acts of criminality.

The fifth and laſt ſpecies of baſe coin made in imitation of ſilver-money of the realm, is called FIGS, or FIG THINGS.—It is a very inferior ſort of counterfeit money, of which compoſition however the chief part of the ſixpences now in circulation are made.—The proportion of ſilver is not, generally ſpeaking, of the value of one farthing in half a crown; although there are certainly ſome exceptions, as counterfeit ſixpences have been lately diſcovered, ſome with a mixture, and ſome wholly ſilver: but even theſe did not yield the makers leſs than from 50 to 80 *per cent.* while the profit on the

former is not leſs than from five hundred to one t
ſand *per cent.* and ſometimes more.

It is impoſſible to eſtimate the amount of this
money which has entered into the circulation o
country during the laſt twenty years; but it mu
immenſe, ſince one of the principal coiners in th
way, who has lately left off buſi and made
important diſcoveries, acknowledged to a magiſtr
the police, that he had coined to the extent of
hundred thouſand pounds ſterling in counterfeit
crowns, and other baſe ſilver money, in a perio
ſeven years.—This is the leſs ſurpriſing, as two pe
can ſtamp and finiſh to the amount of from 200
300 *l.* a week.

Of the copper-money made in imitation of the cu
coin of the realm, there are many different ſorts f
various prices, according to the ſize and weight; b
general they may be divided into two kinds, namely
ſtamped and the plain half-pence, of both which l
immenſe quantities have been made in London;
alſo at Birmingham, Wedgbury, Bilſton, and Wo
hampton, &c. *

* A ſpecies of counterfeit half-pence, made *wholly of lead*, has been
circulated in conſiderable quantities, coloured in ſuch a manner as even
ceive the beſt judges. They are generally of the reign of George II. an
the exact appearance of old Mint half-pence.

The plain half-pence are generally made at Birmingham; and, from their thickneſs, afford a wonderful deception.—They are ſold, however, by the coiners to the large dealers at about a farthing each, or 100 *per cent.* profit in the tale or aggregate number.—Theſe dealers are not the *utterers*; but ſell them again by retail in *pieces*, or *five-ſhilling papers*, at the rate of from 28 *s.* to 31 *s.* for a guinea; not only to the ſmaſhers, but alſo to perſons in different trades, as well in the metropolis as in the country towns, who paſs them in the courſe of their buſineſs at the full import value.

Farthings are alſo made in conſiderable quantities, chiefly in London, but ſo very thin that the profit upon this ſpecies of coinage is much greater than on the half-pence, though theſe counterfeits are not now, as formerly, made of baſe adulterated metal.—The copper of which they are made is generally pure.—The advantage lies in the weight alone, where the *coiners*, *ſellers*, and *utterers*, do not obtain leſs than 250 *per cent.*—A well known coiner has been ſaid to finiſh from ſixty to eighty pounds ſterling a week.—Of half-pence, two or three perſons can ſtamp and finiſh to the nominal amount of at leaſt two hundred pounds in ſix days.

When it is conſidered that there are not leſs than be-

tween forty and fifty coinages, or private mints, almoſt conſtantly employed in London and in different country towns, in ſtamping and fabricating baſe ſilver and copper money, the evil may truly be ſaid to have arrived at an enormous height.—It is indeed true that theſe people have been a good deal interrupted and embarraſſed of late, by detections and convictions; but while the laws are ſo inapplicable to the new tricks and devices they have reſorted to, theſe convictions are only *a drop in the bucket*; and indeed it is no unuſual thing for the wife and family of a culprit, or convicted *ſeller* of *baſe money*, to carry on the buſineſs, and to ſupport him luxurioufly in Newgate, until the expiration of the *year* and *day's* impriſonment, which is generally the puniſhment inflicted for this ſpecies of offence.

It has been already ſtated, that trading in baſe money has now become as regular and ſyſtematic as any fair branch of trade.

Certain it is that immenſe quantities are regularly ſent from London to the camps during the ſummer ſeaſon; and to perſons at the ſea-ports and manufacturing towns, who again ſell in retail to the different tradeſmen and others, who paſs them at the full *import* value.

In

In this nefarious traffic a number of the lower order of the Jews in London aſſiſt the dealers, in an eminent degree, particularly in the circulation of bad half-pence.

It has not been an unuſual thing for ſeveral of theſe dealers to hold a kind of market, every morning, where from forty to fifty Jew boys are regularly ſupplied with counterfeit half-pence; which they diſpoſe of in the courſe of the day, in different ſtreets and lanes of the metropolis, for *bad ſhillings*, at about 3*d.* each.—Care is always taken that the perſon who cries bad ſhillings ſhall have a companion near him who carries the half-pence, and takes charge of the purchaſed ſhillings (which are not cut): ſo as to elude the detection of the officers of the police, in the event of being ſearched.

The bad ſhillings thus purchaſed, are received in payment, by the employers of the boys, for the bad half-pence ſupplied them, at the rate of four ſhillings a dozen; and are generally re-ſold to *ſmaſhers*, at a profit of two ſhillings a dozen; who ſpeedily re-colour them, and introduce them again into circulation, at their full nominal value.

The boys will generally clear from five to ſeven ſhillings a day, by this fraudulent buſineſs; which they almoſt

moſt uniformly ſpend, dur
debauchery; returning pen
old trade.

Thus it is that the frau
beyond all poſſible conce
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terfeit ſhillings to Jew bo
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him again at the rate of t
profit to the purchaſers and

But theſe are not the
the coiners and dealers, as
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Counterfeit French hal
cellent workmanſhip, hav
a view to elude the puniſh

Fraudulent die-ſinkers
metropolis and in Birmi
artiſts; able and willing t
any coin, from the Britiſh
key, or to the ſtar pagod
have therefore every oppo
wiſh for; while their accu

ency of the laws, and where the point of danger lies, joined to the extreme difficulty of detection, operates as a great encouragement to this ſpecies of treaſon, felony, and fraud; and affords the moſt forcible reaſon why theſe peſts of ſociety have ſo increaſed and multiplied of late years.

An opinion prevails, ſounded on information obtained through the medium of the moſt intelligent of theſe coiners and dealers, that of the counterfeit money now in circulation, not above one third part is of the ſpecies of *flats* or *compoſition money*; which we have ſeen is the moſt intrinſically valuable of counterfeit ſilver, and contains from one fourth to one half ſilver; the remainder being blanched copper.—The other two thirds of the counterfeit money being *caſt* or *waſhed*, and intrinſically worth little or nothing, the impoſition upon the public is obvious.—Taking the whole upon an average, the amount of the injury muſt be conſiderably within ten *per cent.* of a total loſs upon the maſs of the baſe ſilver money now in circulation; which, if a concluſion may be drawn from what paſſes under the review of any perſon who has occaſion to receive ſilver in exchange, muſt conſiderably exceed *one million ſterling!* To this we have the miſerable proſpect of an acceſſion every

year, until ſome effectual ſteps ſhall be taken to remedy the evil.

Of the copper coinage, the quantity of counterfeits now in circulation may be truly ſaid to equal three fourth parts of the whole, independent of the daily acceſſion; and nothing is more certain than that a very great proportion of the actual counterfeits paſs as Mint half-pence, from their ſize and appearance, although they have yielded the coiners a large profit.

In ſhort, nothing can be on a worſe footing than both the ſilver* and copper coinage of this kingdom at the preſent period; for at no time can any perſon minutely examine either the one coin or the other, which may come into his poſſeſſion, without finding a conſiderable proportion counterfeit.

What therefore muſt be the ſituation of the retail dealers, the brewers, diſtillers, and many other claſſes of induſtrious traders, who, in the courſe of their buſineſs, are compelled to receive ſuch money as is in circulation?

The

* It is ſincerely to be regretted that any objections ſhould have ariſen relative to the adoption of a ſilver and gold coinage, ſimilar to the beautiful and maſterly ſpecimens which were fabricated in the year 1790, and tendered to government by that excellent artiſt, and uſeful and valuable man—Mr. BOLTON, of Birmingham.

Such

The burden is not only grievous beyond expreſſion, to thoſe who have no alternative but to take ſuch baſe money in payment; but extends indirectly to *the poor*: in as much as the diminiſhed value of ſuch coin, ariſing from its reduced or baſe quality, taken in connexion with the quantities thrown into circulation, tends to enhance the price of the firſt articles of neceſſity.

The labourer, the handicraftſman, and the working manufacturer, being generally paid their weekly wages, partly in copper money of the preſent depreciated value; —it is obvious they muſt obtain leſs than they would otherwiſe receive, were the coin of a higher ſtandard; for the retail dealers who furniſh the poor with food, muſt ſhield themſelves, at leaſt in part, againſt the unavoidable loſſes ariſing from baſe money, by advancing the prices of their various commodities.

Nor are ſuch advances made upon a principle which cannot be defended; ſince it is evident that the relative value *even of the Mint copper coin* to gold or ſilver, is nearly *twice its intrinſic value*; and while ſuch copper money cannot be paid into the receipt of his Majeſty's

Such a coinage, while the expence, at the time when copper was low, would have been very moderate, muſt have remedied completely all thoſe evils which have proved ſuch a weight upon the commerce of the country both before and ſince that period.

tion and punishment of offenders, but also to the me of prevention.

The vigour and energy requisite to the suppression crimes of every kind, but particularly that of the co age and circulation of base money, depend much on t zeal and activity of the magistrate: and on the affordi an adequate pecuniary resource, to enable him to ward men who may undertake to risk their persons the company of desperate and daring offenders, in or to obtain that species of evidence which will produc conviction.—Without such pecuniary resource, t law, as well the exertions of the magistrate, become dead letter: and his efforts, for the purpose of prom ing the ends of public justice, are crippled and lost the community.

In suppressing great evils, strong and adequate pow must be applied, and nothing can give force and activ to these powers, but the ability to reward liberally persons engaged in the public service, either as pol officers, or as temporary agents for the purpose of dete ing atrocious offenders. The following ideas are the fore suggested with a view to the important subject present under discussion.

T

The coinage laws (except thoſe relating to copper money) which contain the moſt important regulations in the way of prevention, having been made a century ago, it is not to be wondered, in conſequence of the regular progreſs of the evil, and the new tricks and devices reſorted to, in that period, that many obvious amendments have become neceſſary. A conſolidation of the whole laws from the 25th of Edward III. to the 14th of his preſent Majeſty, would, perhaps, be the moſt deſirable object; as it would afford a better opportunity of correcting every deficiency, and of rendering this branch of the criminal code *conciſe*, *clear*, *explicit*,—applicable to the exiſting evils, and to the means of prevention.

For the purpoſe, however, of more fully elucidating this propoſition, it will be neceſſary to ſtate the exiſting laws, and what are conſidered as the moſt apparent deficiencies therein.

We will begin by giving a ſhort *ſummary* of the exiſting laws.

25. Edw. III. *ſtat.* 5, *cap.* 2.
1 Mary, *ſtat.* 2, *c.* 6,
1 & 2 Ph. & Mary, *cap.* 11.

Theſe acts make counterfeiting the gold and ſilver coin of the realm,—counterfeiting foreign money, current within the realm,—knowingly bringing falſe

5 Eliz. *cap.* 11.	money into the realm counte
14 Eliz. *cap.* 3.	to the money of England;
18 Eliz. *cap.* 1.	bringing in *any* falſe and coun
	feit money, current within
	realm; in order to utter the ſ
	here;—diminiſhing or lighte
	any current (gold or ſilver) c
	—*High Treaſon.*—— Cou
	feiting foreign money, not
	rent in the kingdom,—*Miſp*
	of Treaſon.
7 Will. III. *cap.* 3. —8 & 9 Will. III. *cap.* 26. (made perpetual by 7 Anne, *c.* 25)—9 & 10 Will. III. *c.* 21.	Theſe acts contain a de of the principal offences puniſhments, upon which ſecutions are founded at preſ
7th of Queen Anne, *cap.* 24.	Allows 400 *l.* a year for pr cuting offenders; increaſed 15 Geo. II. *c.* 28. § 10, to 6
15th and 16th of George II. *cap.* 28.	Amends ſome of the al laws, and eſtabliſhes new reg tions relative to the copper c age.

11th George III. *cap.* 40.	Makes further regulations reſpecting the copper coinage; which, however, have not been at all effectual.

We next proceed to ſtate the deficiences of theſe laws.

1. Proſecutions are at preſent limited to commence within three months.—This may often defeat juſtice, as offences committed in the country frequently cannot be tried in leſs than four, five, and in ſome caſes nearly ſix months.—THE LIMITATION TO 12 MONTHS WOULD REMOVE THE DIFFICULTY.
2. The words *milled money* ſeemed neceſſary, in the minds of the makers of the Act of 8 and 9 William III. *cap.* 26. to form the deſcription of coin ſimilar to the current coin of the realm; and that act declares it to be felony to take, receive, pay, or put off *counterfeited milled money*.—A conſiderable portion of counterfeit coin is *caſt* and *not milled*.—THE WORDS COUNTERFEIT MONEY, MILLED, OR NOT MILLED, WOULD REMOVE THE AMBIGUITY.
3. No proviſion is made in any act againſt, and conſequently no puniſhment is inflicted on, the offence of

BUYING BASE MONEY TO RECOLOUR IT;—this is a modern device.

4. Neither does it appear that any proviſion is clearly made, or puniſhment inflicted, for the offence of *uttering baſe ſilver money in exchange*, as well as in payment: except under *ſtat.* 8 and 9 Will. III. *cap.* 26, where the expreſſion of *counterfeit milled money* is uſed; the ambiguity of which has already been noticed. The words in the *ſtat.* 15 Geo. II. *c.* 28. are, "any perſon who ſhall utter or tender in payment," and it ſeems that the word *utter* cannot be detached from the ſubſequent words, "in payment."

5. No exiſting law gives any power to magiſtrates, upon information on oath, TO SEARCH FOR, OR SEIZE COUNTERFEIT COIN, IN THE CUSTODY OR POSSESSION OF KNOWN DEALERS OR REPUTED UTTERERS; although theſe dealers and utterers are now the perſons (and not the actual coiners) who keep the baſe money: neither is there any power to ſeize baſe money conveying in coaches or waggons going into the country.—Under this ſhelter the dealers are enabled to hold markets for ſale in their houſes, where they frequently keep large ſtocks; and baſe money is alſo

alſo ſent into the country without the leaſt hazard of detection or ſeizure.

6. No power is directly given by any exiſting law, even upon the moſt pointed information, to ſearch the houſes or workſhops of coiners IN THE NIGHT TIME.—Hence it is that *detection* becomes ſo difficult, and the evil increaſes, becauſe the law in ſome meaſure ſhields the offenders from diſcovery.—Since in lottery offences (which are certainly greatly inferior in their enormity to coining) a power is granted to break open houſes in the night time, ſurely no reaſon can be aſſigned why treaſonable offences, in coining baſe money, ſhould not in this reſpect be on the ſame footing.—Unleſs a poſitive power is given to ſearch in the night, and ſuddenly to force open doors or windows, it will be impoſſible to detect the makers of caſt-money.

7. The laws peculiarly relating to the *copper coinage*, although more modern, have alſo been found to be extremely defective, and totally inadequate to their object.

The act of the 11th of his preſent Majeſty, *cap.* 40, indeed, makes it felony to ſell copper money of the ſimilitude OF THE CURRENT MONEY OF THE

REALM at a leſs value than the denomination doth import; but the benefit of clergy not being taken away, and no ſpecific puniſhment being mentioned, the offenders are generally ſubjected only to a year's impriſonment, which proves no check whatever, as their families carry on the buſineſs in the mean time; and if they ſell PLAIN HALFPENCE, or what are called IRISH HARPS, or mix them with STAMPED HALFPENCE, ſimilar to the current coin of the realm, ſo that the ſtamped coin does not exceed the value of what the denomination imports, it is doubtful whether the conviction will not fail.

8. The act above mentioned gives a power to magiſtrates to iſſue their warrants to ſearch for tools and implements uſed in the COPPER COINAGE (with regard to ſilver or gold coinage no ſuch power is given); but, what is very ſingular, NO PUNISHMENT WHATEVER CAN BE INFLICTED BY ANY EXISTING LAW on the owner or proprietor of ſuch tools for making copper money, nor upon the perſon in whoſe houſe they are found; and if when ſuch ſearch is made, there ſhall be found only *plain* halfpence, or IRISH HARPS, or HALFPENCE or FARTHINGS VARYING IN THE STAMP in any degree from the

curren

current coin of the realm, ſo as not to be of the exact ſimilitude, the act in queſtion is defeated; inaſmuch as the crime of felony does not attach to offences ſhort of coining COPPER MONEY OF THE SIMILITUDE OF THE CURRENT COIN OF THE REALM.—The coinage of baſe copper therefore goes on with impunity; becauſe it is the careleſſneſs of the parties themſelves if ever they permit the law to reach them.

9. The laws now in being give no power to ſeize counterfeit halfpence; either in the hands of the dealers who keep a kind of open market at their own houſes every morning to ſupply jew boys who cry bad ſhillings, or in thoſe of many others in various trades, who become the channels of circulation to a vaſt extent without riſk or inconvenience.—Neither does the ſtatute law authoriſe the apprehenſion of jew boys, who go out every morning loaded with counterfeit copper, which they exchange for bad ſhillings, to be afterwards coloured anew, and again put into circulation.

10. It muſt here be repeated, that the great cauſe of the defect in the execution of the laws againſt coiners, is the want of a proper fund for proſecutions and rewards, and other expences for detecting offenders.—The acts

7 Anne,

7 Anne, *cap.* 24. and 15 George II. *c.* 28. allo
£600. for profecuting only; which has never fin
been increaſed by any parliamentary grant, for abo
half a century; although the offences, as well as t
expence of detection and profecutions, have increaſ
at leaſt ſix-fold.

The reward of £40. given under the Acts 6 a
7 Will. III. *c.* 17; 15 Geo. II. *c.* 28, is conſtru
to be limited only to the conviction of actual coine
and clippers of gold and ſilver; and is not allowed
extend to colouring and finiſhing, as well as a num
ber of other offences connected with MAKING, COU
TERFEITING, and UTTERING baſe money:—t
reward for copper coin is by the ſaid act of 15 Geo. I
c. 28, limited to £10. and is by no means a ſufficie
encouragement to officers to do their duty.—I
WOULD BE A GREAT IMPROVEMENT IF A LIBERA
SUM WERE ALLOWED ANNUALLY BY PARLI
MENT FOR DETECTIONS, PROSECUTIONS, AN
REWARDS; TO BE PAID ON THE REPORT OF T
JUDGES WHO TRY THE OFFENDERS, ACCORDIN
TO THE MERIT AND TROUBLE OF THE APPR
HENDERS, PROSECUTORS, AND WITNESSES; WH
THER THERE IS A CONVICTION OR NOT.

II. T

11. The laws, as they now ſtand, are ſilent regarding provincial copper coin, or what are called *tokens*, repreſenting a halfpenny. — If a new coinage of copper money is not reſolved on by government, it might perhaps be uſeful to legalize *tokens*, or *provincial coins* on three conditions. — 1. THAT THE COPPER OF WHICH THEY ARE MADE SHALL BE PURE.— 2. THAT THIS COIN SHALL BE AT LEAST 50 PER CENT. HEAVIER THAN THE PRESENT MINT COINAGE.—3. THAT THE PARTIES CIRCULATING SUCH COIN BE RESPONSIBLE TO THE HOLDERS, FOR THE VALUE IN GOLD OR SILVER, WHEN DEMANDED: AND SHALL STAMP THEIR NAMES AND AN OBLIGATION TO THAT PURPOSE ON THE COINS, TOKENS, OR MEDALS SO ISSUED BY THEM.—It may alſo be neceſſary that ſuch perſons, iſſuing tokens or medals, ſhould take out a licence for that purpoſe from the principal officers of the mint, as an authority for ſuch coinage; giving ſecurity at the ſame time to obſerve the above conditions.

12. The laws reſpecting foreign coin are extremely defective, and productive at preſent of many frauds upon the public.—The act of the 14th of Elizabeth, *cap.* 3, which declared it to be miſpriſion of treaſon

to counterfeit foreign money, not current
realm, has not been put in force for many y
Counterfeit French ſhillings and half crowns,
as other foreign coins, are made of baſe met
mixed with counterfeit Britiſh coin, to the in
the public.—And foreign coin is counterfe
exportation, to the diſgrace of the national ch
PROHIBITIONS AND RESTRAINTS, UNDER
LATIVE AUTHORITY, HAVE BECOME ABSOI
NECESSARY TO PREVENT THIS EVIL; WHIC
NOT AT PRESENT SEEM PUNISHABLE B
EXISTING LAW.

13. The puniſhment inflicted on the different
ſpecified in the coinage laws, do not ſeem t
proportion to the degree of enormity, in ſo
ſtances; while in others, from being too ſeve
law is not always put in execution.—The
baſe money (for inſtance) under the value it
is only puniſhable by a year's impriſonment; al
in point of fact, it is well known, that th
are the EMPLOYERS OF THE COINERS; th
them this high offence originates, and but f
it would not have been committed: wl
actual coiners, who work for theſe dealers m
journ

journeymen, ſubject themſelves to the puniſhment of death.

14. The miſchievous agents of the dealers in baſe money, THE PERSONS WHO KEEP FLATTING MILLS, AND OTHER MACHINERY, FOR PREPARING, AND ROLLING THEIR METALS, FOR BEING COINED INTO BASE MONEY, are not at preſent within the reach of puniſhment by any exiſting law.—Although by preparing the metal for the ſubſequent proceſs of ſtamping, they are in fact parties concerned, without whoſe aid the coinage could not be carried on.—The chief difficulty is in puniſhing perſons for producing an article which may be turned into coach and harneſs ornaments, buttons, and many purpoſes as well as baſe money.—Perhaps a licence to ſuch perſons as flatten mixed metals, with ſecurity from them "that "they ſhall not work for coiners under a ſevere "penalty," might prove ſome check.—Or why, indeed, might not ſome proviſions, ſimilar to thoſe of the act, 8 and 9 William III. *c.* 26, (againſt perſons blanching copper for ſale, or mixing blanched copper with ſilver, or buying, ſelling, or offering to ſale blanched copper, alone, or mixed with ſilver,) be extended to the whole tribe of dangerous manu-

factures, whoſe trade and abilities are ſo liable to be perverted to bad uſes?

Whatever might be the effect of theſe amendments in the mint laws, and neceſſary as they appear to be, it is ſtill to be feared that until a new coinage of gold and ſilver money ſhall take place, * no legiſlative reſtrictions, regulations, or puniſhments, can produce an effectual cure to this enormous evil; although from the many deficiencies which have been detailed, it is evident a great deal of good may be done immediately in this way.

The coinage of new money is a great ſtate queſtion, which may require a fuller conſideration; but no doubt can be entertained of the indiſpenſable neceſſity of ſuch a meaſure, with regard to ſilver and copper coin, as ſoon as circumſtances will admit.

If to a new coinage of *ſhillings* and *ſixpences*, ſhould be added an extenſive coinage of ſilver money of the value of *three-pence*, according to antient uſage, it would prove a great convenience to the public, and remedy ſome of the abuſes and evils which ariſe from the vaſt quantity of baſe copper now in circulation.

* Vide note *, page 408.

The

The nation might alſo, in a new point of view, derive conſiderable advantages from increaſing the weight of the copper coin, ſo as to bring it as near as poſſible to the *intrinſic* value of the metal of which it is compoſed.

An arrangement of this ſort would not only be the means of effectually preventing counterfeits; but the copper, being a native article produced in the country, might, through the medium of *coined money*, become a profitable branch of commerce with foreign nations; where even an extenſive circulation might be inſured, in conſequence of the *intrinſic* and *denominative* value being the ſame, or nearly ſo.—

This is exemplified in the policy of Sweden, where the copper dollar being ſo heavy as to anſwer to ſixpence ſterling, has long been exported; and forms a conſiderable, and even a profitable branch of commerce to that nation.

In Ruſſia the *three copee piece* is very nearly of the weight of ſix Engliſh halfpence, yet its current value is only a ſmall fraction above one penny ſterling;—and thus by iſſuing no copper coin where the *denominative* is not in proportion to the *intrinſic* value, every claſs of dealers who vend the neceſſaries of life are

ſhielded againſt loſs; and
price of proviſions for the
courſe prevented.

This principle ſeems t
legiſlature; for when the
under the conſideration o
a period not very remot
opinion then prevailed,
"*to ſecure the copper coin*
"*that the denominative va*
"*near a proportion as poſſ*
" metal of which it was f

It is earneſtly to be hop
poſed will be adopted;
coinage of ſilver as well as
the honeſt part of the c
fraud, rapid beyond all ex
paralleled as to its extent.

Certain it is, that baſe
the ſupport as well as to
of thoſe miſchievous and
community, who exiſt
fraud, than any other de
enable them to live in the

debauchery, and to indulge in luxury and extravagance.

THE INCREASE IS CERTAINLY ASTONISHING, SINCE IT IS KNOWN, THAT IN LONDON AND THE COUNTRY THERE ARE 54 ACTUAL COINERS, AND 56 LARGE DEALERS, BESIDES, AT LEAST, 10 DIE-SINKERS, WHOSE NAMES, CHARACTERS, AND PURSUITS ARE AT PRESENT PERFECTLY KNOWN.—BUT THESE BEAR NO PROPORTION TO THE HORDE OF SMALLER DEALERS AND UTTERERS OF BASE MONEY IN THE METROPOLIS, AND IN MOST OF THE COMMERCIAL AND MANUFACTURING TOWNS IN THE KINGDOM. — THEIR NUMBERS MUST AMOUNT TO SEVERAL THOUSANDS.—FROM BEING AT PRESENT NUISANCES IN SOCIETY, IN THE CONSTANT HABIT OF DEFRAUDING THE PUBLIC, THEY MIGHT BE RENDERED (THROUGH THE APPLICATION OF THE REMEDIES PROPOSED) USEFUL MEMBERS OF THE STATE; BY EXCHANGING A LIFE OF IDLENESS AND CRIMES, FOR A COURSE OF USEFUL LABOUR AND INDUSTRY *.

* COLQUHOUN.

SECT.

SEC

BE

Too long have the pu
lity and religion, called a
evil, which, though hab
us, always appears in all i
and whoſe dangerous e
where, and are increaſing

Too long already have
metropolis ſeen with con
the Beggars, their imp
ſhameleſs debaucheries;
(thoſe peſts of ſociety) ha
that, inſtead of being
have triumphed over the
them, and acquiring fr
ſucceſs, have ſpread the
wide.

What well affected citizen can be indifferent to the ſhame that devolves upon himſelf and upon his country, when whole ſwarms of diſſolute rabble, covered with filthy rags, parade the ſtreets, and by tales of real or of fictitious diſtreſs,—by clamorous importunity, inſolence, and rudeneſs, extort involuntary contributions from every traveller?—When no retreat is to be found, no retirement where poverty, miſery, and impudent hypocriſy, in all their diſguſting and hideous forms, do not continually intrude; when no one is permitted to enjoy a peaceful moment, free from their importunity, either in the churches or in public places, at the tombs of the dead, or at the places of amuſement?—What avail the marks of affluence and proſperity which appear in the dreſs and equipage of individuals, in the elegance of their dwellings, and in the magnificence and ſplendid ornaments of our churches, while the voice of woe is heard in every corner, proceeding from pretended cripples; from ſtrong and healthy men capable of labour; from young infants and their ſhameleſs and abandoned parents?

The public honour calls aloud to have a ſtop put to this diſgraceful evil.

The public ſafety alſo de
ſequences are obvious, v
numbers of healthy indivi
in idleneſs, without any f
day with ſchemes for defr
ſiſtence for the next: wh
this numerous ſociety are
credulity of the benevole
larly trained, from their
infamous practices, whic
and to ſuch an alarming

Great numbers of theſe
the hands of the execut
they receive from their
deceive; and daily practi
their very infancy, rend
in their infamous trade.-
juſtice ſhow in innumera
of idleneſs and beggary a
lows; and among the m
committed in this capita
not committed by perſons
different pretences.

What perſon is ignoran
demand further proofs of

durable inſtitution, for the relief and ſupport of the poor?

The reader would be ſeized with horror, were we to unveil all the ſecret abominations of theſe abandoned wretches.—They laugh alike at the laws of God and of man.—No crime is too horrible and ſhocking for them, nothing in heaven or on the earth too holy not to be profaned by them without ſcruple, and employed with conſummate hyprocriſy to their wicked purpoſes.

Whence is it that this evil proceeds? not from the inability of this great capital to provide for its poor; for no city in the world, of equal extent and population, has ſo many hoſpitals for the ſick and infirm, and other inſtitutions of public charity.—Neither is it owing to the hard-heartedneſs of the inhabitants; for a more feeling and charitable people cannot be found.—Even the uncommonly great and increaſing numbers of the beggars ſhow the kindneſs and liberality of the inhabitants; for theſe vagabonds naturally collect together in the greateſt numbers, where their trade can be carried on to the greateſt advantage.

The injudicious diſpenſation of alms is the real and only ſource of this evil.

In every community there are certainly to be fc
greater or leſs number of poor and diſtreſſed p
who have juſt claims on the public charity.—T
the caſe every where; and nature dictates to us th
of adminiſtering relief to ſuffering humanity, an
eſpecially to our poor and diſtreſſed fellow-citizen
our holy religion promiſes eternal rewards to hi
ſupports and relieves the poor and needy: but t
lates to the *real* poor.—The truly diſtreſſed
baſhful to mix with the herds of common b
neceſſity, it is true, will ſometimes conquer the
dity, and compel them publicly to ſolicit charit
their modeſt appeal is unheard or unnoticed, v
diſſolute vagabond, who exhibits an hypocritical
of diſtreſs,—a drunken wretch, who pretends to
numerous family and to be perſecuted by misfor
or an impudent unfeeling woman, who excites
the tears and cries of a poor child whom ſhe h
perhaps for the purpoſe, and tortured into ſi
ſteps daringly forward to intercept the alms
charitable; and the well-intentioned gift whicl
relieve the indigent is the prize of impudence
poſition, and the ſupport of vice and idleneſs.
then is left for the modeſt object of real diſtreſs

retire diſpirited and hide himſelf in the obſcurity of his hut, there to languiſh in miſery, whilſt the bolder beggar conſumes, in public houſes, the ill-beſtowed gift in mirth and riot?—And, yet, the charitable donor flatters himſelf that he has performed an exemplary duty!

WE THEREFORE EARNESTLY ENTREAT EVERY ONE, AND ESPECIALLY THE INHABITANTS OF THIS CAPITAL, EACH IN HIS RESPECTIVE STATION, NO LONGER TO COUNTENANCE MENDICITY BY SUCH A MISAPPLICATION OF THEIR WELL-MEANT CHARITY; CONTIBUTING THUS TO AUGMENT THE FATAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE EVIL ITSELF, AS WELL AS TO IMPEDE THE RELIEF OF THE REALLY NECESSITOUS.

SEC

PUBLIC ESTABLISH

As nothing tends more
nefs and immorality amo
to perpetuate all the evil
the prevalence of poverty
cious diſtributions of al
cautious in beſtowing t
forming ſchemes for givi
otherwiſe they will moſt
good.—The evil tendenc
nately to beggars is unive
not, I believe, ſo general
done by what are called t
duals.—Far be it from me
charities; I am only anxi
applied.

Without taking up ti
motives by which perſon

duced to give alms to the poor, or of ſhewing the conſequences of their injudicious or careleſs donations; which would be an unprofitable as well as a diſagreeable inveſtigation; I ſhall briefly point out what appear to me to be the moſt effectual means which individuals in affluent circumſtances can employ for the aſſiſtance of the poor in their neighbourhood.

An object of the very firſt importance in forming an eſtabliſhment for the relief and ſupport of the poor, is to take effectual meaſures for introducing a ſpirit of induſtry among them; for it is moſt certain, that *all ſums of money, or other aſſiſtance, given to the poor in alms, which do not tend to make them induſtrious, never can fail to have a contrary tendency, and to operate as an encouragement to idleneſs and immorality.*

And as the merit of an action is to be determined by the good it produces, the charity of a nation ought not to be eſtimated by the millions which are paid in poor's taxes, but by *the pains which are taken* to ſee that the ſums raiſed are properly applied.

As the providing uſeful employment for the poor, and rendering them induſtrious, is, and ever has been, a great *deſideratum* in political economy, it may be proper

proper to enlarge a littl
ſubject.

The great miſtake com
which have been made to
where habits of idleneſs h
frequent and improper
which the perſons to be r
offended and thoroughly
Force will not do it.—Ad
on thoſe occaſions.

The children in the
who, being placed upon
where other children w
ſpectators of that amuſ
when their requeſt to be
places, and mix in that h
they would, moſt probal
they been taken abruptly
work.

" Men are but childr
thoſe who undertake to d
in mind that important tr

That impatience of co
perſeverance in maintain

berty and independence, which ſo ſtrongly mark the human character in all the ſtages of life, muſt be managed with great caution and addreſs, by thoſe who are deſirous of doing good;—or, indeed, of doing any thing effectually with mankind.

It has often been ſaid, that the poor are vicious and profligate, and that *therefore* nothing but force will anſwer to make them obedient, and keep them in order;—but, I ſhould ſay, that *becauſe* the poor are vicious and profligate, it is ſo much the more neceſſary to avoid the appearance of force in the management of them, to prevent their becoming rebellious and incorrigible.

Thoſe who are employed to take up and tame the wild horſes belonging to the Elector Palatine, which are bred in the foreſt near DUSSELDORF, never uſe force in reclaiming that noble animal, and making him docile and obedient.—They begin with making a great circuit, in order to approach him; and rather decoy than force him into the ſituation in which they wiſh to bring him, and ever afterwards treat him with the greateſt kindneſs; it having been found by experience, that ill-uſage ſeldom fails to make him "a man-hater," untameable, and incorrigibly vicious.—It may, perhaps,

be

be thought fanciful and trifling, but the fact really is, that an attention to the means uſed by theſe people to gain the confidence of thoſe animals, and teach them to like their keepers, their ſtables, and their mangers, ſuggeſted to me many ideas which I afterwards, ſays Count Rumford, put into execution with great ſucceſs, in reclaiming thoſe abandoned and more ferocious animals in human ſhape, which I undertook to tame and render gentle and docile.

It is however neceſſary in every attempt to introduce a ſpirit of order and induſtry among the idle and profligate, not merely to avoid all harſh and offenſive treatment, which, as has already been obſerved, could only ſerve to irritate them, and render them ſtill more vicious and obſtinate, but it is alſo indiſpenſably neceſſary to do every thing that can be deviſed to encourage and reward every ſymptom of reformation.

It will likewiſe be neceſſary ſometimes to puniſh the obſtinate; but recourſe ſhould never be had to puniſhments till *good uſage* has been firſt fairly tried and found to be ineffectual.—The delinquent muſt be made to ſee that he has deſerved the puniſhment, and when it is inflicted, care ſhould be taken to make him feel it.—But in order that the puniſhment may have the effects intended,

intended, and not ſerve to irritate the perſon puniſhed, and excite perſonal hatred and revenge, inſtead of diſpoſing the mind to ſerious reflection, it muſt be adminiſtered in the moſt ſolemn and moſt *diſpaſſionate* manner; and it muſt be continued no longer than till the *firſt dawn* of reformation appears.

How much prudence and caution are neceſſary in diſpenſing rewards and puniſhments; and yet—how little attention is in general paid to thoſe important tranſactions!

Rewards and *puniſhments* are the only means by which mankind can be controlled and directed; and yet, how often do we ſee them diſpenſed in the moſt careleſs—moſt imprudent—and moſt improper manner!—how often are they confounded!—how often miſapplied!—and how often do we ſee them made the inſtruments of gratifying the moſt ſordid private paſſions!

To the improper uſe of them may be attributed all the diſorders of civil ſociety.—To the improper or careleſs uſe of them may, moſt unqueſtionably, be attributed the prevalence of poverty, miſery, and mendicity in moſt countries, and particularly in *Great-Britain*, where the healthfulneſs and mildneſs of the climate—the fertility of the ſoil—the abundance of fuel—the

numerous and flouriſhing manufactures—the extenſive commerce—and the millions of acres of waſte lands which ſtill remain to be cultivated, furniſh the means of giving uſeful employment to all its inhabitants, and even to a much more numerous population.

But if inſtead of encouraging the laudable exertions of uſeful induſtry, and aſſiſting and relieving the unfortunate and the infirm—(the only real objects of charity,)—the means deſigned for thoſe purpoſes are ſo miſapplied as to operate as rewards to idleneſs and immorality, the greater the ſums are which are levied on the rich for the relief of the poor, the more numerous will that claſs become, and the greater will be their profligacy, their inſolence, and their ſhameleſs and clamorous importunity.

There is, it cannot be denied, in man, a natural propenſity to ſloth and indolence; and though habits of induſtry,—like all habits,—may render thoſe exertions eaſy and pleaſant which at firſt are painful and irkſome, yet no perſon, in any ſituation, ever choſe labour merely for its own ſake. It is always the apprehenſion of ſome greater evil,—or the hope of ſome enjoyment, by which mankind are compelled or allured, when they take to induſtrious purſuits.

In

In the rude ſtate of ſavage nature the wants of men are few, and theſe may all be eaſily ſupplied without the commiſſion of any crime; conſequently induſtry, under ſuch circumſtances, is not neceſſary, nor can indolence be juſtly conſidered as a vice; but in a ſtate of civil ſociety, where population is great, and the means of ſubſiſtence not to be had without labour, or without defrauding others of the fruits of their induſtry, idleneſs becomes a crime of the moſt fatal tendency, and conſequently of the moſt heinous nature; and every means ſhould be uſed to diſcountenance, puniſh, and prevent it.

And we ſee that PROVIDENCE, ever attentive to provide remedies for the diſorders which the progreſs of ſociety occaſions in the world, has provided for idleneſs—as ſoon as the condition of ſociety renders it a vice, but not before—a puniſhment every way ſuited to its nature, and calculated to prevent its prevalency and pernicious conſequences:—This is *want* *,—and a moſt efficacious remedy it is for the evil,—when the *wiſdom of man* does not interfere to counteract it, and prevent its ſalutary effects.

* He who will not work deſerves to *ſtarve*, ſays St. Paul.

But reſerving the farther inveſtigation of this part of my ſubject—that reſpecting the means to be uſed for encouraging induſtry—to ſome future opportunity, I ſhall now endeavour to ſhow, in a few words, how, under the moſt unfavourable circumſtances, an arrangement for putting an end to mendicity, and introducing a ſpirit of induſtry among the poor, might be introduced and carried into execution.

If I am obliged to take a great circuit, in order to arrive at my object, it muſt be remembered, that where a vaſt weight is to be raiſed by human means, a variety of machinery muſt neceſſarily be provided; and that it is only by bringing all the different powers employed to act together to the ſame end, that the purpoſe in view can be attained. It will likewiſe be remembered, that as no mechanical power can be made to act without a force be applied to it ſufficient to overcome the reſiſtance, not only of the *vis inertia*, but alſo of friction, ſo no moral agent can be brought to act to any given end without ſufficient motives; that is to ſay, without ſuch motives as *the perſon who is to act* may deem ſufficient, not only to decide his opinion, but alſo to *overcome his indolence*.

The

The object propoſed,—the relief of the poor, and the providing for their future comfort and happineſs, by introducing among them a ſpirit of order and induſtry, is ſuch as cannot fail to meet with the approbation of every well-diſpoſed perſon.—But I will ſuppoſe, that a bare conviction of the *utility* of the meaſure is not ſufficient alone to overcome the indolence of the public, and induce them to engage *actively* in the undertaking; —yet as people are at all times, and in all ſituations, ready enough to do what they *feel* to be their intereſt, if, in bringing forward a ſcheme of public utility, the proper means be uſed to render it ſo intereſting as to awaken the *curioſity*, and fix the attention, of the public, no doubts can be entertained of the poſſibility of carrying it into effect.

In arranging ſuch a plan, and laying it before the public, no ſmall degree of knowledge of mankind, and particularly of the various means of acting on them, which are peculiarly adapted to the different ſtages of civilization, or rather of the political refinement and corruption of ſociety, would, in moſt caſes, be indiſpenſably neceſſary; but with that knowledge, and a good ſhare of zeal, addreſs, prudence, and perſeverance, there are few ſchemes, in which an honeſt man would wiſh

to

to be concerned, that might not be carried into execution in any country.

In ſuch a city as *London*, where there is great wealth; —public ſpirit;—enterprize;—and zeal for improvement; little more, I flatter myſelf, would be neceſſary to engage all ranks to unite in carrying into effect ſuch a ſcheme, than to ſhow its public utility; and, above all, to prove that there *is no job* at the bottom of it.

It would, however, be adviſable, in ſubmitting to the Public, Propoſals for forming ſuch an Eſtabliſhment, to ſhow that thoſe who are invited to aſſiſt in carrying it into execution, would not only derive from it much pleaſure and ſatisfaction, but alſo many real advantages; for too much pains can never be taken to intereſt the public individually, and directly, in the ſucceſs of meaſures tending to promote the general good of ſociety.

In the forty-third year of the reign of Queen ELIZABETH, an act was paſſed, requiring the churchwardens and overſeers of every pariſh, under the direction of the magiſtrates, to provide materials and implements, for the purpoſe of ſetting the poor to work; and to compel ſuch perſons to work, as ſhould not be thought able to maintain themſelves and families. She limited the

number

numbers of the poor, and prevented their increaſe, by not ſuffering cottages to be erected, unleſs they were endowed each with four acres of land; and at the ſame time forbidding inmates. The ſuperior wiſdom of theſe laws will appear from hence, that for ninety years there were no complaints to occaſion any alteration in them. This act may be conſidered as the ground-work of all the ſubſequent plans for the relief and employment of the poor, very little having been done for that purpoſe before this time. If it has not been *generally* attended with the good effects which might have been expected from it; the want of ſucceſs is not ſo much to be attributed to the deficiences of the act itſelf, as to a total relaxation of diſcipline, and to other cauſes, which it would be invidious to mention.

Mr. LOCKE, in a memorial drawn up by him and delivered by the Board of Trade, of which he was a member, to the lords juſtices of the kingdom, inculcates this wiſe plan of conduct; *That Working Schools ſhould be ſet up in every pariſh, to which the children of all ſuch as demand relief of the pariſh above three, and under fourteen years of age, ſhould be obliged to come.* To this excellent plan was added a power to admit into the ſame room *grown perſons* out of employ, and

and a recommendation
bourers not chargeable,
pariſh, where they reſid
for the advantage of beir
duſtry *.

This method is produ

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" II. It provides an
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" III. It produces a
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* Wherever any attempt has be
failed of producing ſome good effe
manufactures, wherein the poor ar
yet if the poor are kept from idlen
induſtrious way of living, the goo
to the public, will fully compenſ

and uninfluenced by that emulation, which naturally ariſes among numbers engaged together in the ſame employment.

" IV. It greatly improves the *quality* of the work, by ſubjecting it to the conſtant inſpection of the maſter or miſtreſs.

" V. It occaſions a very conſiderable ſaving of the fuel and light, which muſt be wanted for enabling the ſpinners, &c. to obtain in winter, any ſuch wages as ſhall afford them a comfortable maintenance.

" VI. It obviates every complaint that can ariſe from want of employment, by opening an aſylum, where the unemployed may always exerciſe ſome trade.

" We will therefore preſume to hope that the plan of the *Society of Induſtry*, if ſeriouſly adopted and ſteadily perſevered in as it is kindly and earneſtly recommended, will probably change the face of things in this country, that every intereſt both of this world and the next will be advanced by it, that every pariſh will be paid tenfold what may be laid out in ſo good a work, by a reduction of its rates; but however *this* be, that every inhabitant who can feel and think, were he to be put to the *expence* of twice as much as in fact he may *gain* by

this reform, ought even
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If their better relief
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expence (which there
ſhould be ſomewhat inc
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in ſeeing them made mo

rience of the good effects which have attended this ſyſtem in the counties of *Lincoln* and *Rutland*, we are juſtified in expecting that it *will leſſen the public burden occaſioned by the maintenance of the poor*.—In proof of the reaſonableneſs of this aſſertion, we mention the following important fact.—" Upon taking a general view of the tables publiſhed by the ſociety of induſtry in *Lincolnſhire*, it appears that 135 children between eleven and twelve years of age, in *ten months*, taken in the depth of five ſucceſſive winters, earned the ſum of 680 *l.* 3 *s.* 3 *d.* or HALF A CROWN A WEEK EACH; excluſive of all their work during the other ten months of each of thoſe years."

To what has been already advanced, we will only add the following obſervation of Mr. LOCKE, in the report of the board of trade above alluded to.—" Every one muſt have meat, drink, cloathing, and firing; ſo much goes out of the ſtock of the kingdom, whether they work or no.—Suppoſing, then, there be *a hundred thouſand* poor in *England* that live upon the pariſh; that is, who are maintained by other people's labour, (for ſo is every one who lives upon alms without working;) if care were taken that every one of thoſe, by ſome labour in the woollen or other manufacture, ſhould earn but a

PENNY a day, (which c
well do, and more) this
DRED AND THIRTY TH
which in *eight years* woul
LION of POUNDS richer."

The juſtices of the p
in *Lincolnſhire*, deſerve al
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came to reſolutions, wh
ſtanding.—They declare
moſt ſubſtantial reaſons,
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bour.—They well obſerv
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gence, or ill-will, to ſpo
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or from being occupied i
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which had prevailed, th
idleneſs is no leſs entitl
evitable misfortunes hav
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tion, good ſpinning, and
the poor ſufficient room

employment.—In conformity with theſe principles, they ordered, that no one ſhould have any relief till he had done ſuch work as he was capable of; that materials and convenient places ſhould be provided for ſetting the poor to work; and that all children ſhould be taught to knit before they were ſix years old, and to ſpin before they were nine.—In aid of theſe judicious orders, ſchools were opened, and premiums were given from the poor rates.

THOMAS FIRMIN, a friend of Archbiſhop TILLOTSON, had long ſince delivered the ſame opinions, which we here find adopted by theſe reſpectable gentlemen in *Lincolnſhire*.—This truly benevolent and uſeful citizen gave out raw materials to the induſtrious poor; and he well remarked, that one ſhilling earnt by labour went further than two by way of gift.

FROM THESE PRINCIPLES WE MUST NOT ONLY CONDEMN THE WHOLE SYSTEM OF OUR PRESENT POOR'S LAW, BUT EVERY SYSTEM WHICH STANDS IN NEED OF WORKHOUSES.—WE MUST COMMEND SCHOOLS OF INDUSTRY, PAROCHIAL WORKSHOPS, AND MAGAZINES OF RAW MATERIALS; AND WE MUST GIVE ENCOURAGEMENT, UNDER PROPER REGULATIONS, TO FRIENDLY SOCIETIES AMONG THE

LABOURING POOR.—BUT, ABOVE ALL, WE MUST STRENUOUSLY CONTEND, THAT WHATEVER AID IS GIVEN BY THE PUBLIC, SHOULD BE DISPENSED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO CALL FORTH THE MOST STRENUOUS EFFORTS OF THE PARTY WHO IS TO BE RELIEVED, WITH GRATITUDE TO HIS BENEFACTORS, AND DUE SUBORDINATION TO HIS EMPLOYERS.

SECT.

SECT. XXXII.

SIR BENJAMIN THOMSON'S * ACCOUNT OF THE ESTABLISHMENT AT MUNICH.

But in order to clear the country of beggars (the number of whom in Bavaria had become quite intolerable) it was neceſſary to adopt general and efficacious meaſures for maintaining and ſupporting the poor. Laws were not wanting to oblige each community in the country to provide for its own poor; but theſe laws had been ſo long neglected, and beggary had become ſo general, that extraordinary meaſures, and the moſt indefatigable exertions, were neceſſary to put a ſtop to this evil.—The number of itinerant beggars, of both ſexes, and all ages, as well foreigners as natives, who ſtrolled about the country in all directions, levying contributions from the induſtrious inhabitants, ſtealing and robbing, and leading a life of indolence, and

* This patriot philoſopher has been created Count de Rumford by the reigning Duke of Bavaria.

the

contributions for the ſupport of idleneſs and d
chery!

That total inſenſibility to ſhame, and all thoſe
qualifications which are neceſſary in the profeſſio
beggar, are likewiſe eſſential to form an accomp
thief; and both theſe profeſſions derive very co
able advantages from their union. A beggar wh
about from houſe to houſe to aſk for alms, has
opportunities to ſteal, which another would n
eaſily find; and his profeſſion as a beggar gives
great facility in diſpoſing of what he ſteals; for h
always ſay it was given him in charity. No w
then that thieving and robbing ſhould be pre
where beggars are numerous.

That this was the caſe in Bavaria will not be d
by thoſe who are informed that in the four years
diately ſucceeding the introduction of the m
adopted for putting an end to mendicity, and c
the country of beggars, thieves, robbers, &c. ab
thouſand of theſe vagabonds, foreigners and native
actually arreſted and delivered over to the civil
trates; and that in taking up the beggars in M
and providing for thoſe who ſtood in need of
aſſiſtance, no leſs than 2600 were entered up

lists; though the whole number of the inhabitants of the city of Munich probably does not amount to more than 60,000, even including the ſuburbs.

But before I proceed to give a more particular account of the funds of this inſtitution, and of the application of them, it will be neceſſary to mention the preparations which were made for furniſhing employment to the poor, and the means which were uſed for reclaiming them from their vicious habits, and rendering them induſtrious and uſeful ſubjects. And this was certainly the moſt difficult, as well as the moſt curious and intereſting part of the undertaking. To truſt raw materials in the hands of common beggars, certainly required great caution and management;—but to produce ſo total and radical a change in the morals, manners, and cuſtoms of this debauched and abandoned race, as was neceſſary to render them orderly and uſeful members of ſociety, will naturally be conſidered as an arduous, if not impoſſible, enterpriſe. In this I ſucceeded;—for the proof of this fact I appeal to the flouriſhing ſtate of the different manufactories in which theſe poor people are now employed,—to their orderly and peaceable demeanour—to their cheerfulneſs—to their induſtry,—to the deſire to excel, which manifeſts itſelf

among them upon all occaſions,—and to the very air o
their countenances. Strangers, who go to ſee this in-
ſtitution, (and there are very few who paſs throug
Munich who do not take that trouble,) cannot ſuffi
ciently expreſs their ſurpriſe at the air of happineſs an
contentment which reigns through every part of th
extenſive eſtabliſhment, and can hardly be perſuade
that among thoſe they ſee ſo cheerfully engaged i
that intereſting ſcene of induſtry, by far the great
part were, five years ago, the moſt miſerable an
moſt worthleſs of beings,—common beggars in th
ſtreets.

An account of the means employed in bringing abou
this change, cannot fail to be intereſting to every beni
volent mind; and this is what has encouraged me t
lay theſe details before the public.

By far the greater number of the poor people to b
taken care of were not only common beggars, but ha
been bred up from their very infancy in that profeſſion
and were ſo attached to their indolent and diſſolute wa
of living, as to prefer it to all other ſituations. Thi
were not only unacquainted with all kinds of work, bu
had the moſt inſuperable averſion to honeſt labour; an
had been ſo long familiarized with every crime, th
th

they had become perfectly callous to all ſenſe of ſhame and remorſe.

With perſons of this deſcription, it is eaſy to be conceived that precepts;—admonitions;—and puniſhments, would be of little or no avail. But where precepts fail, *habit* may ſometimes be ſucceſsful.

To make vicious and abandoned people happy, it has generally been ſuppoſed neceſſary, *firſt*, to make them virtuous. But why not reverſe this order? Why not make them firſt *happy*, and then virtuous? If happineſs and virtue be *inſeparable*, the end will be as certainly obtained by the one method as by the other; and it is moſt undoubtedly much eaſier to contribute to the happineſs and comfort of perſons in a ſtate of poverty and miſery, than, by admonitions and puniſhments, to reform their morals.

Deeply ſtruck with the importance of this truth, all my meaſures were taken accordingly. Every thing was done that could be deviſed to make the poor people I had to deal with comfortable and happy in their new ſituation; and my hopes, that a habit of enjoying the real comforts and conveniences which were provided for them, would in time, ſoften their hearts;—open their eyes;—and render them grateful and docile, were not diſappointed.

The

The pleaſure I have had in the ſucceſs of this experiment is much eaſier to be conceived than deſcribed. Would to God that my ſucceſs might encourage others to follow my example! If it were generally known how little trouble, and how little expence, are required to do much good, the heart-felt ſatisfaction which ariſes from relieving the wants, and promoting the happineſs of our fellow-creatures, is ſo great, that I am perſuaded, acts of the moſt eſſential charity would be much more frequent, and the maſs of miſery among mankind would conſequently be much leſſened.

Moſt of them had been uſed to live in the moſt miſerable hovels, in the midſt of vermin, and every kind of filthineſs; or to ſleep in the ſtreets, and under the hedges, half naked, and expoſed to all the inclemencies of the ſeaſons. A large and commodious building, fitted up in the neateſt and moſt comfortable manner, was now provided for their reception. In this agreeable retreat they found ſpacious and noble apartments, kept with the moſt ſcrupulous neatneſs, well warmed in winter, and well lighted; a good warm dinner every day, *gratis*, cooked and ſerved up with all poſſible attention to order and cleanlineſs;—materials and utenſils for thoſe who were able to work;—maſters,

gratis,

gratis, for thoſe who required inſtruction;—the moſt generous pay, *in money*, for all the labour performed; and the kindeſt uſage from every perſon, from the higheſt to the loweſt, belonging to the eſtabliſhment. Here, in this aſylum for the indigent and unfortunate, no ill uſage;—no harſh language, is permitted. During five years that the eſtabliſhment has exiſted, not a blow has been given to any one; not even to a child by his inſtructor.

As the rules and regulations for the preſervation of order are few, and eaſy to be obſerved, the inſtances of their being tranſgreſſed are rare; and as all the labour performed, is paid by the piece, and not by the day; and is well paid; and as thoſe who gain the moſt by their work in the courſe of the week, receive proportional rewards on the Saturday evening; theſe are moſt effectual encouragements to induſtry.

It is eaſy to conceive that ſo great a number of unfortunate beings, of all ages and ſexes, taken as it were out of their very element, and placed in a ſituation ſo perfectly new to them, could not fail to be productive of very intereſting ſituations. Would to God I were able to do juſtice to this ſubject! but no language can deſcribe the affecting ſcenes to which I was a witneſs upon this occaſion.

The

The exquiſite delight which a ſenſible mind muſt feel, upon ſeeing many hundreds of wretched beings awaking from a ſtate of miſery and inactivity, as from a dream; and applying themſelves with cheerfulneſs to the employments of uſeful induſtry;—upon ſeeing the firſt dawn of placid content break upon a countenance covered with habitual gloom, and furrowed and diſtorted by miſery;—this is eaſier to be conceived than deſcribed.

During the firſt three or four days that theſe poor people were aſſembled, it was not poſſible entirely to prevent confuſion: there was nothing like mutinous reſiſtance among them; but their ſituation was ſo new to them, and they were ſo very awkward in it, that it was difficult to bring them into any tolerable order. At length, however, by diſtributing them in the different halls, and aſſigning to each his particular place, (the places being all diſtinguiſhed by numbers,) they were brought into ſuch order as to enable the inſpectors, and inſtructors, to begin their operations.

Thoſe who underſtood any kind of work, were placed in the apartments where the work they underſtood was carried on; and the others, being claſſed according to their ſexes, and as much as poſſible according to their ages,

ages, were placed under the immediate care of the different inſtructors.—By much the larger number were put to ſpinning of hemp;—others, and particularly the young children from four to ſeven years of age, were taught to knit, and to ſew; and the moſt awkward among the men, and particularly the old, the lame, and the infirm, were put to carding of wool.—Old women, whoſe ſight was too weak to ſpin, or whoſe hands trembled with palſy, were made to ſpool yarn for the weavers; and young children, who were too weak to labour, were placed upon ſeats erected for that purpoſe round the rooms where other children worked.

The awkwardneſs of theſe poor creatures, when they were firſt taken from the ſtreets as beggars, and put to work, may eaſily be conceived; but the facility with which they acquired addreſs in the various manufactures in which they were employed, was very remarkable, and much exceeded my expectation. But what was quite ſurpriſing, and at the ſame time intereſting in the higheſt degree, was the apparent and rapid change which was produced in their manners,—in their general behaviour,—and even in the very air of their countenances, upon being a little accuſtomed to their new ſituations.—The kind uſage they met with, and the comforts

they enjoyed, ſeemed to have ſoftened their hearts, and awakened in them ſentiments as new and ſurpriſing to themſelves, as they were intereſting to thoſe about them.

The melancholy gloom of miſery, and air of uneaſineſs and embarraſſment, diſappeared by little and little from their countenances, and were ſucceeded by a timid dawn of cheerfulneſs, rendered moſt exquiſitely intereſting by a certain mixture of ſilent gratitude, which no language can deſcribe.

In the infancy of this eſtabliſhment, when theſe poor creatures were firſt brought together, I uſed very frequently to viſit them,—to ſpeak kindly to them,—and to encourage them;—and I ſeldom paſſed through the halls where they were at work, without being a witneſs to the moſt moving ſcenes.

Objects, formerly the moſt miſerable and wretched, whom I had ſeen for years as beggars in the ſtreets;—young women,—perhaps the unhappy victims of ſeduction, who, having loſt their reputation, and being turned adrift in the world, without a friend and without a home, were reduced to the neceſſity of begging, to ſuſtain a miſerable exiſtence, now recognized me as their benefactor; and, with tears dropping faſt from their

cheeks, continued their work in the moſt expreſſive ſilence.

If they were aſked, what the matter was with them? their anſwer was, ("nichts") "nothing;" accompanied by a look of affectionate regard and gratitude, ſo exquiſitely touching as frequently to draw tears from the moſt inſenſible of the byſtanders.

It was not poſſible to be miſtaken with reſpect to the real ſtate of the minds of theſe poor people; every thing about them ſhowed that they were deeply affected with the kindneſs ſhewn them;—and that their hearts were really ſoftened, appeared, not only from their unaffected expreſſions of gratitude, but alſo from the effuſions of their affectionate regard for thoſe who were dear to them.—In ſhort, never did I witneſs ſuch affecting ſcenes as paſſed between ſome of theſe poor people and their children.

It was mentioned above that the children were ſeparated from the grown perſons.—This was the caſe at firſt; but as ſoon as order was thoroughly eſtabliſhed in every part of the houſe, and the poor people had acquired a certain degree of addreſs in their work, and evidently took pleaſure in it, as many of thoſe who had children expreſſed an earneſt deſire to have them near

them, permiſſion was granted for that purpoſe; and t
ſpinning halls, by degrees, were filled with the moſt i
tereſting little groups of induſtrious families, who v
with each other in diligence and addreſs; and who c
played a ſcene, at once the moſt buſy, and the m
cheerful, that can be imagined.

An induſtrious family is ever a pleaſing object; t
there was ſomething peculiarly intereſting and affect
in the groups of thoſe poor people.—Whether it w
that thoſe who ſaw them compared their preſent ſitu
tion with the ſtate of miſery and wretchedneſs fr
which they had been taken;—or whether it was t
joy and exultation which were expreſſed in the co
tenances of the poor parents in contemplating their c
dren all buſily employed about them;—or the air
ſelf-ſatisfaction which theſe little urchins put on, at
conſciouſneſs of their own dexterity, while they purſ
their work with redoubled diligence upon being obſer
that rendered the ſcene ſo ſingularly intereſting,
know not; but certain it is, that few ſtrangers v
viſited the eſtabliſhment, came out of theſe halls wi
out being much affected.

Many humane and well-diſpoſed perſons are of
withheld from giving alms, on account of the bad c

ra

racter of beggars in general; but this circumſtance, though it ought undoubtedly to be taken into conſideration in determining the mode of adminiſtering our charitable aſſiſtance, ſhould certainly not prevent our intereſting ourſelves in the fate of theſe unhappy beings. On the contrary, it ought to be an additional incitement to us to relieve them;—for nothing is more certain, than that their crimes are very often the *effects*, not the *cauſes* of their miſery; and when this is the caſe, by removing the cauſe, the effects will ceaſe.

Nothing is more extraordinary and unaccountable, than the inconſiſtency of mankind in every thing; even in the practice of that divine virtue benevolence; and moſt of our miſtakes ariſe more from indolence and from inattention, than from any thing elſe. The buſy part of mankind are too intent upon their own private purſuits; and thoſe who have leiſure, are too averſe to giving themſelves the leaſt trouble, to inveſtigate a ſubject but too generally conſidered as tireſome and unintereſting. But if it be true, that we are really happy only in proportion as we ought to be ſo;—that is, in proportion as we are inſtrumental in promoting the happineſs of others; no ſtudy ſurely can be ſo intereſting, as that which

which teaches us how moſt effectually to contribute to the well being of our fellow creatures.

If *love* be blind, *ſelf-love* is certainly very ſhort ſighted; and without the aſſiſtance of reaſon and reflection, is but a bad guide in the purſuit of happineſs.

Thoſe who take pleaſure in depreciating all the ſocial virtues have repreſented pity as a mere ſelfiſh paſſion; and there are ſome circumſtances which appear to juſtify this opinion.—It is certain that the misfortunes of others affect us, not in proportion to their greatneſs, but in proportion to their nearneſs to ourſelves; or to the chances that they may reach us in our turns. A rich man is infinitely more affected at the misfortune of his neighbour, who, by the failure of a banker with whom he had truſted the greater part of his fortune,—by an unlucky run at play,—or by other loſſes, is reduced from a ſtate of affluence, to the neceſſity of laying down his carriage;—leaving the town;—and retiring into the country upon a few hundreds a-year;—than by the total ruin of the induſtrious tradeſman over the way, who is dragged to priſon, and his numerous family of young and helpleſs children left to ſtarve.

But however ſelfiſh pity may be, *benevolence* certainly ſprings from a more noble origin. It is a good-natured,

—generous

—generous ſentiment, which does not require being put to the torture in order to be ſtimulated to action.—And it is this ſentiment, not pity, or compaſſion, which I would wiſh to excite.

Pity is always attended with pain; and if our ſufferings at being witneſſes of the diſtreſſes of others, ſometimes force us to relieve them, we can neither have much merit, nor any laſting ſatisfaction, from ſuch involuntary acts of charity; but the enjoyments which reſult from acts of genuine benevolence are as laſting as they are exquiſitely delightful; and the more they are analyzed and contemplated, the more they contribute to that inward peace of mind and ſelf-approbation, which alone conſtitute real happineſs.—This is the "ſoul's calm ſun-ſhine, and the heart-felt joy," which is virtue's prize.

To induce mankind to engage in any enterpriſe, it is neceſſary, firſt, to ſhow that ſucceſs will be attended with real advantage; and ſecondly, that it may be obtained without much difficulty.—The rewards attendant upon acts of benevolence have ſo often been deſcribed and celebrated, in every country and in every language, that it would be preſumption in me to ſuppoſe I could add any thing new upon a ſubject already diſcuſſed by

the

the greateſt maſters of rhetoric, and embelliſhed with all the irreſiſtible charms of eloquence; but as *examples of ſucceſs* are ſometimes more efficacious in ſtimulating mankind to action, than the moſt ſplendid reaſonings and admonitions, it is upon *my ſucceſs* in the enterpriſe of which I have undertaken to give an account, that my hopes of engaging others to follow ſuch an example are chiefly founded; and hence it is, that I ſo often return to that part of my ſubject, and inſiſt with ſo much perſeverance upon the pleaſure which this ſucceſs afforded me. I am aware that I expoſe myſelf to being ſuſpected of oſtentation, particularly by thoſe who are not able to enter fully into my ſituation and feelings; but neither this, nor any other conſideration, ſhall prevent me from treating the ſubject in ſuch a manner as may appear beſt adapted to render my labours of public utility.

Why ſhould I not mention even the marks of affectionate regard and reſpect which I received from the poor people for whoſe happineſs I intereſted myſelf, and the teſtimonies of the public eſteem with which I was honoured?—Will it be reckoned vanity, if I mention the concern which the poor of Munich expreſſed in ſo affecting a manner when I was dangerouſly ill?—that

they

they went publicly in a body in proceſſion to the cathedral church, where they had divine ſervice performed, and put up public prayers for my recovery?—that four years afterwards, on hearing that I was again dangerouſly ill at Naples, they, of their own accord, ſet apart an hour each evening, after they had finiſhed their work in the Military Workhouſe, to pray for me?

Will it be thought improper to mention the affecting reception I met with from them, at my firſt viſit to the Military Workhouſe upon my return to Munich laſt ſummer, after an abſence of fifteen months; a ſcene which drew tears from all who were preſent?—and muſt I refuſe myſelf the ſatisfaction of deſcribing the fête I gave them in return, in the Engliſh Garden, at which 1800 poor people of all ages, and above 30,000 of the inhabitants of Munich aſſiſted? and all this pleaſure I muſt forego, merely that I may not be thought vain and oſtentatious?—Be it ſo then;—but I would juſt beg leave to call the reader's attention to my feelings upon the occaſion; and then let him aſk himſelf, if any earthly reward can poſſibly be ſuppoſed greater;—any enjoyments more complete, than thoſe I received. Let him figure to himſelf, if he can, my ſituation, ſick in bed, worn out by intenſe application, and

dying, as every body thoug
which I had devoted myſ
my feelings, upon hearin
prayers of a multitude of p
the ſtreets, upon being t
Munich, many hundreds i
proceſſion to the church
me:—public prayers for m
ſtranger!—a proteſtant!—
ſtance of the kind that eve
ture to affirm that no proo
this, that the meaſures a
people HAPPY by being
SUCCESSFUL;—and let it
FACT IS WHAT I AM
APPEAR IN THE CLEAR
TORY MANNER *.

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SECT. XXXIII.

ON QUACK MEDICINES.

Quid non mortalia pectora cogis, auri ſacra fames!

EVERY phyſician, even of the moſt moderate practice, muſt have been often witneſs of the deſtruction occaſioned by thoſe peſts of ſociety, who have obtained patents for pretended diſcoveries, and uſe every art to delude the ſick and helpleſs man; protected, I ſhould be ſorry to ſay, encouraged, by government, and enabled to make as pompous a diſplay of his MAJESTY'S ARMS, as if they had either been generals or admirals, and had achieved ſome great exploit.

What reaſon, ſays the Rev. Mr. TOWNSEND, in his excellent claſſification of diſeaſe, can we aſſign then for the aſtoniſhing, and ſtill increaſing, demand for *quack medicines* and *quack books?*—Whence is it, that *quack medicines* and *quack books* are to be found, not merely among the lower claſſes of ſociety, but in reſpectable families, and almoſt in every houſe?—Is it, that they

have a higher opinion of ſuch medicines and of ſuch books, than of the judgment, the ſkill, the extenſive experience, of men devoted to the ſcience; of men, who have been regularly taught, and who are in the daily habit of diſtinguiſhing diſeaſes?—No, certainly it is not.—But I leave this important queſtion, ſays he, to be anſwered by writers on *political œconomy*, and in the mean time anxiouſly caution the unwary of being miſled by thoſe who have obtained LETTERS PATENT.

In vain are colleges endowed, and called *royal* foundations, if this growing evil is not checked.

BACON has too well obſerved, that the length of diſeaſes, the ſweets of life, the illuſive flattery of hope, and the recommendations of the patient's officious friends, are ſufficient reaſons for the vileſt and moſt ignorant quacks being often preferred to the beſt phyſicians.—An ignorant fellow always gives more hopes than a man of learning.

FRIEND, who at a very early time of life acquired the reputation of a great phyſician and a fine writer, adopted the ſame reaſoning and met with the moſt unjuſt fate.—The reader will ſee what is ſaid on this ſubject, by this phyſician (who was ſo deſpiſed by *empirics* and the *vulgar*, and ſo much cheriſhed by all reſpectable

ſpectable people) in his letter to his friend MEAD.—
"The eſteem," ſays he, "in which ignorance is held,
"is the reaſon why men of true genius, who might
"have diſtinguiſhed themſelves in phyſic, have ſought
"for reputation, by attaching themſelves to other
"ſciences; and in theſe they have often excelled thoſe
"who ſeemed to be particularly deſtined by nature to
"this cultivation.—In good truth, they who look up
"only at glory and reputation, have ſurely good reaſon
"for abandoning an art, in which the prejudices of the
"vulgar give as much to mediocrity as to the rareſt
"and moſt accompliſhed merit, and the practice of
"which is diſtinguiſhed by the public, only in propor-
"tion to the *boaſtings* of the practitioner."

The *quack* has a conſiderable advantage over the regular practitioners.—If any one of his promiſes become realized, he is applauded to the ſkies; and if the patient finds himſelf deceived, he is obliged in honour to be ſilent, that he may not expoſe himſelf to blame, for having confided himſelf to a *wretch*, who gains much by deceit, as the number of ſimple people is always the greateſt.—Beſides, this daring man riſks no loſs of reputation; becauſe, as it exiſts only amongſt ignorant people, the blame will always incline towards thoſe who

have

have liſtened to him.—Men are ſo fond of the marvellous, that the *quack* has, above all others, the power of making the vulgar reliſh novelty.—The more abſurd his promiſes are, the more he is attended to.—He applies a popular name to a medicine he has juſt gathered at the entrance of the village, and then giving the detail of his miracles, this medicine is adopted as the cure of every infirmity.

BUT IS IT NOT STRANGE, THAT THE STATE SHOULD SUFFER THIS DESTRUCTIVE BREED; FOR SURELY THE PEOPLE, BLIND AND IGNORANT AS THEY ARE, OUGHT NOT TO BE ABANDONED TO THE PREY OF THESE IMPUDENT AND DANGEROUS MEN.—IF SOCIETY CLAIMS A RIGHT TO OPPOSE THE DESIGNS OF ANY INDIVIDUAL, WHO WISHES TO RENDER ANOTHER UNHAPPY, WHY SHOULD NOT SHE PRESERVE THE SAME PRIVILEGE, WHEN THE SAFETY OF A GREATER NUMBER OF HER MEMBERS BECOMES CONCERNED?—IF SOCIETY HAS SUCH A RIGHT, SHE IS SURELY BLAMEABLE FOR NOT EXERCISING IT.—THE SOVEREIGN WILL ALWAYS BE DISPOSED TO INCLINE A FAVOURABLE EAR TO REPRESENTATIONS WHICH MAY BE MADE TO HIM ON THIS SUBJECT.—THE COLLEGES OF

PHYSIC

PHYSIC OUGHT TO UNITE IN THE REFORMATION OF THESE ABUSES, BY REPRESENTING THEM TO THE LEGISLATURES.

The life of a negro ſlave is valued at an hundred pounds, and if we calculate the deaths occaſioned by quack medicines, there is no difficulty to calculate the vaſt loſs to the community by theſe *legal murderers* * ;—I ſhould give them too fair a title to call them only *purſe-takers*.

THIS IMMENSE EVIL OUGHT THEN IMMEDIATELY TO BE CHECKED BY A PATERNAL LEGISLATURE, AND REWARDS GIVEN FOR ANY NOBLE DISCOVERIES IN MEDICINE; JUST AS AN ADEQUATE RECOMPENCE FROM PARLIAMENT WAS FORMERLY BESTOWED UPON MRS. STEVENS FOR HER SOLVENT, AND HAS BEEN GIVEN TO SOME OTHERS, WHERE PROPER APPLICATION HAS BEEN MADE, FOR EMINENT DISCOVERIES.

* The ſmall annual ſum theſe *wretches* pay for their INDULGENCE ſurely can be no compenſation to the loſs ſuſtained by the deſtruction of the lives of ſuch a number of the community.—Beſides it has been before argued that *get money* is no excuſe for *mal-adminiſtration* in any government: even the impudence of quackery can have no anſwer, when the laſt paragraph of this ſection is attentively conſidered.

SECT.

SECT. XXXIV.

ON JUSTICE ADMINISTERED TO THE POOR.

THE *ſtreams of juſtice*, which, like the vital blood, ought to flow through every part, carrying with them comfort and refreſhment, alas! are obſtructed.—The diſeaſe in this country has increaſed to a moſt alarming degree, and has made ſome even doubt, whether a ſtate of nature, where each man redreſſes his own wrong, is not preferable, to the midling claſs, to ſuch a dreadful condition of civilized ſociety.—My blood runs cold in my veins while I think of the expence and delay of law; and that any free-born Briton ſhould be ſituated, like hungry TANTALUS, with the food he longs for above his head, but unable to reach it*.—According to the prevailing

* The author of this work is convinced, that the preſent virtuous legiſlators of this country will ſoon remedy this evil: for never was there an age where the middling and lower claſſes were more conſidered, and wiſer meaſures adopted.—The preſent evils complained of have grown out of time, and to find fault with them in any other way than to have them rectified, is like quarrelling with the ſun for a few ſpots, or wiſhing to pull down St. Paul's, becauſe a few cobwebs are attached to its windows.—The ſame may be ſaid of every other ſection in this work; the ſuperſtructure of our government is grand and noble, and the prying architect can only obſerve ſome few defects in the out pillars.

ſyſtem

ſyſtem of things in this country, ſays a learned magiſtrate*, if a perſon owes only 40*s.* an action for it may be brought, which if conteſted or defended, the expence, at the loweſt computation, muſt be upwards of *fifty pounds!* Prudent men, under ſuch circumſtances, will forego a juſt claim upon another, or make up a falſe one upon themſelves, as by far the leaſt of two evils, in all caſes where they come in contact with deſigning and bad people; and hence it is, that the worthleſs part of mankind, availing themſelves in civil, as others do in criminal caſes, of the imperfections of the law, forge theſe defects into a rod of oppreſſion, either to defraud the honeſt part of the community of a juſt right, or to create fraudulent demands, where no right attaches; merely becauſe thoſe miſcreants know that an *action at law*, even for 40*s.* cannot either be proſecuted or defended, without ſinking three times the amount in law expences, beſides the loſs of time, which is ſtill more valuable to men in buſineſs.

To convince the reader that this obſervation is not hazarded on weak grounds, and that the evil is ſo great as to cry aloud for a remedy, it is only neceſſary to ſtate,

* Colquhoun.

that in the County of Middleſex alone, in the year 1793, the number of bailable writs and executions, for debts from ten to twenty pounds, amounted to no leſs than 5719!

It will ſcarcely be credited, ſays Colquhoun, although it is moſt unqueſtionably true, that the mere coſts of theſe actions, although made up, and not defended at all, amount to 68,728*l.*—And if defended, the aggregate expence to recover 81,791*l.* muſt be—*(ſtrange and incredible as it may appear)* no leſs than 285,950*l.*! being conſiderably more than three times the amount of the debts ſued for!

THE MIND IS LOST IN ASTONISHMENT AT THE CONTEMPLATION OF A CIRCUMSTANCE, MARKING, IN SO STRONG A DEGREE, THE DEFICIENCY OF THIS IMPORTANT BRANCH OF THE JURISPRUDENCE OF OUR COUNTRY.

SECT. XXXV.

OF SLAVERY.

THE property which ſome men have acquired over others in Guinea, is of very high antiquity.—It is generally eſtabliſhed there, excepting in ſome ſmall diſtricts, where liberty hath, as it were, retired and is ſtill maintained. No proprietor, however, has a right to ſell a man who is born in a ſtate of ſervitude. He can only diſpoſe of thoſe ſlaves whom he gets, whether by *war*, in which every priſoner is a ſlave unleſs exchanged, or *in lieu of compenſation for ſome injury*; or if he hath received them as a *teſtimony of acknowledgment*. This law, which ſeems to be made in favour of one who is born a ſlave, to indulge him with the enjoyment of his family and of his country, is yet ineffectual, ſince the Europeans have eſtabliſhed luxury on the coaſts of Africa. It is every day eluded by *concerted quarrels*, which two proprietors mutually diſſemble, in order to be reciprocally condemned, each in his turn, to a fine,

which is paid in perſons born ſlaves, the diſpoſal of whom is allowed by the ſanction of the ſame law.

Corruption, contrary to its ordinary progreſs, hath advanced from private perſons to *princes*. The procuring of ſlaves hath given frequent occaſion to *wars*. —INJUSTICE hath known no bounds or reſtraints.— At a great diſtance from the coaſt, there are chiefs, who give orders for every thing they meet with in the villages around them to be carried off.—The children are thrown into ſacks; the men and women are gagged to ſtifle their cries. If the ravagers are ſtopped by a ſuperior force, they are conducted before the prince, who always diſowns the commiſſion he has given, and under pretence of doing juſtice, inſtantly ſells his agents to the ſhips he has treated with.

Notwithſtanding theſe infamous arts, the people of the coaſt have found it impoſſible to ſupply the demands of the merchants. They have experienced what every nation muſt, that can trade only with its nominal ſtock.—Slaves are to the commerce of Europeans in Africa, what gold is in the commerce we carry on in the New world.—The heads of negroes repreſent the ſtock of the ſtate of Guinea.—Every day this

ſtock

ſtock is carried off, and nothing is left them but articles of conſumption.—Their capital gradually va-niſhes, becauſe it cannot be renewed, by reaſon of the ſpeedy conſumptions.

In 1768, there were exported out of Africa, 104,100 ſlaves.—The Engliſh bought up 53,100 of them for their highlands; their coloniſts on the north continent 6,300; the French 23,500; the Dutch 11,300; the Portugueſe 8,700; and the Danes 1,200.—All theſe unhappy men did not arrive at the place of their deſtination.—In the ordinary courſe of things, the eighth part at leaſt muſt have periſhed in their paſſage.

In July 1783, the ſlave-ſhip, in which he was, arrived at Cape *La How*, on the Gold Coaſt of *Africa*. In the ſpace of a week above *one hundred* prime ſlaves, *young*, *ſtout*, and *healthy*, were purchaſed. The competition, however, of the purchaſers at *Annamaboe*, whither this ſhip afterwards ſailed, ran ſo high, that the captain could not obtain more than two thirds of the uſual complement. The ſlaves were confined below ſixteen hours out of twenty-four, and permitted no exerciſe when upon deck. The rooms, where they were ſecured, are from five to ſix feet in height. Theſe rooms

are

are imperfectly aired by gratings above, and ſmall ſcuttles in the ſide of the ſhip, which of courſe can be of little uſe at ſea. The gratings are alſo half covered, when it blows hard, to keep out the ſalt ſpray. The temperature of theſe rooms was often above 96 of Fahrenheit's ſcale. In the evidence, of which this is an abſtract, Dr. TROTTER affirms, he could never breathe there, unleſs under the hatchways. In ſuch circumſtances the ſufferings of theſe poor creatures muſt have been dreadful. *I have often*, ſays Dr. TROTTER, *obſerved the ſlaves drawing their breath with all the laborious and anxious efforts for life, which are obſerved in expiring animals, ſubjected by experiment to foul air, or in the exhauſted receiver of an air-pump. I have often ſeen them, when the tarpawlings have been inadvertently thrown over the gratings, attempting to heave them up, crying out in their own language*, "We are ſuffocated." *Many have I ſeen dead, who the night before have ſhewn no ſigns of the ſmalleſt indiſpoſition; ſome alſo in a dying ſtate, and if not brought up quickly upon the deck, irrecoverably loſt.*

Hence, before the arrival of this veſſel at ANTIGUA, out of 650 ſlaves more than 50 had *died*, and about 300 were tainted with the SEA SCURVY.

Dr. TROTTER declares, in his evidence before a ſe-

lect

laſt committee of the Houſe of Commons, that the natives of theſe parts are *ſometimes* ſlaves from *crimes*, but the greater part of the ſlaves are, *what are called priſoners of war*. Of his whole cargo he recollects only *three criminals*; two ſold for *adultery*, and one for *witchcraft*, whoſe *whole family ſhared his fate*. One of the firſt ſaid he had been decoyed by a woman who had told her huſband, and he was ſentenced to *pay a ſlave*; but being *poor*, was *ſold himſelf*. The laſt ſaid he had had a quarrel with a *cabuſheer* (or great man), who *in revenge* accuſed him of *witchcraft*, and ſold *him* and *his family for ſlaves*.

Dr. TROTTER having often aſked ACCRA, a principal trader at LA HOW, what he meant by *priſoners of war*, found they were ſuch as were carried off by a ſet of *trepanners and kidnappers, who ravage the country for that purpoſe*. The buſh-men making war, *to make trade* (that is, *to make ſlaves)*, was a common way of ſpeaking among the traders. Having aſked, What they did with their ſlaves when the nations, who traded for ſlaves with them, were at war with each other? was anſwered, That when ſhips ceaſed to come, *ſlaves ceaſed to be taken*. The practice was alſo confirmed by the ſlaves on board,

SECT. XXXVI.

THE WRETCHED CONDITION OF SLAVES.

In America it is generally believed and aſſerted, that the Africans are equally incapable of reaſon and of virtue.—The following well-authenticated fact will enable us to judge of this opinion.

An Engliſh ſhip that traded in Guinea in 1752, was obliged to leave the ſurgeon behind, whoſe bad ſtate of health did not permit him to continue at ſea.—Murray, for that was his name, was there endeavouring to recover his health, when a Dutch veſſel drew near the coaſt, put the blacks in irons, whom curioſity had brought to the ſhore, and inſtantly ſailed off with their booty.

Thoſe who intereſted themſelves for theſe unhappy people, incenſed at ſo baſe a treachery, inſtantly ran to Cudjoc, who ſtopped them at his door, and aſked them what they were in ſearch of.—*The white man, who is with you*, replied they, *who ſhould be put to death, be-*

cauſe his brethren have carried off ours.—The Europeans, anſwered the generous hoſt, *who have carried off our countrymen, are barbarians; kill them whenever you can find them.—But he who lodges with me is a good man, he is my friend; my houſe is his fortreſs; I am his ſoldier, and I will defend him.—Before you can get at him, you ſhall paſs over my body.—O my friends, what juſt man would ever enter my doors, if I had ſuffered my habitation to be ſtained with the blood of an innocent man?*—This diſcourſe appeaſed the rage of the blacks: they retired aſhamed of the deſign that had brought them there; and ſome days after acknowledged to MURRAY himſelf, how happy they were that they had not committed a crime, which would have occaſioned them a perpetual remorſe.

This event renders it probable, that the firſt impreſſions which the Africans receive in the New world, determine them either to good or bad actions.—Repeated experience confirms the truth of this obſervation: thoſe who fall to the ſhare of a humane maſter, willingly eſpouſe his intereſts.—They inſenſibly adopt the ſpirit and manners of the place where they are fixed.—This attachment is ſometimes exalted even into heroiſm.—*A Portugueſe ſlave who had fled into the woods, having learnt*

learnt that his old maſter had been taken up for an aſſaſſination, came into the court of juſtice, and acknowledged himſelf guilty of the fact; let himſelf be put into priſon in lieu of his maſter; brought falſe, though judicial, proofs of his pretended crime, and ſuffered death inſtead of the guilty perſon.—Actions of a leſs heroical nature, though not uncommon, have touched the hearts of ſome coloniſts.

But there are barbarians, who conſidering pity as a weakneſs, delight in making their dependents perpetually ſenſible of their *tyranny*.—They juſtly, however, receive their puniſhment in the negligence, infidelity, deſertion, and ſuicide of the deplorable victims of their inſatiable avarice.—Some of theſe unfortunate men, eſpecially thoſe of Mina, courageouſly put an end to their lives, under the firm perſuaſion, that they would immediately after death riſe again in their own country, which they look upon as the fineſt in the world.—A vindictive ſpirit furniſhes others with reſources ſtill more fatal.—Inſtructed from their infancy in the arts of poiſons, which grow, as it were, under their hands, they employ them in the deſtruction of the cattle, the horſes, the mules, the companions of their ſlavery, and of every living thing employed in the cultivation of the lands of their oppreſſors.—In order to remove from themſelves

all ſuſpicion, they firſt exerciſe their cruelties on their wives, their children, their miſtreſſes, and on every thing that is deareſt to them.—In this dreadful project, which can only be the reſult of deſpair, they take the double pleaſure of delivering their ſpecies from a yoke more dreadful than death, and of leaving their tyrant in a wretched ſtate of miſery, that is an image of their own condition.—The fear of puniſhment does not check them.—They are ſcarce ever known to have any kind of foreſight; and they are, moreover, certain of concealing their crimes, being proof againſt tortures.—By means of one of thoſe inexplicable contradictions of the human heart, though common to all people, whether civilized or not, negroes, though naturally cowards, give many inſtances of an unſhaken firmneſs of ſoul.—The ſame organization which ſubjects them to ſervitude, from the indolence of their mind, and the relaxation of their fibres, inſpires them with vigour and unparalleled reſolution for extraordinary actions.—They are cowards all their life-time and heroes only for an inſtant.—One of theſe miſerable men has been known to cut his wriſt off with the ſtroke of a hatchet, rather than purchaſe his liberty, by ſubmitting to the vile office of an executioner.

Nothing,

Nothing, however, is more miſerable than the condition of a black, throughout the whole American Archipelago.—A narrow, unwholeſome hut, without any conveniences, ſerves him for a dwelling.—His bed is a hurdle, fitter to put the body to torture than to afford it any eaſe.—Some earthen pots, and a few wooden diſhes are his furniture.—The coarſe linen which covers part of his body, neither ſecures him from the inſupportable heats of the day, nor the dangerous dews of the night.—The food he is ſupplied with, is caſſava, ſalt beef, cod, fruits and roots, which are ſcarce able to ſupport his miſerable exiſtence.—Deprived of every enjoyment, he is condemned to a perpetual drudgery in a burning climate, conſtantly under the rod of an unfeeling maſter.

The condition of theſe ſlaves, though every where deplorable, is ſomething different in the colonies.—Thoſe who have very extenſive eſtates, generally give them a portion of land, to ſupply them with the neceſſaries of life.—They are allowed to employ a part of the Sunday in cultivating it, and the few moments that on other days they ſpare from the time allotted for their meals.—In the ſmaller iſlands, the coloniſt himſelf furniſhes their food, the greateſt part of which hath been imported

by ſea from other countries.—Ignorance, avarice, or poverty, have introduced into ſome colonies, a method of providing for the ſubſiſtence of negroes, equally deſtructive both to the men and the plantation.—They are allowed on Saturday, or ſome other day, to work in the neighbouring plantations, or to plunder them, in order to procure a maintenance for the reſt of the week.

Beſides theſe differences ariſing from the particular ſituation of the ſettlements in the American iſlands, each European nation hath a manner of treating ſlaves peculiar to itſelf.—The Spaniards make them the companions of their indolence; the Portugueſe, the inſtruments of their debauch; the Dutch, the victims of their avarice; the Engliſh, who eaſily derive their ſubſiſtence from their eſtates on the northern continent, are leſs attentive to the management of them than any other nations.—If they never promote inter-marriages among the blacks, they yet receive with kindneſs, as the gifts of nature, thoſe children that are the produce of leſs reſtrained connexions, and ſeldom exact from the fathers or mothers a toil or a tribute above their ſtrength.—Slaves by them, are conſidered merely as *natural productions*, which ought neither to be *uſed*, nor *deſtroyed without*

without neceſſity; but they never treat them with familiarity: they never ſmile upon them, nor *ſpeak* to them. One would think they were afraid of letting them ſuſpect, that nature could have given any one mark of reſemblance betwixt them and their ſlaves.—This makes them hate the *Engliſh*.—The French, leſs haughty, leſs diſdainful, conſider the Africans as a ſpecies of moral beings; and theſe unhappy men, ſenſible of the honour of ſeeing themſelves almoſt treated like rational creatures, ſeem to forget that their maſter is impatient of making his fortune, that he always exacts labours from them above their ſtrength, and frequently lets them want ſubſiſtence.

SECT.

SECT. XXXVII.

IN WHAT MANNER THE CONDITION OF SLAVES MIGHT BE RENDERED MORE SUPPORTABLE.

If the vice of ſlavery muſt exiſt, the method of ameliorating its condition would be to attend to the natural and moral ſtate of man.—Thoſe who purchaſe blacks on the coaſts of ſavage nations; thoſe who convey them to America, and eſpecially thoſe who direct their labours, often think themſelves obliged, from their ſituation, and frequently too for the ſake of their own ſafety, to *oppreſs* theſe wretched men.—The ſoul of theſe managers of ſlaves, loſt to all ſenſe of compaſſion, is ignorant of every motive to enforce obedience, but thoſe of *fear* or *ſeverity*, and theſe they exerciſe with all the harſhneſs of a temporary authority.—If the proprietors of plantations would ceaſe to regard the care of their ſlaves, as an occupation below them, and conſider it as an office to which it is their duty to attend, they would ſoon diſcard theſe errors that ariſe from a ſpirit of cruelty.—

The

The hiſtory of all mankind would ſhew them, that, in order to render ſlavery uſeful, it is, at leaſt, neceſſary to make it eaſy; that force does not prevent the rebellion of the mind; that it is the maſter's intereſt that the ſlave ſhould be attached to life, and that nothing is to be expected from him the moment that he no longer fears to die.

This principle of enlightened reaſon, derived from the ſentiments of humanity, would contribute to the reformation of *ſeveral abuſes*. Men would acknowledge the neceſſity of lodging, clothing, and giving proper food to beings condemned to the moſt painful bondage that ever has exiſted ſince the infamous origin of ſlavery. They would be ſenſible that it is naturally impoſſible that thoſe who reap no advantage from their own labours, can have the ſame underſtanding, the ſame œconomy, the ſame activity, the ſame ſtrength, as the man who enjoys the produce of his induſtry.—That political moderation would gradually take place, which conſiſts in leſſening of labour, alleviating puniſhment, and rendering to man part of his rights, in order to reap with greater certainty the benefit of thoſe duties that are impoſed upon him.—The preſervation of a great number of ſlaves, whom diſorders occaſioned by

vexation or regret deprive the colonies of, would be the natural conſequence of ſo wiſe a regulation.—Far from aggravating the yoke that oppreſſes them, every kind of attention ſhould be given to make it eaſy, and to diſſipate even the idea of it, by favouring a natural taſte that ſeems peculiar to the negroes.

Their organs are extremely ſenſible of the powers of *muſic*.—Their ear is ſo true, that in their dances, the time of a ſong makes them ſpring up a hundred at once, ſtriking the earth at the ſame inſtant.—Enchanted, as it were, with the voice of a ſinger, or the tone of a ſtringed inſtrument, a vibration of the air is the ſpirit that actuates all the bodies of theſe men: a ſound agitates, tranſports, and throws them into ecſtaſies.—In their common labours, the motion of their arms, or of their feet, is always in cadence.—At all their employments they ſing, and ſeem always as if they were dancing.—Muſic animates their courage, and rouſes them from their indolence. The marks of this extreme ſenſibility to harmony are viſible in all the muſcles of their bodies, which are always naked.—Poets and muſicians by nature, they make the words ſubſervient to the muſic, by a licence they arbitrarily aſſume of lengthening or ſhortening them, in order to accommodate them to an air

air that pleaſes them.—Whenever any object or incident ſtrikes a negro, he inſtantly makes it the ſubject of a ſong.—In all ages this has been the origin of poetry.—Three or four words, which are alternately repeated by the ſinger and the general chorus, ſometimes conſtitute the whole poem.—Five or ſix bars of muſic compoſe the whole length of the ſong.—A circumſtance that appears ſingular, is, that the ſame air, though merely a continual repetition of the ſame tones, takes entire poſſeſſion of them, makes them work or dance for ſeveral hours: neither they, nor even the white men, are diſguſted with that tedious uniformity which theſe repetitions might naturally occaſion.—This particular attachment is owing to the warmth and expreſſion which they introduce into their ſongs.—Their airs are generally double time.—None of them tend to inſpire them with pride.—Thoſe intended to excite tenderneſs, promote rather a kind of languor.—Even thoſe which are moſt lively, carry in them a certain expreſſion of melancholy.—This is the higheſt entertainment to minds of great ſenſibility.

So ſtrong an inclination for muſic might become a powerful motive of action under the direction of ſkilful hands.—Feſtivals, games, and rewards, might on this ac-

count be eſtabliſhed among them.—Theſe amuſements, conducted with judgment, would prevent that ſtupidity ſo common among ſlaves, eaſe their labours, and preſerve them from that conſtant melancholy which conſumes them, and ſhortens their days.

After having provided for the preſervation of the blacks exported from Africa, the welfare of thoſe who are born in the iſlands themſelves would then be conſidered.—The negroes are not averſe from the propagation of their ſpecies even in the chains of ſlavery.—But it is the cruelty of the maſters which hath effectually prevented them from complying with this great end of nature. Such hard labour is required from negro women, both before and after their pregnancy, that their children are either abortive, or live but a ſhort time after delivery.—Mothers, rendered deſperate by the puniſhments which the weakneſs of their condition occaſions them, ſnatch ſometimes their children from the cradle, in order to ſtrangle them in their arms, and ſacrifice them with a fury mingled with a ſpirit of revenge and compaſſion, that they may not become the property of their cruel maſters. This barbarity, the horror of which muſt be wholly imputed to the Europeans, will, perhaps, convince them of their error.

Their

Their ſenſibility will be rouſed, and engage them to pay a greater attention to their true intereſts. They will find that by committing ſuch outrages againſt humanity, they injure themſelves; and if they do not become the benefactors of their ſlaves, they will at leaſt ceaſe to be their executioners.

They will, perhaps, reſolve to ſet free thoſe mothers who ſhall have brought up a conſiderable number of children to the age of ſix years. The allurements of liberty are the moſt powerful that can influence the human heart. The negro woman, animated by the hope of ſo great a bleſſing, to which all would aſpire, and few would be able to obtain, would make neglect and infamy be ſucceeded by a virtuous emulation to bring up children, whoſe number and preſervation would ſecure to them freedom and tranquillity.

After having taken wiſe meaſures not to deprive their plantations of thoſe ſuccours ariſing from the extraordinary fruitfulneſs of the negro women; they will attend to the care of conducting and extending cultivation by means of population, and without foreign expedients. Every thing invites them to eſtabliſh this eaſy and natural ſyſtem.

There are ſome powers, whoſe ſettlements in the

American iſles every day acquire extent, and there are none whoſe manual labour does not continually increaſe. Theſe lands, therefore, conſtantly require a greater number of hands to clear them. Africa, where all Europeans go to recruit the population of the colonies, gradually furniſhes them with fewer men, and ſupplies them at the ſame time with worſe ſlaves and at a higher price.—This ſource for the obtaining ſlaves will be gradually more and more exhauſted.—But were this change in trade as chimerical, as it ſeems to be not far diſtant, it is nevertheleſs certain that a great number of ſlaves, drawn out of a remote region, periſh in their paſſage, or in the New world; and that when they come to America they are ſold at a very advanced price; that there are few of them whoſe natural term of life is not ſhortened; and that the greater part of thoſe who attain a wretched old age, are extremely ignorant, and being accuſtomed from their infancy to idleneſs, are frequently very unfit for the employments to which they are deſtined, and are in a continual ſtate of *deſpondency*, on account of their being ſeparated from their country. If we are not miſtaken in our opinion, cultivators born in the American iſlands themſelves, always breathing their native air, brought up without any other expence than

than what conſiſts in a cheap food, habituated in early life to labour by their own parents, endowed with a ſufficient ſhare of underſtanding, or a ſingular aptitude for all the uſeful arts; ſuch cultivators cannot but be preferable to ſlaves that have been ſold and live in a perpetual exile and reſtraint.

The method of ſubſtituting in the place of *foreign negroes* thoſe of the *colonies themſelves*, is very obvious. It wholly conſiſts in ſuperintending the black children that are born in the iſlands, in confining to their workhouſes that multitude of ſlaves who carry about with them their worthleſſneſs, their licentiouſneſs, and the luxury and inſolence of their maſters, in all the towns and ports of Europe; but, above all, in requiring of navigators who frequent the African coaſts, that they ſhould form their cargo of an equal number of men and women, or even of a majority of women, during ſome years, in order to reduce that diſproportion which obtains betwixt the two ſexes.

This laſt precaution, by putting the pleaſures of love within the reach of all the blacks, would contribute to their eaſe and multiplication. Theſe unhappy men, forgetting the weight of their chains, would with tranſport ſee themſelves live again in their children. The

majority

majority of them are faithful, even to death, to thoſe negro women whom love and ſlavery have aſſigned to them for their companions; they treat them with that compaſſion which the wretched mutually derive from one another even in the rigour of their condition; they comfort them under the load of their employments; they ſympathize, at leaſt, with them, when, through exceſs of labour, or want of food, the mother can only offer her child a breaſt that is dry, or bathed in her tears. The women, on their part, though tied down to no reſtrictions of chaſtity, are fixed in their attachments; provided that the vanity of being beloved by white people does not render them inconſtant. Unhappily this is a temptation to infidelity, to which they have too often opportunities to yield.

Thoſe who have inquired into the cauſes of this taſte for black women, which appears to be ſo depraved in the Europeans, have found it to ariſe from the nature of the climate, which under the torrid zone irreſiſtibly excites men to the pleaſures of love; the facility of gratifying this inſurmountable inclination without reſtraint, and without the trouble of a long purſuit; from a certain captivating attraction of beauty, diſcoverable in black women, as ſoon as cuſtom hath once reconciled the eye

to

to their colour; but principally from a warmth of conſtitution, which gives them the power of inſpiring and returning the moſt ardent tranſports. Thus they revenge themſelves, as it were, for the humiliating deſpondence of their condition, by the violent and immoderate paſſions which they excite in their maſters; nor do our ladies, in Europe, poſſeſs in a more exalted degree the art of waſting and running out large fortunes than the negro women. But thoſe of Africa have the ſuperiority over thoſe of Europe, in the real paſſion they have for the men who purchaſe them. The happy diſcovery and prevention of conſpiracies that would have deſtroyed all their oppreſſors by the hands of their ſlaves, hath been often owing to the faithful attachment of theſe negro women. The double tyranny of theſe unworthy uſurpers of the eſtates and liberty of ſuch a number of people, deſerved, doubtleſs, ſuch a puniſhment.

SECT. XXXVIII.

SLAVERY IS ENTIRELY REPUGNANT TO HUMANITY, REASON, AND JUSTICE.

WE will not here ſo far debaſe ourſelves as to enlarge the ignominious liſt of thoſe writers who devote their abilities to juſtify by *policy* what *morality condemns.*—In an age where ſo many *errors* are boldly laid open, it would be unpardonable to conceal any *truth* that is intereſting to humanity.—If whatever we have hitherto advanced hath ſeemingly tended only to alleviate the burden of ſlavery, the reaſon is, that it was firſt neceſſary to give ſome comfort to thoſe unhappy beings whom we cannot ſet free; and convince their oppreſſors that *they are cruel to the prejudice of their real intereſts.* But, in the mean time, until ſome conſiderable revolution ſhall make the evidence of this great truth felt, it may not be improper to purſue this object further.—We ſhall then firſt prove, that there is no reaſon of ſtate that can *authoriſe* ſlavery.—We ſhall

not

not be afraid to cite to the tribunal of reaſon and juſtice thoſe governments which tolerate this cruelty, or which even are not aſhamed to make it the baſis of their influence.

MONTESQUIEU could not prevail on himſelf to treat the queſtion concerning ſlavery in a ſerious light.—In reality it is degrading reaſon to employ it, I will not ſay in defending, but in refuting an abuſe ſo repugnant to it.—Whoever juſtifies ſo odious a ſyſtem, deſerves the utmoſt contempt from a philoſopher, and from the negro a ſtab with his dagger.

If you touch me, ſaid CLARISSA to LOVELACE, that moment I kill myſelf; I would ſay to him, who attempted to deprive me of my liberty, If you approach me, I will ſtab you.—In this caſe, I ſhould reaſon better than CLARISSA; becauſe, defending my liberty, or, which is the ſame thing, my life, for life cannot be enjoyed without it, is my primary duty; to regard that of another, is only a ſecondary conſideration; and if all other circumſtances were the ſame, the death of a criminal is more conformable to juſtice than that of an innocent perſon.

Will it be ſaid, that he who wants to make me a ſlave does me no injury, but that he only makes uſe of

his rights?—*Where are thoſe rights?—Who hath ſtamped upon them ſo ſacred a character as to ſilence mine?*—From NATURE I hold the right of ſelf-defence; NATURE, therefore, has not given to another the right of attacking me.—If thou thinkeſt thyſelf authoriſed to oppreſs me, becauſe thou art ſtronger and more ingenious than I am; do not complain if my vigorous arm ſhall plunge a dagger into thy breaſt; do not complain, when in thy tortured entrails thou ſhalt feel the pangs of death conveyed by poiſon into thy food: I am ſtronger and more ingenious than thou: fall a victim, therefore, in thy turn; and expiate the crime of having been an *oppreſſor*.

He who ſupports the ſyſtem of ſlavery is the enemy of the whole human race.—He divides it into two ſocieties of legal aſſaſſins; the oppreſſors and the oppreſſed.—It is the ſame thing as proclaiming to the world, if you would preſerve your life, inſtantly take away mine, for I want to have yours.

But the right of ſlavery, you ſay, extends only to the *right* of *labour* and the *privation* of *liberty*, not of *life*.—What! does not the maſter, who diſpoſes of my ſtrength at his pleaſure, likewiſe diſpoſe of my life, which depends on the voluntary and proper uſe of my faculties?—What is exiſtence to him, who has not the

diſpoſal

diſpoſal of it?—I CANNOT KILL MY SLAVE; *but I can make him bleed under the whip of an executioner, I can overwhelm him with ſorrows, drudgery and want; I can injure him every way, and ſecretly undermine the principles and ſprings of his life; I can ſmother, by ſlow puniſhments, the wretched infant which a negro woman carries in her womb.*—Thus the law protects the ſlave againſt a violent death, only to leave to my cruelty the right of making him die *by inches.*

Let us proceed a ſtep further: the right of ſlavery is that of perpetrating all ſorts of crimes: thoſe crimes which invade property; for ſlaves are not ſuffered to have any even in their own perſons: thoſe crimes which deſtroy perſonal ſafety: for the ſlaves may be ſacrificed to the caprice of his maſter: thoſe crimes which make modeſty ſhudder.—My blood riſes at theſe horrid images.—I deteſt, I abhor ſuch beings, victims and executioners;—and can *our laws* ſanction ſuch crimes?

Ye bands of Senators, whoſe ſuffrage ſways
Britannia's realms, whom either Ind obeys,
Who right the injured, and reward the brave,
Stretch your ſtrong arm, for ye have power to ſave.
Thron'd in the vaulted heart, his dread reſort,
Inexorable conſcience holds his court,
With ſtill ſmall voice the plot of guilt alarms,
Bares his marked brow, his lifted hand diſarms;

But,

But, wrapt in night, wi
He ſpeaks in thunder, w
Hear him, ye Senators!
HE WHO ALLOWS OF

Further, that I may diſ
timents on this ſubject—
man, ſitting at the foot of
lating the profit and loſſes of
pay of his aſſociates, and adj
proportion and diſtributive
not a very different charact
the ſlave-ſhip, who reclined
in his hand, ſettles the num
order to be made on the co
rately examines how many
him, in order to ſupport
him with ſlaves; how n
him aboard, how many wh
much each drop of blood
which each negro will wat
women will contribute mo
of her hands, or by thoſe
think you of this parallel
you and takes your money

your perſon.—The *one* invades the rights of ſociety, the *other*, thoſe of nature.—This certainly is the truth; and if there exiſted a legiſlature which authoriſed, which tolerated, even by its ſilence, ſuch enormities; if, moreover, occupied by idle or factious queſtions, it did not eternally denounce vengeance againſt the authors or inſtruments of this tyranny; if it made it criminal for a ſlave to break his bonds; if it did not expel the unjuſt judge who condemns the fugitive to death; if ſuch a ſtate exiſted, its miniſters deſerve * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *.

But theſe negroes, ſay they, are a race of men born for ſlavery; their diſpoſitions are narrow, treacherous, and wicked; they themſelves allow the ſuperiority of our underſtandings, and almoſt acknowledge the juſtice of our authority.

The minds of the negroes are contracted; becauſe ſlavery deſtroys all the ſprings of the ſoul.—They are wicked; but not ſufficiently ſo with you.—They are treacherous, becauſe they are under no obligation to ſpeak truth to their tyrants.—They acknowledge the ſuperiority of their underſtandings; becauſe we have abuſed their weakneſs.—I might as well ſay, that the Indians are a ſpecies of men born to be cruſhed to death;

death; becauſe there are fanatics among them, who throw themſelves under the wheels of their idol's car before the temple of Jaguernat.

But theſe negroes, it is further urged, were born ſlaves.—Barbarians, will you perſuade me, that a man can be the property of a ſovereign, a ſon the property of a father, a wife the property of her huſband, a domeſtic the property of a maſter, a negro the property of a planter?

But theſe ſlaves have ſold themſelves.—Could a man ever by compact, or by an oath, permit another to uſe and abuſe him?—If he aſſented to this compact, or confirmed it by an oath, it was in a tranſport of ignorance or folly; and he is releaſed from it, the moment that he either knows himſelf, or his reaſon returns.

But they had been taken in war.—What does this ſignify to you?—Suffer the conqueror to make what ill uſe he pleaſes of his own victory.—Why do you make yourſelves his accomplices.

But they were criminals condemned in their country to ſlavery.—Who was it that condemned them?—Do you not know, that in a deſpotic ſtate there is no criminal but the tyrant.

Dr.

LET US, THEREFORE, ENDEAVOUR TO MAKE THE LIGHT OF REASON AND THE SENTIMENTS OF NATURE TAKE PLACE OF THE BLIND FEROCITY OF OUR ANCESTORS.—LET US BREAK THE BONDS OF SO MANY VICTIMS OF OUR MERCENARY PRINCIPLES, SHOULD WE EVEN BE OBLIGED TO DISCARD A COMMERCE WHICH IS FOUNDED ONLY ON INJUSTICE, AND WHOSE OBJECT IS LUXURY.

But even this is not neceſſary.—There is no occaſion to give up thoſe conveniences which cuſtom hath ſo much endeared to us.—We may draw them from our colonies, without peopling them with ſlaves.—Theſe productions may be cultivated by the hands of *freemen*, and then be reaped without remorſe.

The iſlands may be filled with blacks, whoſe fetters have been broken. They will ſucceſſively clear the ſmall plantations given them, or which they have acquired by their induſtry.—Such of theſe unhappy men, as ſhould recover their independence, would live in quiet upon the ſame manual labours, that would be then free and advantageous to them.—The vaſſals of Denmark, who have lately been made free, have not abandoned their ploughs.

Is it then apprehended, that the facility of acquiring ſubſiſtence without labour on a ſoil naturally fertile, and of diſpenſing with the want of clothes, would plunge theſe men in idleneſs?—Why then do not the inhabitants of Europe confine themſelves to ſuch labours as are of indiſpenſible neceſſity?—Why do they exhauſt their powers in laborious employments which tend only to the ſenſual gratifications of a frivolous imagination?—There are amongſt us a thouſand profeſſions, ſome more laborious than others, which owe their origin to our inſtitutions.—Human laws have given riſe to a variety of fictitious wants, which otherwiſe would never have had an exiſtence.—By diſpoſing of every ſpecies of property according to their capricious inſtitutions, they have ſubjected an infinite number of people to the imperious will of their fellow-creatures, ſo far as even to make them empty our ordure for ſubſiſtence.—We have amongſt us beings, formed like ourſelves, who have conſented to inter themſelves under mountains, to furniſh us with metals and with copper, perhaps to poiſon us: why do we imagine that the negroes are leſs dupes and leſs fooliſh than the Europeans?

At the time that we gradually confer liberty on theſe unhappy beings as a reward for their œconomy, their good

good behaviour, and their induſtry, we muſt be careful to ſubject them to our laws and manners, and to offer them our ſuperfluities.—We muſt give them a country, give them intereſts to ſtudy, productions to cultivate, and an object adequate to their reſpective taſtes, and our colonies will never want hands, which being eaſed of their chains, will be more active and robuſt.

The ſlave-trade has been prohibited by our legiſlature. —Slavery, it is probable, will alſo ſoon be aboliſhed in our iſlands, by the ſame active benevolence of the beſt of men.—The whole country offer up their prayers for the ſucceſs of his laudable endeavour; and the univerſe muſt ever admire that patriot who has, with infinite perſeverance and difficulty, always ſtruggled to promote the welfare and happineſs of the human race.

How beautifully does COWPER expreſs himſelf on this ſubject—

I would not have a ſlave to till my ground,
To carry me, to fan me while I ſleep,
And *tremble* when I wake, for all the wealth
That ſinews bought and ſold have ever earn'd.
No: dear as freedom is, and in my heart's
Juſt eſtimation priz'd above all price,
I had much rather be myſelf the ſlave,
And wear the bonds, than faſten them on him.

WE HAVE NO SLAVES AT HOME, THEN WHY ABROAD?
AND THEY THEMSELVES ONCE FERRIED O'ER THE WAVE
THAT PARTS US, ARE EMANCIPATE AND LOOS'D.
SLAVES CANNOT BREATHE IN ENGLAND; IF THEIR LUNGS
RECEIVE OUR AIR, THAT MOMENT THEY ARE FREE;—
THEY TOUCH OUR COUNTRY, AND THEIR SHACKLES FALL.
THAT'S NOBLE, AND BESPEAKS A NATION PROUD
AND JEALOUS OF THE BLESSING. SPREAD IT THEN,
AND LET IT CIRCULATE THROUGH EV'RY VEIN
OF ALL YOUR EMPIRE, THAT WHERE BRITAIN'S POWER
IS FELT, MANKIND MAY FEEL HER MERCY TOO.

Thanks be to God, through the perſeverance of Mr. WILBERFORCE, this blot has been wiped away from the annals of our country.

THE END.

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